

























1 


House Calendar No. 207. 


63d Congress, ) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, I Report 
$d Session. f j No. 1176 . 



INVESTIGATION OF THE BEHAVIOR OF JUDGE EMORY 

SPEER. 


J 


October 2, 1914. —Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed. 


Mr. Webb, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 

following 

REPORT. 

[To accompany H. Res. 234.] 

The Committee on the Judiciary, having had under consideration 
House resolution 234, to authorize the Committee on the Judiciary 
to inquire into and concerning the official conduct of Emory Speer, 
United States district judge for the southern district of Georgia, 
beg to report to the House of Representatives that a subcommittee 
of the Committee on the Judiciary, consisting of Representatives 
Webb, FitzHenry, and Volstead, was appointed to take testimony in 
the investigation of the behavior of Judge Emory Speer, United 
States judge for the southern district of Georgia, and that the sub- 
committee sat in the cities of Macon and Savannah, Ga., and exam¬ 
ined numerous witnesses touching their knowledge of the alleged 
misbehavior of Judge Speer. The subcommittee made a report to 
the Committee on the Judiciary, which report is herewith submitted, 
setting forth in detail the charges against said judge and the evidence 
adduced under each charge, and concluding their report with a rec¬ 
ommendation that no further proceedings be had with reference to 
House resolution 234. 

The Committee on the Judiciary considered the evidence and the 
report and came to the conclusion that no further proceedmgs should 
be had with reference to said resolut .on, and the Committee on the 
Judiciary beg to report the same to the House and recommend that 
no further proceedings be had with reference to said resolution. 










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GOT 14 I§J4 





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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY. 


House of Representatives. 

SIXTY-THIRD CONGRESS. 


EDWIN Y. WEBB, North Carolina, Chairman. 


CHARLES C. CARLIN, Virginia. 
JOHN C. FLOYD, Arkansas. 

ROBERT Y. THOMAS, Jr., Kentucky. 
H. GARLAND DUPR6, Louisiana. 
WALTER I. McCOY, New Jersey. 
DANIEL J. McGILLICUDDY, Maine. 
JACK BEALL, Texas. 

JOSEPH TAGGART, Kansas. 

LOUIS FITZHENRY, Illinois. 

JOHN F. CAREW, New York. 


JOHN B. PETERSON, Indiana. 

JOHN J. MITCHELL, Massachusetts 

ANDREW J. VOLSTEAD, Minnesota 
JOHN M. NELSON, Wisconsin. 

DICK T. MORGAN, Oklahoma. 
HENRY G. DANFORTH, New York. 
GEORGE S. GRAHAM, Pennsylvania. 
WALTER M. CHANDLER, New York 


A. L. Quickel, Clerk. 


Mr. Webb, chairman of the special subcommittee of the Committee 
on the Judiciary, appointed to investigate charges of official mis¬ 
conduct on the part of Judge Emory Speer, judge of the United 
States Court for the Southern District of Georgia, submitted the 
following 

SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT. 


Mi\ Chairman, your special subcommittee, having had under con¬ 
sideration the following House resolution: 


[H. Res. 234, Sixty-third Congress, first session.] k 

Whereas on the sixteenth day of August, nineteen hundred and thirteen, the Attorney 
General of the United States transmitted to the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
House of Representatives a report of a special examiner designated by the Attorney 
General to investigate various charges of alleged misconduct of Emory Speer, a 
United States district judge for the southern district of Georgia, which charges had 
been brought to the attention of the Department of Justice; and 
Whereas the charges embodied in said report are accompanied by exhibits and affida¬ 
vits and are of such grave nature as to warrant further investigation; Therefore be it 
Resolved , That the Committee on the Judiciary be, and it is hereby, authorized to 
inquire into and concerning the official conduct of Emory Speer, United States dis¬ 
trict judge for the southern district of Georgia, touching his conduct in regard to the 
matters and things set forth in said report, and further to inquire whether said judge 




2 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


has been guilty of any misbehavior for which he should be impeached, and report to 
the House of Representatives the conclusions of the committee in respect thereto, 
with appropriate recommendations; and said committee is hereby authorized to send 
for persons and papers, administer oaths, take testimony, employ a clerk and stenog¬ 
rapher, if necessary, and to appoint and send a subcommittee whenever and wherever 
it may be necessary to take testimony for the use of said committee; the said sub¬ 
committee while so employed shall have the same powers in respect to obtaining tes¬ 
timony as are herein given to said Committee on the Judiciary, with a sergeant at 
arms, by himself or deputy, who shall serve the process of said committee and the 
process and orders of said subcommittee and shall attend the sittings of the same as 
ordered and as directed thereby; and that the expense of such investigation shall be 
paid out of the contingent fund of the House; that said Committee on the Judiciary 
or subcommittee thereof shall have power to sit during the sessions of this House or in 
vacation. 

Your special subcommittee made a trip to the southern district of 
Georgia, leaving Washington on the evening of Saturday, January 17, 
and arriving at Macon, the seat of the court, on the evening of the 
following day. Monday morning, January 19, at 10 o’clock, the sub¬ 
committee opened its public hearings in the United States court room 
in the Federal building at Macon, and examined witnesses who were 
caused to appear for the purpose of giving testimony. These hear¬ 
ings were held continuously throughout the w T eek, ending Saturday, 
January 24. The committee then went to Savannah, Ga., in said 
district, and examined witnesses during the entire of the following 
week, concluding its hearings there on Saturday, January 31. 

All of the hearings were public. Judge Speer attended each session 
of the committee and was accompanied by counsel, who were per¬ 
mitted to cross-examine the several witnesses. 

The subcommittee examined witnesses whose evidence tended to 
support the charges made against Judge Speer, as follows: 

1. That he had violated section 67 of the Judicial Code in allowing 
his son-in-law, Mr. A. H. Heyward, to be appointed and employed in 
offices and duties in his court. 

2. That he had violated the bankruptcy act in allowing compen¬ 
sation in excess of the provisions of that act to a trustee wdio was 
bis personal friend. 

3. That he had violated the laws as to drawing jurors. 

4. That he had violated the mandate of the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 

5. That he had been guilty of the oppressive and corrupt use of 
his official position in deciding cases unjustly in favor of his son-in-law. 

6. That he was guilty of unlawful and corrupt conduct in pro¬ 
ceedings in cases wherein his son-in-law had a contingent fee. 

7. That he was guilty of corrupt and unwarranted abuse of his 
official authority in using court officers who were paid by the Gov¬ 
ernment as private servants without rendering any service to the 
Government. 

8. That lie was guilty of oppressive and corrupt conduct in allowing 
the dissipation of assets of bankruptcy estates in the employment of 
unnecessary officials and the payment of excessive fees. 

9. That lie was guilty of oppressive and corrupt abuse in granting 
orders appointing receivers for property without notice to the owners 
and without cause, resulting in great loss to the parties. 

10. That he was guilty of oppressive and corrupt abuse of authority 
in refusing to allow the dismissal of litigation for the purpose of per¬ 
mitting relatives and favorites to profit by the receipts of large fees; 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 3 

11. That he was guilty of improper, if not a corrupt, abuse of 
authority in taking, or causing to be taken, money from the court 
funds for his private use; 

12. That he was guilty of oppressive conduct in entertaining mat¬ 
ters beyond his jurisdiction, fining parties, and the like; 

13. That he was guilty of unlawful and oppressive conduct in deny¬ 
ing the mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals; 

14. That he was guilty of oppressive conduct in allowing money to 
remain on deposit without interest in banks in which relatives or 
friends were interested; 

15. That he was guilty of allowing excessive fees to receivers for 
improper purposes and also corrupt conduct in raising the amount of 
fees allowed to others in order that his son-in-law might profit 
thereby; 

16. That he was guilty of attempted bribery of officials appointed 
to act as custodians; 

17. That he was guilty of oppressive conduct in unlawfully seizing 
and selling property; 

18. That he was guilty of the excessive use of drugs; and, 

19. That he was guilty of general unlawful and oppressive conduct 
for his own private ends. 

THE EVIDENCE UPON THE SEVERAL CHARGES. 

The following is a digest of the evidence taken and the facts 
adduced: 

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SECTION 67, JUDICIAL CODE, IN 

ALLOWING HIS SON-IN-LAW, A. H. HEYWARD, TO BE AP¬ 
POINTED TO AND EMPLOYED IN OFFICES AND DUTIES 

IN HIS COURT. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. R. COLTON LEWIS. 

(Pages 1263-1306.) 

Mr. Lewis stated he was a special agent employed by the Depart¬ 
ment of Justice, and had made a partial examination of the records 
of the court in the southern district of Georgia, relating to bankruptcy 
matters. He then identified a letter written to himself by Mr. J. N. 
Talley, and the letter was read into the record by the clerk. This 
letter is dated July 5, 1913, and in it Mr. Talley says that the fees 
received by him in all cases in the Federal court, including masters’ 
fees, were shared with Mr. A. H. Heyward, the son-in-law of the judge. 
Mr. Lewis was then requested to read the list of cases prepared show¬ 
ing the connection of Mr. A. H. Heyward, and his partner, Mr. J. N. 
Talley, with the bankruptcy cases. He then read into the record a 
list of cases showing the employment of either Mr. Heyward or Mr. 
Talley, or the firm of Talley & Heyward, as receiver, custodian or 
trustee, or attorneys for receiver, custodian or trustee. 

In addition to the oral evidence relative to fees allowed Mr. Hey¬ 
ward presented during this investigation, a partial list of the cases m 
which the firm of Judge Speer’s son-in-law received fees, nearly all 
of them being allowed by the court, has been prepared, and it shows 


4 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER, 


that Talley & Heyward received as attorneys, mostly in bankruptcy 
cases, acting for receiver and trustee, during the years from 1906 to 
1912, $13,600.42, and that they received as fees to Mr. J. N. Talley 
as standing master during the same period $9,126; also that they 
received as receiver and trustee $14,161.70 and fees to Mr. J. N. 
Talley as special master $1,886.50. The total amount of fees shown 
on this partial list is $38,794.62, and it should be noted that fees in 
some of the cases on the list are omitted. As the list was furnished 
by Mr. Talley it is not understood why the amount of the fees in 
these cases is not mentioned, unless it is because his records did not 
show the amount received. It has been stated heretofore that Mr. 
Heyward, Judge Speer’s son-in-law, received one-half of the earnings 
of this firm, including all the fees of Mr. Talley as standing master and 
special master. See Mr. Talley’s letter, Exhibit 18-A. The list of 
fees mentioned follows: 

Fees allowed Talley & Heyward July 1, 1906, to Dec. 31, 1912. 


Title of case. 


J. D. Shi, bankruptcy. 

J. D. Shi, bankruptcy. 

J. T. Flahive, bankruptcy. 

Macon Implement Co.,bankruptcy.. 

W. T. Lawson & Co., bankruptcy_ 

Memeger vs. Postal Tel. Co. 

O’Neil vs. Sou. Ry.. 

Taylor vs. Cabaniss. 

Dana Bragg Sta. Co., bankruptcy... 
Dublin Cooperage Co.,bankruptcy.. 

Meadows Co.,bankruptcy. 

Fishfish, bankruptcy. 

W. B. Stokes, bankruptcy. 

McRee Lumber Co., bankruptcy_ 

E. Becker, bankruptcy.. 

W. J. Locke, bankruptcy. 

W. J. Gilbert, bankruptcy.. 

L. C. Ricks Co., bankruptcy.. 

Sheehan Co.,bankruptcy. 

G. Chandler, bankruptcy. 

R. L. Cheek, bankruptcy. 

S. E. Lime & C. Co. vs. Bibb, etc_ 

Brown Wagon Co., bankruptcy. 

Jackson Stores, bankruptcy.. 

Rockledge Supply Co., bankruptcy.. 

Flahive vs. U. S. Casualty Co. 

Baggott & Co. vs. Harris.. 

Funstan Supply Co.,bankruptcy_ 

Crawford vs. Kirkland.. 

Henderson vs. Phillips.. 

Graves vs. Ashburn. 

Cit. Furn. Co.,bankruptcy.. 

W. J. Bush, bankruptcy.. 

Minona Min. Sprgs., bankruptcy_ 

Phillips, bankruptcy. 

Kilgore vs. Haygood. 

Northup vs. Col. Lumber Co. 

Gray & Mitchell, bankruptcy.. 

-vs. Phillips et al. 

McRee Bros. vs. A. C. L. 

J. Brown, bankruptcy. 

P. Orth, bankruptcy. 

Rebecca Lumber Co.,bankruptcy.., 

Porter vs. Swindell. 

A. D. Oliver, bankruptcy. 

Mize & Oliver, bankruptcy. 

Northrup vs. Clements. 

Northrup vs. Troup. 

Bainbridge Gro. Co. vs. A. C. L. 

-vs. City Bainbridge. 

U.S.vs. A.C. L. 

Brunswick Shingle Co., bankruptcy 

Goins & Rustin. 

Jesup Manf. Co., bankruptcy. 


Capacity. 

Amount. 

Attorney for receiver. 

§50.00 

Attorney for trustee. 

150.00 

Attorney for bankrupt. 

75.00 

Attorney for receiver. 

100.00 

Attorney for trustee. 

20.50 

Attorney for plaintiff. 

310.84 

_do..._T. 

100.00 

Attorney for defendant. 

Attorney for trustee. 

100. 00 

Attorney for bankrupt. 

112.50 

_do.....*. 

128. 75 

Attorney for trustee. 

62.50 

Attorney for bankrupt. 

124.50 

Attorney for trustee.*.. 

125.00 

Attorney for bankrupt. 

145.00 

_do. 

350. 00 

Attorney for trustee.;. 

155.00 

Attorney for bankrupt. 

75.00 

_do.....*.. 

69.55 

Attorney for trustee. 

100. 00 

Attorney for trustee and receiver. 

300.00 

Attorney for trustee and receiver. 

Attorney for trustee. 

1,700.00 
350.00 

Attorney for bankrupt. 

25.00 

Attorney for plaintiff. 


50.00 

Attorney for receiver. 

150.00 

Attorney for plaintiff. 





Attorney for bankrupt.about.. 

Attorney for bankrupt. 

100.00 
50.00 

Attorney for trustee*.. 

100. 00 

Attorney for receiver. 

100. 00 

Attorney for plaintiff. 

50.00 


Attorney for trustee. 

275.00 

Attorney for receiver. 

2,500.00 

Attornej*for plaintiff. 

Attorney for trustee. 

150.00 

Attorney for trustee and receiver. 

200. 00 
516.67 

Attorney for receiver. 

350.00 

Attorney for trustee. 

1,000.00 

Attorney for creditors. 

162.50 

Attorney for plaintiff. 







Attorney for defendant. 


Attorney for trustee. 

50.00 

Attorneys for trustee and receiver. 

Attorneys for trustee. 

125.00 
200.00 


















































































































CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 5 
Fees allowed Talley & Heyward July 1 , 1906, to Dec. SI, 1912— Continued. 


Title of case. 

Capacity. 

Amount. ; 

Hazel Hurst Mercantile Co... 

Watson vs. Hester. 

Attorneys for trustee and receiver. 

Attorneys for plaintiff 

$250.00 

Armour Fert. Wks. vs. Hinson Bro. 


i 

Bell vs. Burton. 



Southern Elec. Co., bankruptcy. 

Attorneys for receiver. . 

1,125.00 

225.00 

H. C. Allen, bankruptcy. 

Tipton vs. Smith.. 

Attorneys for trustee and creditors.... 
Attorneys for plaintiff 

R. A. Williams, bankruptcy. 

Beach Mfg. Co., bankruptcy. 

Attorneys for creditors and trustee.... 

300.00. 

T. A. Scott, bankruptcy. 

Attorneys for creditors .. 

362.11 
200.00 
300.00 

Standard & Son, bankruptcy. 

Attorneys for trustee .. 

Perkins Mfg. Co.. 

Attorneys receiver 

Powell vs. Ins. Co. 

Attorneys. 

Total. 


13,620.42 




List of cases referred to J. N. Talley as standing master, one-half of compensation being 

received by A. H. Heyward. 


Title of case. 

B. & L. Mfg. Co. vs. Blanchard. $156 

Chandler Land Corp. vs. Baxter Co. 500 

Crawford vs. McCook. 450 

A. C. L. R. R. Co. vs. Gulf Line Ry.. 

H. H. Tift vs. Southern Ry. 4, 000 

Bid well vs. Huff. 750 

A. C. L. Ry. vs. Jackson Brown. 


Harnsberger vs. Kilpatrick. ; 

J. J. Oliver vs. S. A. & N. Ry. 3, 000 

Henry vs. Harris. 

Ayres vs. Ocmulgee Land Imp. Co. 270 


$9,126 

List of cases in which J. N. Talley was appointed receiver or elected trustee or both, one• 
half of fees being received by A. H. Heyward. 


Title of case. 


Capacity. 


Amount. 


News Publishing Company. 

W. H. Tinker, bankruptcy. 

R. M. Butts, bankruptcy. 

L. F. Haskins, bankruptcy. 

P. H. Maddox, bankruptcy. 

Abbeville Trading Company. 

Telfair Mfg. Company, bankruptcy. 

T. S. Yates, bankruptcy. 

Jaudon Furniture Co. 

Southern Cotton Mills. 

R. H. Plant, bankruptcy. 

Do. 

Minona Mineral Springs Co. 

J. C. Tracy Co., bankruptcy. 


Trustee and receiver, 

.do. 

.do. 

Trustee. 

Trustee and receiver 

Trustee. 

Trustee and receiver, 

Trustee. 

Trustee and receiver 

Trustee. 

Receiver. 

Trustee. 

Receiver. 

_do. 


$ 88.58 
20.08 
552.97. 
52.00f 
83.84 
105.66 
289.94 
190. 40 
120.92 
440.00 
500. OOi 
1,764. 58' 
58.26 
300.00 


4,577.07; 
























































































6 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


List of cases referred to J. N. Talley as special master to fix fees. 

Title of case. 

McKenna Shoe Co., bankruptcy. $50. 00 

Turner & Company... 25. 00 

D. Lamar Turner. 35. 00 

B. K. Cross. 10.00 

E. O. Williams. . 25.00 

Erie Lumber Company. 120. 00 

W. A. Baker. 50. 00 

E. J. Leben. 15. 00 

W. B. Lewis. 15.00 

C. H. Harper. 35.00 

J. J. Parks... 30.00 

Hataway. 55. 00 

Jesse McCormick. 15. 00 

Bibb Plumbing & Heating Co. 37. 50 

J. D. Turner. 30. 00 

Rountree, Knight & Coleman. 72. 65 

G. W. Twilly. 40.00 

M. C. Peavy. 40. 00 

Stewart Taylor Co. 40. 00 

B. G. Knight. 20.00 

Rhodes Brothers... 15. 00 

J. J. Toole, bankruptcy. 20. 00 

Culpepper & Cochran. 15. 00 

Fenn Brothers. 50. 00 

McArthur Sons Co. 75. 00 

D. L. Barnhill. 25. 00 

Robinson & Thomas. 10. 00 

J. A. Ansley. 25. 00 

J. B. Roberts. 20.00 

Harrison Brothers. > _ 30. 00 

W. L. Cook. 10. 00 

Taylor Shoe Company. 75. 00 

D. L. Barnhill. 20. 00 

Spivey Trading Company. 35. 00 

Tysor Cheatham Mercantile Co. 25. 00 

Winebrew Company. 325. 00 

C. I. Patterson. 20. 00 

W. W. Jackson. 25. 00 

Wiley Williams. 15. 00 

E. Hochman. 25.00 

W. S. Bell & Son. 50. 00 

H. B. McDaniel. 25.00 

H. Burns. 25. 00 

W. A. Hill. 40. 00 

Joseph Burns. 25. 00 

C. T. Bailey. 15.00 

Garfield & Combs Co. 10.00 

Birch Hardware Co. 50. 00 

J. L. Bostick. 35. 00 

J. R. King. 15. 00 

Dunn Bros. 19. 00 

J. R. Robbins. 25.00 

Outler Mercantile Company...;. 20. 00 

H. W. Elkins. 25. 00 

C. B. Coleman. 20.00 

E. B. Harris. 85. 00 

Pepsicola Company. 18. 00 

Abe Lesser.. 40.00 

H. H. Chandler, bankruptcy. 15. 00 


1,886. 50 






























































CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 7 


List of cases in which A. H. Heyward was appointed receiver or elected trustee or both, 

from July 1 , 1905, to Decejnber 13, 1913. 


Title of case. , 

Capacity. 

Amount. 

F. H. Brently. 

Trustee_ 

$206.00 
350.00 
512.88 
109. 71 
80. 00 

B. Mandle & Son. 

Receiver_ 

Hines & Vaughn. 

Receiver and trustee 

F. W. Shelton. 


J. T. Taggart. 

Receiver.. 

W. L. Moye. 

Trustee_ 

Marx Zarks. 

Trustee and receiver 

53. 34 

I. W. Garner.. 

Trustee_ 

W. J. Braswell. 

Trustee and receiver. 

260.00 
1,000.00 
38. 26 
375.00 
200.00 

C. Watchel Bros. 


Beale Bros. Co. 

Receiver. 

A. W. Drew. 

Receiver and trustee. 

Eastman Supply Company. 

Receiver. 

Eastman Supply Company. 

Trustee. 

J. T. Croon.. 

Receiver.. 

250. 00 
300. 00 

I. A. Adams. 


r. A. Adams. 

Trustee.... 

G. W. Wheatley. 

Receiver. 

800. 00 
500. 00 
302. 20 
81.15 
39. 73 
138. 95 
31.06 
104. 26 
18. 50 
33. 39 
127. 86 
72.00 
25. 40 
81.62 
115. 37 
1,000.00 
230. 00 
460. 00 
150.00 
400.00 
300. 00 
2*4. 75 
106.00 
400.00 

W. H. Lee. 


Winn Johnson Company. 

.do. 

Winn Johnson Company. 

Trustee. 

Orr Smith Grocery Co... 

R eceiver... 

Orr Smith Grocery Company. 

Trustee. 

R. Levison. 

Receiver_ 

R. Levison. 

Trustee.... 

L. S. McClendon. 

Custodian. 

W. B. Outler. 

Receiver. 

W. B. Outler. 

Trustee. 

Hyman Slater. 

.do. 

C. C. Cox. 

Receiver. 

C. C. Cox. 

Trustee.... 

Union Dry Goods Company. 

.do. 

M. A. Baker Company L.. 

Receiver. 

M. A. Baker Company. 

Trustee. 

J. Champagne...... 

Trustee and receiver. 

H. C. Gilmore. 

Receiver. 

W. 0. Willard. 

Receiver and trustee. 

Fain & Weaver. 

Receiver. 

Rouse & Williams. 

Trustee. 

J. F. Register. 

.do. 

Bainbridge Trading Company. 

Receiver. 

Total. 


9,584.63 

Grand total. 


38,794.62 




Mr. Talley in preparing this list has omitted the fees received in 
26 cases, and as the list is furnished in defense of Judge Speer in 
answer to the charge that his relatives and favorites have profited 
largely from the court business through his influence, it is probably 
fair to assume that the fees in the cases which Mr. Talley has failed 
to mention in the list were substantial. It is also noted that the list 
furnished by Mr. Talley does not include all the cases reported by the 
examiner of the Department of Justice, and the examination made 
by that official was limited and covered only two to three years. It 
therefore seems conservative to state that the fees received by this 
firm during the six years covered by the list furnished probably 
amount to at least $50,000, and it should be noted that by far the 
greatest proportion of these fees were received upon appointment 
or through employment which came about only through the action 
of the court, though indirectly. 

In this connection it should be noted that Mr. Heyward, the judge’s 
son-in-law, is a man of such limited ability that during ail of the six 
years of his connection with the firm of Talley & Heyward he had 
never tried a case in court, and the testimony of several witnesses 


































































































8 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

was to the effect that he was not able to prepare a case for trial in 
the court of a justice of the peace. 

The judge makes explanation in his reply of the manner in which 
Mr. Heyward received the appointments mentioned, showing that 
they were made by the referee in bankruptcy and not by himself. 
He also endeavors to show that this action is not in contravention of 
section 67 of the Judicial Code, which provides as follows: 

No person shall be appointed to or employed in any office or duty in any court who 
is related by affinity or consanguinity within the degree of first cousin to the judge of 
such court; 

by arguing that the referee is a judge and holds a separate court, 
and that the provisions of the act do not prevent the employment of 
persons appointed in bankruptcy cases by the referee who are related 
to the judge of the court. 

This contention is quite technical. The referees are appointed by 
the judge. They are simply officers created by him and, of course, 
are responsible to him for all their acts. A receiver or custodian 
appointed in this manner in bankruptcy cases is, in the opinion of the 
subcommittee, an employee or officer of the court, and the argument 
that they are not subject to the provisions of section 67 of the Judicial 
Code appears to be quite strained. All the duties of these officials, 
including the referee, are connected with the court business. It 
would be strange, indeed, if the section of the Judicial Code in ques¬ 
tion should be so construed as to place the referee as a separate court, 
and so defeat the manifest intention of the act, which is to prevent 
improper influence of family relationship in the administration of 
justice. The employment of Mr. Heyward as receiver and custodian 
in such cases is in violation of the spirit, certainly, if not the letter of 
the act. 

In this connection attention is called to the fact that the judge’s 
son-in-law has always shared equally in the fees of the standing 
master of the court as well as in his fees as special master. By sharing 
these fees Mr. Heyward is again brought within the spirit of the 
provisions of section 67 of the Judicial Code, and it can not be argued 
in this instance that the appointments are made by the referee, as 
Judge Speer made the appointments, Mr. Talley as standing master 
and special master, and it would hardly be argued that he was not 
aware that his son-in-law was sharing in the fees received from these 
appointments. The fees allowed to standing masters and special 
masters during the life at the partnership of Talley & Heyward 
amounted to about $11,000 and one-half of this amount went direct 
to Judge Speer’s son-in law as a result of his appointment of Mr. 
Talley as master. These facts appear to show a clear violation, at 
least, of the spirit of the statute mentioned. 

Judge Speer denies in his answer (257-264) that he had ever ap¬ 
pointed Mr. Heyward to any position or that he had suggested to any 
referee that such appointment should be made. In connection with 
this statement it is noted there was testimony presented during the 
investigation to the effect that Judge Speer had intimated to Referee 
W. L. Lane that his son-in-law should be appointed to such positions, 
and that this intimation was acted upon by Mr. Lane. 

Attention is also invited to the letter‘of Judge Speer to Referee 
Alexander Proudfit, appearing on page 259 of the judge’s brief, 
which reads as follows: 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 9 

Highlands, N. C., June 28, 1905. 

My Dear Aleck: With regard to your inquiry as to Hasell, you had best look at 
the statute and determine for yourself. I haven’t got it here. Certainly it would 
seem that if the trustee thought proper to employ him as an attorney he ought not to 
be barred from the privilege of earning his livelihood because he is my son-in-law. I, 
however, have never attempted to control trustees in the selection of counsel and 
would certainly not do so in this case. Of course I will be very grateful for anything 
we can properly do for him. * * * 

Emory Speer. 

This letter was written in reply to a communication from Mr. 
Proudfit, asking the judge whether there would be any impropriety 
in appointing Mr. Heyward custodian Or receiver, and, while the 
judge’s answer is couched in courteous language, it is very plain 
from hi$ words that he wishes his son-in-law to receive the assistance 
of the referee. 

It is also true that the firm of Judge Speer’s son-in-law has been 
employed as attorneys for trustees and receivers in many cases, 
and as there is a rule of court requiring such officials to first obtain 
authority from court before employing counsel, it is apparent that 
Judge Speer must have consented to if not authorized the employ¬ 
ment of his son-in-law in these cases. 

The list of cases in which Talley & Heyward received fees, showing 
the capacity in which they were employed and, in the majority of 
cases, the fees received by them, will give an idea as to the extent 
of this practice of employing the son-in-law and his division of 
fees with Judge Speer’s appointees, the total amounting to $38,794.62. 
This sum does not represent all of the fees received by the firm 
from this source. When legal reputation and lack of experience 
and ability of Mr. A. H. Heyward is considered in connection 
with the fact that Mr. Talley was Judge Speer’s secretary for a 
number of years before this partnership was formed, it becomes 
plain that this large amount of money was received by them almost 
entirely through their relationship to the court. 

It is noted that in Judge Speer’s brief he presents figures showing 
the assets in bankruptcy cases, the expenses of administering estates, 
and the percentage which the expenses bear to the assets, for the 
several judicial districts represented by the members of the Judiciary 
Committee of the House of Representatives, covering the years 
from 1899 to 1912, inclusive, except 1905, which is omitted. He 
endeavors to show from these figures that the expenses of adminis¬ 
tering bankruptcy estates fin his district compare well with like 
expenses in the other districts, in spite of a large amount of testimony 
to the effect that his son-in-law and others have received excessive 
fees from bankruptcy cases. 

It is submitted, however, that a comparison of general averages 
such as is presented by him is of little value as a defense to the 
charge that his son-in-law has profited by relationship to the judge. 
The conditions and circumstances under which the assets in bank¬ 
ruptcy cases are administered are so varied and the classes of busi¬ 
ness differ to such an extent, that a comparison of this kind carries 
little weight. In a district such as the southern district of Georgia, 
which is almost entirely rural, with few large cities, the nature of 
the business coming into the bankruptcy court is such that large 
fees can be received in but comparatively few cases. 


10 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


It is evident, therefore, that the conditions in each judicial district 
are so different that no proper comparison can be made. 

In submitting these figures, however, the judge is unfortunate, as 
he has proved by them that the expenses of his district during the 
years his son-in-law has been connected with the court have been 
two and a half times as large as they were before his son-in-law was 
receiving the fees from this source. 

The following table showing the expenses in his district from 
1899 to 1906, as compared with the years after Mr. Heyward was 
connected with the court business; that is, from 1906 to 1912 will 
demonstrate that fact: 


Southern district of Georgia. 


Year. 

Assets. 

Expense. 

Percentage. 

1899. 

$543,166.20 
319,401.53 
113,939.58 
95,121.75 
158,984.21 
327,500.24 
235,773.27 
183,316.63 
244,456.15 
314,070.04 
1,206,718. 78 
284,209.36 
364,090.74 

$9,582.74 
2,041.16 
8,881.80 
12,101.42 
11,054.44 
12,501.55 
22,773.00 
17,537.33 
27,673.91 
38,552.98 
79,387.39 
62,336. 75 
71,095.12 

0.017 

1900. 

.006 

1901. 

.077 

1902. 

.126 

1903. 

.069 

1904. 

.038 

1906. 

.096 

1907. 

.095 

1908. 

.113 

1909. 

.122 

1910. 

.065 

1911. 

.219 

1912. 

.195 


General average for years 1899 to 1904 before Mr. Heyward was connected with the court, 0.056. 
General average for years 1906 to 1912 when Mr. Heyward was connected with the court, 0.129. 


These figures show that the expenses of administering the bank¬ 
ruptcy courts in the district for the years 1899 to 1905, when the 
judge’s son-in-law was not connected with the courts, amounted to 
only 5J per cent of the assets, and that during the years 1906 to 1912, 
inclusive, when the judge’s son-in-law was enjoying the patronage 
of the court, the expenses were 12.9 per cent of the assets, or nearly 
two and one-half times as much as they were before Mr. Heyward 
was receiving these fees. 

ALLEGED OPPRESSIVE AND CORRUPT ABUSE OF AUTHORITY 
IN GRANTING ORDERS APPOINTING RECEIVERS FOR PROP¬ 
ERTY WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE OWNERS AND WITHOUT 
CAUSE. 


CASE OF HECHT v. JOSEPH DRY GOODS CO. 

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE S. JONES 
(Pages 1309-1315.) 

Mr. Jones testified that he was an attorney practicing in the Federal 
court in the southern district of Georgia; that in the year of 1902 he 
was employed to represent the defendant in the above-mentioned 
case; that Judge Speer appointed a receiver without notice for about 
$6,000 in money and $60,000 worth of merchandise of the Joseph 
Dry Goods Co., on a bill filed by Hecht, alleging that Joseph was 
indebted to him for about $2,000; that application was made for 





















CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. ll 

appeal from the appointment of a receiver to Judge Pardee, of the 
circuit court of appeals, who requested that the application be made 
to Judge Speer, as he was sensitive on the subject; that the hearing 
was then had before Judge Speer, who stated he would render his 
decision that night at his home, and asked the attorneys to meet 
there at 7 o’clock, stating that before rendering his decision he wished 
the attorneys to make an effort to settle the matter; that the attor¬ 
neys assembled at Judge Speer’s house and that the judge endeavored 
to persuade them to settle, and stated he would allow a fee from the 
estate to the attorneys involved, in case a settlement was madej 
that during the effort to persuade the attorneys to settle Judge Speer 
made the following statement: “* * * Now, you want to take 

the matter into your hands and settle it, because if you don’t I will 
be compelled to write an opinion in the case w T hich will ruin Joseph 
in the business world.” That the next day he (Jones) again applied 
to Judge Pardee for an appeal, which w^as granted and a supersedeas 
bond fixed; that he presented the papers to the receiver appointed 
by Judge Speer, who declined to pay over the money held; that the 
attorneys for the plaintiff appeared before Judge Speer and took 
the records in the case away from the court so that the clerk could 
not get the appeal papers perfected before the expiration of the time 
limit; that he again presented the matter to Judge Pardee and 
explained the facts, stating that the receiver had refused to recognize 
the supersedeas; that Judge Pardee thereupon passed another order 
calling on the receiver to show cause w*hy he should not be attached 
for contempt, and calling on the attorney for the plaintiff to show 
cause wiiy he should not be attached for contempt for carrying the 
papers out of the jurisdiction; that Judge Speer wrote an opinion 
which w r as published in the Macon Telegraph which reflected upon 
him (Jones), stating that he had misled the judge; that he then 
prepared an affidavit to meet this opinion and filed it with the circuit 
court of appeals; that the circuit court of appeals upon hearing the 
case reversed Judge Speer. 

Mr. Jones stated further (pp. 1324-1332) that in this case Judge 
Speer was wholly without jurisdiction and that the court of appeals 
so held upon argument of the appeal; that he considered the 
conduct of Judge Speer as arbitrary and harsh; that Judge Speer 
has made it a practice to appoint receivers without notice, and this 
action has been criticised severely by the court of appeals in several 
cases, naming the Recco Mining Co. case, the Bishop case, the Joseph 
Dry Goods case, and the Frank R. Mann case, and that the judge 
continued to appoint receivers without notice after this criticism. 

The action of Judge Speer in appointing a receiver without notice 
to take charge of $6,000 in cash and $60,000 in merchandise upon a 
claim of less than $2,000 when no allegations of insolvency or other 
sufficient cause w r ere made, appears to go beyond the bounds of rea¬ 
sonable discretion. It is thought proper to quote from the language 
of the circuit court of appeals in reversing Judge Speer in this case 
(120 Fed. Rep., p. 760): 

If the decree when rendered would be collectible, there is no necessity for seizing 
property for its satisfaction in advance of its rendition. The appointment of a receiver 
is an extraordinary remedv and can not be properly resorted to unless a necessity for 
it is shown. It follows that in a case like this a receiver should not be appointed 
unless the insolvency of the defendant debtor is shown. The court should not resort 


12 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


to eo harsh a measure when it is not alleged that the defendant has no property subject 
to execution with which to satisfy the decree when rendered; there having been no 
allegation or proof of the insolvency of the defendant against whom the decree for the 
debt is sought. It was not shown to be necessary for the court to take possession of the 
stock of goods and money for the purpose of making it available to the plaintiff to 
satisfy a decree he might obtain. 

It does not appear that this warning from the court of appeals 
had any effect upon Judge Speer. 

The judge appears to base his action in appointing the receiver 
without notice upon the prayer in. the bill. If all courts took the 
property of the owners away from them without notice or opportunity 
to show the fallacy of the complaint against them, merely upon such 
bald statements without investigating them, as appears to have been 
his practice if the testimony of many of the prominent attorneys of 
southern Georgia is worth anything, all property rights would be 
exceedingly insecure. 

As a matter of fact, however, the bill itself did not allege sufficient 
cause for appointing the receiver without notice and the court of ap¬ 
peals held that Judge Speer therefore acted without jurisdiction. 

BEACH MANUFACTURING CO. CASE. 

TESTIMONY W. W. LAMBDIN. 

(Pages 2253-2273.) 

Mr. Lambdin testified that he was an attorney by profession and 
had practiced in the southern district of Georgia for 25 years; that 
he was of counsel for the company in the bankruptcy proceedings 
against the Beach Manufacturing Co. which were instituted March 13, 
1913. That immediately after the resignation of Mr. Isaac as referee 
in bankruptcy the firm of Isaac & Heyward was formed and that 
shortly after that, in rapid succession, three very important firms in 
his section of the State were brought into the bankruptcy court; 
namely, the Beach Manufacturing Co., the Gray Lumber Co. and the 
L. Carter Co.; that the petitions against these companies were filed by 
the firm of Isaac & Heyward and while they had other legal counsel 
associated with them Mr. Isaac took the lead in all the cases and 
handled them before the court. That the filing of these cases, which 
involved very large property interests, sent a shock through the entire 
commercial world of south Georgia; that receivers were appointed in 
these cases by Judge Speer, who retained the firm of his son-in-law, 
Isaacs & Heyward, as their counsel and the impression got abroad 
that these suits were filed with the cooperation of Judge Speer; that 
there was a general feeling of uneasiness and unrest and that the 
apprehension spread through the commercial world; nobody felt 
safe, and every concern which had past due bills thought it was marked 
for the next victim; that he was employed as counsel in all three of 
the cases mentioned. 

Mr. Lambdin then testified relative to the Beach Manufacturing 
Co. case that Judge Speer without notice, in an ex parte hearing, 
appointed a permanent receiver for the company; that he did not 
even issue a rule requiring the company to show cause why the re¬ 
ceiver should not be made permanent, but made the permanent 
order on the original petition; that the attorneys for the company 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 13 

filed an answer denying any acts of bankruptcy and denying insol¬ 
vency, and asked for a jury trial. That the attorneys also filed a 
petition asking for the vacation of the receivership, stating there was 
no necessity for it, that it was granted ex parte without a hearing, 
etc. That Judge Speer then issued a rule nisi against the attorneys 
who filed the suit against the company requiring them to show cause 
why the receivership should not be dissolved and the matter came 
on for hearing at Macon, Ga., April 3, 1913. That during the course 
of the hearing Judge Speer once or twice intimated to counsel that 
they should settle the case and finally said to Mr. L. A. Wilson, one 
of the attorneys for the company, that the case looked bad indeed 
for the defendant and apparently he had decided to continue the 
receiver in charge. The counsel for the company, among whom 
were Hon. Charles G. Edwards, M. C., and Judge V. E. Padgett, then 
conferred on the subject and decided that as Judge Speer had appar¬ 
ently made up his mind to continue the receiver in charge it would 
serve no good purpose to continue the hearing, and they therefore 
stated to the judge that the motion to dismiss the receiver would be 
withdrawn. That when the order dismissing the motion was drawn 
it was decided by consent of the counsel to include in it a provision 
by which the receiver might issue certificates for the purpose of bor¬ 
rowing $1,000. That Mr. Isaac in drawing up the order included a 
paragraph reciting that all parties consented to the receivership, 
and that the attorneys for the company objected to this, as they had 
not consented to the receivership, and had the provision stricken from 
the order. That when the order was finally completed and signed 
by Judge Speer it had no provision in it reciting that the receivership 
was consented to by the defendant. That when he next saw the order 
it was upon the trial of the main case held at Savannah, Ga., in Sep¬ 
tember, 1913, and that he noticed the words “by consent” apparently 
in the handwriting of Judge Speer at the bottom of the order. That 
these words were very material, as they did not speak the truth and 
would have a material bearing on the question of expenses of the re¬ 
ceivership; that on the trial of the case the jury found the Beach 
Manufacturing Co. to be solvent and the petition was dismissed; 
that the question as to the expense of the receivership then arose and 
that of course the insertion of the words “by consent’’ at the bottom 
of the order in question was very material. That these expenses 
were very heavy, one item alone, that of the fee of an accountant ap¬ 
pointed by Judge Speer to go over the books of the company, amount¬ 
ing to $3,500; that the receiver through his lawyer applied for fee of 
$5,000 and the other expenses of the receivership were equally heavy. 

Mr. Lambdin further testified that about a year previous to the 
time when the bankruptcy petition in question was filed against the 
Beach Manufacturing Co. by Messrs. Isaac & Heyward, as attorneys 
for creditors, a similar petition was filed against this company by 
other attorneys and the company having retained Talley & Heyward 
to defend them, it was able to have the case dismissed. Mr. Lambdin 
then proceeded to explain the injury done to the Beach Manufac¬ 
turing Co. during the year in which it was held by the court in the 
custody of a receiver, stating that it had been nearly ruined. He 
testified further that in all three of the cases mentioned by him, 
Isaacs & Heyward being attorneys for creditors, necessarily their 
fees were contingent upon their success in having the concerns 


14 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

adjudged bankrupt, as they would get a fee out of the estate in case 
of adjudication, and if there was no adjudication they would get no 
fee out of the estate. That on account of this fact Judge Speer was 
disqualified in all of these cases, and yet he presided in all three of 
them in the proceedings which took place before the investigation 
against him was started; that the attorneys for the companies dis¬ 
cussed the question of disqualifying Judge Speer, but were advised 
that he would take it as a mortal affront and might put them in jail, 
and therefore they were afraid to suggest to him that he was dis¬ 
qualified. He stated he did not‘believe there was a lawyer in the 
United States who would dispute the proposition that Judge Speer 
was disqualified from trying these cases. 

Mr. Lambdin was then handed the order which he mentioned in 
his testimony, beaiing the two words wiitten at the bottom in ink 
appaiently in Judge Speer’s handwiiting, while the balance of the 
order is wiitten on the typewriter. He again testified that the order 
was not a consent order, except as to the authority to borrow $1,000. 
Mr. Lambdin then read the order into the record (p. 2267), and latei 
stated that the first he knew of the words “by consent” being written 
on the order was about September 15, 1913, while the order itself was 
dated April 4, 1913. He stated further that the jury in passing upon 
the question as to the solvency of the Beach Manufacturing Co. found 
the assets to be about $350,000 or $400,000, while the indebtedness 
of the company bonded and otherwise, amounted to $270,000. He 
testified further that the receiver for the Beach Manufacturing Co., 
Mr. Moss, employed the firm of Isaac & Heyward to represent him. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. V. E. PADGETT. 

(Testimony, 2323-2350.) 

Mr. Padgett testified that he was an attorney by profession and 
had practiced in the southern district of Georgia since 1896; that he 
was of counsel for the defense in the Beach Manufacturing Co. case; 
that in the spring of 1912 a bankruptcy petition was filed against 
this company and the appointment of a receiver asked, and that 
Judge Speer refused to appoint the receiver ex parte, but issued a 
rule nisi requiring the company to show cause; that he, as general 
counsel for the company, employed the firm of Talley & Heyward to 
assist him and immediately prepared to defend the company; that 
when the rule nisi was heard the judge refused to appoint a receiver 
and dismissed the petition against the company; that shortly there¬ 
after Messrs. Isaac & Heyward filed a petition in bankruptcy against 
the same company and Judge Speer, without notice, on an ex parte 
hearing, appointed a permanent receiver for the company and took 
its property away from it; that he and the other counsel of the com¬ 
pany prepared a petition asking for the dismissal of the receiver and 
also in answer to the bankruptcy petition denied insolvency and 
asked for a jury trial; that during the hearing of the motion to dis¬ 
miss the receiver, Judge Speer suggested to one of the company’s 
attorneys—Mr. L. A. Wilson—that they were making a poor showing 
and that it appeared to be necessary to continue the receiver; that 
thereupon Mr. Wilson reported to the other attorneys, and after a 
consultation they decided to withdraw their motion; that Judge 
Speer at that time promised to give them an immediate tried of the 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 15 

question of solvency; that he appointed as receiver a Mr. Moss and 
before Mr. Moss had even visited the property or been near it, 
authorized the employment of Isaac & Heyward to represent the 
said receiver; that when the order for the dismissal of the motion to 
vacate the receivership was drawn Hon. Charles Edwards, who was 
also of counsel in the case, suggested that they had better see the 
order which was being drawn, and that they then approached Mr. 
Isaac who had the order in his hand, and both he and Mr. Edwards 
read it; that the order had then been signed by Judge Speer and that 
the words “by consent” were not on it. Mr. Padgett then recited 
the circumstances relative to the administration of the estate pend¬ 
ing the trial of its solvency by jury, which had been, requested, and 
stated that Judge Speer made orders relative to the cutting of tim¬ 
ber, etc., which were causing the property to be wasted, and that 
finally the question of disqualifying him on account of his son-in-law 
having a contingent fee in the case, was discussed; that there was 
considerable publicity given the matter, and that finally Judge Speer 
wrote a letter to Judge Pardee, of the circuit court of appeals, dis¬ 
qualifying himself, after which Judge Newman, of the northern dis¬ 
trict of Georgia, was designated to sit on the case; that in spite of 
this designation Judge Speer continued to pass administrative orders 
in the case and authorized the receiver to cut up valuable timber 
into crossties; that after considerable unpleasantness and some show 
of feeling on the part of Judge Speer he was persuaded to recuse 
himself in all matters relative to the case. 

Mr. Padgett further testified that the case finally came to trial and 
the company was found to be solvent. He then testified in detail 
with regard to. the injury done to the Beach Manufacturing Co. by 
being held in the court so long a time. In answer to a question from 
the chairman, Mr. Padgett stated he was quite positive that the order 
about which Mr. Lambdin testified was examined by himself and 
Congressman Edwards after it had been signed by Judge Speer and 
that the words “by consent” were not on it, but that when the com¬ 
pany had been declared solvent by the jury and the question of costs 
arose, they were dumbfounded to find the words “by consent” at 
the bottom of the order, and that he and Mr. W. W. Lambdin and 
Mr. Edwards discussed the matter and agreed that the words “by 
consent” were in the handwriting of Judge Speer, and each stated 
that they were not on the order when they had examined it after it 
was signed by the judge. 

Mr. Padgett then identified signed .statements marked “Exhibits 
31-B,” “31-C,” and “31-D” given by him to the agent of the Depart¬ 
ment of Justice during the investigation, and they were placed in the 
custody of the clerk to the committee. Mr. Padgett then testified, 
in response to questions, that the effect of the receivership on the 
Beach Manufacturing Co. has been to just about ruin it; that it may 
recover, but that it has just about been put out of business. He then 
explained the losses inflicted upon the company. 

TESTIMONY OF J. C. MORECOCK. 

(Pages 2350-2355.) 

Mr. Morecock testified that he was deputy clerk of the United 
States court at Savannah, Ga., and he then identified an order on the 
H. Rept. 1176, 63-2-2 


16 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


minutes of the court relative to the Beach Manufacturing Co. dated 
April 4, 1913, and was asked when the order was recorded. In 
response he stated that the order was made by Judge Speer while at 
Macon and came down to Savannah with other papers in the mails 
a few days thereafter, and that it was recorded in due course. In 
answer to questions of the chairman, however, Mr. Morecock admit¬ 
ted that he did not arrive at Savannah until April 9 and as the order 
was recorded by him it must have been put on the minutes some time 
later, although dated April 4. He stated the words “by consent” 
were on the order when it came down in the mails from Macon. 
Mr. Morecock testified further that it was the practice for the minutes 
of each day to be read and approved in the court the following morn¬ 
ing, but in response to questions stated that the order in question 
was never read and approved in court but that it was an order in 
equity signed in Macon. 

On cross-examination, Mr. Morecock stated he could not tell 
when the order was put in the minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. JOHN W. BENNETT. 

(Pages 2425-2434.) 

Mr. Bennett testified that he was an attorney by profession and a 
member of the law firm of Wilson, Bennett & Lambdin; that he was 
connected with the bankruptcy proceedings against the Beach Manu¬ 
facturing Co., and that he and the other attorneys had been discuss¬ 
ing the question of disqualifying Judge Speer, owing to his relation¬ 
ship to Mr. Heyward, whose firm were attorneys for the petitioning 
creditors, and that the matter was circulated freely. That shortly 
after this discussion they learned that Judge Speer had written a 
letter to Judge Pardee disqualifying himself. Mr. Bennett then read 
into the record a letter from Judge Speer to Judge Pardee. Judge 
Speer, however, declined to disqualify himself as to administrative 
orders touching the operation of the company, and that this caused 
considerable friction and confusion, and after the matter was again 
brought to his attention Judge Speer finally withdrew from the case 
entirely. Mr. Bennett gave in detail the troubles experienced by the 
attorneys in getting this done, and the fear they entertained that they 
might be punished for suggesting that Judge Speer disqualify. Mr. 
Bennett also testified that Judge Speer had passed an order author¬ 
izing the receiver for the Beach Manufacturing Co. (Mr. Moss) to cut 
good timber into crossties, and that much good timber was destroyed 
in this way; that after Judge Newman took charge of the case he 
passed an order stopping the receiver from this waste. 

The evidence in this case shows that Judge Speer appointed a per¬ 
manent receiver for the Beach Manufacturing Co., a very large and 
prosperous concern, without notice and upon an ex parte hearing upon 
a bankruptcy petition filed by the firm of his son-in-law, Isaac & 
Heyward. The evidence further shows that Judge Speer refused to 
dismiss the receiver appointed, although the defendant offered to pay 
the claims in full or make bond for their security. Also that the com¬ 
pany resisted bankruptcy and upon a jury trial was found to be doubly 
solvent. The most censurable action of Judge Speer shown by the 
evidence in this case is in connection with the so-called “consent” 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 17 

order signed by him. The evidence of Messrs. Lambdin, Padgett, 
Bennett, and Congressman Charles G. Edwards shows that the order in 
question when originally signed by Judge Speer did not bear the 
words “by consent,” and that later, when the company had been 
found solvent by the jury and the question of costs arose, it was found 
that the words “by consent” in Judge Speer's handwriting appeared 
at the end of the order. Attention is especially invited to the affidavit 
of Congressman Charles G. Edwards, as Exhibit 31, in which he 
swears that he and Mr. Padgett examined the order after it was signed 
by Judge Speer and that the words “by consent” were not on it. In 
considering this charge against Judge Speer it should be remembered 
that the firm of the judge's son-in-law filed the petition in the case 
which was dismissed by the verdict of the jury, and that the costs 
which accrued while the company was in the hands of the receiver 
appointed by Judge Speer amounted to many thousands of dollars, 
which made the question as to whether the order in question was a 
consent order exceedingly important, especially to the judge's son-in- 
law, as his firm would undoubtedly receive a large fee from the estate 
of the company if the order were accepted with the words “by con¬ 
sent,” and on the contrary this firm would probably be heavily 
involved in the expenses of the litigation if the order were construed 
without the words “by consent.” Judge Speer does not deny that 
the words “by consent” were written by him, and he claims that the 
order was a “consent” order, despite the affidavit of Congressman 
Edwards and the testimony of the attorneys who have testified. The 
order is Exhibit 31-A. 

McREYNOLDS v. CITY & SUBURBAN RAILWAY CO. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. W. W. OSBORNE. 

(Pages 2054-2071.) 

Mr. Osborne stated that he represented the railway company in 
this case, and that Judge Speer causelessly took the property away 
from the company and put it in the hands of a receiver without 
notice and without the slightest excuse. Mr. Osborne then read a 
written statement of the facts in this case which was furnished by 
him to the examiner of the Department of Justice. (See record, p. 
2054.) The substance of this statement is as follows: There were 
two competing railway systems in Savannah which had been cutting 
rates for a number of years and engaging in considerable litigation. 
While affairs were in this condition Judge Speer, on April 9, 1895, 
without notice and at the instance of one J. W. McReynolds, a 
citizen of Tennessee, appointed a temporary receiver for the City & 
Suburban Railway and ordered the company to show cause on 
May 1 why the receiver should not be made permanent. The peti¬ 
tion for this receiver was filed by the firm of attorneys which had 
represented the competing system in previous litigation. The 
plaintiff in this petition, J. W. McReynolds, had purchased one bond 
on which his suit was based about 10 days prior to the filing of the 
suit, and it developed that he, McReynolds, was an uncle of Mr. 
Robert N. Hicks, one of the owners of the competing system. 




18 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


Mr. Osborne stated he went to Tennessee in person to investigate 
this Mr. McReynolds and found he was a man over 60 years of age 
and without any means and made his living by odd jobs of carpenter 
work, etc. Mr. Osborne states he satisfied himself Mr. McReynolds 
had no means with which to invest in bonds, especially of a street 
railway company at a time when competition was so fierce that car¬ 
fare was reduced to one-half a cent per ride. He states the suit was 
not filed in good faith, and was collusive and started for improper 
motives in the railroad warfare. He stated, also, that Judge Speer 
had personal knowledge of all the facts in the case owing to the pre¬ 
vious litigation between the railway systems, and yet despite this he 
placed the City & Suburban Railway in the hands of a receiver 
without notice upon the application of a ‘party residing in another 
State who owned but one or two bonds purchased while the rate war¬ 
fare was on, obviously for the purpose of litigation. He states further 
that there had been no default of interest on the bonds held by this 
party, and that there was absolutely nothing in connection with the 
petition of McReynolds that would have justified the summary 
appointment of a receiver without notice. He also stated the court 
proceedings previously had before Judge Speer put him in possession 
of every fact necessary to warn him of the circumstances, and that 
the summary appointment of the receiver in this case was a clean- 
cut violation of judicial discretion. The receiver appointed took 
charge of the property of the railway and demanded and received all 
the books and papers of the company, which were taken to the offices 
of the attorneys for the competing company. Mr. Osborne states 
his first thought was to regain possession of the property and that he 
went to Judge Speer at Macon and stated to him that his client would 
give bond in the sum of $250,000, if necessary, to regain the possession 
of the property, and that this bond was actually required by Judge 
Speer. This enormous bond exacted having been made, the receiver 
surrendered the property to the owners and the case was dismissed, 
but not until costs amounting to about $1,300 had been paid. He 
stated that Mr. Parsons, being a very rich man, was able to furnish the 
outrageous bond exacted, and but for this fact the arbitrary, tyran¬ 
nical, and outrageous act of Judge Speer in appointing the receiver 
would have resulted in much greater loss of property than actually 
occurred. Mr. Osborne stated that he learned from Mr. Mayhew 
Cunningham, who acted as attorney for the trustee in accepting 
the bond mentioned, that when he went to Judge Speer’s chambers 
in connection with the matter the judge made an effort to dissuade 
him from accepting the bond and that Mr. Cunningham will so state. 
He also stated that if Mr. Parsons had not been able to protect him¬ 
self the railroad company might have been bankrupted by the action 
of Judge Speer. 

The undisputed evidence in this case shows that Judge Speer 
appointed a receiver for a great city railway system without notice 
upon a bill filed by the holder of one bond of the company, bought 
during the litigation for the purpose of instituting a suit not in good 
faith. The evidence shows that there was no good reason for this 
drastic action by the judge, and no allegation of insolvency or irre¬ 
parable injury, no default having been made in the interest or pay¬ 
ments upon the bond upon which the suit was filed. It is shown 
further that this railway company was required to make bond in 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 19 


the sum of $250,000 and to pay the expenses of the litigation amount¬ 
ing to $1,300 before it was able to regain possession of its property. 
Only the fact that the owners of this railway company were in pos¬ 
session of large resources saved it from long and tedious unnecessary 
litigation, and probably ruin, through the loss of credit and the 
heavy expenses of the litigation, fees to officials, etc. 

CASE OF CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RECEIVERSHIP. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. A. R. LAWTON. 

(Pages 1599-1636.) 

Mr. Lawton stated that he was an attorney by profession and at 
present held the position of vice president of the Central of Georgia 
Railway; that his firm, Lawton & Cunningham, has been counsel for 
the railroad mentioned since in the early eighties. Mr. Lawton then 
testified with regard to the receivership case in substance as follows: 
On March 3, 1892, one Rowena M. Clarke, of Charleston, S. C., who 
owned 50 shares of capital stock of the company, filed a bill against 
the railway, alleging that the company had made a contract which 
was ultra vires, and that Judge Speer, without a hearing and without 
notice, placed this great railroad corporation in the hands of a re¬ 
ceiver; that at the time the bill was filed the stock of the corporation 
was selling at $110 per share and had paid 7 per cent dividends 
without interruption for a number of years; that the stock was 
owned by many small holders throughout the State and was a favor¬ 
ite investment for trust funds and that the semiannual dividend of 31 
per cent was paid on the 1st of January, 1892, prior to the filing of 
the bill mentioned in March, 1892; that the corporation had leased its 
railroad lines to the Georgia Pacific Railroad Co., a subsidiary of the 
Richmond Terminal Co., and that he knew nothing of any difficulty 
until on March 4, 1892, he was served with an order from the United 
States court, appointing Mr. E. P. Alexander receiver of the company 
and calling upon them to show cause on March 14 why a permanent 
receiver should not be appointed; that at the time this notice was 
served the capital stock of the company was selling at $110 per share 
and that when the litigation was ended, after years of control by the 
court, the stock was worth only $4.50 per share; that during the 
receivership the railroad company became insolvent and was unable 
to conduct its business, while it was solvent before the commence¬ 
ment of the receivership proceedings; that the bill filed did not 
allege insolvency and that the stock was so highly considered gen¬ 
erally that probably 20 per cent of it was owned by women and trust 
estates. 

In answer to questions Mr. Lawton stated he had never been able 
to find who was behind the plaintiff in filing the suit against the 
company, but that the receiver was appointed without any notice 
of any kind or character, and that it had always been described as 
the “midnight order,” and that it came like a thunderclap out of a 
clear sky. That the bill was not verified or sworn to by the plain¬ 
tiff, and that it alleged that the lease to the Richmond Terminal 
Co/ was contrary to public policy and beyond its powers to contract, 
and that the property was being mismanaged generally. He stated 


20 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

further that the bill did not contain an allegation of insolvency or 
allege irreparable injury unless immediate relief was afforded. That 
the bill was verified by counsel only, and that this attorney could 
not possibly have known a single fact alleged in the bill, the im- 

E ortant allegations being alleged on information and belief. Mr. 

iawton read the verification of the bill as follows: “I, Daniel W. 
Rountree, do swear that the allegations contained in the foregoing 
bill are true.” In answer to further questions Mr. Lawton replied 
that there was no allegation, and no affidavit of irreparable loss or 
injury upon which the summary action of the court could be based. 
That the placing of the company in the hands of the court destroyed 
its credit, and that it was difficult for it to obtain funds. Mr. Law- 
ton then recited the history of the railroad during the several years 
it was in the hands of the court, and stated that when the original 
bill finally came up for a hearing it was dismissed for want of equity 
by Justice Jackson, and upon appeal being taken to the circuit court 
of appeals, the judgment dismissing it for want of equity was affirmed. 
That the Georgia Central Railroad Co. was ruined upon a bill that 
had no equity in it, in his opinion, and that the judgment of the 
circuit court and circuit court of appeals affirmed his opinion. He 
stated further that he did not believe that any receiver would have 
been appointed if there had been a hearing on the application. He 
stated that it would be impossible to state in figures the amount of 
damage done by this action of the judge, but tha t every security of the 
corporation went very low and a great many people were forced to 
sell out. That the expenses of the receivership, counsel fees, court 
costs, etc., were enormous, the litigation lasting three and a half 
years. 

Mr. Lawton stated that in his opinion the railway company would 
have remained solvent, and even weathered the panic of 1893 if it 
had not been taken in custody by the court. 

AFFIDAVIT OF HON. T. M. CUNNINGHAM, JR. 

On the subject of alleged arbitrary and oppressive conduct of 
Judge Speer in placing this great railway corporation in the hands 
of a receiver without notice, the Hon. T. M. Cunningham had made 
an affidavit, which will be found marked “Exhibit No. 26.” This 
affidavit corroborates the testimony of Mr. A. H. Lawton in every 
way. Mr. Cunningham states that the properties of the company 
were placed in the hands of a receiver on an order signed by Judge 
Speer at chambers March 3, 1892, and that it was commonly sup¬ 
posed that the judge signed the order on the night of March 3; that 
the company had no notice of the order until March 4, when it was 
presented by the attorney, Daniel W. Rountree; that the bill was 
sworn to by Mr. Rountree and by no one else; that it alleged that 
a lease made by the railway company was ultra vires and null and 
void; that there was no allegation or suggestion that the company 
was insolvent, and that on this bill the receiver was appointed ex 
parte and without notice of any kind; that the company had been 
operating successfully for many years previously and regular divi¬ 
dends paid upon the stock. Mr. Cunningham further states that 
the bill in question was subsequently dismissed for want of equity 
by Justice Jackson, and that the decision of Justice Jackson was 



CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 21 

affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. (Clarke et al. v. Richmond 
& W. P. Terminal Co. et al., 62 Fed., p. 328.) 

The evidence on this subject shows that Judge Speer, by what is 
historically known as the “midnight order,” placed this great rail¬ 
way corporation in the hands of a receiver without any notice what¬ 
ever, in an ex parte hearing, on a bill which was not verified by the 
plaintiff, and which did not allege insolvency or irreparable injury. 
The evidence further shows that, when this bill was finally passed 
upon by the court, it was declared to be without equity and dis¬ 
missed, and this decision affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 
The evidence further shows that this great corporation, although 
in a prosperous condition and paying regular dividends of 7 per cent 
prior to the receivership, was injured to such an extent that at the 
e nd of the litigation its securities, which formerly sold at $110 per 
spare, were valued at only $4.50 per share. It is also shown from 
the evidence that many private fortunes were ruined in this way, 
and that, if it had not been for the action of Judge Speer and the 
resulting loss of credit and court costs and expenses of the receiver¬ 
ship, the company would probably have remained solvent, and 
even successfully passed through the panic of 1893, which followed 
shortly. The evidence also shows that during the several years 
during which this railway corporation was in the hands of the court 
Judge Speer shipped freight over it free of charge, a privilege not 
enjoyed by any other person, not even by the president and high 
officials of the railway corporation. 

THE HUFF CASE. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. THOMAS F. FELDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL. 

(Pages 1846-1900.) 

Mr. Felder, the present attorney general of Georgia, testified that 
he had represented Mr. W. A. Huff in this suit, which was a creditor’s 
bill filed against Huff on August 5, 1899; that the complainants, 
Bidweil and Woodford, held judgments for $3,900 and interest 
against Mr. Huff, and that Judge Speer appointed a receiver upon 
the filing of this bill in an ex parte hearing and ordered him to take 
charge of the property of Mr. Huff; that the court has sold and 
realized from this property during the progress of the case $103,000 
and that there still remains unsold property valued at $15,000; that 
Bidweil held a $1,500 mortgage against a piece of property which 
was sold during the litigation for $21,500, and that Woodford held a 
small mortgage lien against another piece of property valued at 
$12,000 to $15,000; that Judge Speer in taking charge of all this 
property appointed Mr. Clem P. Steed temporary receiver, and shortly 
thereafter left the district and went to his summer home at Mount 
Airy, Ga.; that this temporary receiver held the property for three 
and one-half years, and that when the case came up for hearing a 
permanent receiver was appointed, at which time Mr. Felder was 
brought into the case; that Mr. J. N. Talley was appointed examiner 
in the case and testimony taken before him; that'at this time all of 
Mr. Huff’s debts of every kind and character amounted to about 
$34,500, including the $15,000 mortgage held by the Scottish American 


22 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

Mortgage Co. against a piece of Huffs property which later sold for 
S71,500; that after the testimony was taken before the examiner 
the case was argued before Judge Speer and he refused to dismiss the 
hill; that a part of the property seized by the court belonged to 
two of Mr. Huff’s children and that their rights were ignored and all 
of it sold; that no claim was made that the property of these children 
was subject to Mr. Huff’s debts, but notwithstanding that the court 
proceeded to sell it. 

That appeal was taken to the circuit court of appeals, which court 
held that the plaintiffs were liable for all costs up to the time the 
receivership was made permanent, but affirmed the permanent 
appointment of the receiver as it was made to appear in the record, 
that no objection had been made to said appointment; that when 
the matter was being argued he produced before the circuit court of 
appeals a letter written to Mr. Huff by his attorney, Alexander 
Proudfit, in which this attorney denied having consented to the 
receivership; that the circuit court of appeals allowed him to file the 
letter, but that it was probably never considered by them, as it was 
not a part of the record. Mr. Felder then read the letter mentioned, 
which appears on page 1856 in the record. He then cited the de¬ 
cision of the circuit court of appeals in this case as follows: 151 Fed., 
563; 176 Fed., 1022; 195 Fed., 430. He then read from the decision 
holding that Judge Speer erred in appointing the temporary receiver 
as follows: 

The case has now reached the final decree on its merits, and we can do nothing as to 
the appointment of the receiver except to direct that the costs growing out of this 
receivership shall be taxed as seems right under the circumstances. We, therefore, 
direct that all the costs of the receivership, of every nature and kind, from the appoint¬ 
ment of the receiver without notice on August 5, 1899, until the defendants did 
“seemingly acquiesce” in the renewal order of appointment of May 31 (1902), be 
taxed against the complainants who procured the appointment. 

Mr. Felder also testified that the complainants in this case also 
attempted to remove from Huff the support of the city of Macon by 
proposing to pay the paving assessment which was charged against 
some of the property; that in spite of this order of the circuit court 
of appeals that the costs of the temporary receivership be taxed 
against the complainants, Judge Speer ignored it and taxed them 
against Huff’s property; that when exceptions were made to this 
Judge Speer ordered the money held up until it could be finally passed 
upon by the court of appeals, although it had already been plainly 
stated by the court of appeals that these costs be taxed against the 
complainants; that when the property was ordered sold under the 
final decree, Messrs. E. Y. Mallary and John F. Cone, who had been 
made receivers after the death of Mr. Steed, were appointed commis¬ 
sioners for the sale, and proceeded to sell the property in a way which 
was not authorized by the decree; that he (Felder) went to see Judge 
Speer and made a complaint that they were preparing to sell the 
property in large tracts, contrary to decree, and also to sell the Huff 
home, which was not necessary, but that the judge ordered the com¬ 
missioners to proceed; that Mr. Huff had owned the home for many 
years and had buried a child on the lot, and that this fact was especially 
called to the attention of the judge, but he declined to protect the 
homestead; that the property was sold at this time and brought 
$70,000, and produced a net amount of moreAhan $40,000 in excess 



CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 23 

of enough to pay Huff’s debts; that he made objection to the approval 
of the sale, as the debts had already been fixed by a former decree 
and they did not wish any more property sold than enough to pay 
his debts. This objection was overruled. 

Mr. Felder next testified that Judge Speer allowed out of Mr. 
Huff’s estate to the counsel for the complainants against him, Hall 
& Wimberly, a fee of $10,000, to be paid out of the money in court 
realized from the sale mentioned; that appeal was taken to the circuit 
court of appeals, which reversed Judge Speer and stated he had no 
right to sell any more of Huff’s estate than enough to pay his debts 
(195 Fed., 430); that the next step was the fixing of commissioners’ 
and receivers’ fees, etc., and that the master, Mr. Talley, had already 
been paid $1,500 for his services in this case, but that Judge Speer 
brought Judge Andrew J. Cobb (now acting as his attorney in this 
investigation) into the case, and appointed him master to pass upon 
fees, and allowed him $750 for that service out of Mr. Huff’s property; 
that Mr. Cobb made two trips to Macon and stayed a couple of days, 
during which time testimony was taken, and was paid the fee men¬ 
tioned; that the judge made the order allowing this fee without giving 
the defense any opportunity to object. Mr. Felder testified also 
that Mi*. Talley, who was paid about $1,500 as master, was at the time 
partner of Mr. Heyward, son-in-law of Judge Speer, also that he 
(Speer) ordered $823.70 paid to Mr. Cork, who was appointed exam¬ 
iner to take testimony; that this money was paid out of Huff’s fund, 
notwithstanding the issue in which Mr. Cork was engaged was 
between Bidwell and the city of Macon; also that Mr. Cecil Morgan, 
brother-in-law of Judge Speer, was paid $5 as stenographer and Mr. 
Cameron, Judge Speer’s stenographer, was paid $24 for stenographic 
services; that Mrs. Clem P. Steed, the widow of the first receiver 
appointed by Judge Speer, was paid $1,000, and Mallary and Cone, 
as commissioners, were paid $3,800, and C. Morecock, a former 
stenographer of Judge Speer, was paid $308, all out of Huff ’s estate. 
Mr. Felder mentioned a number of other fees paid in a similar manner. 

On the subject of arbitrary action Mi*. Felder testified further that 
after the sale of the property known as the Kimball House, in which 
Mr. Huff’s children had a separate undivided two-sevenths interest, 
which sale was made upon the express understanding that these chil¬ 
dren should receive the money due them promptly; he made repeated 
applications to the court for the money due these children, amounting 
to $6,143, but that these applications were denied; that this money 
has been held in court and charges and expenses taxed against it 
unjustly; that the interest of the children in other parts of Mr. Huff’s 
property were likewise sacrificed and the property sold over their pro¬ 
test; that when the money was finally tendered to these children it 
was so depleted that they declined to accept it and appealed to the 
circuit court of appeals. 

Mr. Felder testified in reference to statements made that the prop¬ 
erty of Huff had greatly enhanced in value, and also that it had 
brought these large amounts of money due to the good management 
of the receivers; that there had been no management and there was 
nothing to manage; that the property was allowed to go to wreck and 
ruin, and that they had been unable to get back even the property 
which had not been sold by the court on account of the excess already 


24 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


realized. He also stated in reference to the claims made that Huff 
had been allowed a living out of the money brought into court, that 
the only allowance made was $75 per month at first, and then $100 
per month, until the time appeal was taken in the case, and that 
nothing had been received by Huff since 1906, and his money still 
remains in court. 

Mr. Felder testified that all of the money received from the sale of 
Huff’s property, amounting to approximately $100,000, had been 
placed in the Commercial National Bank of Macon, of which one 
of the receivers was president, another of the receivers a director, 
and Judge Speer’s brother-in-law, Mr. Morgan, vice president; that 
this money had been allowed to remain in this bank without drawing 
any interest for several years; that during the trial of the case he 
objected to paying fees and expenses and called attention to the fact 
that the fund in the bank was producing no income and to the further 
fact that the receiver asking for the large fee in question was presi¬ 
dent of the bank which was profiting by this condition, and the other 
receiver a director in the bank; that he put on the stand during these 
proceedings certain bankers of Macon to prove that it was the custom 
of Macon banks to allow 3 per cent interest on deposits subject to 
check and 4 per cent on time deposits; that the master’s attention 
was called to this fact and that the matter went to Judge Speer, who 
sustained the master; that Mr. Huff addressed a letter to Judge Speer 
in July, 1912, advising him that the money of the bank was drawing 
no interest, and protesting against the parties profiting from his fund 
in that manner; that appeal was taken from the decision of Judge 
Speer that the debts of Huff draw interest covering all the period the 
estate was in court, although the fund in the court was not drawing 
any interest, and that the appeal is now pending. 

Mr. Felder also stated that the questions, first of the judge ignoring 
the decree of the court of appeals as to costs, second, the allowance 
of costs, and third, the rights of the children of Mr. Huff are now 
pending on appeal. 

Mr. Felder said that the case had been grossly mismanaged; that 
the property amounting to $103,000.48 had been sold, and rent 
amounting to $8,516.09 collected, making a total of $111,564.09 
brought into court in cash; and that there is still unsold property 
known as the Armory property, valued at from $12,000 to $15,000; 
that this money was all brought into court on the original claims of 
$3,900 and interest, and that the other debts of Huff were brought 
into the case later; that Judge Speer did wrong when he appointed 
a receiver without notice in the case, as the property was all real 
estate and could not get away, and that Judge Speer must have been 
informed of this, as he was a close neighbor of Mr. Huff and was 
acquainted with him and his property condition. He also stated 
that when the case is finally settled Huff should receive back a large 
sum of money in addition to the Armory property, which has not 
been sold; also that the fees of Mr. Talley, a partner of the judge’s 
eon-in-law, were allowed without notice to him (Felder) and without 
any opportunity for protest. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 25 


TESTIMONY OF MR. W. A. HUFF. 

(Pages 621-704.) 

Upon being sworn Mr. Huff gave his name, age, and residence, and 
stated that he had known Judge Speer for 30 or 35 years. He then 
stated that on August 5, 1899, Judge Speer put all his property 
and. that of his children into the hands of a receiver without any 
notice, Mr. Clem P. Steed being made temporary receiver. That the 
matter ran along until the spring or summer of 1902, at which time 
this temporary receiver attempted to sell a part of his estate to the 
State of Georgia for a site for the Academy for the Blind. That he 
objected to the price named by the receiver, and that it was raised 
from $500 to $600 per acre, and the property finally sold. That 
when the time came for the appointment of a receiver permanently 
Mr. Steed was made permanent receiver. That after the appoint¬ 
ment of the permanent receiver the court proceeded to take testi¬ 
mony with regard to his debts, etc., and that after two or three years, 
during which time many officers and attorneys were employed, Judge 
Speer rendered a decree for the sale of his property, from which his 
attorney appealed. That at this time he changed his attorney from 
Mr. Proudfit to Hon. T. S. Felder. That the appellate court modified 
the decree of Judge Speer and placed all the costs of the litigation 
upon the plaintiffs up to the time the receivership was made perma¬ 
nent, the court stating that the defendant having 11 seemingly” 
acquiesced in the permanent receivership the subsequent costs 
would be charged to him. That he had not consented to the per¬ 
manent receivership, but that his attorney had failed to make any 
positive objection and the court of appeals had taken this action for 
consent. 

That in July, 1909, the receivers came to him and requested his con¬ 
sent to the sale of the Kimball Plouse property. That he requested 
the receivers to first advertise the property. That this was refused. 
That after considerable controversy over the matter he consented 
to sell all the property, provided there should be a prompt distribu¬ 
tion of the proceeds, the property being finally sold for $21,500. That 
this sale took place July 15, 1909, and that in the fall of the same year 
a proposition was made to him, by one of the commissioners appointed 
by the court, for the sale of the Yineville property for $50,000, which 
proposition he refused, and that later the same parties made a propo¬ 
sition to buy the Yineville property for $52,500, which was also re¬ 
fused. That as time went on a number of syndicates were formed 
for the purpose of buying his property, one of which included Mr. 
Olm J. Wimberly the attorney w ho had originally filed the suit against 
him. That the property w 7 as finally advertised for sale, and when 
sold brought $70,500, this money being deposited in the Commercial 
National Bank at Macon, where the $21,500 realized from the sale 
of the Kimball House had already been placed. ^ That this money 
remained in the bank for a number of years, and that large fees were 
paid out of it to the receivers, masters, examiners, etc., $4,000 being 
paid to the commissioners and $750 to the master, the master being 
Judge Andrew J. Cobb. That $1,000 or $1,500 was paid to Mr. Talley 
and Mr. Cork. That with the exception of the amounts mentioned 
the vdiole of the money deposited, that is, $94,000, remained in the 


26 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

bank until May, 1913, at which time a part of it was distributed. 
That the bank held this money without interest being paid therefor. 
Mr. Huff related the incident relative to the publication of certain 
letters written by him regarding Judge Speer’s conduct, which re¬ 
sulted in his arrest and the proceedings known as the Huff contempt 
case. 

In answer to questions from the chairman, Mr. Huff stated that the 
original suits upon which this property was placed in the hands of 
the court were filed on judgments, one for $1,500 and another for 
$2,400. Mr. Huff then gave the facts with regard to the value of his 
property at the time it was seized by the court, stating that the 
Kimball House was taxed for $20,000, and later sold for $21,500. 
That he had been offered $65,000 for his Yineville property before 
the fding of the suit against him, and that the Armory propert}^ was 
assessed by the city at $10,500, the total value of his property at that 
time being about $125,000. He stated further that his total indebted¬ 
ness was less than $34,000. Mr. Huff further testified that Mr. Clem 
P. Steed, the party named as receiver of his estate, was a lecturer at 
Mercer University with Judge Speer, and that Mr. Wimberly, the 
attorney who filed the original suit against him, was also a lecturer 
at the university, and a close friend of Judge Speer. That when Mr. 
Steed died Judge Speer appointed in his place Messrs. Mallary & Cone, 
both of whom were officers in the bank where the money realized 
from his estate was deposited. That Judge Speer appointed his 
stenographer, Mr. Talley, master in the case. Mr. Huff then testified 
that the Mr. Mallary mentioned above was president of the Com¬ 
mercial National Bank, and that Mr. Cone was a director and stock¬ 
holder. 

He also testified that Mr. Cecil Morgan, a brother-in-law of Judge 
Speer, was vice president of the bank mentioned and also deputy clerk 
or the United States court. In answer to questions, Mr. Huff testified 
that the money realized from his estate, amounting to nearly $100,000, 
had remained in the bank mentioned for a number of years without 
interest, while his debts had been allowed to draw interest all during 
the years while the litigation was pending; that Judge Speer allowed 
the attorney for the plaintiffs in the case a fee of $10,000 out of his 
estate, and that his decision was appealed from and the circuit court 
of appeals reversed it; that this $10,000 fee was allowed by Judge 
Speer to the attorneys who presented claims amounting to only $3,900, 
but that the court of appeals set him right. He testified, further, that 
Judge Cobb, who is mentioned as having received $750 as master to 
pass upon the commissioners’ fees, resides at Athens, a city about 70 
or 80 miles distant from Macon, the only services which he rendered 
being three trips to Macon for the hearing of the argument in favor 
of the commissioners’ fees; that the commissioners asked for $12,000 
as their- fee and that Judge Cobb allowed them $4,000. He stated, 
further, that although sufficient property had been sold to pay his 
debts, with interest and accumulated court costs, he still had unsold 
property worth $15,000, and that he claimed that at the time the 
receiver was appointed his estate was entirely solvent; that if the 
estate had been properly handled his home could have been saved to 
his children. 

Upon being recalled Mr. Huff produced copies of letters (pp. 
1340-1383) which he had written to Judge Speer which were handed 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 27 


to the clerk and marked for identification. Mr. Huff then testified 
that in the suit against him, mentioned in his testimony heretofore, 
he had not consented to the receivership and that his attorney had 
not consented to it. He then produced a letter from his attorney, 
Mr. Alexander Proudfit, in which the statement is made that he 
positively did not consent to the receivership. He testified further 
that at the time his suit was filed against him and the receiver ap¬ 
pointed, he went to the attorney for the plaintiff, Olin J. Wimberly, 
and asked upon what terms the suit could be withdrawn, to which 
Mr. Wimberly replied that it could be withdrawn upon the payment 
of a substantial amount on the claims represented by him, and upon 
further payment to him (Wimberly) of a fee of $2,000 and an addi¬ 
tional fee of $2,000 to the receiver ; that this proposition was refused, 
and that later the attorney, Mr. Wimberly, made another proposi¬ 
tion that Mr. Huff pay him a fee of $2,000 and the receiver $1,000, 
which was also refused. That after his property was placed in the 
hands of a receiver without notice, he was allowed out of the rents 
collected by the receiver $18 per week until the time he appealed in 
December, 1903, and that then this allowance was cut off. Mr. 
Huff also testified that the money realized from his estate, i. e., 
$21,500 from the Kimball House, $70,500 from his Vineville property, 
and other items of rent, etc., collected, totaling $94,000, remained in 
the Commercial National Bank without interest for three years and 
two months, while the bank was paying 4 per cent interest on its 
ordinary deposits; that this bank was known as the “ family bank” 
on account of Judge Speer’s brother-in-law being vice president and 
stockholder. Mr. Huff testified that when he appealed from the 
action of Judge Speer, the circuit court of appeals, after a hearing on 
argument, placed all the costs of the cases, up to the time the receiver¬ 
ship was made permanent, upon the plaintiffs, and proceeded with 
the statement that as the defendant “seemingly acquiescing” in 
the receivership being made permanent, the subsequent costs would 
be charged against him. He states this action of the court shows 
that the court of appeals considered the appointment of the receiver 
improper. 

Mr. Huff further complained that the manner in which his property 
was sold by the court resulted in the sacrifice of much of its value; 
that 295 acres of suburban land was sold in 3 hours and 45 
minutes in large tracts, with no attempt to subdivide or make the 
most of it, one tract of 90 acres being sold in a lump and others of 35, 
45, 50, and 60 acres. Mr. Huff stated further that Judge Cobb was 
brought into the case unnecessarily and paid a fee of $750 as master 
to pass upon certain other fees. 

Mr. Huff testified further that Judge Speer had ordered a road to 
be cut through a part of his property in the following manner: He 
(the judge) was riding horseback and passed the property in question, 
and when he reached a cotton mill run by Mr. P. Willingham was 
stopped by Mr. Willingham and asked if a road could be cut through 
the Huff land in order to make a more direct entrance to the mill; 
that Mr. Wimbush, the county superintendent of public works, was 
working with a gang of men not far distant, and that Judge Speer 
sent for him and instructed him to cut a 30-foot road through the lot 
in question, to which Mr. Wimbush objected, on account of having 
no order from the road commissioners; that Judge Speer replied, “Mr. 


28 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

Wimbush, you will cut that road,” and upon being asked about the 
objections of Mr. Huff said, “You let me know if Huff says anything 
about it; I have been caring for him and his family and children for 
several years.” The road was then cut without further authority. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. CECIL MORGAN. 

(Pages 1426-1428.) 

In answer to questions of the chairman, Mr. Morgan stated he was 
a brother-in-law of Judge Speer, and further that he held the position 
of vice president of the-Commercial National Bank; that the presi¬ 
dent is E. Y. Mallary. Mr. Morgan was then asked by the chairman 
to identify the advertisement of his bank appearing in the Macon 
telephone directory in which they offer to pay 4 per cent interest on 
deposits. 

On cross-examination, Mr. Morgan testified the bank in question 
was the court depositary and that he had never known any funds in 
the registry of the court to bear interest. Also that he did not know 
of any effort by the parties in the Huff case to have the money 
involved placed at interest. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. ANDREW J. COBB. 

(Pages 1589-1594.) 

In answer to questions from the chairman, Judge Cobb said that 
he had represented Judge Speer in a suit over his mother’s will filed 
in Clarke County, Ga., and that it took about three days to try it; 
that he did not charge Judge Speer any fee for representing him in 
this case. 

The evidence ol Mr. W. A. Huff and of Hon. Thomas S. Felder, 
taken together with the records in this case, shows that Judge Speer 
appointed a receiver without notice for propertv of Mr. Huff worth 
about $100,000 on a creditor’s bill representing claims of about 
$4,000; that he allowed the money arising from the sale of this prop¬ 
erty amounting in all to nearly $100,000 to remain without interest 
in the bank of which his brother-in-law was vice president for a 
number of years, although the matter was brought to his attention; 
that he allowed property belonging to the children of Mr. Huff, 
which was not subject to his debts, to be sold by the receiver; that 
he allowed the homestead of Mr. Fluff to be sold by the receiver, 
although property equally valuable has remained unsold; that he 
allowed the attorneys opposing Mr. Huff a fee of $10,000 out of his 
estate; that the Judge’s son-in-law’s firm was paid $1,500 out of 
this estate for acting as master of the court, and that Judge Andrew 
J. Cobb, who had previously represented the Judge in private litiga¬ 
tion gratuitously, was appointed a master in this case and paid a fee 
of $750 by Judge Speer. 

In his brief Judge Speer states that no application to have the 
money realized from this estate placed at interest was ever made to 
him, but he admits that he received a letter from Mr. Huff in which 
the matter was called to his attention. It is noted that when appeal 
was taken from the decree of Judge Speer for a sale of Mr. Huff’s 
property the circuit court of appeals in hearing the matter taxed all 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 29 

of the costs of the suit up to the time when the receivership was made 
permanent against the plaintiff, and stated that as the defendant 
had seemingly consented^ to the permanent appointment of the re¬ 
ceiver they could not do otherwise than assess the subsequent costs 
against him. It is also noted that in passing upon the appeal taken 
by Mr. Huff from the allowance of $10,000 out of his estate to the 
attorneys opposing him, the circuit court of appeals, in reversing 
Judge Speer, criticized his conduct, and stated that no more of Mr. 
Huff’s property should have been sold than enough to pay his debts. 

The argument that this large amount of money remained in what 
is known as the ‘‘family bank” for several years without interest 
because no application was made to have it put at interest is refuted 
by the testimony of both Mr. Huff and Mr. Felder, but it is sub¬ 
mitted that a wise and just chancellor would not wait for such an 
application, and would see that this money under his charge was 
producing some income, and this is especially so when it is remem¬ 
bered that to allow it to remain without interest (in a bank in which 
his family was interested) would naturally cause criticism. The 
arrangement for having funds of this character taken from the reg¬ 
istry of the court and placed at interest is very simple, and would 
have been done in this case had Judge Speer intimated that such 
course was desirable. 

ALLEGED OFFERS TO ACCEPT BRIBES. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN M. BARNES. 

(Pages 909-911.) 

Mr. Barnes testified that in the year 1901 he went to Judge Speer’s 
chambers to thank him for a fee as custodian in a bankruptcy case, 
and in thanking him stated that he feared the judge had been too 
liberal; to which the judge replied that people do not appreciate a 
man’s working for them for nothing and that he (Barnes) had better 
make the most out of these things; that he then thanked the judge 
again, but before he could leave the room, the judge detained him 
and slowly said: “You thank me very beautifully for these things 
sometimes, but what is there in it for me?” Mr. Barnes states that 
he had been expecting this for a year or more and was greatly con¬ 
fused, but threw up his hands and made an effort to appear not to 
understand, and said, “Oh, millions, Judge,” and hastily got out of 
the door; that he went at once to the judge’s, stenographer (Mr. 
Talley), who was also his adviser and mouthpiece, and told him 
that favors as large as custodianships tendered to disturb the proper 
relations between the judge and marshal and that in the future he 
would only be willing to accept such appointment where the fees 
were nominal; that thereafter the judge was cool for a long time 
and gave him no occasion to object to the liberality of the fees; 
that prior to this time, in August, 1900, the judge had told him that 
he had instructed all referees to appoint him (Barnes) custodian in 
all bankruptcy cases during the judge’s absence from the district, 
quoting the exact language of the order; that the judge hinted that 
he would want some of his hangers-on appointed as subcustodians, 
or to some of the under places. That he made a clumsy effort at 


30 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

diplomacy and declined the offer on the ground that he feared the 
department might set up a claim to the fees, and that it would ruin 
him to have to repay such fees. 

Mr. Barnes stated further that on one occasion he wished to give 
the judge a Christmas present, but feared that the provisions of the 
Revised Statutes prohibited such action, and that he asked Mr. 
Talley, who was used by all the court officials to communicate with 
the judge, to ascertain if the statute applied, and that the next day 
Mr. Talley came back and told him the statute did not interfere, 
as he was not an inferior officer in the sense that was meant in 
the law, but was merely a smaller officer; that thereafter he felt 
free to send such presents to the judge and continued to do so. 

Judge Speer states in explanation of the charge made by Mr. 
Barnes that he merely recited to Mr. Barnes a quotation from well- 
known classical literature, and that Mr. Barnes construed this into 
an offer on his part to accept a bribe. 

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE LAWS IN DRAWING JURIES. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. THOMAS FELDER. 

(Pages 1814-1823.) 

Mr. Felder stated that he was an attorney by profession and had 
been practicing in the southern district of Georgia for 18 or 20 years, 
and at present holds the position of Attorney General of the State of 
Georgia. Upon being asked to explain the law with reference to the 
drawing of juries, Mr. Felder stated that the law requires the district 
judge to draw the juries from jury boxes which have previously been 
prepared by the jury commissioner; that this drawing must be done 
publicly and in the presence of the marshal and clerk of the court; 
that special juries may be drawn under certain conditions, but that 
they must in all cases be drawn from the jury box; that the Federal 
law adopts the State law in reference to special juries and distinctly 
says so in the Federal Statutes; that when a panel is depleted by any 
reason the judge can order it filled from the bystanders, and that is 
the only instance where a jury can be selected without drawing their 
names from the box. 

Mr. Felder testified that in the peonage case, entitled United States 
v. Laidler Branen and John H. Branen, he was employed to defend 
these parties, and when he went to look up the list of jurors he found 
that every man on the list resided within the city of Macon, and that 
as it was impossible for all the names on a jury drawn from the box 
according to law to be those of men residing in the city of Macon, he 
became suspicious and inquired of the clerk of the court, Mr. Cecil 
Morgan, as to how the jury was selected, and Mr. Morgan told him 
that the jury was not drawn from the box, but was selected from a 
list by the marshal, Mr. George F. White. He stated also that he was 
quite certain this statement was also made to him by Mr. L. M. 
Erwin, deputy clerk of the court. He then asked Mr. Morgan if any 
order had been passed by Judge Speer with reference to the jury, and 
Mr. Morgan replied that no order had been made. Mr. Felder re¬ 
turned to the clerk’s office later in the case and found that an order 
had been entered on the minutes, nunc pro tunc. Mr. Felder stated 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 31 

he then prepared a challenge to this panel of jurors, and that every 
statement made in it was true. Upon being asked to read the 
challenge, Mr. Felder read it into the record. This challenge is found 
beginning at page 1818 in the record in this case and is Exhibit 14. 
It states in substance that the panel of jurors put upon these defend¬ 
ants was not properly or legally drawn from any jury box according 
to law or in any legal manner, but on the contrary, each and all of 
these men, all residing in the city of Macon, Ga., were selected by the 
marshal, George F. White, without regard to ballot or lot or the draw¬ 
ing of them from any jury box, and summoned to serve as jurors; 
that these jurors were not summoned and brought into court, as re¬ 
quired by law or by rule 81 of the circuit and district courts, the clerk 
not having made and delivered to the marshal a venire directing him 
to summon these jurors to serve at this or any other term of court, no 
venire whatever having been issued by the clerk or any other officer, 
but on the contrary the marshal used his own discretion in selecting 
the jurors without regard to any venire; all of which is in violation 
of the acts of Congress and the rulings of the said court. The chal¬ 
lenge states further that the jurors put upon these defendants make 
up and compose the only panel of jurors summoned for that term of 
court, there having been no other jurors drawn or selected for said 
term of court, and that these jurors mentioned were not selected and 
empaneled to take the place of any jurors theretofore drawn, or to 
complete any panel of jurors drawn, but that the jurors put upon 
these defendants are acting as a regularly empaneled trial jury for 
the October term of court, all of which is contrary to law; that these 
jurors were not taken impartially from different parts of the district, 
but on the contrary each and all of said jurors are residents of the city 
of Macon, Ga., and were arbitrarily selected by the marshal without 
any order of the court directing him in that regard. 

Mr. Felder stated that after this challenge was prepared he sub¬ 
mitted the question to his clients as to raising the point of the illegal 
selection of jurors, and explained to them that if Judge Speer over¬ 
ruled the challenge it would be necessary to appeal to the circuit 
court of appeals, and that unless they had sufficient funds to carry 
the case up their interests might be prejudiced with the court and 
jury by the raising of the point; that the defendants stated they did 
not have sufficient funds to appeal the case, and that therefore the 
challenge was never filed. Mr. Felder testified further that on the 
list of jurors selected there was more than one man who had received 
favors from Judge Speer by virtue of receiverships, etc. He also 
stated (p. 1953) with regard to the illegal jury mentioned in his testi¬ 
mony, tnat Judge Speer in the trial of his cases pays no attention to 
the terms of court, and that the jury in question was the only jury 
that had been drawn for the regular term of court then in session. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. W. C. SNODGRASS. 

(Pages 705-706.) 

Mr. Snodgrass stated that he was an attorney and had been prac¬ 
ticing in the southern district of Georgia 15 or 20 years. In answer 
to questions as to the manner of drawing juries, Mr. Snodgrass stated 
that “in the State court a jury commissioner makes up what is 

H. Kept. 1176, 63—2-3 


32 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


known as a grand and petty jury list. These names are placed in 
boxes and drawn by the judge in the presence of the sheriff and clerk. 
Now as to Federal juries, I have never had occasion to look into it 
carefully, but my impression is that it follows the State court 
practice.’ ’ 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN M. BARNES. 

(Pages 915-916.) 

On this subject Mr. Barnes testified that in January, 1904, after 
repeated efforts on the part of the judge to get juries without colored 
men on them ho (Barnes) left the city for a day, but before leaving 
cautioned the chief deputy that the judge would most likely avail 
himself of Mr. Barnes’s absence to have a tales jury summoned; that 
on his return, as he had anticipated, he found the judge had drawn 
the name of one grand juryman from the box and ordered the deputy 
to summon 29 tales jurors at once; that the deputy had partially 
obeyed his caution and summoned only 24 men; that he (Barnes) 
summoned the remaining 6 talesmen, three of whom were colored; 
that in making a return of the venire he placed these colored men on 
the list as Nos. 7, 10, and 18; that he handed the venire to the deputy 
clerk of the court, Mr. Morgan, Judge Speer’s brother-in-law, who 
gave it to Mr. Akerman, the assistant district attorney, who disap¬ 
peared with it in the direction of Judge Speer’s office; that Mr. 
Akerman’s clerk rewrote the venire and put the colored men as Nos. 
28 and 29 upon the list so that they were shut out from service on 
the grand jury. That on another occasion when a colored juror had 
been regularly drawn, the judge facetiously remarked that the deputy 
would find'it too far out of the way to serve that man. 

Mr. Barnes stated (pp. 918-922) that Judge Speer packed the grand 
jury in the Greene and Gaynor case in the fall of 1899; that the judge 
wanted to get as ignorant a jury as possible, and to that end excluded 
all names from the counties of Chatham and Glynn, these two coun¬ 
ties embracing the cities of Savannah and Brunswick. That when 
the grand jury was to be drawn in this case the judge called him 
(Barnes) and gave him a bunch of 50 names from the box, asking him 
to look them over and see if he knew any of those men; that the 
names were all from the southwestern division of the district and that 
he knew hardly any of them; that during all of the drawing Judge 
Speer and Mr. Talley were in frequent low conversation; that finally 
when the name of one McKee or McGee, from Valdosta, was reached, 
the judge and Mr. Talley had a long low conversation, and when the 
grand jury was empaneled at Savannah this man was appointed fore¬ 
man by the judge; that one of the men drawn in this manner (named 
Bennett) had been arrested by the deputy marshal for some offense 
against the United States and was out on bond, and another was a 
fugitive from justice, but both were served with subpoenas and became 
grand jurors in this case. 

Mr. Barnes testified further that about 10 per cent of the names in the 
jury box are those of colored men, a letter “C” enclosed in brackets 
being written after the names of such men; that when the judge gets 
his jury by drawing the names out of the box he requests the other 
officials to keep at a distance, ordering off H. H. King, the clerk, and 
himself (Barnes), saying he didn’t need strict surveillance in the mat- 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 33 


ter; that he frequently picks up two or more slips as if by mistake 
and then with a glance and dexterous movement of the fingers drops 
all but one. 

In answer to a question Mr. Barnes again described the method 
used by Judge Speer in selecting the grand jury in the Greene and 
Gaynor case (pp. 932-947), stating, “He would ask me to look over 
them [the names] and see what I could tell about them. There 
were very few that I knew and I called out the names; and he would 
reject them or accept them, as the case might be. * * * And 

when the judge would accept one he would pass it to Mr. L. M. 
Erwin, deputy clerk, to enter on the list.” In answer to questions 
as to whether the judge accepted or rejected names after consulta¬ 
tion with Mr. Barnes, with Mr. Talley, or Mr. Tucker, Mr. Barnes 
testified that the names were accepted or rejected after being dis¬ 
cussed in the manner described. Mr. Barnes testified that he was 
reasonably sure at least 100 names were taken from the box and 
examined in selecting 30 names for the grand jury, and in replying 
to a further question as to whether the names were selected by lot 
or indiscriminately, he states, “I tried to select men from every 
class and mix them in, so there could be no possible chance of any¬ 
thing like a picked or packed jury. I took the rich and the poor, 
high and the low, the banker and the farmer, everything, so as to 
get a representative jury. 

• 

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER AKERMAN. 

(Pages 1089-1091.) 

Mr. Akerman stated that in the fall of 1912 Judge Speer had drawn 
a grand jury while outside of the judicial district; that he had received 
a written notice from the judge that he was unable to come to the 
district for the purpose of drawing a grand jury, and requesting that 
one of the assistant district attorneys be sent to Mount Airy, Ga., 
with the clerk, the marshal, and the jury boxes, for the purpose of 
drawing a jury; that he doubted the legality of such proceedings, 
and wired the department for authority to send one of his assistants 
as requested by the judge; that the jury was actually drawn by the 
judge at Mount Airy, Ga., and that he still doubts the legality of 
such a jury, as the law states that it shall be publicly drawn, which 
means in such a manner that the public affected by the proceedings 
can have access to them; that Mount Airy, Ga., is between three and 
four hundred miles distant from the city of Savannah, where the 
jury was to be used. 

This correspondence is in evidence as Exhibit 14-B. 


TESTIMONY OF MR. A. A. LAWRENCE. 

(Pages 1430-1445.) 

Mr. Lawrence stated that he was an attorney, practicing in the 
Federal court at Savannah, Ga., and was a partner of Mr. W. W. 
Osborne; that he was acquainted with Judge Speer and had known 


34 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


him since his college days. Upon being asked as to Judge Speer’s 
methods in drawing juries, he stated that he had never known the 
judge to select a jury according to law; that it was a very remark¬ 
able thing for the judge to select a jury in open court; that in the 
Greene and Gaynor case, in which he was employed as counsel for 
the defendants, he learned that something mysterious was being 
done in regard to the jury box; that they were fixing up a special 
box for the case, and upon proceeding to inquire was told by the 
clerk of the court that no new box had been prepared- but some 
six weeks afterwards he happened to be going through the files of the 
case and found there an order which provided for a special jury box 
by which the defendants should be tried; that the order had been 
kept from the defendants and was not in the papers at the time the 
grand jury was drawn. Mr. Lawrence then produced a letter writ¬ 
ten to Mr. T. F. Johnson, clerk of the court, inclosing an order for 
the preparation of a special jury box and ordering that it be entered 
upon the minutes of the court the first day of the term. Mr. Law¬ 
rence states this box was made up of men living in five counties in 
the most remote part of the division, the closest town in the district 
being 150 miles from Savannah, the place at which the jury was to 
sit; that the trial jury was also taken from the same box; that 
when he charged Judge Speer with having ordered the preparation 
of the jury box in the manner described during the trial of the case 
he was fined $100 for contempt* of court; that Judge Speer never 
lets anybody have an opportunity to study jury lists and does not 
draw a jury in advance; that he did not know who the jurymen were 
to be in the trial of the Greene and Gaynor case until the day before 
the trial. 

The statement of Mr. Lawrence is Exhibit 14-C. 

Mr. Lawrence testified (pp. 1445-1449) that he was of counsel in the 
case of United States v. Crawley & McClellan, and that at 5 o’clock in 
the afternoon of the day before the trial he went to the clerk’s office and 
obtained a list of the jurymen who had been empaneled in order to be 
able to strike from it, but that to his surprise on going into court the 
next morning he found that there was an entirely new panel of jurors 
gotten together since the previous afternoon; that he never under¬ 
stood exactly how they did it, but that there was no doubt that it was 
a picked jury; that all these men were from Savannah and were 
served before breakfast on the morning of the trial; that they did not 
get these names out of the box unless they went and picked them outr 
that the regular panel of jurors entered upon the records had not been 
discharged and were present in court. He also stated that there was 
no provision of law for the drawing of jurors in this way and that they 
couldn’t be called tales jurors. 

He stated also (pp. 1466-1469) that Judge Speer did not draw 
juries in a public way and that he could not tell just how they were 
obtained, but that he does not draw them out of the box. He stated 
that he had never in all his practice known Judge Speer to draw a jury 
out of the box in open court, except in the Greene and Gaynor case, in 
which a special request was made. He stated further that he had a 
vague recollection of having seen one other jury drawn from the box. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 35 
TESTIMONY OF W. W. OSBORNE. 

(Pages 2103-2107.) 

Mr. Osborne stated that the jury put upon the defendants in the 
case of United States v. Crawley & McClellan was one of the juries 
fixed up overnight, all of the parties being residents of the city of 
Savannah; that these juries were prepared in this way by Judge Speer 
for the purpose of taking away from the defendants the riglit to use 
peremptory strikes, as it is impossible for the defendants' attorney to 
study the jury intelligently when it is put upon them overnight; that, 
although he has practiced in this court for 20 years, he has never seen 
Judge Speer draw but one jury from the box, which was in the Greene 
and Gaynor case, and was done after a demand from the attorneys 
for the defense that they be present when the jury was to be drawn; 
that in this case the judge ordered a special jury box prepared from 
the names of parties residing in six counties situated 300 miles from 
Savannah, where the trial was to be held; that the making of this 
special box was secretly kept from the defense for a couple of months. 

AFFIDAVIT OF MR. T. F. JOHNSON. 

Mr. Johnson was clerk of the circuit and district courts for the 
southern district of Georgia for seven and a half years, and he has 
furnished an affidavit with regard to the manner in which Judge 
Speer selected juries, and also with regard to his neglect of court 
business, etc., which is marked “ Exhibit 14-D.'' 

The substance of Mr. Johnson's affidavit on the question of drawing 
juries is as follows: 

Sometimes Judge Speer drew all the jurors out of the box. Often he would draw a 
few names out of the box and then direct the marshal to select the balance of the 
jurors from a list of names kept in the clerk’s office. This list in the clerk’s office con¬ 
tained the names which were in the jury boxes. Sometimes the judge would draw 
two or three juries during a term of court. He would first draw a full panel, and then 
if he had an important case to try, just before the case would be tried he would draw 
an entirely new panel. He would not draw a jury where an important case was to be 
tried until just a short time before the case was to be tried, and embarrass the marshal 
by having him to hurry up to get his subpoenas served for the jury to get in on time. 
"Very often the jury boxes would be sent to Judge Speer at Macon to draw juries in the 
other divisions. I am informed that the last jury for the eastern division was drawn 
at Mount Airy, the box having been sent there for that purpose. 

Mr. Johnson also testified that Judge Speer violated the law in 
appointing Mr. A. S. Anderson, a Republican, as jury commissioner 
while he (Johnson) was also a Republican, the law requiring that the 
commissioners be of opposite political parties; and that he called this 
matter to the attention of Judge Speer, but that notwithstanding this 
fact the judge continued to use the jury boxes prepared by these two 
Republicans for one or two subsequent terms without revision. 

TESTIMONY OF JUDGE SAMUEL B. ADAMS. 

/ 

(Pages 2473-2489.) 

Mr. Adams testified that Judge Speer passed an order for the prep¬ 
aration of jury boxes in connection with the case of United States v. 
Merchants & Miners Transportation Co., which was contrary to the 


36 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

law and which provided that the names put into the box be prepared 
according to a certain specified number from each county, not in 
accordance with the population or wealth of the counties. That he, 
representing the defendant, filed a plea in abatement on the ground 
that the indictment found by a jury obtained in this way was unlaw¬ 
ful, and being overruled by Judge Speer he appealed to the supreme 
court (circuit court of appeals), and that the court held that the 
manner of preparing the jury boxes mentioned was strictly un¬ 
warranted by law; but they did not reverse Judge Speer on the theory 
that no injury had been shown to the defendants. (199 Fed., p. 902.) 

In connection with the testimony given by Judge Samuel B. Adams, 
relative to the alleged illegal action of Judge Speer in ordering the 
jury commissioners to prepare jury boxes by placing the names of a 
certain number of men therein from each of the several counties, it is 
noted that after the circuit court of appeals had stated in the case of 
U. S. v. M. & M. T. Co. (199 Fed., p. 902): 

The order of the trial judge instructing the jury commissioners as to the revision of 
the jury box and directing the placing therein of a certain number of names from the 
different counties comprising the eastern division of the southern district of Georgia, 
though strictly unwarranted by law, was not so irregular or so erroneous that, in the 
absence of proof of injury, prejudice can be predicated thereon. 

the judge continued to make orders for the preparation of jury boxes 
in the manner which the court of appeals had stated was strictly 
unwarranted by law. Exhibit 14-E is a certified copy of an order 
made by Judge Speer March 17,1913, ordering the jury commissioners 
to make up boxes in the manner mentioned. This order was made 
some months subsequent to the decision of the court of appeals 
mentioned. 

The evidence on this subject shows that Judge Speer has made a 
practice of obtaining juries in an illegal manner, and he does not 
contradict the testimony of Hon. Thos. S. Felder to the effect that 
in the case of United States v. Branen Judge Speer Qrdered the mar¬ 
shal to draw a picked jury from the list of jurors when no legally 
impaneled jury had theretofore been drawn. 

It is noted the judge endeavors to show in justification of his action 
that only good juries have been selected by him and that no harm 
has been done. He states also that in the Branen case he was under 
the impression that a regular jury for the term had been impaneled. 
If he was under such an impression, it is difficult to understand why 
he thought it necessary to order the marshal to summon a new jury 
of picked men, all from the city of Macon, some of whom had received 
favors from him. The facts show that no venire whatever had been 
drawn or summoned and that the picked jury mentioned were not 
talesmen, but were the only jurymen summoned for that term of 
court. 


CHARGES OP ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 37 


ALLEGED UNLAWFUL AND OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT IN DEFY¬ 
ING MANDATES OF SUPREME COURT AND CIRCUIT COURT 

OF APPEALS. 

THE JAMISON CASE. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. CUSTIS NOTTINGHAM. 

(Pages 7-49.) 

Mr. Nottingham testified he had lived in Macon since he was 12 
years of age, and held the position of recorder of the city court from 
December, 1904, until about the first part of 1908. On March 13, 
1904, Jamison was brought before him charged with being drunk 
and disorderly, also with the offense of being violently abusive and 
disorderly after his arrest; that Jamison cursed the officers in the 
most obscene and profane manner, and persistently demanded that 
the officers ring up Judge Speer; he fined Jamison, and in default of 
the payment of the fine Jamison was delivered to the superintendent 
of public works for service in the chain gang. That he was later 
released from that custody on a writ of habeas corpus issued by the 
United States court, upon the order of Judge Speer, Mr. Alexander 
Akerman appearing as his counsel in that hearing. 

Upon the case being taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of the 
United States by the city of Macon, the decision of Judge Speer was 
reversed. Mr. Minter Wimberly, the city attorney, made applica¬ 
tion to Judge Speer to have the mandate of the Supreme Court made 
the judgment of the lower court, but the motion of Mr. Wimberly 
was declined and not acted upon. Mr. Wimberlv then directed the 
chief of police of the city, Mr. Connor, to take Jamison into custody, 
and return him to Mr. Wimbush, that his sentence might be served. 
As a result of this action, attachments for contempt of court were 
issued by Judge Speer for Mr. Wimbush, Mr. Connor, and Mr. Wim¬ 
berly, and Jamison was also taken from the custody of the city and 
released. 

Pending the determination of the Jamison case, several writs of 
habeas corpus were sued out on behalf of other parties, who were 
released in a like manner. So far as the witness was informed no 
effect had ever been given to the mandate of the Supreme Court, and 
he had no knowledge whatever of the order which now appears in the 
United States Dist ict Court at Macon, dated June 8, 1906. He had 
about this time been involved in a newspaper controversy with 
Judge Speer, and is certain he would have been advised if any pub¬ 
licity had been given to the order of the court finally made in the case. 
The original writ of habeas corpus sued out was made returnable at 
Savannah, Ga., about 175 miles distant from Macon, and, as he 
unde stands the statutes, it is imperative that writs of habeas corpus 
shall be made returnable within a mileage distance, as he recalled 
it, within 50 miles of the place of detention. Mr. Nottingham 
stated further that after an extended hearing on the attachments 
for contempt issued against the city authorities, Judge Speer reserved 
his decision for several years, and that he was infornred later that the 
contempt cases we e dismissed. The act under which Jamison was 
sentenced to the Bibb County chain gang was later declared void by 
the supreme court of the State of Georgia, and a technical change in 


38 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


the city charter, by which the city established its own chain gang, 
the sentence reading, under the amended act, “to the public works 
of the city,” instead of “to the pub he works of the county.” 

CROSS-EXAMINATION. 

Mr. Nottingham stated he was a lawyer by profession and had prac¬ 
ticed about 10 years at the time he rendered the sentence in the Jami¬ 
son case. Aggregate money penalty imposed by him in the ca^e was 
approximately $60, and that the time to be served in default of pay¬ 
ment aggregated seven months, there being two separate charges and 
convictions. The persons with whom Jamison was confined were 
felons of all classes under the laws of Georgia. After receipt of the 
mandate of the supreme court in the Jamison case, a case somewhat 
similar to the Jamison case—i. e., the Pearson case—was taken to the 
Supreme Court of Georgia. In that case a decision was rendered to 
the effect that sentences such as were involved in these cases, of city 
prisoners to the county chain gang, were unconstitutional. In 
answer to questions as to the action of the Supreme Court of Georgia 
that the trouble with the authority presented by the attorney for 
Judge Speer was that it was authority subsequent to the time the 
case in question was decided. In answer to the question, as to the 
reasons for litigating this case—i. e., as to whether it was for the pur¬ 
pose of testing the constitutionality of that class of sentences—Mr. 
Nottingham replied that his view was that the litigation was due to 
the desire of Judge Speer to release Jamison from the sentence im¬ 
posed by the municipal court. 

On further questions Mr. Nottingham replied that the motion to 
make the mandate of the supreme court the order of the lower court 
was made immediately after the mandate was received in Macon, 
and some time prior to the decision of the State court in the Pearson 
case. Mr. Nottingham stated that he had no distinct recollection 
as to the other habeas corpus petitions filed 

On being questioned as to the final determination of the case, Mr. 
Nottingham replied that he did not recall, as the chief matter of 
interest was “what we thought a high-handed intervention of the 
Federal court,” and that there never was any unwillingness on the 
part of the city authorities to have the matter thoroughly tried in the 
courts of the State by orderly procedure. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. E. A. WIMBUSH. 

(Pages 530-532.) 

Mr. Wimbush testified that in the year of 1904-5 he was employed 
as superintendent of public works for Bibb County, Ga., and recalled 
having received during that time for service on the chain gang a man 
named Henry Jamison; that he was received March 14^ 1904, and 
released by order of Judge Speer on March 17, 1904; that he was 
rearrested by the chief of police on November 25, 1905, and again 
released on a new writ of habeas corpus on December 3, 1905. He 
stated further that Jamison had never been returned to him by the 
United States marshal. Also, that he was attached for contempt 
about December 3, 1905, the writ releasing Jamison and the contempt 
rule being “practically together.” 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 39 


TESTIMONY OF GRANVILLE C. CONNOR. 

(Pages 49-53.) 

Mr. Connor testified that he was deputy clerk of the court of the 
city of Macon, Ga., and that in 1904 he held the position of chief of 
police of the city; that after the decision of the supreme court in the 
Jamison case he was instructed by Mr. Wimberfy, the city attorney, 
to rearrest Jamison; that he did so and turned the prisoner over to 
the superintendent of public works; that he was ruled for contempt 
and appeared in answer to the rule, and that after argument of the 
case the judge reserved decision, and that about three years later he 
was informed that the proceedings had been dismissed. He stated 
that he had the rule which was served upon him and would furnish 
it to the committee. In answer to the question of what became of 
Jamison, Mr. Connor stated that he turned him over to the superin¬ 
tendent of public works, and that the United States marshal came 
the next morning and took him out. Mr. Connor had no knowledge 
of the present whereabouts of Jamison. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. MINTER WIMBERLY. 

(Pages 474-521.) ' 

Mr. Wimberly stated that he was city attorney for Macon for 14 
years, and was holding that position during the litigation known as 
the Jamison case. Jamison was arrested for a violation of a city 
ordinance, tried, fined, and sentenced on two charges. Jamison was 
a common laborer and, he understood, worked at Judge Speer’s 
house at times; that he was notified in his official capacity that the 
United States marshal had taken Jamison from the custody of Mr. 
Wimbush, superintendent of public works, on a writ of habeas corpus, 
the writ directing a hearing in Savannah a day or two after the serv¬ 
ice thereof,*and that he called Judge Speer on the lorg-distance tele¬ 
phone and asked if he could extend the time a day or two, the statute 
granting the respondent in such a case a day for every 50 miles trav¬ 
eled. The judge granted the time and the case was argued at Sa¬ 
vannah and continued until some later day, Jamison being enlarged 
on bond. Upon hearing of the case Jamison was discharged by Judge 
Speer and appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. Mr. Wimberly testified that there was a great deal of feeling 
in Macon over the case, and that the city contended-that the Federal 
court had no jurisdiction; that the proper remedy for Jamison from 
the action of the city court was by appeal to the supreme court of 
the State. In answer to questions as to his action subsequent to the 
mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States reversing the 
action of Judge Speer in the Jamison case, Mr. Wimberly testified that he 
received the mandate some weeks after the case was argued, and that 
he contended that he had the right to immediately take action upon 
that decision, but that he considered it a better practice to wai t 30 
days; that he did actually wait 30 days after the rendition of the 
mandate, and then gave the mandate to Mr. Akerman, requesting 
him to take it to Judge Speer and ask what direction the cour t desired 
to give in the further progress of the case; that he wanted to avoid 
all feeling in the case and went so far as to suggest that he would pay 


40 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

$5 toward the negro’s fine to get rid of the case; that he waited 30 
days and Mr. Akerman gave back the mandate, after which he pre¬ 
pared a short petition addressed to the court asking that the mandate 
of the Supreme Court be made the judgment of the district court; 
that upon presenting the matter to Judge Speer, who was at that 
time holding court in the Hotel Lanier, the judge replied that he was 
then entertaining bankruptcy matters and requested him (Wim¬ 
berly) to file the petition with the clerk of the court, which he did. 

Mr. Wimberly stated that in presenting the petition to the court 
he held it in his hand and made the request for action upon it, but din 
not remember whether he read it to the court or not. He stated, 
however, that he distinctly recalled the judge’s telling him to file 
the petition with the clerk, and that he took the petition to the clerk 
and saw him mark it filed. 

This precaution was taken as the mayor and city council were 
pressing him to have the mandate enforced. That after having seen 
the petition filed with the clerk of the court, he directed the chief of 
police to rearrest Jamison and deliver him to the superintendent of 
the county chain gang. That Mr. Connor, the chief of police did 
rearrest Jamison, and shortly thereafter an attachment for contempt 
was issued against himself, Mr. Connor, and Mr. Wimbush, the super¬ 
intendent of the chain gang. He stated that he did not remember 
whether a separate petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the part 
of Jamison was filed, or whether it was in the same proceeding, but 
that Jamison was again released by the United States marshal. That 
he filed an answer to the rule for contempt, and that after argument 
of the case Judge Speer reserved decision and that the case “ just wore 
out,” that is, that he learned that some years afterwards the contempt 
cases were dismissed. Mr. Wimbush stated that Mr. Alexander 
Akerman was the attorney for Jamison in the habeas corpus pro¬ 
ceedings, and also acted as attorney for the petitioner in the Pearson 
case. 

Mr. Wimberly stated he did not know how long it was after the 
making of the mandate of the supreme court in the Jamison case 
before it was made the judgment of the lower court, and that he did 
not know of any reason why it was not made the judgment of the 
lower court immediately after it was filed. 

That he had called the attention of Judge Speer to the mandate prior 
to the issuance of the attachment for contempt against himself and 
the other city authorities, and had made a motion to the judge to have 
the said mandate recognized in the expectation that the marshal 
would then deliver Jamison over to the recorder, but when it was not 
done he proceeded to enforce the sentence of the city court. Mr. 
Wimberly stated further that he distinctly recalls having prepared 
the written application to the court to have the mandate of the 
supreme court recognized and that he presumed a blank order to that 
effect was attached to the petition. Upon cross-examination Mr. 
Wimberly declined to admit that the “decision of the Supreme Court 
of the State of Georgia settled any of the issues involved in the 
Jamison case.” He stated that the Supreme Court of Georgia in the 
Pearson case merely decided that the city recorder of Macon had no 
authority to sentence offenders to the Bibb County chain gang. That 
its only effect was to require such offenders to be sentenced to service 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 41 

on the city chain gang. Mr. Wimberly stated that his view of the 
Jamison case was that Jamison was still a fugitive from justice. 
In response to a question from Mr. Volstead Mr. Wimberly stated he 
thought the rearrest of Jamison after the supreme court mandate was 
filed, and his second enlargement by the marshal, and the issuance of 
the rule for contempt under the case were practically contempo¬ 
raneous. Mr. Wimberly stated that he had never been notified that 
the mandate of the supreme court was ever made the order of the 
district court, and that he was not advised that an order was entered 
to that effect on June 8, 1906. 

Upon being recalled Mr. Wimberly was questioned by the chair¬ 
man in regard to the petition which he had testified was presented to 
the judge while holding court at the Lanier House, the said petition 
not having been found by clerk of court when placing papers in the 
case in the record, but later located and turned over to the committee. 
Mr. Wimberly identified the petition, and stated that he presented it 
to the court and was requested by the judge to file it with the clerk, 
which he did. 


TESTIMONY OF CECIL MORGAN. 

(Pages 54-84.) 

Mr. Morgan testified that he was the deputy clerk of the United 
States district court at Macon, Ga., and had held the position since 
March, ,1899. That he knew something of the record in the Jamison 
case and had the papers in his possession. In response to the request 
of the chairman Mr. Morgan then placed the papers in the case in the 
record by reading the title of each, and turned them over to the 
stenographer. In answer to the question as to the delay in making 
the mandate of the Supreme Court the order of the district court from 
November 25, 1905, to June 8, 1906, Mr. Morgan stated there was 
nothing in the record to show Mr. Wimberly appeared before the court 
and filed a petition asking that the mandate of the Supreme Court be 
made the order of the district court, and that he had no recollection 
of such a paper being filed. On cross-examination Mr. Morgan stated 
that he believed the new Federal building was in the course of con¬ 
struction duiing the time the Jamison case was being litigated; also 
that during the early part of the year 1906 the Greene and Gaynor 
case was being tried at Savannah by Judge Speer. Mr. Morgan also 
read into the record the numbers and titles of certain other habeas 
corpus cases which were instituted during the time the Jamison case 
was pending. 

Upon being recalled and questioned with regard to a petition filed 
by Mr. Min ter Wimberly in the Jamison case, requesting Judge Speer 
to make the mandate of the United States Supieme Couit the judg¬ 
ment of the district court at Macon, Mr. Morgan stated (pp. 525-527) 
that there was no such paper on file, and that nothing on the record 
showed the receipt of any such paper. 

Upon being recalled a second time (pp. 616-617) Mr. Morgan was 
handed a paper by the chairman and questioned as to its nature, to 
which he replied, “This is indorsed 'in the Distiict Court of the United 
States for the Western Division of the Southern District of Georgia, 
E. A. Wimbush, superintendent, et al. v. Henry Jamison, making the 


42 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States the judgment of 
the district court.’ ” Upon being asked where he found that paper, 
Mr. Morgan stated that it was in an envelope with a number of sub¬ 
poena. writs, marshal’s bills, etc., that are hied in the Jamison case. 
He stated that the paper was not signed by the judge, but was placed 
among the papers in the Jamison case. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. ALEXANDER AKERMAN. 

(Pages 1053-1058.) 

Mr. Akerman stated that he resided in Macon, Ga., and was an at¬ 
torney by profession, and at present holds the position of United 
-States attorney for the Southern District* of Georgia. He said he 
remembered the Jamison case, and that his firm sued out the habeas 
corpus writ in that case; that in the spring of 1904, while the United 
States Court was in session at Savannah, Judge Speer sent for him to 
come to his chambers and stated that he had received a letter or 
telegram from Mrs. Speer stating that Henry Jamison had been 
sentenced to serve on the chain gang at Macon; that Mrs. Speer was 
very much distressed, and that if he (Akerman) would sue out a writ 
of habeas corpus he (the judge) would have Mrs. Speer pay him' a fee; 
that he then telegraphed his brother to prepare a petition for Jamison, 
which was done, and when presented to Judge Speer, the judge 
granted a writ of habeas corpus returnable at Savannah; that there 
was a partial hearing at Savannah, and adjournment taken to a later 
day at Macon, when a full hearing was had; that Judge Sp'eer ren¬ 
dered an opinion discharging Jamison from custody, and the city of 
Macon appealed to the United States Supreme Court; that he ap¬ 
peared before the court and argued the case for Jamison, but when 
the opinion came down the Supreme Court had reversed Judge Speer 
in a unanimous opinion; that Mr. Minter Wimberly, who represented 
the city of Macon in this litigation, brought the mandate of the 
Supreme Court and turned it over to him (Akerman), stating that 
he wanted his cooperation in getting Judge Speer to make the mandeat 
of the Supreme Court the judgment of the court below; that he took 
the mandate to the judge at his house, but for some reason the judge 
did not consider it advisable to make the mandate the judgment of 
the court below; that after this Mr. Wimberly was continually after 
him, stating that the counsel of the city was impatient for action on 
the mandate; that about this time he had occasion to leave the city 
for a few days, and requested Judge Speer to postpone action on the 
matter until his return; that he handed the mandate back to Mr. Wim¬ 
berly and informed him that there would be a session of the court 
at the Hotel Lanier the next day; that the next morning when court 
opened Mr. Wimberly made a motion to make the mandate the judg¬ 
ment of the court below; that Judge Speer declined and assigned as his 
reason that the court was only in session for bankruptcy matters. 

There is very little dispute as to the facts alleged in this case. The 
evidence shows that Judge Speer requested Mr. Alexander Akerman 
to sue out a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of the colored man, 
Henry Jamison, who had been employed at his house at times, and 
that he stated to Mr. Akerman that Mrs. Speer would pay him a fee; 
that Judge Speer required the city authorities of Macon to produce 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 43 

Jamison in the Federal court at Savannah, 200 miles distant from 
Macon; that upon hearing the case he ordered the release of Jamison; 
and that after the Supreme Court reversed his decision, quashing the 
writ, and assessing the costs against the petitioner, the judge declined 
to recognize the mandate of the Supreme Court, although it was 
brought to his attention both by Mr. Akerman and by Mr. Min ter 
Wimberly, the city attorney, who appeared in court and presented 
a written petition. Also that when the city authorities rearrested 
Jamison, after having made the efforts mentioned to get Judge Speer 
to recognize the mandate of the Supreme Court, they were attached 
for contempt of court and Jamison again released on a second writ of 
habeas corpus sued out by the same party who had brought the 
original writ at the instance of Judge Speer. It is also true that the 
mandate of the Supreme Court, although rendered October 15, 1905, 
and received in Macon on November 17, 1905, was not entered in the 
records of the district court at Macon until June 8, 1906. 

The reply made to these charges by Judge Speer is in the nature 
of a confession and avoidance, and he puts his motive on the high 
ground of a desire to test the constitutionality of the law under which 
Jamison was sentenced by the city authorities. 

The argument that these officials were attached for contempt because 
they acted before all of the legal formalities relative to the matter 
had been observed, when it is admitted that the mandate was pre¬ 
sented to him by a formal petition and said petition and mandate 
filed with the clerk at his request, is hardly sufficient to justify Judge 
Speer in the light of the attending circumstances. 

On pages 68 to 72 of Judge Speer’s argument he states the history 
of the case from his standpoint up to the time Mr. Min ter Wimberly 

g resen ted the petition requesting that the mandate of the Supreme 
ourt be recognized to the judge while holding court at chambers at 
the Hotel Lanier on November 24, 1905. The judge then recites 
that immediately after the mandate was filed with the clerk, at his 
suggestion, the city authorities rearrested Jamison and turned him 
over to the superintendent of public works, and instead of proceeding 
chronologically with the recital, and stating that he then immedi¬ 
ately issued the rule against these authorities to show cause why 
they should not be attached for contempt, he recites the habeas 
corpus proceedings in the State court and follows that with the pro¬ 
ceedings on the second writ of habeas corpus granted December 1, 
1905, and proceeds to state the proceedings had on that writ up until 
December 18, 1905. 

After reciting all these proceedings which happened subsequent to 
his contempt rule against the city authorities, he returns to the day 
following the rearrest of Jamison, and states the proceedings had on 
his contempt rule issued against the city authorities, thus making it 
appear that these attachment proceedings were had after the second 
writ of habeas corpus was issued, while as a matter of fact these par¬ 
ties were ruled on the 25th of November, which was a week prior to 
the issuance of the second writ of habeas corpus. A casual reading 
of this reply gives the impression that the officials of the city of Macon 
were attached for contempt for violating the order of the court on 
the second writ of habeas corpus, while the facts are that they merely 
rearrested Jamison on the authority of the mandate of the Supreme 
Court after it had been presented to Judge Speer and filed in his court 


44 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

with a petition asking that it be made the order of his court; and the 
second writ of habeas corpus mentioned was not in existence until a 
week after he had taken this drastic action in the face of the mandate 
of the Supreme Court. 

Considerable space is given by Judge Speer in his brief to the dis¬ 
cussion of the law as to the constitutionality of the act under which 
Jamison was sentenced. It should be borne in mind, however, that 
the only issue made by the charge in this case is with regard to Judge 
Speer's conduct in defying the mandate of the Supreme Court, and in 
ruling the city authorities for contempt in an unwarranted manner, 
and in the face of the mandate of the Supreme Court. While it is 
true that sentences such as that passed upon Jamison were in the 
following year declared to be unconstitutional in that they required 
pri oners sentenced by the recorder of the city court to serve in the 
county chain gang with State prisoners, some of whom might be 
serving time for graver offenses; for the purpo-rsof this investigation 
the matter was technical, and the only effect which the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Georgia had upon the situation was to require the 
city prisoners to be worked in the city chain gang instead of the county 
chain gang. Of course, this has no bearing whatever upon the action 
of the judge in refusing to recognize the mandate of the supreme court 
and in ruling the city authorities for contempt when they were guilty 
of nothing more than performing their official duties in an orderly 
and lawful manner. 

The argument made in the reply of Judge Speer that the city 
authorities were attached for contempt for rearrestirg Jamison after 
he had been discharged by order of the United States court, and 
while this order remained unrevoked, appears to be stated in direct 
opposition to the facts, as the order of the United States court had 
been reversed and dismissed by the highest court in the land, and 
this fact had been brought to Judge Speer’s attention and the mandate 
filed in his court upon his direction. The actions of Judge Speer in 
this case might be ascribed to error, or possibly to obstinacy on account 
of having his decision reversed, were it not proved that he and his 
wife were interested in Jamison and that the proceedings were in¬ 
stituted at his requ st and further that there was bad feeling between 
himself and the city authorities whom he took this opportunity to 
discipline. When the personal element is considered in connection 
with all of the circumstances of this case Judge Speer’s motive may 
be fairly inferred. 

The argument that the mandate of the supreme court was held up 
from November 24, 1905, until June 8, 1906, and not made the order 
of the distri t court on account of the fact that the Greene and Gay- 
nor case was tried at Savannah in the spring and summer of 1906 is 
not very satisfactory, in view of the fact that it was filed with the clerk 
at Macon some two and a half months before the court convened at 
Savannah for the trial of the Greene and Gaynor case. The only 
action necessary was for the judge to request the clerk to enter the 
order. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 45 


ALLEGED ARBITRARY AND OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT IN RE HOLST 
V. SAVANNAH ELECTRIC CO. ET AL. 

(Pages 1469-1481.) 

Mr. Lawrence testified that he was employed as counsel for de¬ 
fendant in the case of Holst v. Savannah Electric Co. et al., in which 
Judge Speer granted an injunction against the railway company on 
the ground that property was beirg taken without due process 
of law; that appeal was taken to the circuit court of appeals and 
Judge Speer reversed because’he had no jurisdiction; that when 
the mandate of the circuit court of appeals came, Mr. John Rourke 
was sent to Mount Airy, at which place the judge was stoppirg, 
about 400 mil: s distant from Savannah, to get Judge Speer to sign 
an order making the mandate the order of his court, and that Judge 
Speer declined to sign the order and dictated a teh gram to Mr. 
Lawrence’s firm for Mr. Rourke to sign as follows: “The court in 
Savannah not being in session, Judge Speer docs not feel at liberty 
to sign the judgment of the circuit court. Besides he wishes to hear 
counsel upon the question: Has the circuit court of appeals juris¬ 
diction to try an appeal involving the constitutional question in 
the case, and has not the Supreme Court of the United States ex¬ 
clusive jurisdiction? The court will convene at Savannah on the 
28th instant; he would consider a motion to consent to waive the 
question mentioned.” That the mandate of the circuit court of 
appeals was thus held up and that on the 26th day of November, 
1904, two days before the court was to convene at Savannah, a 
second suit was filed and Judge Speer granted another restraining 
order in the case, which had the effect of nullifying the mandate of 
the circuit court of appeals; that after the second injunction was 
issued, Judge Speer tiied to force the parties to settle the case and 
adjourned the hearing on the matter; that the following day the 
hearing proceeded just as if no such suggestion had been made by 
Judge Speer, and he finally dissolved the restraining order and denied 
the injunction. 

It should be remembered in considering this case that during the 
time this mandate of the circuit court of appeals was being hold up by 
Judge Speer the Savannah Electric Co. was prevented from con¬ 
tinuing its operations and laying its tracks, and that this action on 
the part of the judge allowed the enemies of the company time to 
institute another suit, entirely defeating the mandate of the higher 
court. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. JOHN ROURKE, JR. 

(Pages 1564-1568.) 

Mr. Rourke testified that he was an attorney practicing in the 
courts at Savannah, Ga., and that he remembered the case of Holst 
v. Savannah Electric Co. et al., tried in November, 1904, in which 
he acted for Messrs. Osborne and Lawrence, and took the mandate 
of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversing Judge Speer to Mount Airy, 
and presented it to the judge, requesting him to sign the order making 
it the judgment of the circuit court; that the judge refused to sign 
the order and stated that the Circuit Court of Appeals had no juris¬ 
diction in the matter; that they had no business to take the matter 


46 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER 


up or reverse him, and that he would refuse to sign it; that he left 
the judge, but as he had to wait four hours for his train, saw the 
judge again; witness did not recall whether he was sent for or went 
back of his own volition, and asked him if he would give some reason 
for his refusal to recognize the mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals, 
and that Judge Speer then dictated the telegram which is mentioned 
in the testimony of Mr. Lawrence; that the judge stated further that 
he would take up the case when he convened court at Savannah. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. E. P. DAVIS. 

(Pages 1211-1224.) 

Mr. Davis testified that in the case of Bean v. Orr he was employed 
to set up a mortgage against the bankrupt’s estate, and that when he 
appeared in court with his associate, Mr. C. W. Smith, of Atlanta, 
Judge Speer appeared to be unable to understand which side of the 
case they were on, and after they had proceeded 15 or 20 minutes 
wanted to know why they were attacking the mortgage, and that 
they replied they were trying to sustain the mortgage; that the judge 
would not allow any further argument and stated the referee had 
passed upon the mortgage, and that he would sustain the judgment 
of the referee; that he took the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals 
and argued it there, and Judge Speer was reversed; that when they 
received the mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals he and Mr. 
Smith “ played Alphonse and Gaston, I trying to get him to go to 
the court to get the mandate made the judgment of the lower 
court, and he trying to get me, but he being the braver man, finally 
went, while I stayed at home”; that he was later informed by Mr. 
Smith that he (Smith) took the mandate to Judge Speer when court 
was in session at Augusta and that Judge Speer declined to entertain 
it, and that it was necessary for Mr. Smith to go back to Atlanta and 
then appear before the court in Savannah to have the mandate made 
effective. 

Mr. Davis testified further that he had found it very difficult to 
get Judge Speer to sign orders, and that he had frequently written to 
Judge Speer in such matters and could never get a reply from him; 
that in the case of Murray & Smith, bankrupts, he had effected a 
composition settlement which had been approved by the referee and 
that he wrote to the judge, who was in North Carolina, three times 
without getting a reply and finally was compelled to go in person to 
Mount Airy, Ga., to get the order signed. That the judge stated to 
him that he had received his letters but that he made it a point to 
have the attorneys appear in person and present such orders. Mr. 
Davis stated further that he knew Judge Speer was absent from the 
district a considerable portion of the time, especially in the latter 
part of the summer and the first part of the fall. 

This refusal to recognize the mandate of the circuit court of appeals 
should be considered in connection with the other similar cases 
shown by the evidence. 

The testimony of Mr. Davis with regard to Judge Speer neglecting 
the business of the district, requiring attorneys to appear in person 
hundreds of miles away from the district, etc., is in line with the 
statements made by other witnesses. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 47 


REVERSALS. 

In this connection it is noted that Judge Speer states in his brief, 
in referring to the testimony that he had been reversed by the circuit 
court of appeals in 19 out of 41 cases, that this showing is not so bad, 
in view of the fact that he has been on the bench for 28 years, and he 
states that it shows an average of less than one reversal per year. 
As a matter of fact, the 41 cases mentioned in the testimony cover only 
the years from 1907 to 1913, or only about one-fifth of the time he has 
been on the bench. The judge is undoubtedly aware that he has 
been reversed many more times than the number mentioned in the 
testimony, but he apparently endeavors to give the impression that 
this number includes all of the cases in which he has been reversed, 
and that is the impression which a person not advised on the subject 
would get. 

The average instead of being less than one reversal a year, as he 
states, is more than three a year, and the percentage of reversals is 
nearly 50 per cent of the cases carried up. 

The following references are made to statements of the circuit 
court of appeals in reversing Judge Speer: 

MANN V. GADDIE. 

(158 Fed., page 44.) 

In reversing the action of Judge Speer in the above-entitled case, 
the circuit court of appeals used the following language: 

The bill was presented to the judge and indorsed “filed” June 29, 1906, and on the 
same day the judge made an order appointing J. A. Dunwoody temporary receiver 
and ordered him to take possession of the property, described in the bill, and all 
moneys arising from the sale of any property described in the bill. An injunction 
was also issued as prayed for. The learned judge, in appointing the receiver, held 
that the case made by the bill was one of urgency, and which, under the provisions of 
the Georgia Code, rendered proper the appointment of a receiver. 

The Georgia statute provides that: 

Under extraordinary circumstances a receiver may be appointed before, and with¬ 
out notice to the trustee, or other person having charge of the assets. (Civ. Code, 
Ga„ 1895, 4904.) 

We have had occasion heretofore to decide that this statute is only confirmatory of 
a principal of equity procedure and jurisdiction. (Joseph Drygoods Company v. 
Hecht.) In the absence of this statute under extraordinary circumstances a court 
of equity may appoint a receiver without notice. The extraordinary circumstances 
referred to in the statute are the exceptional cases which sometimes occur and which 
make it necessary that the courts should have the power to act without notice to the 
defendant. The defendant may be out of the jurisdiction of the court, or can not 
be found, or some emergency may be shown, rendering the interference, before there 
is time to give notice, necessary to prevent waste, destruction, or loss; and a case may 
arise in which notice itself would jeopardize the safety of the property over which the 
receivership is extended. The jurisdiction without notice should never be exercised 
except in cases of imperious necessity when the complainant’s right is clear and can 
not be protected in any other way. This is the rule wherever equity is administered 
and has been enjoined and enforced by repeated decisions of this court. Taking all 
the averments of the bill as true no reason is shown for the appointment of a receiver 
without notice. We heartily indorse the observation of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 
made in a case where the trial judge appointed a receiver without notice to the 
defendant. 

Under the circumstances of the case the appointment of the receiver was an unwar¬ 
ranted exercise of judicial power which it is the duty of this court to reverse and set 
aside. 


H. Rept. 1176, 63-2- 


4 


» 



48 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

HUFF ET AL. V. BID WELL ET AL. (SOLICITORS FEES). 

(195 Fed., page 430.) 

The circuit court of appeals in reversing Judge Speer in this 
instance stated that it was proper for all of the creditors to join in 
paying part of the attorneys fees incurred by the moving creditors 
and in reference to the question as to whether these fees should be 
paid out of the surplus due Mr. Huff stated: 

But the plaintiff in this case in no sense represented Mr. Huff, the defendant. The 
suit was not brought for his benefit. There was no just reason for seizing more of his 
property than would pay his debts, principal and interest, and the costs of the suit. 
The property having been sold for a sum in excess, the proceeds necessarily came into 
court; but it was never the purpose of the suit to accomplish more than the payment 
of the debts and costs. If no creditors had intervened, if the suit had been brought 
by the plaintiffs to enforce and collect their judgments only, is there any known 
principle upon which Mr. Huff could have been made responsible for the plaintiffs’ 
solicitor’s fees? The intervening of the creditors may in such cases oblige them to 
contribute to the payment of the fee; but such intervention imposed no obligation 
on the defendant who is sued. On principal, it seems to us that this fee can not be 
added to Mr. Huff’s indebtedness. 

The court then cites a number of authorities sustaining the position 
taken. 

There existed no reason or legal right to create at Mr. Huff’s expense a larger fund 
than enough to pay his debts and the costs. If it had been known in advance that 
the property as advertised would produce a surplus, and it had been capable of a 
suitable division to avoid that result, only enough of it should have been sold to pay 
the debts and the costs. There would have been no authority to sell more of it for the 
purpose of paying the fees of complainant’s solicitors. 

The court concluded by reversing the decision of Judge Speer that 
the fee of $10,000 claimed by the complainant's solicitors be paid out 
of Mr. Huff's estate, and remanded the case for action and conformity 
with the decision rendered. 

HUFF ET AL. V. BIDWELL ET AL. 

(151 Fed., page 563.) 

The circuit court of appeals used the following language in con¬ 
nection with Judge Speer's action in appointing a receiver in this 
case: 

The bill in this case was filed August 5, 1899, and on that day the circuit court, 
without notice to the defendant in the suit, appointed a “temporary” receiver to 
take possession of and to hold and manage the property mentioned and described in 
the bill, referring to the property of the defendant. * * *- We find no facts stated 
in the bill or shown by the record that made it proper to appoint a receiver without 
notice to the defendant. A court of equity has the power to make such appointment 
without notice; but, as has often been said, such powers should never be exercised 
except in a clear case of imperious necessity, when the rights of the plaintiff and the 
relief to which he shows himself entitled can be secured and protected in no other 
way. More than two years afterwards, on May 31, 1902, the case came on to be heard 
upon application to appoint a permanent receiver. The court granted the applica¬ 
tion, appointing the temporary receiver permanent receiver. The decree states as a 
fact that none of the parties to said cause contested the necessity for such appoint¬ 
ment. * * * The case has now reached a final decree on the merits, and we can 
do nothing as to the appointment of the receiver except to cause the costs growing 
out of the receivership to be taxed as seems right under the circumstance. We 
therefore direct that all the costs of the receivership, of every nature and kind, from 
the appointment of the receiver without notice on August 5, 1899, until the defend- 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 49 


ant seemingly acquiesced in the renewal of the order of appointment on May 31, 1902, 
be taxed against the plaintiff who procured the appointment. 

The circuit court of appeals also relieved Mr. Huff of any part of 
the costs of the appeal in this case, assessing them against the plaintiff 
and the city of Macon, which had been made a party to the suit. 

U. S. V. MERCHANTS & MINERS TRANSPORTATION CO. 

(199 Fed., page 902.) 

The language of the circuit court of appeals with reference to the 
order of Judge Speer for the preparation of the jury boxes in this 
case is as follows: 

The order of the trial judge instructing the jury commissioners as to the revision 
of the jury boxes and directing the placing therein of a certain number of names 
from the counties comprising the eastern division of the southern district of Georgia, 
though strictly unwarranted by law, was not so irregular or so erroneous that in the 
absence of proof of injury prejudice can be predicated thereon. 

Attention is invited elsewhere to the fact that Judge Speer con¬ 
tinued to follow the course which the higher court called strictly 
unwarranted by law after the decision mentioned was made. 

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF THOMASYILLE, GA., V. HOPKINS. 

(199 Fed., page 873.) 

In deciding this case against the bank Judge Speer stated the 
matter was too plain to be taken under advisement at all, and there¬ 
upon made a summary order calling ppon the bank to pay over 
forthwith the money involved, some $10,298.48. Upon appeal, the 
circuit court of appeals reversed Judge Speer; held that his action 
in ordering the payment of this money was improper. 

CABANISS V. RECO MINING COMPANY. 

(116 Fed., page 318.) 

The circuit court of appeals in reversing Judge Speer in this case, 
after reciting the averments in the bill asking for a receiver, used the 
following language: 

This bill seems to us to be clearly without equity, and it affords no sufficient basis 
for an order appointing a receiver. * * * 

It may be improper to say, in response to the discussion of that question, that the 
appointment of a receiver after notice before final trial is a jurisdiction which should 
be exercised with great care, and with studious effort to avoid mistake and oppres¬ 
sion; but to appoint a receiver without notice is a usurpation of power that should be 
rarely used, and never except in a clear case of imperious necessity, when the right 
of the complainant on the showing made by him is undoubted and when such relief 
can be given in no other way. When such notice can be given it should be given, 
unless there is immediate danger of loss, or great damage, or irrevocable injury, or 
the greatest emergency, or when by giving notice the very purpose of the appoint¬ 
ment of a receiver would be rendered nugatory; such instances are of rare occurrence 
in Federal courts, because of their power, when an injunction is asked for, to grant a 
temporary restraining order, which may be served at the same time that the notice 
is served, to prevent action by the defendant or his agent, and preserve the existing 
conditions until the application for an injunction and for a receiver can be heard. 

The order of appointing a receiver herein is reversed and annulled, and the receiver 
appointed is discharged, and he shall forthwith turn over and deliver all property 


50 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


held by him as receiver to the party or parties from whom he received it; and this 
cause is remanded, with instruction to pass upon the receiver’s account and compensa¬ 
tion, all costs in the circuit court and the expenses of the receivership to be paid by 
the complainants in the three bills;-and each party to the appeal will pay his own 
costs on the appeal; and the circuit court is directed to dismiss the bills and the con¬ 
solidated cases without prejudice. 

Let mandate issue immediately. 

This is the case in which bankruptcy proceedings were brought 
against the Rogers & Joiner Co. shortly after the decision of Judge 
Speer was reversed, and the receiver dismissed by the circuit court 
or appeals; and in which Judge Speer promptly appointed the same 
party receiver upon the bankruptcy petition and thereby defeated 
the mandate of the circuit court of appeals in spite of the very 
plain and unmistakable language of the court in reversing him to 
the effect that the appointment of a receiver should only be resorted 
to in the most urgent cases. 

JOSEPH DRY GOODS CO. ET AL. V. HECHT. 

(120 Fed., page 760.) 

The circuit court of appeals, in reversing Judge Speer in this case, 
used the following language: 

Cases occur where it is necessary to the ends of justice for the chancellor to act at 
once and without notice to the defendant. But notice should be given and the 
defendant afforded an opportunity to be heard, except in cases of imperious necessity, 
requiring immediate action by the court, and where protection could be afforded the 
plaintiff in no other way. It is error for the court to act without notice except in such 
cases. 

The court then cites a number of decisions sustaining this position, 
and proceeds: 

We find nothing in the record before us showing such emergency. The defendants 
were entitled to notice before action was taken on the prayer for a receiver. But if 
notice had been given the appointment even then could not be sustained. The 
ultimate purpose of the bill is to collect the plaintiff’s part of a debt which Joseph 
owes to Fried & Co. * * * There being no averment m the bill that the defendant 
Joseph is insolvent, and it not appearing that there would be any difficulty in collecting 
a judgment, the decree when rendered would be collectible; there is no necessity for 
seizing property for its satisfaction in advance of its rendition. The appointment of a 
receiver is an extraordinary remedy and can not be properly resorted to unless a neces¬ 
sity for it is shown. It follows that in a case like this a receiver should not be appointed 
unless the insolvency of the defendant debtor is shown. The court should not resort 
to so harsh a measure when it is not alleged that the defendant has no property subject 
to execution with which to satisfy the decree when rendered, there having been no 
allegation or proof of the insolvency of the defendant against whom the decree for the 
debt is sought. It was not shown to be necessary for the court to take possession of the 
stock of goods and money for the purpose of making it available to the plaintiff to 
satisfy a decree he might obtain. 

Language stronger than that of the circuit court of appeals in some 
of these cases could hardly have been used except at the expense of 
the dignity of the court, but Judge Speer seems to have paid little 
attention to the admonitions of the circuit court of appeals. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 51 

ALLEGED NEGLECT OF COURT BUSINESS, OFFICIAL DUTIES, 

ETC. 

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER AKERMAN, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY. 

(Pages 1059-1061.) 

Mr. Akerman testified that each year Judge Speer leaves the dis¬ 
trict in July and does not return until some time in November, and 
that during the time Judge Speer is in the district from November 
until July he devotes a great deal of his time to public speeches, etc.; 
that the criminal business of the district has been woefully neglected; 
that the judge only likes to try such cases as have some spectacular 
features which will attract attention in the public print; that owing 
to this neglect of the court business other judges, namely, Judge 
Sheppard, of Florida; Judge Grubb, of Alabama; and Judge Foster, 
of Louisiana, have been assigned to the trial of cases in Judge Speer’s 
district; that the report of an examiner of the Department of Justice 
showed such an accumulation of business that the Attorney General 
complained and suggested that he (Akerman) take the matter up with 
Judge Pardee, which was done, and Judge Grubb was later assigned 
to clear up some of the accumulated business. 

TESTIMONY OF A. A. LAWRENCE. 

(Pages 1481-1489.) 

Mr. Lawrence stated that Judge Speer is absent from the district a 
great part of every year, leaving some time in June and returning 
some time in November; that the judge goes to Mount Airy, Ga., or 
Highlands, N. C., or Toxaway, N. C., and that it is necessary for 
attorneys to travel hundreds of miles to get him to sign orders, etc., 
and that he had been forced to go to some of these places to see the 
judge, and that he had heard a good many other attorneys state that 
they had gone to Toxaway to see the judge, naming Col. Garrard and 
Judge Callaway. 

Mr. Lawrence further stated that Judge Speer makes a practice of 
coming to Savannah in November or December for a few days, at 
which time he assigns cases for hearing in February or March and 
then returns in the spring and holds a term of court, after which he 
does not appear again until the next November; that the law pro¬ 
vides for four terms of court each year at Savannah, but that the judge 
does not hold them, and is really only present for trying cases once a 
year. Mr. Lawrence stated further that Judge Newman and Judge 
Sheppard had been assigned to try cases in Savannah. 

Mr. Lawrence also stated (pp. 1494-1498) that Judge Speer, upon 
leaving the district for his long absences, never made any arrangemen 
with another judge for the transaction of court business, and tba 
since the circuit court was abolished they have practically no judge; 
that, speaking generally, the conditions as they exist at present are 
intolerable; that they can not get court business attended to, and 
when it is done it is attended to with caprice; that the judge will not 
sign even the most formal order unless it is presented by the attorney 
in person and that every kind of trouble is experienced in getting fit tie 


52 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


formal things done. Judge Speer claims that it is necessary for him 
to go to the mountains for several months a year on account of his 
being a sufferer from hay fever. 

TESTIMONY OF P. W. MELDRIM. 

(Pages 1652-1656.) 

Gen. Meldrim testified'that Judge Speer does not hold his terms of 
court at Savannah according to law and has no method about it. 
That the first notice the attorneys or litigants have of the time when 
court will be held frequently appears in the newspapers the evening 
before court convenes the following morning. That the judge then 
proceeds to assign cases for trial and the attorneys have to accom¬ 
modate themselves to such assignments. That generally speaking 
they have one term of court each year for the trial of cases; that the 
law fixes the dates of four terms of court to be held, and Judge Speer 
has never followed the provisions of the law. 

Gen. Meldrim also testified that he had gone to Highlands, N. C., to 
have an order signed by Judge Speer, and had also had occasion to go 
to Mount Airy, Ga., for similar business, and that the court was held 
on the hotel piazza, with the ladies all around; that there was general 
complaint as to the difficulties of getting cases tried before Judge 
Speer. 

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS S. FELDER. 

(Pages 1953-1956.) 

On this subject Mr. Felder testified that he had found it necessary 
to go outside of the district to try cases in Judge Speer’s court. 
That he had been in Mount Airy, Ga., and Highlands, N. C., for that 

E urpose. That when he was at Highlands court was held in the 
otel parlor and notices sent around inviting ladies to be present and 
that the attorneys were made to perform like monkeys; that Judge 
Speer has no fixed time for returning to the district in the fall, and 
that it depends upon the bird season. 

AFFIDAVIT OF MR. T. F. JOHNSON. 

Mr. T. F. Johnson, the former clerk of the court in the southern 
district of Georgia, has furnished an affidavit with regard to the 
alleged neglect of business by Judge Speer, which refers also to other 
matters, and which may be found as Exhibit No. 14-D. Mr. Johnson 
states in substance on this subject as follows: 

That during his term of service Judge Speer never held court in 
Savannah between May and November, but always omitted the 
regular terms of court provided by the statute in May and August; 
that it was the custom of the judge to come to Savannah some time in 
November or December of each year and stay a week or 10 days and 
assign cases to be tried in January, February, or March. That in the 
summer time Judge Speer leaves the District some time in July, goes 
to Mount Airy, Ga., or Highlands, or Toxaway, N. C., and holds 
court at those places, requiring the court records to be sent out of the 
district; that it was his custom to hold court in the divisions outside 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 53 


of Macon once a year. That neither the officers of the court nor 
members of the bar could ever tell with any certainty whether a case 
assigned upon a particular date would be tried upon that elate, as the 
judge would arbitrarily displace the assignment as he saw fit. That 
the judge would not publish his coming, or the time that he would 
hold court in advance, and that the clerk of the court could never tell 
the members of the bar with any degree of accuracy what date the 
court would convene. 

Mr. Johnson sent word to the committee, in response to a call from 
them, that he was in ill health and could not appear before the com¬ 
mittee and requested that his affidavit be used in lieu of his testimony. 

The evidence on this subject shows that Judge Speer, as a general 
rule, holds one term of court for the trial of cases in Savannah and 
the other divisions of the district other than at Macon each year. 
With the exception of Macon, court has been held more frequently 
at Savannah than at the other place of holding court. The records 
show that Judge Speer held court at Savannah 13 days in 1899, 32 

days in 1900, 30 days in 1901, 40 days in 1902, 27 days in 1903, 39 

days in 1904, 23 days in 1905, 82 days in 1906, 20 days in 1907, 39 

days in 1908, 22 days in 1909, 17 days in 1910, 37 days in 1911, 30 

days in 1912. When it is remembered that Savannah is by far the 
largest and most important city in the judicial district it will be 
appreciated that this list shows a very small number of court days 
for that division, and the testimony of the large number of attorneys 
from Savannah to the effect that they had been required to make 
frequent visits to Mount Airy, Ga., and Highlands and Toxaway, 
N. C., in the summer time, in addition to the necessity of going to 
Macon for the transaction of court business at other times during 
the year, should be considered in connection with this condition. 
The testimony of Mr. Akerman, the United States attorney, and the 
report of the examiner of the Department of Justice, upon which the 
Attorney General requested the assignment of other judges to the 
district in order to clear the congested condition of the dockets, 
appear to strengthen the charge of neglect of duty. 

It is true that Judge Speer has made a practice for many years of 
absenting himself from the district for about four months each year, 
and further, that during the time when he is in the district a large 
part of his attention is given to his duties at the Mercer University 
and to the preparation of addresses, etc., which have no connection 
with his judicial position. Reference is made to the list of addresses 
before different bodies presented in Judge Speer’s brief. 

Attention is also invited to the large amount of business which he 
refers to examiners, standing masters, and special masters, and the 
fees allowed for this service. 

There is certainly no other district in the country where the attor¬ 
neys have to travel from 200 to 400 miles during four months of the 
,.year to get court business attended to, but, on the contrary, it is the 
practice for the judge, in leaving his district even for a few weeks, to 
arrange with another judge to attend to the business in his absence. 
It is also true that terms of court are generally held according to law, 
and therefore frequently enough to prevent congestion and unusual 
delays in trying cases. 


54 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

BRIEF OUTLINE OF MORE IMPORTANT EVIDENCE. 

ALLEGED DEFYING OF THE MANDATES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND 
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS. 

There is considerable testimony on this subject, the principal cases 
being the Jamison case, the Savannah Electric Co. case, and the case 
of Bean v. Orr. The evidence in the Jamison case shows that Jamison 
was taken from the authorities of the city of Macon on a writ of 
habeas corpus sued out at the request of Judge Speer, owing to the 
interest of Mrs. Speer in Jamison as her servant, and that Judge Speer 
heard the case and liberated Jamison. It also shows that when Judge 
Speer’s decision had been reversed by the Supreme Court, which 
ordered the dismissal ot the writ of habeas corpus, and taxed the 
costs against the petitioner, and the mandate was presented to him 
with a written petition asking that it be made the judgment of the 
district court, the judge declined to recognize the mandate and di¬ 
rected that it be filed with the clerk. The city authorities thereupon 
rearrested Jamison in an effort to carry out the judgment of the city 
court, and on account of this effort these authorities were promptly 
attached for contempt of court by Judge Speer, although he had on 
the previous evening received the mandate of the Supreme Court and 
directed that it be filed with his clerk. The judge does not deny that 
he took this drastic action, but he endeavors in his brief to minimize 
the significance of it by first reciting that a second writ of habeas 
corpus was sued out on behalf of Jamison, making it appear from the 
sequence of his recita 1 that his action was taken after the second writ 
of habeas corpus was sued out and on account of a violation of it, 
when as a matter of fact his action in ruling the city authorities for 
contempt was taken a week prior to the application for the second 
writ of habeas corpus. 

As a matter of fact and of law, there does not appear to be any 
doubt that the Macon authorities in arresting Jamison after Judge 
Speer had been requested to recognize the mandate of -the Supreme 
Court, and after it had been filed in his court at his direction were 
well within their rights. The effect of his action in thus refusing 
to give effect to the mandate of the higher court and in ruling the 
Macon authorities for contempt on account of their attempt to make 
the said mandate effective, was to entirely defeat the judgment of 
the city court and nullify the decision of the Supreme Court. The 
petitioner in this case, who was taken from the Macon city authori¬ 
ties who were acting in pursuance of their official duties, is still at 
large and beyond the jurisdiction of Judge Speer, and has never 
served the sentence which had been imposed, although the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that Judge Speer had no jurisdiction 
in taking him from the city authorities. It is also true that although 
the Supreme Court ordered the costs of these proceedings assessed 
against the petitioner these costs have never been paid by him. 
There is evidence to show that Judge Speer at this time was not on 
good terms with the city authorities, and he does not deny that the 
petitioner had been employed at his house and that Mrs. Speer 
requested him to intervene in his behalf. The statement made 
by Judge Speer that the law under which sentences of prisoners 
similar to the one imposed upon Jamison was changed the following 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 55 

year so as to work such prisoners on the city chain gang, instead of 
on the county chain gang, does not appear to have any legal bearing 
upon the action complained of. The judge apparently does not 
attempt to justify his action in ruling these officers for contempt. 
His plea that the mandate of the Supreme Court was held up by him 
for seven months, or from November, 1905, to June, 1906, on account 
of the trial of the Greene & Gaynor case in the spring of 1906 is 
hardly tenable. 

The action of Judge Speer in the Savannah Electric Co. case, 
wherein he refused to recognize the mandate of the Circuit Court of 
Appeals, although the attorneys made a special trip from Savannah, 
Ga., to Mount Airy, Ga., a distance of nearly 400 miles, in order to 
have the mandate made the order of the lower court, should be con¬ 
sidered in the light of the personal feelings of the parties. The 
attorneys who caused him to be reversed in this case, Messrs. Osborne 
and Lawrence, had previously experienced unpleasant relations with 
the judge in the trial of another suit. It should also be noted that 
his action in holding up the mandate of the higher court was promptly 
followed by a second suit filed on behalf of the losing parties, and 
that upon this bill the judge promptly granted a second restraining 
order which had the effect of entirely defeating the mandate of the 
higher court. The proposition of the judge to hear an argument upon 
the question as to whether the circuit court of appeals had jurisdic¬ 
tion of a case in which that high tribunal had already reversed him, 
appears to be quite remarkable,. especially in view of the fact that 
the proposition was made on his own motion and without any sug¬ 
gestion from either of the parties in interest. 

The action of the judge in declining to recognize the mandate of 
the circuit court of appeals reversing him in the case of Bean v. Orr 
is open to censure, as the attorney who caused him to be reversed in 
this case, Mr. E. P. Davis, was the same attorney whom the judge 
had fined $50 for contempt of court on a rather slender excuse in the 
Stein case. 

The evidence shows, therefore, that in these instances the judge 
was open to the suspicion of being actuated by personal feeling. 

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SECTION 67 OF THE JUDICIAL CODE, IN ALLOW¬ 
ING HIS SON-IN-LAW, A. H. HEYWARD, TO BE APPOINTED TO AND 

EMPLOYED IN OFFICES AND DUTIES IN HIS COURT. 

The evidence in this case shows that Mr. A. H. Heyward, Judge 
Speer’s son-in-law, has been employed as receiver, custodian and 
attorney for receiver, custodian and trustee, in many cases pending 
in Judge Speer’s court, and also has shared equally in all of the fees 
of the standing master and special master of the court, Mr. J. N. 
Tally. It is true that Judge Speer claims the appointment as 
receiver and custodian do not come within the strict provisions of 
section 67 of the Judicial Code, but the appointment and employment 
of his son-in-law in all these different capacities are a violation of the 
spirit of the statute, if not its letter. 

Mr. Tally, the standing, and often special, master of the court was 
appointed bv Judge Speer, and his son-in-law shared equally all 
such master’s fees allowed by the judge. The evidence shows that 
the son-in-law mentioned has undoubtedly received during the past 


56 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


six years at least $25,000 from these sources, and it further shows 
that this son-in-law is a man of such small ability that it is reasonable 
to believe that practically all of this money was received by him 
owing to his relationship to Jud^e Speer. The employment of his 
son-in-law in the different capacities mentioned is in violation of the 
spirit if not the letter of the provisions of section 67 of the Judicial 
Code. 


NEGLECT OF COURT BUSINESS, JUDICIAL DUTIES, ETC. 

The evidence on this subject shows that Judge Speer has neg¬ 
lected the business of his court to such an extent that it has been 
brought to the attention of the Department of Justice in different 
ways and at different times and other judges assigned to his district 
for the purpose of relieving the congestion. It shows, further, that 
Judge Speer has made a practice of leaving the district from four to 
five months of each year, and has made no provision for the proper 
conduct of the business of the court in his absence, so that it has 
been necessary for attorneys to travel long distances and remain 
away from home at heavy expense for considerable periods. The 
evidence also tends to show that Judge Speer neglects cases of minor 
importance and those which will not bring newspaper notoriety to 
himself. It also shows that the judge has entirely omitted some of 
the regular terms of court in his district, and that the court when 
held by him is convened sometimes without notice to attorneys or 
officials and without due regard for the proper conduct of the court 
business. The judge contends that his poor health compels him to 
remain away from his district three or four months in the year. 

VIOLATION OF THE LAWS IN DRAWING JURIES. 

On this subject there is the testimony of a large number of gen¬ 
tlemen of the highest standing, including Hon. Thomas S. Felder, 
attorney general of the State of Georgia; Judge Samuel B. Adams, 
one of the foremost attorneys of the State of Georgia, a former mar¬ 
shal of the court, and a former clerk of the court, as well as the 
present United States attorney of the district, Mr. Alexander Aker- 
man. All of these gentlemen testified to the illegal manner in which 
Judge Speer has drawn juries, and his answer does not appear to 
contain any direct denial of the charges made. While he does not 
admit the charges, he does argue that no harm has come from the 
conduct complained of, and that, although the parties may have 
been deprived of a trial by a jury drawn strictly according to law, 
yet no miscarriage of justice has resulted. When we consider that 
numbers of prominent men have testified that Judge Speer endeav¬ 
ors to influence the outcome of trials and the verdicts of juries, this 
method of drawing juries should be severely condemned. 

IMPROPER USE OF RAILWAY FACILITIES. 

The evidence on this subject, both oral and documentary, is quite 
conclusive, and it is not contradicted by Judge Speer. It shows that 
Judge Speer made a practice of requesting the lines of the Central of 
Georgia Railway system and of the Southern Railway to transport 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 57 


his horses, servants, and household goods sometimes in carload lots, 
free of charge, over these railroads, covering a long period of years. 
The evidence also shows that tills was a privilege which no other 
person ever enjoyed, and that it was not even extended to the high 
officials of the railway companies. Attention is invited to the 14 
letters as Exhibit No. 27, showing that it was the practice of Judge 
Speer to request the Southern Railway to transport his household 
effects, including horses and servants, to and from his summer home 
regularly and that some of these free shipments amounted to two 
carloads of freight. 

When it is remembered that during much of this time the Central 
of Georgia Railway system was in the hands of a receiver appointed 
by Judge Speer, his conduct in requesting these privileges and thereby 
avoiding the payment of hundreds if not thousands of dollars in 
freight bills, is certainly unbecoming a high judicial officer and is im 
consistent with a proper sense of judicial ethics. The judge admits 
in his brief that he accepted free transportation from railroads and 
states that such privileges were also enjoyed by others, but he does not 
state that any other person ever requested the shipment of carloads 
of freight free of charge and the evidence is positive to the effect that 
no other person ever enjoyed such privileges or exemptions, not 
excepting the owners of the railways. 

ALLEGED ABUSE OF AUTHORITY IN APPOINTING RECEIVERS WITHOUT 
NOTICE AND WITHOUT CAUSE. 

The evidence on this charge shows that Judge Speer has appointed 
receivers and seized property of persons and corporations without 
notice in a reckless and unwarranted manner. In the case of the Jo^ 
seph Dry Goods Co., as well as in the Beach Manufacturing Co. case, 
and that of the Georgia Central Railway and others, he summarily 
seized large properties and took them away from the owners causing 
great property loss as well as annoyance and embarrassment to the 
owners and great inconvenience to the public without sufficient facts 
having been alleged for such action upon ex parte hearings in which 
his orders were made. The evidence shows that important properties 
have been wrecked by his disregard of the rules in such cases and that 
many people have suffered loss of practically all of their property, 
This conduct of Judge Speer in this regard has been so improper that 
the circuit court of appeals has been frequently called upon to 
reverse him and in a number of instances has used strong language in 
criticizing his action. In the case of Joseph Dry Goods Co. the 
circuit court of appeals plainly stated that “ taking all of the aver¬ 
ments in the bill as true there could have been no reason for appoint^ 
ing a receiver without notice,” and the language of that court in re¬ 
versing Judge Speer shows that it considered his conduct very irm 
proper. In one case the court of appeals stated that Judge Speer’s 
conduct was an unwarranted exercise of judicial power and in another 
it stated that his conduct in appointing a receiver without notice was 
a usurpation of power which should be rarely used. In another case 
in commenting upon the conduct of Judge Speer, the court stated, that 
even if notice had been given to the defendant, the action of the judge 
in appointing the receiver could not be sustained. There is no doubt 
but that Judge Speer’s love of power and his disregard for the rules of 


58 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


equity in appointing receivers without notice, has resulted in great 
property loss and in some instances a denial of justice to parties. 
The testimony of many witnesses on this subject, as well as in connec¬ 
tion with other charges, shows that this conduct has brought about 
conditions which are complained of all over his district. 

ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT IN RAISING FEE IN ORDER THAT SON- 
IN-LAW MIGHT PROFIT. 

On this subject there is the direct testimony of the United States 
attorney that Judge Speer raised the fee of others in order that his 
son in-law might receive a large fee without objection. This is denied 
by Judge Speer. While the testimony of Mr. Akerman is not cor¬ 
roborated by others, his word alone being opposed to that of Judge 
Speer, the statement made by him, when considered in connection 
with the testimony of many other persons of undoubted high char¬ 
acter, relative to other subjects, is given more force. 

ALLEGED ALLOWANCE OF EXCESSIVE FEES TO FAVORITES. 

The evidence shows that in the case of the White Supply Co. Judge 
Speer increased the fee of his personal counsel in this investiga¬ 
tion, Mr. Orville Park, as allowed by the master, from $350 to $550 
without proper reason. The judge stated on the stand that this 
increase was made on account of additional money brought into the 
fund by Mr. Park, but the record shows conclusively that Mr. Park 
had no part in bringing in the money mentioned, and that if any 
additional compensation was proper it should have been allowed to 
other attorneys who' were responsible for increasing the fund men¬ 
tioned. The records show, however, that the attorneys entitled to 
this increase did not receive it. This case appears to be especially 
repugnant when it is considered that the excess allowance was made 
after Judge Speer was under investigation and after his friend, Mr. 
Park, had been engaged to defend him. 

The records in the Rogers and Joiner case show that Judge Speer 
increased the extra compensation allowed this same gentleman, Mr. 
Park, from $500 to $800, and that this extra compensation was paid 
him in addition to the amount seemingly allowed by the law, which 
provides that the commissions of such officials shall be in full com¬ 
pensation for their services. This extra compensation was paid to 
Mr. Park as trustee in the bankruptcy case above mentioned, and 
the records also show that his firm was employed as attorneys for 
trustee, and that Judge Speer increased their compensation from 
$1,500 to $1,800, and of course Mr. Park shared in that increase. 

The records in the case of Standard & Son, Bankrupts, show that 
Judge Speer allowed his friend, and clerk of the court, Mr. Cook 
Clayton, $600 commissions, whereas it appears that he was entitled 
to only $23.16, a composition settlement having been made, and the 
law prescribing the amount to be paid in such circumstances. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMOKY SPEER. 59 


ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT IN ALLOWING THE DISSIPATION OF 

ASSETS OF BANKRUPTCY ESTATES BY UNNECESSARY EMPLOYMENT 

OF FAVORITES, RELATIVES, ETC. 

The evidence on this subject shows that Mr. George F. White, 
Judge Speer’s friend, and also United States marshal, received more 
than $10,000 as fees resulting from appointments made by Judge 
Speer, and also that in many cases Judge Speer’s son in law was 
employed as receiver or custodian, and large fees paid, apparently 
through the sole influence of his relationship to the judge. The 
evidence also shows that Judge Speer has taken personal interest in the 
partnership of his son-in-law, and that he has gone so far as to offer 
this partnership to at least one attorney. 

ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT IN PRESIDING IN CASES WHERE HIS 
SON-IN-LAW WAS INTERESTED IN A CONTINGENT FEE. 

There is evidence to show that Judge Speer has made a practice of 
presiding in cases where his son-in-law was interested in contingent 
fees, particularly in bankruptcy cases, where his son-in-law was 
retained as attorney for petitioning creditors, as well as attorney for 
receiver, etc., and in which his fee was contingent upon the outcome 
of the cases. 

The judge states that he has not “ consciously” presided in any case 
where his son-in-law was interested in a contingent fee, but in the 
very nature of the case he could not have been ignorant of the fact 
that in any of the bankruptcy cases mentioned the fee of his son-in-law 
was dependent upon the outcome of such cases, and his statement 
that he has not consciously presided in any such case is not entirely 
convincing. It does not appear that the judge ever disqualified him¬ 
self in a case where his son-in-law was interested until after he was 
under investigation, and there is evidence to the effect that he had 
threatened to punish any person for contempt who suggested that he 
disqualify himself under such circumstances. 

ALLEGED OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT IN ENTERTAINING MATTERS BEYOND 
HIS JURISDICTION, FINING PARTIES, ETC. 

The evidence on this subject shows that Judge Speer has made a 
practice of entertaining, cases plainly beyond the jurisdiction of his 
court, and that his decisions in such cases have sometimes been 
rendered in favor of relatives or favorites, which makes it appear that 
his conduct in assuming jurisdiction has not been due entirely to 
error, but possibly to favoritism toward some or ill-feeling toward 
others. The testimony shows that in the case of J. T. Hill, Judge 
Speer entertained a suit filed by his kinsman against Mr. Hill for the 
collection of $75, and made a summary order against Mr. Hill, stating 
that he would be sent to jail unless he paid the money, and refused to 
grant an appeal or fix a supersedeas bond. Also, that when he 
found that Mr. Hill and his attorney had gone to Atlanta to effect an 
appeal, he ordered a rehearing and iater reversed himself without any 
application therefor. 

The evidence also shows that Judge Speer has fined the employees 
of the custodian of the Federal building for contempt of court, on 


60 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


account of their alleged failure to properly perform their duties in 
cleaning the building, while, as a matter of fact, these employees are 
only responsible to the custodian, and Judge Speer has no jurisdiction 
over them. 

In the E. P. Davis contempt case, and in the case of the rule 
against Mr. Gordon Saussy, Judge Speer likewise plainly exceeded his 
jurisdiction. 

DECIDING MATTERS IN FAVOR OF RELATIVES, ETC. 

The evidence on this subject shows that Judge Speer has made a 
practice of appointing favorites to many positions and allowing 
targe fees to them, as well as rendering decisions in favor of such 
parties. It shows that in the E. B. Harris case numerous relatives 
and favorites received large fees, and that Judge Speer’s personal 
counsel, Judge Andrew J. Cobb, was brought into the case and paid 
a fee of $400 for a few days’ work, although he resided in another 
judicial district. Judge Speer decided in favor of his attorney, 
Mr. Orville Park, in the case of a bank in Thomasville, Georgia, v. 
Hopkins, and was reversed by the circuit court of appeals. In the 
case of United States v. Frank Scarboro the evidence shows he used 
every effort to have the side represented by the firm of his son-in-law 
prevail. The testimony of Mr. John R.L. Smith, Mr. W. H. Burwell, 
and Mr. J. T. Hill, all gentlemen of high standing, relative to other 
cases is strong and direct on this charge. 

ALLOWING MONEY TO REMAIN ON DEPOSIT WITHOUT INTEREST. 

The evidence on this subject shows that in the Huff Case, Judge 
Speer allowed the money realized from the sale of Mr. Huff’s property 
to remain without interest in the bank known as the “family bank,” 
of which his brother-in-law is vice president, for a number of years, 
although the matter was brought to his attention. This money 
amounted to nearly $100,000, and Mr. Huff has figured that the 
deposit profited the bank mentioned at the rate of $6,000 per year. 

Judge Speer claims that no formal application was made to him 
to have this money placed at interest, but the evidence shows that 
the matter was brought to his attention in writing as well as otherwise, 
and it is not understood how a just and conscientious chancellor 
could allow this money to profit the bank in which his brother-in-law 
Was interested for so long a time, when it was within his power to 
remove the unpleasant imputation that he was improperly favoring 
his kinsman in the matter mentioned. 

The evidence shows that in the Max Alexander case formal appli¬ 
cation was made to Judge Speer by both the parties in interest to 
have the sum of money involved, $46,000, placed at interest, and that 
he declined to grant the necessary authority, which resulted in the 
large sum of money mentioned remaining without interest for several 
years. 

ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT IN REFUSING TO ALLOW DISMISSAL OF 

LITIGATION. 

The evidence on this subject is given by Messrs. Anton P. Wright 
and W. V. Davis, and it shows that Judge Speer refused to dismiss 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 61 

the case against the Savannah Electric Co., although all parties in 
interest were in accord on the proposition, and that he threatened 
the attorneys with punishment tor merely attempting to dismiss the 
case which they had instituted. It also shows that immediately 
upon taking this action Judge Speer appointed his friend, Mr. George 
F. White, receiver of the company mentioned, and that the receiver 
promptly employed Judge Speer’s son-in-law to represent him, both 
of the parties mentioned taking the train at once for Savannah to 
take charge of the company. From this appointment Mr. White 
received a fee of $850, and Judge Speer’s son-in-law received a fee of 
$1,125. The evidence shows that the Judge’s son-in-law did very 
little work in this case, although he received the large fee mentioned. 
It will be seen, of course, that if the judge had allowed the dismissal 
of this case, as the parties desired, his favorite and his son-in-law 
would not have received the fees mentioned. 

ALLEGED GENERAL OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT. 

Many hundreds of pages of testimony were taken on this subject, 
and of all the scores of witnesses examined only two spoke favorably 
of Judge Speer with reference to this charge. The testimony shows 
that Judge Speer has made a practice of endeavoring to coerce de¬ 
fendants in criminal cases into pleading guilty, and parties in civil 
suits into compromises. He has exercised every possible influence 
over juries to obtain a verdict in accord with his desires. Also, that 
he has decided cases without hearing the evidence on either side; 
that he has treated attorneys at the bar in an improper manner in 
his efforts to coerce verdicts to suit himself; that he has compelled 
parties to make unreasonable bonds in order to regain possession of 
their property; that he has exerted improper influence to convict 
parties; that he takes part in the trial of cases and shows partiality 
and bias in the examination of witnesses, the treatment of attorneys, 
and in his remarks to the jury, etc.; that he has carelessly sacrificed 
the good reputation of attorneys; that he has subjected the Govern¬ 
ment’s attorneys to humiliation and loss of prestige; and that his 
general conduct has been such as to bring the United States Court 
For the Southern District of Georgia into ill repute. The testimony 
of 40 or more of the most prominent attorneys and business men of 
southern Georgia was given to the effect that Judge Speer’s conduct 
of the court generally is such as to cause the public to lose confidence 
in the integrity and fairness of the court. 

ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT IN PRESIDING IN CASES 

WHERE HIS SON-IN-LAW WAS INTERESTED IN A CON¬ 
TINGENT FEE. 

TESTIMONY OF GEN. P. W. MELDRIM. 

(Pages 1641-1645.) 

Gen. Meldrim testified that he represented the defendant, Joseph 
Hester, sheriff of Montgomery County, Ga., in a suit for false impris¬ 
onment, in which the firm of Talley & Heyward was employed on 
behalf of the plaintiff. That Talley & Heyward were working on a 
contingent fee, and lie stated to Mr. Talley that, as he had a con- 


62 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

tingent fee in the matter, and as his partner, Mr. Heyward, was 
a son-in-law of Judge Speer, he did not propose to take any chances 
with the case, as the judge ought to be disqualified, but that Mr. 
Talley ’persuaded him not to raise the point. He states that he 
has since regretted that he did not, as a judgment for $5,000 was 
recovered against the sheriff for false imprisonment, when he, the 
sheriff, had intended merely to do his duty, and that the people chipped 
in and made up the amount to the sheriff and reelected him as 
sheriff of the county, which position he still holds. Mr. Meldrim 
then stated the facts relative to the case against Hester, which were 
to the effect that a party was arrested by the town marshal at 
Mount Vernon, Ga., the county seat of Montgomery County, as a 
fugitive from justice, and that it later turned out that the wrong 
man was arrested; that upon these facts a suit for damages was 
brought against the sheriff, Talley & Heyward being attorneys 
for the plaintiff. During the trial Judge Speer fairly “took charge 
of the case, ,, favoring the plaintiff in his rulings and conduct, and 
a judgment for the plaintiff for $5,000 resulted. Gen. Meldrim 
further stated that the little town of Mount Vernon, where the 
suit arose, is 210 miles from Macon, where the firm of Talley & 
Heyward is located. 

The evidence in this case tends to show that Judge Speer “took 
charge of it,” and that the firm of his son-in-law, Talley & Hey¬ 
ward, had no trouble in securing judgment against the sheriff of 
Montgomery County, Ga., for $5,000 in a damage suit brought 
against the sheriff for mistakenly but innocently keeping in custody 
a prisoner arrested by the town marshal, under the impression 
that he was a different party. It is difficult to understand how such 
a judgment could have been obtained against the sheriff in these 
circumstances, as described by Gen. Meldrim. 

Judge Speer states he has never “consciously” presided in a 
case where his son-in-law was interested in a contingent fee, but he 
does not contradict the testimony of Gen. Meldrim, to the effect 
that plaintiff’s counsel was actually working on a contingent fee 
in this case. The case was in its nature so speculative that any 
layman would readily understand that the fee would be in propor¬ 
tion to the amount recovered, and it would be unkind to expect 
less of the judge, especially when the testimony of Gen. Meldrim 
is considered with regard to the manner in which the judge “took 
charge of the case” in which his son-in-law was of counsel for the 
plaintiff. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. ALEXANDER AKERMAN, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY. 

(Pages 2450-2470.) 

Mr. Akerman testified that on November 5, 1910, he had occasion 
to visit Judge Speer’s chambers at Macon, and found the judge very 
much disconcerted, on account of some one having suggested the 
filing of a motion to disqualify him (Judge Speer) from sitting in the 
trial of a case in which Talley & Heyward had a contingent fee in¬ 
volved,. and that he considered it a direct insult to him and a reflection 
upon his personal and judicial honor and integrity, stating that any¬ 
one who made such a suggestion would go to jail.‘ That he suggested 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 63 

to the judge that he had better go slow, as there was very respectable 
authority to the effect that he was disqualified. That he later ad¬ 
dressed a letter to the judge in which he quoted authorities to the 
effect that he was disqualified; that since this occurrence Judge 
Speer has continued to preside in cases where the fee of his son-in-law 
was contingent upon his success. In answer to questions, Mr. Aker¬ 
man stated that he had never known Judge Speer to disqualify 
himself until the investigation of his conduct was under way. 

On this subject Mr. Akerman testified that in some litigation in 
South Carolina the firm of Callaway & Irwin represented the side 
in which Mr. Heyward was interested, and were paid a fee for their 
services, and that Judge Speer was angry because he had been allowed 
by Mr. Callaway to fix his fee as receiver’s attorney in a case in the 
district court, while under the impression that Callaway had performed 
the service in the case in which Mr. Heyward was interested, free of 
charge. In explanation of this statement Mr. Akerman testified 
that the court m South Carolina had allowed a fee to Mr. Callaway, 
but that Judge Speer understood that Callaway had rendered the 
services to his son-in-law gratuitously. In fixing fees in Judge 
Speer’s court in the case of the Georgia Car Co., the judge had been 
left in ignorance of Mr. Callaway’s receiving the fee in South Carolina 
allowed by the court there. Judge Speer was of the impression that 
he was under obligations to Mr. Callaway’s firm on account of the 
services rendered to Mr. Heyward. 

Mr. Akerman testified further that Judge Speer had frequently 
presided in cases where the firm of Talley & Heyward, and later the 
firm of Isaacs & Heyward were attorneys for petitioning creditors 
in bankruptcy cases, and that necessarily their fees were contingent 
upon adjudication. 

THE GRAY LUMBER CO. CASE-TESTIMONY OF MR. W. W. LAMBDIN. 

(Pages 2273-2285.) 

Mr. Lambdin testified that he was of counsel for the Gray Lumber 
Co. in bankruptcy proceedings instituted against that concern April 
22, 1913, by Messrs. Isaacs & Heyward as attorneys for the creditors. 
Mr. Lambdin then proceeded to explain the circumstances under 
which the petition was filed against the Gray Lumber Co. and stated 
that while the assets of the company were greatly in excess of its 
liabilities it was temporarily embarrassed for cash and had made an 
agreement with its creditors by which the company was to be operated 
by a committee of the creditors as trustees until it could realize 
sufficient money from the operation of its business to pay its debts; 
that the property of the concern consisted of a railroad company, 
sawmills, and large tracts of timber; that after this arrangement 
was consummated a few creditors representing very small claims, 
some of which were spurious, filed a bankruptcy petition against the 
company, Isaacs & Heyward representing them; that upon this 
petition Judge Speer granted a rule nisi requiring the company to 
show cause why a receiver should not be appointed; that Mr. Gray, 
president of the company, went to Macon, and some trade was made 
with the attorneys for petitioning creditors whereby Mr. Gray con¬ 
sented to the appointment of a receiver in advance of the hearing on 

H. Kept. 1176, 63-2-5 


64 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER* 

the rule nisi; that the committee of creditors in charge of the prop¬ 
erty was kept in ignorance of this, and as they were the principal 
parties interested they resisted bankruptcy on behalf of the company. 
The creditors were anxious to keep the case out of court in order to 
avoid the heavy expenses and fees that would be paid to officials. 
Mr. Lambdin states when the question of receivership was tried they 
showed by Mr. Gray that the claim of one of the parties was spurious 
and that without this claim the petition did not carry a sufficient 
amount to give the bankruptcy court jurisdiction. He also states 
that the other claims were very small. The attorneys for the com¬ 
pany asked for the dismissal of the receivership, stating there was 
no necessity for a receiver, and that a receiver should be appointed 
only when absolutely necessary for th preservation of the estate 
(citing Faulk v. Sterner, 155 Fed. Rep., p. 681; also Oakland Lumber 
Co., p. 684). Mr. Lambdin stated the action of Judge Speer in thus 
taking the property away from the committee of creditors was with¬ 
out justification, and it should be considered in view of his relation¬ 
ship to the attorneys for the petitioning creditors. He testified that 
he showed to the court that the claims of the petitioning creditors 
would be paid in full, and that they had the money in court ready to 
pay them, but in spite of this fact, and in spite of the fact Judge Speer 
stated the property would be perfectly safe in the hands of the trustees 
mentioned, he declined to dismiss the receiver; that the attorneys 
for the company at once gave notice of an appeal, and that they have 
made persistent and repeated efforts to get a transcript of the record 
from Judge Speer’s stenographer, in order to file the appeal, but 
although more than six months have elapsed they have been utterly 
unable to get a copy of the record; that all this time the estate 
remains in the hands of a receiver and that the six months allowed 
in which to make an appeal has elapsed. 

The physical assets of the Gray Lumber Co., in round numbers, 
amounted to $300,000. The total indebtedness of the company was 
$150,000. The owners of $149,000 of the indebtedness elected the 
trustees to manage the business. They borrowed $10,000 to pay 
the outstanding claims of $1,000 in full, and operate the business 
with the consent of the company. This was the condition of the 
company’s business when it was thrown into bankruptcy. This 
condition was shown to the court upon the hearing, but with no avail. 

TESTIMONY -OF HON. JACOB GAZAN. 

(Pages 2358-2396.) 

Mr. Gazan testified that he was an attorney practicing in the city 
of Savannah and was employed by a committee of creditors of 
the Gray Lumber Co. to represent them in bankruptcy proceedings 
filed against the concern mentioned in the spring of 1913; that this 
company, at the time it was attacked by bankruptcy proceedings, 
was doubly solvent, its actual assets being worth $302,336.96 and 
its total liabilities being $144,500.31; that it owned two sawmill 
plants, large tracts of timber land, and the capital stock of the Ocilla, 
Valdosta & Pine Bloom Railway Co., in addition to large quantities 
of live stock, vehicles, and commissary; that business being poor and 
ready cash difficult to obtain, this company entered into an agree- 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 65 


ment with its creditors by which it was to be operated by a committee 
of trustees until its debts were paid. Mr. Gazan then presented to 
the committee a statement (Exhibit 32) showing the condition of this 
concern and testified that after the arrangements mentioned had been 
effected the committee of creditors was amazed to find that a petition 
in involuntary bankruptcy had been filed against the company on 
April 22, 1913, by Messrs. Isaacs & Heyward on behalf of three small 
creditors representing claims amounting in all to about S500, which 
claims had been provided for by the trustees and were to be paid 
promptly. 

Mr. Gazan then introduced correspondence showing the manner 
in which this bankruptcy petition was instituted and testified that 
the trustees determined to resist the bankruptcy petition on behalf 
of the creditors; that they held a meeting and agreed to pay the 
claims of the moving creditors in full and reasonable fees to their 
attorneys in order to get the matter out of court, but that the attor¬ 
neys, Isaacs & Heyward, refused to have the matter dismissed on 
those terms; that these attorneys asked for the appointment of a 
receiver in a supplemental petition filed April 26, 1913, and Judge 
Speer without notice appointed a temporary receiver to take charge 
of the properties of the company, although he had issued a rule upon 
the original petition, returnable the 30th day of April, requiring the 
parties to show cause why a receiver should not be appointed on 
that date; that he subsequently learned that Mr. Gray, the president 
of the company, had made a trade or deal with Isaacs & Heyward, 
the attorneys for the moving creditors, by which he agreed to con¬ 
sent to the receivership, and that Judge Speer appointed him (Gray) 
receiver. Mr. Gazan testified further that he, on behalf of the cred¬ 
itors, prepared an answer and at the hearing in Macon on April 30, 
1913, proved that the claim of one Mr. Rothmell for $300 had no 
existence in law or in morals, and that without this claim the bank¬ 
ruptcy petition filed by Isaacs & Heyward would fall on account of 
insufficient amount of claims; that he proved further that the other 
claims represented by Isaacs & Heyward were very small and that 
they had been obtained by improper means. He introduced letters 
to show the unfair methods employed to obtain these claims for the 
purpose of putting the company in bankruptcy; that at the conclu¬ 
sion of the hearing, in spite of the showing, Judge Speer announced 
that he would make the receivership permanent, and stated from 
the bench that he was satisfied the trustees put in charge of the 
property by the owner and the creditors would handle it properly, 
but proceeded to state: “You people down in Savannah seem to 
think that you can run things your own way; you tried to do it in the 
Electric Supply Co. case; but I want you to understand that as long 
as the bankruptcy act is upon the statute books no debtor has any 
right to enter into any voluntary adjustment with his creditors, but 
this court will manage its affairs.” 

Mr. Gazan stated that the judge within a day or two made the re¬ 
ceivership permanent, and he, on behalf of the trustees mentioned, 
noted an appeal; that they were all very much outraged on account 
of the manner in which Judge Speer had conducted the case, and de¬ 
cided to have it reviewed in the higher court. Mr. Gazan then testi¬ 
fied as to the efforts made by him to get a transcript of the record in 


66 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

this case in order to prepare an appeal, stating that he wrote to Mr. 
W. A. Cameron, Judge Speer’s stenographer, and also court reporter, 
on May 6, 1913, requesting him to furnish a copy as quickly as possi¬ 
ble; that he received no reply, and on May 9, wrote a second urgent 
letter,requesting the transcript; that he then received a reply from 
Mr. Cameron, dated May 9, stating he would furnish the transcript 
as soon as he could get to it; that the transcript did not arrive and 
that on June 7, 1913, he again wrote to Mr. Cameron, referring to.his 
former letters and urging the prompt preparation of the transcript; 
that he did not receive any- response to this communication until 
June 21, when Mr. Cameron replied that he had received the several 
communications sent by Mr. Gazan, and made further excuses for his 
delay; that on June 23,1913, he wrote a fourth letter to Mr. Cameron, 
requesting the transcript, and on July 16 wrote a fifth letter to him, 
without receiving any reply; that on July 22 he wrote a sixth time 
to Mr. Cameron, who had by that time accompanied Judge Speer to 
Mount Airy, Ga., and urged still more persistently that the transcript 
be furnished; that on August 19 he wrote a letter to Judge Speer, in¬ 
forming him of the difficulty in obtaining the transcript desired; that 
Judge Speer made no reply to this letter, although it was properly 
stamped, addressed, and mailed in a return envelope; that on August 
26, 1913, he wrote a seventh letter to Mr. Cameron, calling his atten¬ 
tion to all of his other communications, one of which had been sent 
by registered mail, and that he received no reply to the seventh and 
last letter. Mr. Gazan stated also that he had learned from Max 
Isaacs, the partner of Mr. Heyward, that Mr. Cameron had asked him 
(Isaacs) whether he should furnish this transcript to Mr. Gazan; also 
that he is still without this transcript and that the time allowed for 
appeal has now elapsed. 

TESTIMONY OF WARREN A. CAMERON. 

(Pages 2399-2408.) 

In answer to the questions with regard to correspondence between 
him (Cameron) and Mr. Gazan, showing Mr. Gazan’s efforts to get a 
transcript of the record in the Gray Lumber Co. case, Mr. Cameron 
stated that the only reason he could give for not furnishing the 
transcript was that he had been too busy to do so. Mr. Cameron 
told of his having to go to Mount Airy with Judge Speer and having 
left his notes at Macon and also referred to the illness of his wife. 
In answer to the question as to whether this was his method of doing 
business for lawyers as an officer of the court, Mr. Cameron stated 
that it was not; but he gave no reason for making the exception in 
this case, except that he had not been able to get to it, etc. 

The evidence in this case shows that Judge Speer appointed a re¬ 
ceiver for this large corporation upon a bankruptcy petition filed by 
the firm of his son-in-law and took the property away from the 
trustees operating it, although they offered to pay all the claims 
represented in the petition. It should be remembered that the con¬ 
duct of Judge Speer in this case, as well as in other similar cases 
mentioned, directly benefited the judge’s son-in-law in a financial way. 

The evidence shows also that appeal was noted from the decision 
of Judge Speer and that although the parties have endeavored per- 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 67 


sistently and strenuously to obtain a transcript of the record from 
Judge Speer’s stenographer, by writing no less than seven letters to 
the stenographer and also by writing to Judge Speer—these efforts 
covering a period of six months—they have been entirely unable to 
obtain the necessary transcript, and that the six months allowed tor 
such an appeal has long since elapsed. It is denied by Judge Speer 
that he contributed to this conduct on the part of his stenographer, 
but it is remembered that the transcript was desired for the purpose 
of appealing from a decision rendered by him in favor of the firm of 
his son-in-law. The evidence shows also that during this long time 
the company has been kept in the hands of the receiver appointed by 
Judge Speer and that great injury has been done to its property. 

L. CARTER CO. CASE.—TESTIMONY OF MR. W. W. LAMBDIN. 

Mr. Lambdin testified that he was employed to defend this com 
pany in the bankruptcy proceedings filed against it on May 2, 1913 
by Messrs. Isaacs & Heyward on behalf of petitioning creditors; that 
there were four petitioning creditors in this petition and that the 
claim of one, W. J. Broadhurst, was used without his authority or 
consent, and that without it the petition would have contained 
claims insufficient to bring it within the jurisdict ional amount. That 
there was not a single legitimate claim in the pet it ion That Messrs. 
Isaacs & Heyward, shortly after the petition in bankruptcy was filed, 
asked for the appointment of a receiver, and that Judge Speer without 
notice and without any hearing appointed Mr. Henry C. Tucker, 
deputy marshal of his court, as receiver or custodian, at the same 
time issuing a rule nisi requiring the company to show cause why 
the receivership should not be made permanent; that the company 
appeared and answered the petition and presented an affidavit from 
Mr. W. J. Broadhurst stating that his claim was used without his 
knowledge or consent and that he objected to it being used. That 
they denied the validity of the other claims and asked for a jury 
trial; that Judge Speer thereupon struck from their answer the state¬ 
ment that the name of Broadhurst had been used without his knowl¬ 
edge and consent as being scurrilous and impertinent, and at the same 
time stated the placing of this allegation in the answer was improper 
and reprehensible; that they produced evidence to show that none 
of the claims were legitimate and. put Mr. Broadhurst on the stand, 
who testified that his name had been used without his authority, but 
that Judge Speer would not allow his testimony to be used. Athat the 
case proceeded and that the following morning Mr. Broadhurst em¬ 
ployed an attorney, who arose at the motion hour and stated that he 
wished to submit a motiom on behalf of Mr. Broadhurst, asking that 
his name be stricken from the bankruptcy petition, but that Judge 
Speer refused to hear him; that the case proceeded and they proved 
that the claims were without foundation, and Judge Speer finally 
made an order dismissing the temporary receiver, but impounding the 
books of the company, which he modified on objection oi counsel and 
allowed the company to recover its books. 

Mr. Lambdin testified further that after this order was made Mr. 
Isaacs made the proposition to him that if the company would pay 
the costs of the proceedings and the fee of the custodian the pro- 


68 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


ceedings would be dismissed, which offer was finally accepted and 
the petition dismissed. 

Mr. Lambdin then identified the signed statement made to the 
examiner of the Department of Justice, which was filed with the clerk 
as a part of the record. Mr. Lambdin testified on cross-examination 
that Judge Speer disqualified himself in the latter part of the Beach 
Manufacturing Co. case, but that he did not do this until the investiga¬ 
tion against him had been started, and that possibly the presence of 
the examiner of the department at Macon had something to do with it. 

TESTIMONY OF R. L„ BENNETT. 

(Pages 2409-2417.) 

Mr. Bennett testified he was an attorney at law residing at Jessup, 
Ga., and that during the bankruptcy proceedings against the L. Carter 
Co., held at Macon in May, 1913, he was employed by Mr. W. J. 
Broadhurst, whose name had been used in the bankruptcy petition 
in question without his authority, to present a petition to the court 
requesting that his name (Broadhurst) be stricken from the petition. 
He testified that after the attorneys for the L. Carter Co. had failed 
in their efforts to get the name of Mr. Broadhurst stricken from this 
petition, he prepared a motion and presented it to Judge Speer at 
the motion hour, but that Judge Speer refused to hear him. He 
stated also that the name of Mr. J. K. Thomas, which was signed to 
the bankruptcy petition as Mr. Broadhurst’s attorney, was signed 
without Mr. Thomas's permission. Mr. Bennett stated that when he 
asked the court to consider his motion for the withdrawal of the 
name of Mr. Broadhurst he refused this request, and that he then 
asked that he be permitted to file it with the record, and that Judge 
Speer replied he would determine that matter later; that Judge 
Speer gave no reason for refusing to entertain his motion; that it 
was presented at the motion hour and that he was a practicing at¬ 
torney representing Mr. Broadhurst. 

Mr. Bennett then testified that Max Isaacs, the partner of Judge 
Speer’s son-in-law, who filed the petition in this case, had been in¬ 
dicted in Wayne County, Ga. (the home of Mr. Bennett), for barratry 
and that his conduct in the L. Carter case was one of the matters 
embodied in the indictment. Mr. Bennett also testified that he 
understood that Max Isaacs had been indicted in Appling County 
for barratry. He also testified that Judge Speer allowed this same 
Max Isaacs to insult him (Bennett) when he endeavored to get the 
name of Mr. Broadhurst withdrawn from the bankruptcy case, by 
saying that he (Bennett) had been bought off by the defendant; 
that he told the court this statement was maliciously false and that 
Judge Speer paid no attention to it, while he had almost immediately 
theretofore reprimanded the counsel opposing Max Isaacs for making 
a statement in answer to the bankruptcy petition that the name 
of Mr. Broadhurst was included without authority. In answer to 
questions as to the final determination of the case by Judge Speer, 
Mr. Bennett testified that the examiner of the Department of Justice 
was present in pourt and that he understood that this fact had more 
to do with the judge’s action than anything else. 

The evidence in this case shows that Judge Speer appointed a 
receiver without notice in an ex parte hearing upon a bankruptcy 


CHARGES OE ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OE JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 69 

petition filed by tbe firm of his son-in-law and that he refused to dis¬ 
miss the case when the defendant appeared in court and offered to 
pay the claims in full or give bond to secure them, and also proved 
beyond all possibility of doubt that the claims were spurious and 
insufficient to sustain the case. The evidence further shows that 
this company resisted bankruptcy and asked for a jury trial. There 
is also testimony to the effect that Judge Speer’s actions in dismiss¬ 
ing the receiver appointed without notice may have been due to the 
investigation of his conduct, which had been instituted at that time. 
No judge possessing a fine sense of judicial ethics would have permit¬ 
ted himself to be placed in the doubtful position in which Judge Speer 
willingly allowed himself to be placed in the foregoing cases. His con¬ 
duct shows a woeful lack of appreciation of his judicial position. 

ALLEGED OPPRESSIVE AND CORRUPT CONDUCT IN ALLOW¬ 
ING THE DISSIPATION OF ASSETS OF BANKRUPTCY ES¬ 
TATES BY THE UNNECESSARY EMPLOYMENT OF FAVOR¬ 
ITES, RELATIVES, ETC. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. GEORGE F. WHITE, UNITED STATES MARSHAL. 

(Pages 1401-1425.) 

On this subject Mr. White testified that he had received a fee of 
$800 as receiver in the A. D. Oliver bankrupt case, in addition to 
expenses, and also stated that he had received similar appointments 
in a good many other cases, naming the Electric Supply Co. case, in 
which he had received $800, the Perkins Manufacturing Co. case, in 
which he received $800, the Daniels Co. case, in which he received 
$1,000 as receiver. He also testified that in the Electric Supply Co. 
case and the Daniels Co. case, the firm of Talley & Heyward had 
been employed as attorneys for receiver. Mr. White could give no 
special reason for sending 200 miles for an attorney to represent him. 
He also stated that in the Electric Supply Co. case the attorneys 
employed by him, Akerman & Akerman, and Talley & Heyward, 
were paid $2,250. He stated that the firm of Talley & Heyward 
received a fee of $375 in the Daniels case. Mr. White testified fur¬ 
ther that during the time he was receiving these fees in bankruptcy 
cases he was drawing his salary as marshal, amounting to $3,500 per 
annum; that the fees received from these appointments in bank¬ 
ruptcy cases averaged about $1,000 per year. 

Attention is invited to the list of fees paid Mr. 'White on account 
of the appointments as custodian and receiver, showing that Mr. 
White received during his service as marshal fees amounting to over 
$10,267.64, the list not being complete. Mr. White is one of the 
intimate friends of Judge Speer and has testified in his favor in this 
investigation. The appointment of the marshal to such positions 
and the payment to him of large fees is quite unusual, as it is cus¬ 
tomary in other judicial districts for the marshal when directed to 
take charge of property to hold it in his official capacity and receive 
for such services only the fees and expenses allowed by law, which 
are turned over to the Government as part of the earnings of his 
office. It is noted that in a large proportion of the cases where Mr. 
White was appointed receiver he employed the firm of the judge’s 


70 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

son-in-law to represent him as attorneys, arid that they also received 
large fees in such instances. The incomplete list of cases mentioned 
follows: 

List of cases in which George F. White was appointed receiver and allowed fees. 

Title of case. 

Brunswick Shingle Co. $200. 00 

Erie Lumber Company. 300. 00 

H. F. Beckum. 100.00 

J. M. Buckelew. 75. 00 

Corbett Brothers. 75. 00 

Julius Ohlman. 200. 00 

W. A. Yawn. 75. 00 

Abbeville Mercantile Co. 200. 00 

Beddingfield Mercantile Co. 150. 00 

R B. Perry. 125.00 

M. Williams. 150.00 

J. J. Park. 250. 00 

B. Orovitz. 100.00 

C. H. Harper. 125. 00 

Tom Buckings. 25. 00 

W. L. Cook. 25. 00 

J. J. Toole. 100.00 

J. W. Webb. 10.00 

C. A. Harrison. 125. 00 

D. L. Ragan. 16. 50 

Sam Karlowitz. 125. 00 

R. M. Denard. 100.00 

George Fish-Fish & Alex Fish-Fish. 250. 00 

J. A. Curl. 75. 00 

E. B. Harris. 535.00 

F. M. Barfield. 32.00 

R. L. Cheek. 176. 00 

McIntyre Kaolin Co. (Not yet allowed.) 

Union Dry Goods Co. 95. 00 

O. Jarmulowsky. (Not yet allowed.) 

De Lamar Turner- 1 . 125. 00 

T. A. Scott. 750.00 

Massengale Co. 125. 00 

J. R. Crandall. 134. 42 

Perkins Manufacturing Co. 870. 00 

Perkins Logging Co. (Not yet allowed.) 

T. Z. & P. V. Daniels Co. 1,000. 00 

Electric Supply Co. 850. 00 

J. E. Thompson & Brother. 99.14 

Rouse & Williams. 500. 00 

W. W. Jackson. 150. 00 

H. Jones. 150. 00 

Funston Supply Company. 250. 00 

Eatman Hardware Company. 250. 00 

Mize & Oliver. 800. 00 

Tinner Folsom. 100. 00 

Chas. Brigham. 300. 00 

E. L. Moore. (?) 


10,267. 64 
















































CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 71 

ALLEGED EXTRAVAGANT ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES, FEES 
TO SON-IN-LAW AND FAVORITES. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. BOLLING WHITFIELD. 

(Pages 2019-2037.) 

Mr. Whitfield testified he was an attorney by profession and had 
practiced in the southern district of Georgia for 25 years; that he was 
acquainted with Mr. M. A. Baker, and had assisted him in preparing 
an affidavit for use in this investigation; that he knew Mr. A. H. 
Heyward was appointed receiver in the M. A. Baker case, although he 
resided at Macon, 191 miles distant from Brunswick, where the Baker 
estate was located; that he knew Mr. Heyward was also appointed 
receiver in the case of Joseph Champaign, the estate in that case being 
located on St. Simons Island, some 200 miles from Macon, the home 
of Mr. Heyward. 

Mr. WTdtfield testified further that about the time the partnership 
was formed between Max Isaacs and Mr. A. H. Heyward, Mr. Isaacs 
had been appointed attorney for the referee in the Millen Grocery 
Co. case. That shortly after the formation of the partnership 
mentioned efforts were made by this firm to institute bankruptcy 
proceedings against several of the large concerns in the vicinity of 
Brunswick (the home of Mr. Isaacs), namely, the Beach Manufac¬ 
turing Co., the L. Carter Co., and the Gray Lumber Co. He also stated 
this firm filed a petition against the Yaryan Naval Stores Co. 

In answer to questions Mr. Whitfield stated that after the forma¬ 
tion of the partnership of Isaacs & Heyward a general feeling of 
insecurity on the part of the large business interests was expressed 
throughout his section of the State; that Mr. Isaacs had resigned as 
referee in bankruptcy cases and was very active in making up appli¬ 
cations for bankruptcy cases. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. L. M. BAKER. 

(Pages 1998-2013.) 

Mr. Baker stated that he was a merchant residing at Brunswick, 
Ga., and that his business had been put into bankruptcy during Jan¬ 
uary, 1909. That the referee, Max Isaacs, immediately appointed 
Mr. Heyward, Judge Speer’s son-in-law, receiver, although Mr. 
Heyward lived at Macon, about 180 miles distant from Brunswick* 
that the proceedings were brought on Saturday about 11 o’clock ana 
that Mr. Heyward was in Brunswick on Sunday morning at 9 o’clock 
with the papers in the case, took charge of the property, and left 
Brunswick on the train Sunday night for Pensacola, Fla., where part 
of the property was located; that he stayed there Monday, returned 
to Brunswick on Tuesday, stayed there about a day, and instructed 
Mr. Baker to continue in the collection of the revenue from his prop¬ 
erty and deposit the money in the bank, and forward the deposit 
slips to him (Heyward) at Macon. That Mr. Heyward was later 
elected trustee in the estate and held it as receiver and trustee not 
longer than two months. Mr. B^ker then produced a statement of the 
expenses in this case showing the payment of a total of $4,090, among 
the items being $1,000 paid to Mr. Heyward as receiver and $266.21 


72 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

as trustee. For list of disbursements in this case see Record, page 
2004. 

It will be noted that the undisputed evidence on this subject shows 
that Mr. Heyward, residing at Macon, was appointed receiver for the 
M. A. Baker Co., located at Brunswick, Ga., some 200 miles distant 
from Macon, by the referee, Mr. Isaacs, and that he received a fee 
of SI,000 from the estate for a few days’ work. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. JESSE C. HART. 

(Pages 872-888.) 

Mr. Hart testified that he resided in Macon, and was a banker by 
occupation; that he was connected with the Macon National Bank, 
and that he had employed Mr. Heyward to have the bank designated 
a depository for bankruptcy funds. In answer to questions, Mr. Hart 
testified that Mr. Heyward was his personal friend and also a son-in- 
law of Judge Speer; that he was not conscious of having employed 
Mr. Heyward to do this work on account of his relationship to Judge 
Speer, but added, “It may have passed from my mind; I don’t 
remember.” 

Upon cross-examination statements were drawn from Mr. Hart by 
counsel for Judge Speer to the effect that he had never heard anything 
detrimental to Mr. Heyward’s character. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. J. T. HILL. 

(Pages 823-832.) 

Mr. Hill testified that he had been employed by the Exchange Bank 
of Cordele to secure the designation of that bank as a bankruptcy 
depository through the influence of Mr. J. N. Talley with Judge Speer 
and that the bank had to pay Mr. Talley for the services through him 
(Hill). On cross-examination Mr. Hill stated that he did not make 
any personal effort to have the bank mentioned made a depository 
because he did not think he could accomplish it, and that hehad made a 
contract with Mr. Talley for the matter in advance of the application 
to the judge. In response to the question as to whether he had ever 
made application to Judge Speer for the designation of a bank unsuc¬ 
cessfully, Mr. Hill stated that he had not, but that they (meaning the 
attorneys of his town) had made an organized effort to get a referee 
in bankruptcy appointed in his county, which had failed, and that it 
was understood it would take fees to get it. In answer to a question 
from Judge Speer’s attorney as to the grounds for his understanding 
that it was necessary to approach the judge on such subjects in an 
unusual manner, Mr. Hill replied that it was the general understand¬ 
ing that it was necessary to do such things in a delicate way through 
those who are close to the judge, and that he understood that the influ¬ 
ence enjoyed by Mr. Talley was due to the fact that he was a former 
stenographer of the judge and at the time a law partner of Mr. Hey¬ 
ward, a son-in law of the judge; further, that the matter of the desig¬ 
nation of the bank in question was not taken up with Mr. Talley, 
owing to his familiarity with such things, as any competent attorney 
could have prepared such a formal application. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 73 


TESTIMONY OF MR. W. C. SNODGRASS. 

(Pages 2189-2198.) 

On the subject of the influence of Judge Speer with the referees 
in having the firm of his son-in-law receive appointment, etc., Mr. 
W. C. Snodgrass testified that Mr. W. C. Lane, former referee in 
bankruptcy, told him that when Judge Speer appointed him (Lane) 
referee, he gave him to understand that the appointment of the firm 
of his son-in-law would be very acceptable in cases that bore remun¬ 
eration. Upon cross-examination Mr. Snodgrass stated that he had 
associated the firm of Talley & Heyward with himself in the Philip 
Orth case, because the referee, Mr. Lane, had told him it was the 
proper thing to do. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. THOS. S. FELDER. 

(Pages 1901-1952.) 

Mr. Felder, attorney of the State of Georgia, testified that there is 
no question but that the funds of bankruptcy estates are wasted and 
that in the administration of these estates only certain favored ones 
are selected to receive the benefits; that all kinds of officers are 
appointed and paid large fees. That it does not make much dif¬ 
ference where the property is located or what the character of the 
property is, if the estate is of any importance, where big fees are 
likely to be allowed, the favorites of Judge Speer are appointed to 
the positions regardless. of their fitness. That no suggestions or 
agreements of counsel with regard to these appointments are taken, 
but that the appointments go to certain favored parties. That 
when he came to the bar at Macon that was the first thing he heard 
with reference to the court; that the most distinguished lawyers 
never dare to try important cases in Judge Speer’s court unless they 
associate someone with them that can reach the ear of the judge; 
that so far as he is concerned he had some time ago reached the con¬ 
clusion that he could not do justice to himself as a gentleman without 
telling prospective clients that his relations with the court would 
make it detrimental for them to employ him; that it was so well 
known in the district that Judge Speer was going to take sides in a 
case that the attorneys learned to watch his countenance and soon 
knew whether they were going to win or lose. That a lawyer who 
is a gentleman can not prosecute a case in the court whether he wins 
or loses without feeling that justice has not been done; that it does 
not look as if justice has any part in the comedy; that truth is not 
being looked for; that the surroundings are merely for the purpose 
of displaying the court, and that the attorneys are all merely king’s 
jesters; that the people all know as well as the lawyers that when 
they go into court with a lawyer who is favored by the judge they 
are thrice armed. That the people are in terror, not the evildoers 
alone, but all who find it necessary to go into court even in civil cases 
where the rights of property are to be passed upon and estates to be 
administered. 

Mr. Felder further stated that he would say “ most unequivocally 
that the administration of justice in Judge Speer’s court is unsatis- 


74 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

factory and that it is a wonder the people have suffered so long,” 
that it gives him no pleasure to make this statement, but that he does 
it in justice to the people of Georgia. 

THE A. D. OLIVER BANKRUPT CASE—TESTIMONY OF W. C. SNODGRASS. 

(Pages 2155-2189.) 

Mr. Snodgrass testified that he handled most of the litigation in this 
case, and that out of $8,305 realized, there remained only $108.09 on 
hand, all of the balance having been paid in fees and expenses. Mr. 
Snodgrass then gave the circumstances relative to this case (Record, 
p. 2156). He stated in response to question, that this case was mighty 
near like a race for fees on the part of the attorneys and officials, and 
that finally it became just a question of fees; that the firm of Talley 
& Heyward received, in connection with Hawes & Pottle, $2,000 
as attorneys for trustee in one branch of the case, and “I would like 
mightily to do the same thing for the same money; I would have 
taken the $2,000, however, if it had been allowed me.” Mr. Snod¬ 
grass was asked if in his judgment these attorneys did not honestly 
and truly earn the amount allowed in the case, and said, “Honestly 
and truly, to come clean about it, I do not.” Mr. Snodgrass testified 
further, that he was informed by the referee in this case that the 
trustee had made application to the judge for the employment of 
counsel and asked that Talley & Heyward be designated. 

Mr. Snodgrass testified on cross-examination that the receiver 
appointed in the case, George F. White, received a fee of $800, and 
that he (Snodgrass) was employed as attorney for receiver and was 
paid a fee of $375. Mr. Snodgrass testified further, that the location 
of this bankruptcy estate was at Climax, Ga., about 200 miles from 
Macon, and that the trustee in the case evidently went to Macon 
to employ the firm of Talley & Heyward in order that fee allowances 
might be satisfactory, and other arrangements agreeable to the court; 
that this is what the lawyers generally supposed was the reason. 

PARTNERSHIP OF A. H. HEYWARD AND MAX ISAACS-TESTIMONY OF 

MR. W. W. OSBORNE. 

(Pages 2436-2437.) 

Mr. Osborne testified that about the time the partnership of Isaacs 
& Heyward was formed he had been trying cases in the Federal court 
at Savannah, and had noticed Mr. Heyward and Mr. Isaacs about 
the court room frequently; that Mr. Heyward sat in court with Judge 
Speer and conversed with him while cases were being tried, and that 
he also saw Mr. Isaacs and Judge Speer in the evening walking up 
and down in front of the He Soto Hotel; that he passed them engaged 
in conversation at 9 o’clock in the evening, and at 11 o’clock again 
passed the hotel and saw the judge and Mr. Isaacs still in conversa¬ 
tion on the hotel veranda; that the second night after that he again 
passed the hotel and saw Judge Speer and Mr. Isaacs talking together; 
that Mr. Isaacs had just previous to this time resigned his position 
as referee in bankruptcy, and the announcement of the partnership 
of Isaacs & Heyward was made within a few days. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 75 


TESTIMONY OF A. A. LAWRENCE. 

(Pages 1490-1494.) 

Mr. Lawrence testified that at the time the partnership mentioned 
was announced, three things happened contemporaneously, namely, 
the resignation of Isaacs as referee in bankruptcy; the retaining of 
Isaacs as attorney for receiver in the Daniels bankrupt case, and the 
formation of the partnership; that the Daniels Co. was located at 
Millen, Ga., a town 170 miles distant from Brunswick, the home of 
Mr. Isaacs; that court was in session at Savannah at the time and 
that Judge Speer made a long talk in accepting Mr. Isaacs’s resigna¬ 
tion as referee, and referred to his valuable and magnificent services, 
etc., and that it was immediately predicted by two of his friends that 
in a few days the partnership between Isaacs and Heyward would be 
announced. 

Mr. Lawrence then identified three exhibits, namely, “GG,” “Y,” 
and “Z,” representing statements made by him in the investigation 
and testified that the statements made in them were true. 

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER AKERMAN, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY. 

(Pages 2440-2449.) 

Upon being questioned relative to the formation of the partnership 
of Isaacs and Heyward, Mr. Akerman stated that in the latter part of 
February, 1913, he had been in New Orleans appearing before the 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and that on his way home, while on the 
train on the return trip he noticed in a Savannah paper that Max 
Isaacs had resigned as referee in bankruptcy, and expected to engage 
in the practice of law and make a specialty of bankruptcy cases, and 
that he already had one very large case, naming the Millen Grocery 
Co.; that while on the train he engaged in conversation with Judge 
Joseph W. Bennett, of Brunswick, and that they predicted there would 
be a partnership between Isaacs and Heyward. That Mr. George F. 
White, who had been appointed receiver by Judge Speer in the 
Millen Grocery Co. case employed Max Isaacs as his attorney,, 
although he had previously tentatively employed Mr. Akerman in 
that capacity. That Mr. White told him in explanation of his action 
in breaking his agreement, “ Alex, you know me well enough to know 
that I couldn’t help myself,” and Mr. Akerman infers, of course, that 
Mr. White took this action through the influence of Judge Speer. 
Mr. Akerman proceeded to testify as to the intimate relations be¬ 
tween Judge Speer and Mr. White, and stated further in explanation 
of the action of Mr. White in employing Mr. Isaacs as attorney in the 
Millen Grocery Co. case, that the partnership of Isaacs with Judge 
Speer’s son-in-law was formed almost immediately thereafter. That 
he saw Mr. Isaacs in conference with Judge Speer at the De Soto 
Hotel at about the time the partnership was formed. 

AFFIDAVIT OF SIMON N. GAZAN IN RE CONNECTION OF JUDGE SPEER 
WITH ISAACS & HEYWARD PARTNERSHIP. 

Mr. Gazan has furnished an affidavit on this subject which marked 
Exhibit No. 16. Mr. Gazan swears that about the time the part- 


76 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

nership was formed between Mr. Max Isaacs and Mr. A. H. Heyward, 
Judge Speer’s son-in-law, he went to the De Soto Hotel in Savannah, 
Ga., at which place all the attorneys mentioned were stopping at the 
time, and that he saw Judge Speer, Mr. Isaacs, and Mr. Heyward in 
conversation one evening at about 8.30 p. m. in a room at the hotel, 
and that on the next day he met the same three persons on the street 
and was informed by them that Mr. Heyward and Mr. Isaacs had 
formed a copartnership for the practice of law. That he congratu¬ 
lated these gentlemen and invited them to have a drink with him, 
which invitation was accepted, and they proceeded to a nearby club 
for the drink. This affidavit corroborates the testimony of a number 
of other witnesses to the effect that Judge Speer was in frequent con¬ 
versation with these parties at the time the partnership was formed, 
and this fact is undoubtedly the cause of the general impression which 
became current to the effect that Judge Speer was a party to the 
transaction. 

The firm of Talley & Heyward was dissolved on January 1, 1913, 
and in March, 1913, the firm of Isaacs & Heyward was formed. It 
is noted that Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Osborne, and Mr. Akerman testify 
as to the conferences between Judge Speer and Mr. Heyward and 
Mr. Isaacs at about the time the partnership mentioned was formed, 
and it is apparent that Judge Speer was considerably concerned in 
this partnership, although he denies that he had any connection with 
it except that the young men consulted him. Attention is invited 
on this subject to the affidavit of Mr. Samuel S. Bennett (Exhibit 
No. 16-A) in which Mr. Bennett swears that Judge Speer proposed a 
partnership between Mr. Bennett and his son-in-law, Mr. Heyward, 
which proposition was declined by Mr. Bennett. Attention is also 
invited to the statements of some of the witnesses to the effect that 
shortly after the formation of the partnership of Isaacs & Heyward 
and the institution of bankruptcy cases against several important 
business concerns, the names of Judge Speer, Isaacs, and Heyward 
were linked together. 

There is little doubt but that Judge Speer was a party to the forma¬ 
tion of the partnership between Isaacs and his son-in-law, although 
he states he had nothing to do with it. He admits, however, that 
the young men may have consulted him. 

It is also true that Judge Speer proposed a partnership with Hey¬ 
ward to Mr. Samuel Bennett, although stated he could not remember 
it when questioned on the stand by the chairman of the committee, 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JACOB GAZAN. 

(Pages 2396-2398.) 

Mr. Gazan testified that the commercial interests in his section of 
the State regard Judge Speer’s court as a constant menace; that since 
the formation of the partnership of Isaacs & Heyward, Speer, Hey¬ 
ward and Isaacs are called the “unholy triple alliance”; that the air 
is full of rumors that this or that concern was next in order for attack, 
and that even before these big companies were attacked by this firm 
the “grapevine telegraph” had advised the world that it was coming. 
Mr. Gazan then identified a paper marked “Exhibit S” and made 
oath to the statement contained in it. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 77 
TESTIMONY OF MR. R. L. BENNETT. 

(Pages 2418-2424.) 

Mr. Bennett testified that the people generally feel that they can 
get no justice in Judge Speer’s court, and that he has not found any 
man in his section who is not afraid to enter Judge Speer’s court, 
and that they will submit to any compromise and will not go into 
his court unless compelled. Mr. Bennett also testified that immedi¬ 
ately upon the formation of the partnership of Isaacs & Heyward, the 
impression went abroad that it was formed for the purpose of bank¬ 
rupting business interests, and the names of large concerns marked 
for attack were mentioned, and these firms were actually thrown into 
bankruptcy very soon thereafter. 

On cross-examination Mr. Bennett testified that Mr. Isaacs was 
indicted in Wayne and Appling Counties for barratry and was charged 
with soliciting business in bankruptcy cases. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN W. BENNETT. 

(Page 2435.) 

Mr. Bennett testified that the commercial interests of his section of 
the State feel that Judge Speer is a menace to justice, and that the 
people generally feel that cases are tried in his court by a kind of 
“sleight-of-hand performance that nobody ever sees.” That the 
court is not referred to as the United States court, but as “Judge 
Speer’s court”; that occasionally you find a person through the 
country who has been a juror who feels kindly toward Judge Speer, 
as he is very kind to his jurors. 

It appears to be a fact that Mr. Isaacs, who formed the partner¬ 
ship with the judge’s son-in-law, and thereafter immediately began 
soliciting claims and instituting bankruptcy cases against large 
business concerns, has been indicted in two, if not three, counties 
in Southern Georgia, for barratry. It is noted also that since the 
notoriety caused by the actions of this firm, and the indictments 
mentioned, the partnership has been dissolved. 

There is no doubt but that the formation of this partnership, and 
the actions of Judge Speer in presiding in cases where the members 
were involved, appointing receivers without notice and without cause 
at their instance, as well as in deciding questions in their favor, served 
to bring the United States Court into disrepute and place the judge 
thereof under general suspicion. 

ALLEGED ABUSE OF HIS OFFICIAL AUTHORITY IN USING 
COURT OFFICIALS AS PRIVATE SERVANTS. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. H. G. TUCKER. 

(Pages 537-548.) 

Mr. Tucker testified that he had seen Mulholland at Judge Speer’s 
house while he was employed as crier of the court. He stated that 
he had never seen Mulholland open court. Mr. Tucker testified 
further that Mulholland had been employed as crier for a year or 
probably more, and was paid by the Government during that time. 


78 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

In response to a question as to the services rendered to the court 
Mr. Tucker stated Mulholland had never acted as crier, but that he 
had seen him around the judge’s chambers and about the building 
a good deal, but he could not recall what he was doing. He also 
testified that he visited Judge Speer’s house probably once a week, 
and upon being asked as to whether he saw Mulholland as a personal 
servant around the house, Mr. Tucker replied, “Yes, sir; I saw him 
around the house.” In answer to the question as to whether Mul¬ 
holland worked at Judge Speer’s home when he was not on the roll 
of the United States Court as crier, Mr. Tucker replied that he was 
satisfied that he did, because he would go away wdth the judge in the 
summer time. On cross-examination Mr. Tucker replied that the 
salaries of bailiffs and criers are paid by the marshal’s office, and 
that the marshal’s office has to certify to them, and that it was the 
marshal’s (Mr. White’s) purpose to have these officers report at the 
office each day for which they claimed pay. That it was the rule 
for Mr. White to have charge of the bailiffs, and that at the end of 
the week, he (Tucker) would pay them at Mr. White’s direction. 

Upon being recalled (pp. 617-620) Mr. Tucker was presented with 
a paper by Mr. Howard, Judge Speer’s attorney, and identified it as 
a receipt from Charles Mulholland, stating that the body of the 
receipt appeared to be written by Mr. J. C. Morecock, who was 
formerly stenographer to Judge Speer. 

THE TESTIMONY OF MR. JOHN M. BARNES, FORMER UNITED STATES 

MARSHAL. 

(Pages 916-918.) 

On this subject Mr. Barnes testified that Judge Speer used the 
court crier or court messenger as coachmen, and that neither the 
crier not the messenger ever came about the court to discharge the 
duties for which the Govermment paid them, except occasionally, 
and on the first of each month to get their pay from the United States. 
That in the winter of 1902-3, the judge had a colored man named 
Cleveland as messenger, and wished to appoint a colored man named 
W. Mitchell as crier; that he called Mr. Barnes to his office and asked 
him if he would do him the kindness to act as crier if he appointed 
Mitchell; that the judge said Mitchell could not discharge the duties 
of crier but that the judge desired to have both Cleveland and Mitchell 
at his residence outside the city limits, and would be greatly obliged 
if Mr. Barnes would act as crier; that he (Barnes) consented, and 
discharged the crier’s duties for perhaps six months, although the 
said crier Mitchell regularly drew the pay of crier. That during the 
time that Mr. Lamar was marshal and custodian of the Federal Court 
Building, one Henry M. Allen, colored, was employed as janitor, but 
was required by Judge Speer to leave the Federal Building at 9.30 
a. m. each day and repair to the judge’s residence thereafter to act 
as man of all work the rest of the day; that Allen finally objected, 
especially as he had much trouble with the judge’s pack of dogs, which, 
had the mange, Allen being required to wash them; that Allen, 
however, finally agreed to continue this service at the judge’s resi¬ 
dence if the judge would pay him something in addition to his salary 
as janitor; that the judge refused, and that the custodian then asked 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 79 

for Allen's resignation; that Allen inquired as to the cause for his 
dismissal and was told that he had offended Judge Speer, whereupon 
he got out circulars detailing the facts and circulated them on the 
streets; that in 1904 the report was circulated that an effort would be 
made to impeach Judge Speer, and that Allen was recalled and given 
employment about the Federal Building as bootblack, etc., but was 
said to be paid as bailiff. 

While Mi*. Barnes was on the stand, counsel for Judge Speer pro¬ 
duced and read into the record correspondence between Judge Speer 
and the United States marshal, which they claim shows that Mr. 
Barnes's statement relative to the dismissal of the janitor, Allen, and 
his employment at the residence of Judge Speer were untrue. On 
cross-examination Mr. Barnes testified (pp. 949-973) that he did not 
know what particular service the court officials mentioned by him 
performed at the judge's house, but they seemed to be serving the 
judge in some capacity, as they always came to him and stated that 
the judge wanted them out to his house. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. ALEXANDER AKERMAN, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY. 

(Pages 1094-1095.) 

Mr. Akerman stated that the judge had used bailiffs, messengers, 
and criers as personal servants at his house most of the time, and that 
these men performed little if any official duties at the Federal Build¬ 
ing. He referred to Mr. Mell McCoy, stating that he had been 
employed as crier, messenger, and bailiff for some time, and that until 
Mr. Lewis came to Macon to make his investigation McCoy had never 
discharged any duties except as personal servant to the judge and 
looking after his horses, etc.; that the judge has the appointment of a 
messenger and crier, and changes them so often that it is difficult to 
tell in what capacity a man is employed without going to the records; 
that Edward Mathis, although employed as court official, never dis¬ 
charged any duties whatever around the courthouse, and that the 
only duties he ever saw McCoy perform were those of personal servant 
to the judge. 


TESTIMONY OF MR. GEORGE F. WHITE. 

(Pages 1393-1401.) 

Mr. White testified that the pay rolls for bailiffs, criers, and court 
messengers were made up in the office of the marshal and certified to 
there. Upon being asked whether he ever kept anyone on the pay 
roll who did not attend court every day, Mr. White replied, “My 
orders on that have been very strict, that they could not he paid for 
any day they did not come to the courthouse." Mr. White further 
testified that Mell McCoy, present court messenger, stays at Judge 
Speer's house, and he stated also that the judge pays a crier for per¬ 
sonal services rendered “between $25 and $30 per month and his 
clothes." He also stated that Judge Speer employs three servants at 
his house independently of the court officers. In answer to questions 
as to whether the bailiffs and crier would simply go to the courthouse in 
the morning and immediately retire to Judge Speer's home and there 
act as personal servants to the judge and his family, Mr. White stated, 
H. Kept. 1176, 63-2-6 


80 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


“They would come to the courthouse, and if there was anything I 
wanted done they did it,” and upon being further questioned stated, 
“Sometimes they would go back to the judge’s house,” and on being 
still further questioned stated that he knew that the bailiffs and 
crier have assisted Judge Speer at his house. He further said, in 
answer to questions as to whether he had not had bailiffs and criers on 
the pay roll whose chief work and duty was as personal servants to 
Judge Speer at his home, “I have had bailiffs who did help Judge 
Speer at the house.” Mr. White also stated that these officials waited 
on the judge and went with him to hold his horses, cared for the 
horses, etc., and stated as a general proposition one of the bailiffs 
stayed at the judge’s house a good deal of the time in addition to the 
messenger and also said, k ‘ I have sent a messenger to wait on him in a 
personal way, also a bailiff and crier.” 

The testimony on this subject shows that Judge Speer has used 
the court messenger and ordinarily either a court crier or bailiff at 
his house as private servants while these parties were being paid by 
the Government. The testimony of Mr. Barnes, the former United 
States marshal, and Mr. Alexander Akerman, the present United 
States attorney, appears to show that the principal duties of these 
employees were in acting as private servants at the home of Judge 
Speer. Judge Speer claims that the personal services rendered by 
these parties were paid for by him. 

See “Exhibit No. 10.” 

DECIDING CASES IN FAVOR OF RELATIVES, FAVORITES, ETC. 

E. B. HARRIS BANKRUPTCY CASE- TESTIMONY OF MR. E. B. HARRIS. 

(Pages 1003-1053.) 

Mr. Harris gave his residence as Macon, and stated that he was a 
merchant and had been in the shoe business in that city for 18 years. 
That about 1906 he entered into negotiations with one J. Clay Mur¬ 
phy, acting for C. S. Henry of New York City for the sale of his store 
building for $36,000, and accepted $250 as part payment; that he 
gave a receipt and signed an agreement, but that Henry did not 
fulfill said agreement, and that he refused to convey the property; 
that Mr. Murphy then, on behalf of Henry, sued for specific per¬ 
formance of the contract, and lost in the State court, later entered 
suit for specific performance in the United States court; that Henry 
sold his right in the contract to one Joseph N. Neil for $1,000, who in 
turn sold his rights in it to Mr. J. Clay Murphy; that when the case came 
up in the United States court Murphy was represented by W. D. McNeil, 
a relative of Judge Speer; that Judge Speer referred the case to Mr. 
J. N. Talley, a law partner of Mr. Heyward, Judge Speer’s son-in-law, 
as master; that the master (Talley) found in favor of Murphy; that 
is, for specific performance of the contract, but before the matter 
had been passed upon by the court a bankruptcy petition was filed 
against him (Harris) March 27, 1911, by A. L. Dasher, acting as 
attorney for creditors; that his store was closed, and shortly there¬ 
after he effected an agreement for a compromise settlement of 21 
per cent, all the creditors agreeing in writing to accept; that shortly 
thereafter Mr. Dasher and Mr. McNeil withdrew their clients’ accept- 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 81 

ances. That in June, 1911, Judge Speer appointed George F. White, 
United States marshal, receiver in the case, who employed W. D. 
McNeil, the kinsman of Judge Speer, as his attorney; that notwith¬ 
standing the opposition of Dasher and McNeil he secured the written 
consent of 96 per cent of his creditors to a compromise settlement of 
21 per cent, and presented the matter to the referee, who certified 
it to the judge without recommendation; that Judge Speer refused 
to approve the composition, and that the matter proceeded and he 
was adjudged bankrupt, and Mr. Cook Clayton was elected trustee, 
Mr. Alexander Akerman and Arthur L. Dasher, jr., being named as 
attorneys for trustee. That shortly thereafter an offer of composi¬ 
tion settlement of 21 per cent was again made, 93 per cent of the 
creditors accepting the offer in writing. 

That the judge again refused to allow the composition, and in his 
remarks on the subject stated that in view of the effect that it might 
have upon the morale of the mercantile world he could not in justice 
allow a man to “ break full-handed.” That at this time the trustee 
filed exceptions to the findings of the master with regard to specific 
performance of contract with Murphy, and Judge Speer appointed 
another attorney for the trustee, Mr. Macolm D. Jones, who was also 
attorney for the bankrupt. That Judge Speer about this time fur¬ 
nished an article to the Macon News for publication, in which he set 
forth an opinion as to the issue involved; that Mr. McNeil, acting 
for Mr. Murphy, filed an affidavit of prejudice against Judge Speer and 
endeavored to disqualify him. That Judge Speer decided that he was 
not disqualified, and ordered the attorneys to proceed. That the 
attorneys declined to proceed with the case, and Judge Speer there¬ 
upon dismissed it for want of prosecution; that these attorneys then 
appealed to the circuit court of appeals, which upheld Judge Speer 
with regard to his being qualified to act but reversed his action in 
dismissing the case and ordered him to proceed with it; that at this 
time Judge Speer added Judge Andrew J. Cobb to the retinue of 
attorneys for the trustee. That the case then proceeded and a settle¬ 
ment was finally effected by which the store property was to be sold 
and Mr. Murphy was to receive all realized from the sale over $57,000. 
That at the time this settlement was being discussed Mr. Malcolm 
Jones, who was the attorney for Harris, was asked by Judge Speer 
what he thought of it, and that Mr. Jones did not reply. That Judge 
Speer again asked him if he agreed to the settlement, but that Mr. 
Jones was not heard to reply. That since that time he (Harris) had 
been informed that a man sitting near Mr. Jones heard him say, “I 
suppose your judgment is good.” That the judge then said: “Draw 
the decree, gentlemen.” That at the sale the property was bid in by 
Mr. Murphy at $66,000, and that the next day the property was sold 
to the C’tizens National Bank of Macon for $77,500. That the decree 
did not give the public a fair chance to bid, as Mr. Murphy was to get 
all over $57,000, which gave him a big advantage in the bidding. 
That McNeil, the kinsman of the judge, got into the case on an 
85-cent claim, and was paid $550 as attorney for receiver, and that he 
(Harris) did not know what McNeil ever did as receiver’s attorney, as 
he did not know of any litigation handled by him. That this fee was 
allowed him by the special master, Mr. Talley, who at the same time 
allowed himself $50 for allowing it. Mr. Harris then requested to be 


82 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


allowed to give some circumstances of the case, which he stated 
showed a close corporation of interests, and proceeded to state that the 
judge had taken his attorney away from him by making him attorney 
for the trustee. Mr. Harris then read the following list, showing the 
close corporation of interests of Judge Speer and his court officials, 
friends, and relatives with the case: 

1. Judge Speer. 

2. Mr. Akerman, United States attorney (as attorney for trustee). 

3. George F. White, United States marshal (receiver). 

4. United States deputy marshal (acting receiver). 

5. Cook Clayton, court crier (trustee). 

6. J. N. Talley, partner of Judge Speer’s son-in-law (special master). 

7. W. D. McNeil, Judge Speer’s kinsman (attorney for receiver). 

8. A. L. Dasher, jr. (attorney for trustee and petitioning creditors). 

9. Judge Andrew J. Cobb, personal counsel for Judge Speer 
(attorney for trustee). 

10. Malcolm D. Jones (attorney for trustee, also attorney for 
bankrupt). 

Mr. Harris continued that he considered the appointment of Mr. 
Jones improper, as it made his interests conflict. Mr. Harris made 
complaint further with regard to the statement made by Judge Speer 
from the bench relative to him to the effect that he could not allow a 
man to “break full-handed” and stated that no fraud had been alleged 
and that his previous record showed that he had paid creditors 
100 cents on the dollar after they had agreed to accept 50 per 
cent and give receipts in full. He testified further that the action of 
Judge Speer in declining to allow composition settlements when 
practically all the creditors agreed to them in writing*was improper. 
Also, that he could not understand why the trustee, who was an 
experienced man in bankruptcy cases, should have had four attorneys 
to represent him. In answer to questions Mr. Harris testified that 
these four attorneys, namely, A. L. Dasher, Alexander Akerman, 
Malcolm Jones, and Andrew J. Cobb, had been paid fees amounting 
to $5,450. Mr. Harris then identified the statement given to Exami¬ 
ner Lewis, and it was read into the record. This statement sets forth 
most of the facts testified to by Mr. Harris. It states further that 
Judge Andrew J. Cobb, who was appointed by Judge Speer as one of 
the four attorneys for trustee, had previously represented Judge Speer 
in litigation in the State court without compensation. Also, that Mr. 
Malcolm Jones, who was his attorney, had stated to him that he did 
not consent to the settlement effected, which was alleged by Mr. 
Harris to have been coerced by the court. 

Mr. Harris further testified that his total assets at the time the 
bankruptcy case was instituted amounted to $87,750, valuing the 
building at $77,500, at which price it was finally sold, and that his 
debts, secured and unsecured, amounted to approximately $76,000. 
Mr. Harris stated further that while A. L. Dasher, jr. and sr., are 
mentioned in the case, he does not think that A. L. Dasher, sr., was 
in the case; that A. L. Dasher, jr. and sr., were paid out of the case 
$2,750; Miller & Jones, as attorneys for bankrupt, $1,200; M. D. 
Jones (who is the Jones of Miller & Jones), as attorney for trustee, 
$600; Andrew J. Cobb, as attorney for trustee, $400; Alexander 
Akerman, as attorney for trustee, $500; W. D. McNeil, as 
attorney for receiver, $550. Mr. Harris testified further that he 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 83 

had made a contract with Messrs. Miller & Jones to represent him for 
$500, but that the master allowed them $1,200 for doing this very 
work. Mr. Harris then read into the record an extract from a letter 
written by the Mr. Dasher mentioned above to the effect that his store 
building was sold at the exceptionally low price due to the fact that 
the parties holding the lien had a decided advantage over all other 
bidders, and that the court ordered the case settled in the manner 
mentioned. 


TESTIMONY OF MR. ALEXANDER AKERMAN. 

(Pages 1096-1104.) 

Mr. Akerman detailed his connection with this case and stated 
that when the proposition of settlement, out of which arose the affi¬ 
davit of prejudice mentioned in this case, was made to him he pre¬ 
sented it to Judge Speer for permission to submit it to the creditors, 
and that Judge Speer said such matters should not be turned into a 
town meeting, but should be decided judicially; that he cited the law 
and authorities to the judge showing that such questions of settle¬ 
ment should be presented to creditors for consideration, but that he 
was convinced the judge would not allow the matter to take that 
course, and so informed Mr. McNeil, who was representing the parties 
making the proposition of settlement; that Mr. McNeil on hearing 
this immediately withdrew his proposition of settlement, giving as 
his reason that he did not wish the judge to fde any opinion which 
would prejudge the case; that the next day the opinion which is 
mentioned in the testimony of Mr. Simmons appeared in the Macon 
News, and that Mr. McNeil promptly filed an affidavit of disqualifi¬ 
cation; that the judge refused to disqualify himself and perempto¬ 
rily set the case down for hearing. Mr. Akerman then proceeded to 
testify that Judge Speer had delivered an opinion in the case reported 
in the One hundred and ninety-first Federal Reporter, page 808, 
which was an unfair reflection upon his integrity, and read into the 
record as follows: “That was the phase which was presented to the 
court when Mr. Akerman made this motion to call a meeting of cred¬ 
itors, to part with their rights, perhaps, for the sum of $4,000. The 
court very well knew all the creditors were in the dark as to their 
rights. It prepared an opinion which might have enlightened them. 
Then, upon the application of counsel who desires to secure this 
property for his clients, the offer was withdrawn. The attorney, 
W. D. McNeil, according to his own testimony under oath in this 
hearing, stated to the judge at the time he withdrew the offer that 
it w T as done to prevent the publication of the opinion. The judge 
thought about that. Was there any significance to be attached to it ? 
What did counsel have in mind ? Did he desire to deprive the pro¬ 
fession and the public of a lucid opinion setting forth the law upon 
this important topic? Assuredly not; a member of the bar would 
not be so unkind to the public and the court. What, then, was his 
motive? The court could see no other, except that, perhaps, there 
might be some facts in the case which, while these negotiations were 
pending, he did not wish the creditors to be apprised of.” Mr. 
Akerman stated that this was a very unfair reflection, as his only 
action was to present a motion for submitting the matter to a public 


84 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


meeting of the creditors, while Judge Speer stated in his published 
opinion that there was an attempt to cover up something from the 
creditors. 

The records in this case show that when the attorneys presented 
to Judge Speer the request for submitting to the creditors a proposi¬ 
tion of settlement and later withdrew the petition without any hearing 
on it, the judge prepared and furnished the Macon News for pub¬ 
lication a long opinion in which he set forth his views on the case in 
full before the issues involved had been presented to him for adjudi¬ 
cation, and that the attorney for the plaintiff promptly filed an 
affidavit of disqualification under section 21 of the Judicial Code, 
alleging bias and prejudice on the part of Judge Speer, and the 
judge refused to disqualify himself upon the technical ground that 
the word “personal” had been omitted from the affidavit of prejudice. 
The attorneys declined to proceed with the case after the judge de¬ 
cided he was not disqualified, and the judge thereupon dismissed the 
case for want of prosecution. Appeal was taken from the judge’s 
decision and the Court of Appeals ordered him to proceed with the 
case. The record further shows that when this appeal was taken 
from his decision Judge Speer brought Judge Andrew J. Cobb into the 
case and appointed him attorney for the trustee, the trustee already 
having three firms of attorneys representing him. It further appears 
that Judge Cobb was paid $400 for these services, and Judge Cobb has 
testified that he had previously represented Judge Speer in private 
litigation gratuitously. The record also shows that Judge Speer 
authorized the employment of four attorneys for the trustee in this 
case, and that they were paid $5,450 out of this estate. Attention 
is also called to the fact that nearly all of the other large fees allowed 
were paid to Judge Speer’s relatives and favorites. The records show 
that Judge Speer made an order for the sale of the store property of 
Mr. Harris by which all sums in excess of $57,000 received should be 
paid to the plaintiff (Murphy), and it is evident that an order of this 
character gave Mr. Murphy such an advantage in the sale that no 
parties desiring to purchase it could afford to bid against him, as 
he would be the beneficiary in all of the excess received. It is also 
noted that the property in question was ostensibly bid in by Mr. Mur¬ 
phy at $66,000, but that in reality he had an agreement with the Citi¬ 
zens National Bank, and that the property was actually resold to them 
the following day for $77,500. This transaction, of course, resulted 
in Mr. Murphy receiving $20,000 for a claim which had been sold a 
short time previously for $1,000. There is no direct evidence im¬ 
plicating Judge Speer in this transaction beyond his conduct in mak¬ 
ing the order, anci the testimony of Mr. Harris that his attorney was 
coerced into agreeing to the sale. 

Judge Speer denies that he did anything improper in this case. 

There will be found in evidence and marked “Exhibit 19” a copy 
of the affidavit of prejudice filed in this case under the provisions of 
section 21 of the Judicial Code, and upon which Judge Speer declined 
to disqualify himself. There will also be found in evidence and 
marked “Exhibit 19-A” a copy of the affidavit made b}^ Mr. T. J. 
Simmons, the managing editor of the Macon News, to the effect that 
Judge Speer furnished to his paper the opinion upon which the affi¬ 
davit of prejudice was based and which was an alleged prejudging of 
the issues involved. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 85 

The opinion referred to in the affidavits is in evidence as Exhibit 
19-B. 

Mr. Akerman testified further (pp. 1198-1208) that the article sent 
by Judge Speer to the Macon News for publication was a prejudging 
of the merits of the controversy between Henry and Harris. 

TESTIMONY OF W. C. SNODGRASS. 

(Pages 706-720.) 

In answer to the question as to the general reputation of Judge 
Speer as to fairness and judicial temperament Mr. Snodgrass stated 
that the general opinion was that Judge Speer is subject to prejudice 
and to take arbitrary action, and to insist on formulating records and 
procedure in such a way as to require counsel to accede to them 
against their protest and wishes; that the general desire of the people 
is to avoid the Federal court when they can, and that they do not 
wish to come into a court where there is so much talk about favor¬ 
itism, prejudice, and arbitrary ruling; that there is much talk about 
Judge Speer being arbitrary, having favorites, and possessing preju¬ 
dices; that this reputation is the general talk throughout the district. 
Mr. Snodgrass related an instance relative to the actions of Judge 
Speer in the case of the First National Bank of Thomasville v. Hop¬ 
kins, trustee; that in this case $10,000 was involved and that the 
judge decided it on an oral opinion without a review of the record or 
an examination of the authorities cited; that when they undertook to 
argue it the judge did not listen to the argument, was restless, moved 
about, and paid about as much attention to the case as if it was a $5 
justice court case; that the judge stated he did not care to examine 
the authorities cited; that he stated the case was so plain he did not 
care to take it under advisement at all; that appeal was taken to the 
court of appeals and Judge Speer promptly reversed; that the court 
of appeals examined the authorities submitted, and that at the argu¬ 
ment of the case before the court of appeals the plaintiff’s attorneys 
did not attempt to sustain the various actions of Judge Speer in the 
court, but based their argument on the maxim, “Though the coach¬ 
man was drunk, the coach drove on to its destination.” _ Mr. Snod¬ 
grass further testified that one of the attorneys for the plaintiff in this 
case in whose favor Judge Speer erroneously decided was Mr. O. A. 
Park, a friend of Judge Speer and one of his counsel in the investiga¬ 
tion before the committee. 

FRANK SCARBORO CASE-—TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER AKERMAN. 

(Pages 1081-1089.) 

Mr. Akerman testified that in April, 1912, shortly after he was 
appointed United States attorney, the case of United States v. Frank 
Scarboro, indicted for violation of the National Banking Act, came 
up for trial at the Albany division; that Messrs. Talley & Heyward 
were of counsel for the defendants in this case and that when the case 
had progressed for one short day, Judge Speer sent for him at 6.30 
a. m. the following morning and stated that he had seen enough of 
the case to convince him that the defendant was clearly guilty; that 
as he was represented by numerous eminent attorneys he did not wish 


86 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

to see a miscarriage of justice, and suggested that Mr. Akerman was 
overmatched in counsel and that it would be well for him to get 
authority from the department for the employment of assistant 
counsel to represent the Government; that he (Akerman) agreed to 
this and wired the department for authority, and when it was received 
he employed Messrs. Pope & Bennett; that the case then went on for 
several days, the Government continuing to pile up evidence, and the 
defense allowed it to go to the jury without submitting any defense 
whatever; that after the case was argued the judge, without the 
slightest intimation, “ turned loose in a charge that was little short 
of directing a verdict of not guilty;” that the case went to the jury 
about 2 o’clock in the afternoon and the next he heard of it the jury 
sent for a copy of the judge’s charge, and that later in the day when 
he was at the supper table at the hotel the marshal, Mr. George 
White, came over and asked if he would be satisfied with a mistrial, to 
which he replied that after that charge from the judge he would be sat¬ 
isfied with anything; that at about 8 o’clock he went back to his office 
and the jury was called in to court by the judge and a mistrial de¬ 
clared; that Mr. White afterwards told him that he had stated to the 
judge that the jury stood 8 to 4 or 10 to 2 for conviction, and the judge 
told him “Not to let them go back to deliberate, but to keep them 
walking until he could get back there and declare mistrial.” 

AFFIDAVIT OF HARRY BURNS. 

(Pages 1249-1250.) 

The affidavit of Harry Burns, dated Junb 6, 1913, relative to the 
conduct of Judge Speer in this case, was read into the record. Mr. 
Burns was acting as bailiff and, together with one Frank Riley, 
deputy marshal, had charge of the jury in the Scarboro case. Mr. 
Burns swears in this affidavit in substance as follows: 

That after the jury had been deliberating for along time the marshal, 
Mr. White, came to him and asked if there was any chance of arriving 
at a verdict, and upon learning that the majority was in favor of 
conviction the marshal went away, and shortly thereafter the deputy 
marshal and bailiff took the jury to supper; and Mr. Burns states that 
after the jury was through supper the marshal came to them and 
instructed them to keep the jury walking and not take them back to 
their room for further deliberation until specially instructed to do so. 
He states this instruction was followed and the jury kept walking 
for perhaps an hour, and when it was called in it was almost imme¬ 
diately taken into court and mistrial at once declared by the judge. 

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE F. WHITE. 

(Pages 1385-1393.) 

Upon being sworn Mr. White testified that he had held the position 
of United States marshal for nine years and was on very intimate terms 
with Judge Speer. Mr. White denied that he had discussed the action 
of the jury in the Scarboro case with Judge Speer, but later stated 
that the only talk he had with the judge was at about half-past 
4 o’clock in the afternoon of the day the jury was given the ca^e, at 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 87 

which time the judge came to the building and asked if the jury had 
agreed, and upon being told they had not, stated that he wished to 
go to ride and asked him (Mr. White) to go down and see if the jury 
was likely to agree any time soon; that if they would he would not 
go to ride; that he (White) went down to the jury room, but was 
told by the foreman that they had not agreed, and that there was 
no possibility of agreement; that he went back and informed the 
judge of this statement, who then went to ride. That before supper 
the judge told him to let the bailiff go, and to have the deputy marshal, 
Frank Riley, take the jury for a walk, and that was the last he saw of 
them until he went back to the courthouse at about 8 o’clock. Mr. 
White denied that he had been directed by the judge to keep the 
jury walking so that he could reach the courthouse and declare a 
mistrial. He also denied that he had stated to Mr. Akerman in the 
presence of Mr. Betjman that the judge had sent for him to ask how 
the jury stood or that he had made any statement to Mr. Akerman 
to the effect that the judge’s conduct in the case was due to hostility 
to Mr. Akerman. 

While the evidence on this subject is not uncontradicted it is thought 
the conflicting testimony of George F. White should be considered in 
connection with his intimate relations with Judge Speer, and the large 
number of favors enjoyed from the judge’s appointments; the list of 
fees as receiver on appointments from Judge Speer- appearing in 
another part of this report showing that Mr. White has received more 
than $10,000 in such fees during his service as United States marshal. 
It is noted also that Mr. D. C. Betjman corroborated all the state¬ 
ments made by Mr. Akerman in connection with the jury in this case, 
although he has not been called before the committee. It is noted 
also that the judge’s son-in-law was representing the defendant in 
this case and that the alleged conduct of the judge on behalf of these 
defendants naturally redounded to the credit of his son-in-law. 

Judge Speer has submitted a copy of the charge to the jury men¬ 
tioned by Mr. Akerman, and as it is very lengthy it is not included in 
the record, but one can not read it, bearing in mind the relationship 
of the judge to the attorneys for the defense, and his evident ill- 
feeling toward the United States attorney, without being convinced 
that the judge was taking pains to make it perfectly clear to the jury 
that the proper thing to do was to acquit the defendant. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN R. L. SMITH. 

(Pages 100-112.) 

Upon this subject Mr. Smith testified that the conditions were very 
unsatisfactory, especially for the past five or six or seven years; that 
the court had not the confidence of the great mass of people; that the 
prevailing opinion among the people was that the outcome of liti¬ 
gation did not' depend upon judicial consideration; that the attor¬ 
neys were not accorded courteous treatment; that success in the court 
depended upon the particular lawyer employed for causes other than 
his ability, character, or industry. 


88 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


TESTIMONY OF MR. W. H. BURWELL. 

(Pages 974-993.) 

Mr. Burwell testified that he resides at Sparta, Ga., is an attorney 
at law and at present holds the position of speaker of the House of 
Representatives of the State of Georgia; that he has known Judge 
Speer 10 or 15 years, and that during his practice it had been necessary 
for him to travel to Toxaway, N. C., to have a hearing before Judge 
Speer; that upon arriving there he found a large number of other 
attorneys, all from the southern district of Georgia, awaiting the 
hearing before Judge Speer of cases in which they were interested; 
that the rates were high and the accommodations poor at the small 
hotel in the town and that he was required to remain engaged in the 
hearings for 10 days, the judge only holding court 2 or 3 hours a day; 
that he noticed a “ placard posted at the desk at the hotel which 
stated that the United States court was in session, or was being held 
at the pavilion on the island, and ladies were cordially invited, or 
something of that sort”; that he heard one of the attorneys—Judge 
A. L. Miller, of Macon—complain of the length of time he was required 
to remain at Toxaway in attendance upon the court. Mr. Burwell 
testified further in regard to the Mandell bankrupt case, which was 
pending in the court in 1906 and in which a composition had been 
agreed upon by practically all of the counsel of both the bankrupt 
and the creditors, and the question of payment of stenographer’s fees 
for taking the examination before the referee having arisen, an ob¬ 
jection was made by the attorneys to the bill—$90 being charged for 
the work, which covered the hearing during one morning—and the 
referee, upon the objection of counsel, reduced the fee of the stenog¬ 
rapher to $45, and the matter was settled by the parties putting up 
that amount; that two or three days after reaching home he received 
an order from Mr. Proudfit, the referee, demanding the payment of 
$45 additional and stating that Judge Speer had ordered it. 

Mr. Burwell also testified that in the Cautlion bankruptcy case, 
with which he was connected, the parties had arranged for the sale 
of the assets by the sheriff, Mr. Arthur Hutchinson, and agreed upon 
a fee of $10 for the service; that when the order was taken for the 
sale of the assets Judge Speer required them to strike out the name 
of Mr. Hutchinson and insert the name of Mr. Pope S. Hill, an attor¬ 
ney of Macon; that this action caused a delay in the sale of the 
goods, and in the meantime the stock was stolen or dissipated, so 
that it brought only $202, when it had been inventoried at about 
$1,200; that Mr. Hnl was paid a fee of $40, expenses of $25 for sell¬ 
ing this stock, while the parties had arranged to have it sold for $10. 
On cross-examination Mr. Burwell testified that the attorneys had 
agreed to have Mr. Hutchinson sell this stock because he resided at 
the same place, held an official position, and had agreed to turn the 
money into the registry of the court immediately-after the sale; 
that Mr. Hill, who was appointed by Judge Speer and paid $65 for 
the same services, was a busy lawyer and resided at Macon, while 
the estate was some distance in the country, and before he could 
get over there some time elapsed and the stock of goods did not 
bring very much. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 89 

It is, of course, the usual practice where the parties agree to adopt 
their recommendations as to receivers, etc., but that practice does 
not appear to be followed by Judge Speer. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. T. J. HILL. 

(Pages 784-788.) 

Upon being questioned as to the general reputation of Judge Speer 
in the administration of justice, Mr. Hill replied that the conditions 
were unsatisfactory, especially to the country bar and the litigants 
in the country; that he had had experience with clients who would 
make almost any kind of a compromise rather than go into the Fed¬ 
eral Court; that there is a general feeling among the people that in 
order to be at all successful in litigation in Judge Speer’s court you 
must approach the judge in some wireless or underground way— 
that is, by employing some friend of the court, naming especially 
Messers. Talley and Heyward and the firm of which Mr. Orville 
Park is a niember, Mr. Park being one of Judge Speer’s counsel in 
this investigation. As an instance of this condition Mr. Hill cited 
the case of the Exchange Bank of Cordele, which desired to be made 
a depository for bankruptcy funds. The president of the bank 
approached Mr. Hill and asked if there was some way by which the 
judge could be reached and the bank named a depository, to which 
he replied that he thought it could be arranged by having Mr. Talley 
make the application; that at the instance of the president of the 
bank he approached Mr. Talley, and upon agreeing to the payment 
of a certain compensation Mr. Talley soon had the matter fixed. He 
stated that was the way most of the people of his district felt; that 
they must approach the court in some other way than directly. 

In connection with the testimony in the E. B. Harris bankruptcy 
case and the Huff case, from which it appears that Judge Speer 
appointed Judge Cobb as special master in the latter case and allowed 
him a fee of $750 for a few days’ work, and that he also appointed 
Judge Cobb as one of the attorneys for the trustee in the former case 
and allowed him a fee of $400 for a very slight service, it is noted that 
Judge Cobb is one of Judge Speer’s principal attorneys in this investi¬ 
gation, and it is further noted that he has represented Judge Speer 
in private litigation gratuitously in the past. 

Judge Cobb was questioned by the chairman of the committee, and 
he admitted that he had represented Judge Speer in the case of 
Emory Speer et al. v. W. B. Thomas et al., and that he had rendered 
this service free of charge. 

There will be found marked “Exhibit 25-B” a certificate from 
the clerk of the Superior Court of Clarke County, Ga., showing that 
Judge Cobb represented Judge Speer in the litigation mentioned, and 
that the case was heard at Athens, Ga., on May 9, 1910, and that the 
appeal was taken to the superior court and the record filed in that 
court September 6, 1910, and the case tried October 14, 1910. That 
motion for a new trial was made on October 19, 1910, which was over¬ 
ruled December 3, 1910; that on January 6, 1911, a bill of excep¬ 
tions was filed taking the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia, and 
that it was finally decided on October 17, 1911. The clerk of the 
court says that Judge Cobb’s firm appeared for Judge Speer all the 


90 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


way through this case, which lasted, as appears from the certificate, 
for a year and a half. As stated, Judge Cobb admits that he per¬ 
formed these services for Judge Speer without compensation, and it 
is also true that he is acting for Judge Speer in this investigation, 
and that he was present during the whole of the sittings of the com¬ 
mittee in Georgia, covering two weeks, and assisted in the preparation 
of Judge Speer’s brief, his name being signed to the brief as leading 
counsel. It should also be noted that Athens, the home of Judge 
Cobb, is about 100 miles from Macon, and that there is no apparent 
reason why he should have been called such a distance to handle such 
an appointment as special master in the Huff case at Macon, or as 
assistant attorney for the trustee in the Harris case, especially as the 
judge had already appointed three attorneys for the trustee in that 
case. The fees allowed Judge Cobb by Judge Speer in these cases 
also appear to be excessive, $750 being paid in one case and $400 in 
the other case, for a very limited amount of services. 

It is worthy of mention that the appointment of Judge Cobb in the 
Harris case was apparently a personal matter with Judge Speer, as 
he was brought into the case at a time when the attorneys for the 
plaintiff had applied to the circuit court of appeals for a writ of 
mandamus requiring Judge Speer to recuse himself after an affidavit 
of disqualification had been filed against him, and after he had refused 
to disqualify himself. 

All of these facts and circumstances create the suspicion that Judge 
Speer was paying Judge Cobb for service of a private nature out of 
funds from bankrupt estates. 

Certainly the committee imputes no wrong to Judge Cobb, but a 
proper sense of propriety would have prevented Judge Speer from 
drawing Judge Cobb into these cases and allowing him large fees so 
soon after his gratuitous services in a private lawsuit. 

ALLEGED OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT IN ENTERTAINING MATTERS 
BEYOND HIS JURISDICTION, FINING PARTIES, ETC. 

THE J. T. HILL CONTEMPT CASE. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. JOHN R. L. SMITH. 

(Pages 93-100.) 

Mr. Smith testified that he was familiar with the case in which 
Judge Speer issued a rule to show cause why Mr. Hill should not be 
attached for contempt for not paying to the counsel of a jnan by the 
name of Gibson either $37 or $75. Mr. Smith stated that Mr." Hill 
telephoned him one night that he had just been served with an order 
to show cause, having first received a telegram from the marshal to 
meet him at the train. That Mr. Hill stated that he met the train 
as requested, and was served with an order to show cause, without 
being given a copy of the petition upon which the rule was granted; 
that Mr. Hill asked him to learn what the order was about, and that 
he advised him that it could not be done at night and suggested 
that Mr. Hill come to Macon immediately. That Mr. Hill lived at 
Cordele, about 51 miles distant from Macon, and was served with the 
rule on the afternoon of May 2, 1911, the rule requiring him to appear 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 91 

at Macon at 9 o’clock on the following morning; that Mr. Hill took 
the night train and arrived at Macon early the next morning, and 
after calling at Mr. Smith’s office, proceeded to the courthouse, 
accompanied by Mr. Smith; that they obtained access to the papers 
in the case and learned that one John Gibson, through his attorney, 
W. D. McNeil, had filed suit against Mr. Hill for the recovery of 
money alleged to have been received by him, for which no services 
had been rendered. That he assisted Mr. Hill in preparing an answer 
to the rule and appeared in court at the time mentioned in the rule; 
that he understood Mr. McNeil, the attorney for Gibson, was related 
to Judge Speer. That when Mr. Hill’s case was taken up there was 
some testimony and some argument, after which Judge Speer de¬ 
livered an opinion, at the close of which he stated “that if Mr. Hill 
would pay $37.50 the matter would be dropped, or hushed up, or 
something to that effect, that no judgment would be rendered, or 
some such expression as that.” That he (Mr. Smith) arose and 
stated to the Judge that Mr. Hill would not do that, to which the 
judge replied, “then I will order him attached and imprison him 
until he does do it.” That he then stated to the judge that Mr. Hill 
had not refused to obey the order of the court; that he had merely 
declined to accept that method of quashing it. That Mr. McNeil 
then prepared a judgment on the original petition and handed it to 
the judge. That the judge expressed dissatisfaction with it and 
said, in substance, that he would prepare one to suit himself. That 
he and Mr. Hill waited a few moments, and later got up and walked 
to his (Mr. Smith’s) office and hastily prepared papers for an appeal 
and hurried to Atlanta to see Judge Pardee. After arriving at Atlanta 
they communicated with Mg,con to learn whether any order had 
been signed in the case, and were advised that no order had as yet 
been signed in the case. They proceeded to Judge Pardee’s house, 
and at his suggestion left the papers in his possession, with the under¬ 
standing that an appeal would be granted in case an order was signed 
by Judge Speer. That they then returned to their homes, and that 
on the following Monday morning, after court had opened Judge 
Speer made some remarks, referring to counsel having gone to Atlanta 
to make an appeal in a case in which no judgment had been rendered, 
expressing regret that counsel had put themselves to such unnecessary 
trouble, and concluded by saying that he would grant a rehearing in 
the case, suggesting that Mr. Smith take the order. Mr. Smith made 
no response, and Judge Speer then stated if he did not care to do so 
Mr. McNeil could take the order. That this was the last heard of 
the matter until several months later, when Mr. Hill received an 
order from Judge Speer reversing his former holding and finding in 
favor of Mr. Hill. That Mr. Hill was requested by him to file the 
order, which was done. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. CECIL MORGAN. 

(Pages 522-525.) 

Mr. Morgan was placed on the stand and requested to put the 
records in this case before the committee. Mr. Morgan then produced 
the records and read the titles and the substance of their contents, 
the contempt rule being dated May 1, 1911, and requiring the appear- 


92 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

ance of Mr. Hill at the court at Macon, at 9 a. m., May 3, 1911. Mr. 
Morgan testified that the papers showed the service of the rule had 
been made on May 2, 1911. The order of the court for a rehearing 
of the case after the defendant had proceeded to Atlanta to effect an 
appeal was read' into the record in full. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. J. T. HILL. 

(Pages 769-783.) 

Mr. Hill stated in substance as follows: On May 2, 1911, he was 
engaged in the trial of cases in the city of Cordele, and during the 
morning received a telephone message from the United States mar¬ 
shal, Mr. George F. White, directing him to meet one of his deputies 
at the railroad station at 2 o’clock in the afternoon. He asked to be 
excused from the city court, and met the deputy marshal at the depot, 
who served him with this order: 

The foregoing petition read and considered. It is ordered by the court that the 
said J. T. Hill show cause before me at Macon, Ga., on the 3d day of May, 1911, at 
the hour of 9 a. m., why the prayer in said petition should not be granted. 

This the first day of May, 1911. 

Emory Speer, Judge. 

The entry of the deputy shows that the order was served in Crisp 
County on May 3, requiring defendant to appear on the same day, 
but that is evidently an error, because it was served on the 2d. He 
returned to court, and after adjournment asked for leave of absence 
to appear in the Federal court, and after having obtained it went to 
his office and communicated with Mr. John E. L. Smith, of Macon, 
by telephone. The order which was read was the only thing served 
upon him. He asked Mr. Smith to consult the clerk of the court 
and advise him by telephone what the trouble was. Mr. Smith 
called him later and acquainted him with the facts. He left 
home at 1.30 a. m. and on arriving at Macon consulted Mr. Smith 
relarive to the case. They hurriedly prepared an answer to the rule 
issued by the judge and attached copies of correspondence from his 
files. Mr. Hill stated that the plaintiff against him in this case, 
John Gibson, was at the time on trial for burglary of a post office, 
and that he (Hill) was required to attend court day after day until 
the conclusion of the trial of Gibson. He testified that Gibson was 
convicted, and that in sentencing him Judge Speer remarked that he 
was one of the worst characters that had ever appeared in his court. 
Immediately after this case the case of Gibson against Mr. Hill was 
called, and after the evidence was in and a short argument made, 
Judge Speer stated he was inclined to believe that Mr. Hill should 
refund one-half of the money received from Gibson ($75) and that if 
he would do so no further order in the premises would be made. 
Mr. Hill then read into the record the colloquy between Judge Speer 
and his attorney, Mr. Smith, which ended with the statement by the 
judge that he would not allow an appeal from his ruling in the matter. 
Mr. Hill then gave a statement of the facts relative to his services to 
Gibson for which the fee of $75 in the case was received. He next 
testified that after the judge had stated that he would be compelled 
to refund one-half of the fee received—that is, $37.50—he declined to 
do so, and the judge then stated he would be adjudged in contempt of 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 93 

court and ordered arrested by the marshal. His attorney, Mr. Smith, 
secured a copy of the proceedings and prepared papers for an appeal, 
and he and Mr. Smith then took the train for Atlanta and presented 
the matter to Judge Pardee, but after arriving there learned, upon 
communicating with Macon by telephone, that no order had been 
signed in the case by Judge Speer. That the appeal papers with the 
bond were then left with Judge Pardee w T ith the assurance from the 
judge that upon telegraphic information that an order had been 
passed in the premises by Judge Speer the appeal would be granted 
and the bond fixed. Mr. Hill then testified that he was informed that 
Mr. Smith was in court the following Monday morning at Macon, and 
was advised by Judge Speer that he would grant a rehearing in the 
case, but Mr. Smith declined to take the order. Mr. Hill stated he 
heard nothing further from the case until in September, 1911, when 
he received a letter from Judge Speer apologizing for his action in the 
case, and inclosing a signed order reversing his former ruling, and 
deciding the matter in favor of Mr. Hill; that as a matter of course 
he knew Judge Speer had no jurisdiction in such a case, but the 
matter rather reflecting upon his personal integrity he was not 
inclined to raise any question of jurisdiction, feeling that when the 
facts were investigated he would be exonerated from any such charge. 
Mr. Hill further testified that he was informed that the attorney for 
Gibson, the plaintiff against him in this case, Mr. W. D. McNeil, was 
a relative of Judge Speer and at that time on intimate terms with the 
judge. 

On cross-examination Mr. Hill stated (pp. 788-802) that he 
ascribed the actions of Judge Speer in this case to his favoritism 
toward his relative, W. I). McNeil, who was representing the plaintiff 
against him (Mr. Hill). Upon being questioned further as to his com¬ 
plaint against Judge Speer Mr. Hill replied, “When the judge of a 
court states to me that by paying into court a pittance of $37.50 he 
would wipe out what he called a breach of duty or professional ethics, 
as if I wanted to wipe out a charge which was a blot upon my pro¬ 
fessional character, it is enough to cause any man to resent it.” 

In this case there is no dispute as to the facts. The uncontradictcd 
evidence shows that Judge Speer issued a rule against Mr. J. T. Hill 
on a suit filed by Mr. W. D. McNeil, a kinsman of Judge Speer, for 
the collection of $75 from Mr. Hill; that the rule was served upon 
Mr. Hill about 2 p. m., May 2, 1911, and required him to appear at 
Macon, some 50 miles distant, at 9 o’clock on the following morning; 
that Judge Speer kept this gentleman at court some three or four 
days awaiting trial, and upon the hearing ordered him to refund 
$37.50 to the plaintiff, stating that he w^ould be arrested by the mar¬ 
shal and put in jail if he did not comply; that he refused to grant an 
appeal in the case or fix a supersedeas bond, and that Mr. Hill and his 
attorney hastened to Atlanta to effect an appeal. Judge Speer neg¬ 
lected to sign an order in the case, and subsequently reversed his 
original holding and found in favor of Mr. Hill. 

The complaint is, of course, that Judge Speer entertained this civil 
suit for the collection of $75 without jurisdiction, and unjustly cited 
Mr. Hill to appear in court on a summary rule at the instance of his 
kinsman, Mr. McNeil. 

Judge Speer claims that his conduct in issuing the summary, rule 
against Mr. Hill was proper, but he admits that his action in deciding 


94 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

the hearing adversely to Mr. Hill was improper, and that he later 
reversed himself without any application therefor. It is thought the 
facts in this case show not only a distorted idea of the contempt power 
of the court, but also an unwise attempt to exercise it in endeavoring 
to collect this money on behalf of his kinsman, who entered the suit. 
He admits, in reversing his order, that he was wrong in deciding 
against Mr. Hill, and he should have gone further and admitted that 
he had exceeded his power in ruling Mr. Hill to appear in court in 
answer to a rule nisi, and in keeping him there about a week on a 
case which was nothing more than a mere claim for money had and 
received, which was later found to be without foundation. If attor¬ 
neys of such high standing as Mr. Hill can be summarily brought into 
court upon the application of a criminal through his counsel and sub¬ 
jected to such indignities as Mr. Hill suffered in this case, the courts 
of our land would be anything but courts of justice. This action of 
the judge would not appear so censurable were it not for the fact that 
his kinsman brought the suit, and it is certainly proper to consider the 
action of Judge Speer in that light. With nothing before him but the 
statement of a criminal, who was at the time being tried for burglary, 
to the effect that this gentleman had not rendered services for money 
received, Judge Speer granted this harsh rule at the request of his 
kinsman and put Mr. Hill to much annoyance, humiliation, and un¬ 
necessary expense. At best this case should have been no more than 
a mere action for debt, and Judge Speer should not have acted in this 
summary manner. 

EMMA POWERS-KEARNEY WRIGHT CONTEMPT CASE. 

TESTIMONY OF KEARNEY WRIGHT. 

(Pages 144-149.) 

Kearney Wright stated in substance as follows: 

That he is a resident of Macon, and employed at the Federal 
building as janitor of the court rooms, and under the employment 
of the postmaster. In reply to questions from the chairman, Kearney 
Wright stated as follows: “I remember, sir, once I was fined. I 
left the cuspidors off one evening after cleaning them—an oversight, 
and I was brought up and fined a dollar; but I didn’t pay it.” He 
was asked if he had not been fined $10 on another occasion for a 
similar cause, but could not remember any such occasion. 

TESTIMONY OF EMMA POWERS. 

(Pages 149-155.) 

Emma Powers stated that she was a resident of Macon, Ga., and 
employed at the post-office building as janitress. Upon being ques¬ 
tioned as to being fined by Judge Speer for contempt of court, she 
stated that Mr. Tucker (deputy marshal) had come to her and stated 
that she would have to pay a dollar because the court room was not 
cleaned and that she gave a dollar to Mr. Tucker; that she was not in 
court when the fine was imposed, and that Mr. Tucker told her it was 
imposed for failing to keep the court room clean. She also testified 
that on another occasion Mr. Tucker informed her that she would 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 95 

have to sign a bond for her future good conduct in caring for the 
court room, but that she declined to do so; that he also advised her 
that she had been fined $10, but she did not pay it. In reply to the 
question as to why she declined to give the bond she replied, “I didn’t 
know what I was going to say. He told me to sign ‘right there,’ but 
I told him I wouldn’t sign it.” She stated also that Kearney Wright 
was present, but that he did not sign the bond either. The order of 
the court, dated April 14, 1910, was then read into the record. This 
order imposed a fine of $10 each upon Kearney Wright and Emma 
Powers for failing to properly care lor the court rooms. The collec¬ 
tion of the fine was suspended in the order. Emma Powers was 
further questioned upon this subject, and again stated that she was 
asked to sign a bond, but refused to do so. She stated this took 
place in the judge’s room. 

TESTIMONY OF HENRY G. TUCKER. 

(Pages 532-535.) 

Mr. Tucker stated that he held the position of deputy United 
States marshal, and that he knew Emma Powers and Kearney 
Wright; that he had received fines collected from Emma Powers and 
Kearney Wright of $1 each turned over to him by the marshal, Mr. 
White, December 10, 1910. Being questioned as to his knowledge 
of the making of bonds by these people for their future conduct in 
caring for the court rooms, Mr. Tucker stated that the marshal, Mr. 
White, had informed him that Kearney Wright and Emma Powers 
would be required to make bond in the sum of $1,000, each going 
the surety of the other on said bonds. He stated further, he under¬ 
stood Emma Powers refused to sign the bond; also, that Mr. White 
told him the judge had suggested the bonds, but that he did not 
know it of his own knowledge. 

On cross-examination (p. 545) Mr. Tucker stated that the fines 
collected from Emma Powers and Kearney Wright were handed to 
him by the marshal, Mr. White, who stated that the judge had 
loaned the money to them. 

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE F. WHITE. 

(Page 1393.) 

Mr. White testified that Judge Speer paid the fines imposed in 
these cases. 

The evidence on this subject shows that Judge Speer fined em¬ 
ployees of the custodian of the Government building for neglect of 
duty, over whom he had no jurisdiction; also, that he attempted to 
force employees to give a bond for the future performance of their 
duties, although they were responsible only to the custodian of the 
building. (See copy of court order, marked “Exhibit No. 4.”) 

The committee thinks this action on the part of Judge Speer was 
more farcical than serious; but a great courl should not lend its 
powers to such an end. 

H. Kept. 1176, 63-2-7 


96 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


CASE OF GORDON SAUSSY (STENOGRAPHER FEES). 

TESTIMONY OF GORDON SAUSSY. 

(Pages 1569-1589.) 

Mr. Saussy testified that he represented the defendants in the case 
of United States v. A. F. Atkinson, which was tried in Savannah in 
March, 1908, and that at the close of the case he wished to obtain 
from the court stenographer, Mr. Coddington, a copy of the testi¬ 
mony of one of the witnesses, a Mr. Thomas; that he requested Mr. 
Coddington to prepare the transcript of the testimony of this wit¬ 
ness, but that when the testimony was written up he found he had 
prepared a transcript of all the evidence, which was left in the office 
of the marshal with a blank check for $55, with an order that it was 
not to be delivered to Mr. Saussy until the check was signed or the 
amount of $55 paid; that he declined to accept the entire transcript, 
but offered to take the part he ordered and pay for it; that Mr. Cod¬ 
dington refused to accept that offer, and stated that he would rule 
Mr. Saussy to appear before Judge Speer; that a rule was issued 
against him, ana after a hearing before Judge Speer, the judge re¬ 
served his decision, and a few days later “issued a rule absolute 
against me for $55 and costs.” Mr. Saussy states he paid the clerk 
on May 7, 1908, the aggregate amount being $61.50. He testified 
further that the hearing developed that the facts in question were 
strictly up to himself and Mr. Coddington; that he (Saussy) in re¬ 
sponse to the rule nisi, raised the question of jurisdiction, and after 
the judge decided the case he seriously considered an appeal to the 
Circuit Court of Appeals, but later decided not to do so, as it would 
cost his clients too much money; that he considered’Judge Speer 
treated him unjustly. 

This case is somewhat similar to the J. T. Hill contempt case, and 
it is not apparent by what law or reason this gentleman was forced 
to accede to the demands of the judge’s secretary upon such pro¬ 
ceedings in the Federal court. 

It was merely a question of disputed facts between an attorney 
and the judge’s stenographer, and certainly there was no jurisdiction 
in Judge Speer of any kind, especially for the issuance of a summary 
rule to bring this reputable attorney into court as in a criminal 
proceeding. 

The summary powers of the court should not have been used to 
assist its stenographer to collect a simple debt. 

C. R. MULHOLLAND CONTEMPT CASE. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. TUCKER. 

(Pages 535-537.) 

Mr. Tucker testified that a fine of $3 had been collected from R. C. 
Mulholland for contempt of court, the entry upon his book under 
date of December 10, i910, being “fine imposed by court on C. R. 
Mulholland, crier, $3.” He testified further that Mulholland had 
been drunk in the courthouse on the previous day and also on the 
train the previous evening, but he did not know positively on what 
account the fine was imposed. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 97 
THE E. P. DAVIS CONTEMPT CASE. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. E. P. DAVIS. 

(Pages 1208-1213.) 

Mr. Davis testified that he was an attorney residing at Warrenton, 
Ga., and that in the summer of 1896 he was representing one Max 
Stein, who was charged with concealing his assets while a bankrupt. 
That Stein had been arrested and bound over by the commissioner 
to the court, and that after the court convened he and Stein were 
present during the sessions of the grand jury; that one day on going 
into the courthouse one of the Government witnesses casually stated 
to him that he understood the grand jury had failed to find a true bill 
against Max Stein; that he made no inquiry of the witness, but did go 
to the clerk of the court and ask him whether the grand jury had acted 
on the Stein case. That the clerk informed him that the jury had 
voted no bill, but that their report had not been made to the court; 
that the witnesses for the Government, as well as himself and Max 
Stein went home; that he was later informed that the grand jury had 
reconsidered the Stein case and found a bill against him; that he 
immediately communicated with Stein and told him to return to the 
court at Augusta, and himself took the train for that place. That 
when the case was called in court Stein was not present, and he 
(Davis) arose and stated to the court that Stein was not present, but 
would be there on the next train; that the judge asked him if he told 
Stein to go away, and that he replied that he did, but that as a matter 
of fact he had not actually told him to go, although he knew he was 
going. That Judge Speer then imposed a fine of $50 on him, and 
ordered the marshal to collect it, stating in his order that he (Davis) 
had been inquiring of the Government witnesses. Mr. Davis stated 
that he had not inquired of the witnesses and had done no wrong in 
the matter, and that he regarded the action of the judge in fining 
him as arbitrary and unjust. 

The evidence in this case shows the harsh conduct of Judge Speer. 
The defendant was out on bond and no possible harm could have 
resulted, even though it should appear that Mr. Davis advised him 
that he could go home. Mr. Davis had committed no flagrant offense, 
even though he did advise the defendant that he might go home after 
being informed by the clerk of the court that the grand jury had 
voted “no bill” against his client. Mr. Davis swears the judge in 
making the order fining him for contempt misstated the facts and 
reflected upon his integrity unjustly and arbitrarily. 

Judge Speer states that his action was due to the fact that the 
court business had been impeded by attorneys and clients absenting 
themselves when they were required at court, but as. a matter of fact 
much of the evidence taken during the investigation showed that 
the court business was neglected by the judge and that court was 
generally adjourned before the parties waiting to be heard had pre¬ 
sented their cases. Also that they were seldom able to tell when 
court would convene, so that it was difficult to be prepared, all on 
account of the fact that court was not held at the times prescribed 
by the law. 


98 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER 

ALLEGED ABUSE OF AUTHORITY IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 

THE DISMISSAL OF LITIGATION FOR PURPOSE OF PER¬ 
MITTING RELATIVES AND FAVORITES TO RECEIVE FEES. 

THE ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. CASE. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. ANTON P. WRIGHT. 

(Pages 1978-1998.) 

Mr. Wright testified that he was an attorney by profession and 
had practiced at the Savannah bar since 1898; that in the case of 
the Electric Supply Co. his firm was retained by certain creditors 
to file a petition in bankruptcy against the concern mentioned, 
asking in the petition for the appointment of a receiver; that 
subsequently his clients accepted an offer of composition at 40 cents 
on the dollar and he made oral application to Judge Speer, asking 
that the bankrupcy proceedings be dismissed, and that Judge Speer 
declined to dismiss the proceedings, and suggested that he go ahead 
with the matter “ and take an order for the appointment of a receiver”; 
that he declined to take the order mentioned without communi¬ 
cating with the other members of his firm; that they did not wish 
to take the order, but that Judge Speer intimated that they might 
get in trouble by attempting to dismiss the case, and that he finally 
prepared the order; that this proceeding took place at Macon, Ga~, 
and that he took the night train for Savannah and found upon the 
train Mr. George F. White, who had been appointed receiver in 
the case by Judge Speer, Mr. Akerman, and Mr. Heyward, Judge 
Speer’s son-in-law, who had been retained by the receiver as his 
attorneys in the case; that there was a conflict of authority between 
the State and Federal court with regard to the possession of the 
assets of the Electric Supply Co. and that it was finally decided in 
favor of the Federal court-. 

Mr. Wright stated that Mr. Akerman and himself did practically 
all the legal work in the case, but that Mr. Akerman divided the 
fee, amounting to $2,250, equally with Talley & Heyward, giving 
as his reason that he feared Judge Speer would be put out with him 
if he did otherwise. He also testified that his clients, the creditors 
mentioned heretofore, received only 13 cents on the dollar when 
the case was wound up, while they would have received 40 per cent 
if Judge Speer had allowed the settlement of the case as agreed 
upon by all parties. Mr. Wright testified on cross-examination 
that at the time he made the oral application to Judge Speer to 
dismiss the bankruptcy petition the judge declined to allow him 
to do so, but coerced him into taking the order for a receiver, and 
that no opportunity was given him to present the matter in writing 
and ask for a meeting of creditors alter proper notice. He also 
stated on cross-examination that the long opinion of Judge Speer, 
presented to him by Mr. Calloway, Judge Speer’s attorney, was 
never delivered in his presence, and that he knew nothing of it until 
the present time; that the Judge had stated his clients had better 
be careful or they would get in jail, and that he seemed to be very 
angry because Mr. Wright wished to dismiss the case and declined 
to ask for the appointment of a receiver. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 99 


TESTIMONY OF MR. W. V. DAVIS. 

(Pages 1780-1794.) 

Mr. Davis testified that he had been appointed receiver for the 
Electric Supply Co. by the State court and after holding it a year or 
more had gotten its affairs in such shape that a committee of the 
creditors had agreed to continue it in business, and the prospects were 
that it would become prosperous and pay its debts in full and leave 
something for the stockholders. That certain of the creditors, how¬ 
ever, failed to enter this agreement and bankruptcy proceedings were 
instituted against the company in the latter part of July, 1909; that 
bankruptcy was resisted by the company and insolvency denied; that 
the principal creditors, including those who signed the bankruptcy 
petition, subsequently formed a plan for the continuation of the com¬ 
pany and agreed to pay all creditors who did not wish to enter the 
agreement 40 cents on the dollar, which was accepted by these 
creditors. That petition was then made to Judge Speer for dismissal 
of. the bankruptcy proceedings, but he declined to do so, although he 
was shown that all of the parties in interest were in accord on the 
proposition; that Judge Speer appointed George F. White receiver, 
and that when he attempted to displace Mr. Davis, who had been 
appointed receiver by the State court, a lengthy legal controversy 
ensued during which he (Davis) was served with a rule to show cause 
why he should not be punished for contempt for declining to turn 
over the property ; that when the controversy was finally settled he 
was ordered to turn the company over to Mr. White, the receiver of 
the Federal court. That he had held the company for 15 months and 
operated it at a profit, and that when it was turned over to Mr. White 
all of its assets went with it. That he applied to Judge Speer for a 
fee for his services and that Judge Speer declined to allow any fee; 
that he went to Macon to see Judge Speer at his home at his request 
and was received courteously by the judge, but during the conversa¬ 
tion noticed the judge’s stenographer behind a screen taking down all 
of the remarks made. That he felt from then on that there was very 
slight chance of getting a fee and that he promptly left, after being 
told by the judge to file his application; that the judge referred his 
application to a master, E. M. Hitch, who took his testimony and 
decided he was not entitled to any fee, which was sustained by Judge 
Speer; that Mr. Hitch was allowed $175 for making this disallowance. 
Mr. Davis testified further that Mr. White, the receiver appointed by 
Judge Speer, was paid $850 for bolding the property two months, 
while he was denied any fee whatever for holding it 15 months. Also 
that Mr. Hitch, the master, was allowed $250 for passing upon the 
fee allowed Mr. White; that the attorneys for the receiver were paid 
$2,250 and that the amount finally received by the creditors was 
13 per cent, nothing whatever being realized by the stockholders. 
Mr. Davis also stated that as far as he knew the contempt proceedings 
against him had never been dismissed. 

The action of Judge Speer in declining to allow this case to be dis¬ 
missed should be considered in the light of the fact that he appointed 
George White receiver and allowed him a fee of $850, and that this 
receiver employed Talley & Heyward as his attorneys, and that they 
received a fee of $1,125 from the case, although they performed very 


100 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

little service. It is noted that Mr. Anton P. Wright testified in this 
case that on the day the judge refused to dismiss the case at his 
request and threatened him with imprisonment for attempting to 
dismiss it, he found George White and Mr. Heyward on the train for 
Savannah on their way to take charge of the company. 

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT IN ALLOW¬ 
ING COMPENSATION IN EXCESS OF THE PROVISIONS OF 

THAT ACT TO HIS PERSONAL FRIENDS. 

THE WHITE SUPPLY CO. 

The records in this case show that Mr. Orville Park, one of Judge 
Speer’s attorneys in this investigation, was employed as attorney 
for petitioning creditors and that the application of his firm for fees 
was referred to a special master for report. The special master 
appointed by Judge Speer, A. J. Crovatt, allowed Mr. Park $350 for 
the services of his firm in this case, and when the matter was passed 
upon by Judge Speer he raised the compensation of Mr. Park - to 
$550. It should be noted that this allowance was made on Septem¬ 
ber 13, 1913) after the investigation of Judge Speer’s conduct had 
been made by die examiner of the Department of Justice, and after 
Mr. Park had been selected to defend Judge Speer in the present 
investigation. 

Judge Speer testified, in answer to questions, that he raised this 
fee allowed to Mr. Park’s firm because Mr. Park had brought into 
the estate an additional sum amounting to $3,400. An examina¬ 
tion of the papers, however, appears to show that Mr. Park had noth¬ 
ing whatever to do with the bringing into the court of the additional 
money mentioned, as he was representing the creditors, while the 
property from which the money arose was sold by the trustee, and 
it is apparent from the records that the first knowledge Mr. Park 
had of this sale by the trustee was through a letter written him by 
Mr. A. J. Crovatt, the referee in bankruptcy, and that Mr. Park 
took this letter to Judge Speer at Mount Airy, Ga., whereupon 
Judge Speer increased the amount of his compensation as allowed 
by the master from $350 to $550. This letter is in evidence as 
Exhibit 25 and is followed by a copy of the master’s report and the 
order of the judge thereon increasing the fee allowed to Mr. Park, 
marked 11 Exhibit 25-A.” It is noted that Mr. Park’s firm in mak¬ 
ing their application for fees which was referred to the special mas¬ 
ter, reciting the services which they have performed, make no men¬ 
tion of any further money to be realized. 

The records also show that this additional money, which was 
brought into court by the trustee was realized from the sale of a 
piece of land, and that the trustee had been authorized to employ 
the firm of Crawley & Crawley to represent him. It is therefore 
apparent that if the compensation of any firm of attorneys should 
have been increased on account of the money realized by the trustee, 
it should have been allowed to his attorneys, Messrs. Crawley & 
Crawley, and not to Mr. Park’s firm, as his firm was representing 
the creditors and not the trustee. The records show further that 
Judge Speer authorized the employment of an attorney for the re¬ 
ceiver as well as trustee in the case, and also that the bankrupt was 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 101 

represented by a firm of attorneys, all of whom were paid fees out of 
this estate. The attorneys for the bankrupt were allowed by the 
special master $350 as their fee, and that when the matter was passed 
upon by Judge Sheppard he reduced their fee to $125. The fee 
allowed the attorneys for trustee amounting to $250 was not increased 
by Judge Speer, although they were apparently the parties who 
should have received the additional compensation on account of the 
additional money realized, instead of Mr. Park’s firm, if indeed, any 
increase should have been made. It is apparent from the records in 
this case that Judge Speer increased the fee of this law} r er who was 
at that time acting as his private attorney in this investigation, 
thereby depriving the creditors of the amount of the increase, $200, 
and that he also stated on the stand that this increase was made on 
account of additional money brought into the fund by Mr. Park, 
while the record shows that Mr. Park had nothing to do with it, and 
that the additional money was brought in by the trustee without the 
knowledge of Mr. Park. It also appears that Judge Speer should 
have had knowledge of this fact, as it is noted that he indorsed the 
letter which is mentioned as Exhibit 25, in which Mr. Park is in¬ 
formed by the referee that the trustee has realized the money in 
question. 

This appears to be improper conduct on the part of Judge Speer, 
and whether corrupt or not, he should not, under the circumstances, 
have let himself be placed in a position of seeming to give increased 
or extra compensation out of the assets in his court, to counsel who 
was at that very moment his private attorney in the pending investi¬ 
gation by Congress. 

ALLEDGED VIOLATION OF BANKRUPTCY ACT IN RAISING FEE OF OR¬ 
VILLE A. PARK FROM $500 TO $800 IN RODGERS AND JOINER CASE. 

In this case Mr. O. A. Park, who, as stated, is one of Judge Speer’s 
attorneys in this investigation, was trustee for the bankrupt estate, 
and was allowed by Judge Speer $800 extra compensation, that is, in 
addition to the regular percentage or commission allowed by the 
bankruptcy act. His application for extra compensation was 
referred to a special master who allowed him $500, but Judge Speer 
in signing the order raised this extra compensation to $800. 

This case was instituted in 1902 and was governed by the act of 
1898 as it stood at that time. Section 48 provides that the trustee 
shall receive as full compensation 3 per cent on the first $5,000 or 
less and 2 per cent on the second $5,000 or part thereof, and 1 per 
cent on all sums in excess of $10,000. The order of the court in 
allowing this extra compensation states that it is done on account 
of the unusual amount of work involved. The act allowing addi¬ 
tional compensation to trustees for carrying on the business was not 
passed until February 5, 1903, and the amendment of that date 
provides, section 19: That the provisions of this amendatory act 
shall not apply to bankruptcy cases pending when this act takes 
effect, but such cases shall be adjudicated and disposed of conform¬ 
ably to the provisions of the said act of July 1, 1898. As the case in 
question was instituted early in 1902 there would not seem to be any 
justification for this extra compensation even if it appeared.that Mr. 
Park carried on the business as trustee, which, however, does not 


102 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

appear, and the allowance of the extra compensation is not put upon 
that ground. Another fact in this case is that Mr. Park's firm was 
appointed as attorneys for trustee, Mr. Park himself being trustee, 
and this firm on applying for a fee was allowed by the special master 
to whom the application was referred $1,500, but when Judge Speer 
approved the order he raised this fee to $1,800. This was of course 
a discretionary matter, but the discretion appears to have been again 
operated in favor of Mr. Park, who is alleged to be one of Judge 
Speer's favorites. 

This is the case mentioned in connection with the reversals of Judge 
Speer, in which he took the property away from the trustees oper¬ 
ating it, and was reversed by the circuit court of appeals, which 
commented on his conduct in no uncertain terms. 

The subcommittee feels that there is some doubt as to the mean¬ 
ing of the amendment of 1902 to the bankruptcy law as to allowances 
to trustees, but has no hesitancy in saying that the practice of ap¬ 
pointing an attorney a trustee, and then appointing the attorney's 
firm attorneys for such trustee, is bad, and ought not to be allowed by 
any judge, and the judge who allows it shows a striking lack of 
judicial propriety. 

RAISING FEES ALLOWED TO OTHERS IN ORDER THAT SON- 
IN-LAW MIGHT PROFIT THEREBY. 

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER A KERMAN. 

(Pages 1063-1081.) 

On this subject Mr. Akerman testified that he had been of counsel 
in the A. D. Oliver bankrupt case, in which all of the assets were con¬ 
sumed in the payment of expenses and fees to attorneys and court 
officials; that Messrs. Talley & Heyward were also of counsel in the 
case, and that after the litigation had proceeded some time he went 
to Mount Airy, Ga., to see Judge Speer, and while there Judge Speer 
and Mr. Heyward approached him on the lawn of the hotel and the 
judge stated that Hassell (his son-in-law) was badly in need of some 
ready money and asked if there was any reason why the fees of his firm 
should not be allowed at that time; that the master had fixed the 
fees of some of the attorneys, and that he (Akerman) had filed obj ec- 
tion to the amount allowed his firm; that he replied to Judge Speer 
that the fee fixed for his firm was inadequate, and that he would not 
consent to the allowance of fees until it was raised proportionately. 
He states Judge Speer then asked if his fee was raised in proportion 
would that remove his objection, to which he replied that it would; 
that the judge then took the papers and made an order raising the 
fees allowed his firm from $200 to $375, after which the fees of Talley 
& Heyward, and Hawes & Pottle, as attorneys for trustee, amounting 
to $2,000, were allowed. 

On the subject of the influence of Judge Speer’s son-in-law, Mr. 
Akerman testified that the first estrangement between himself and 
Judge Speer arose from the fact that he (Akerman) would not recom¬ 
mend Mr. Heyward (Judge Speer’s son-in-law) for the position of 
assistant district attorney. Mr. Akerman testified that as far as he 
knew Mr. Heyward had never tried a case in court by himself or 
ever even tried a justice court case. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 103 

Mr. Akerman states that since this estrangement he does not 
recall that he had ever succeeded in convicting any defendant in a 
hotly litigated case, and that he attributed this fact to the judge’s 
charges to juries and his manner of conducting cases, and in nagging 
and dogging at him (Akerman), which, of course, gives the juries a 
bad impression; that these actions on the part of the judge are due 
to prejudice and anger toward himself. 

If it is true, as Mr. Akerman testifies, that Judge Speer raised the 
fees of Mr. Akerman’s firm from $200 to $375 in order to remove the 
objection to the payment of the $1,000 fee to his son-in-law, his 
action subjects him to the charge of improper influence in favor of 
Mr. Heyward, and in this connection attention is invited to the testi¬ 
mony of other witnesses that the fees received by these attorneys 
were entirely out of proportion with the services performed, though 
Mr. Akerman says the fee allowed Talley & Heyward was not too 
large, but his was too small. 

Judge Speer makes a direct denial of the charge made by Mr. 
Akerman. 

ALLOWING MONEY TO REMAIN ON DEPOSIT WITHOUT IN¬ 
TEREST IN BANK IN WHICH RELATIVES AND FRIENDS 

WERE INTERESTED. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. WILLIAM GARRARD. 

(Pages 2014-2018.) 

Mr. Garrard testified that in the Max Alexander case there was a 
fund of $46,133.89 deposited in the registry of the court to await 
the outcome of litigation, and that he and the attorney for the other 
side got together and made an arrangement for placing the money 
in the court in a depository where it would bear interest, and made 
a formal application to Judge Speer, naming two of the principal 
banks in Savannah which had agreed to pay interest on the money 
and give bonds for its protection; that Judge Speer declined to allow 
tins money to be placed at interest, and that it remained in the registry 
of the court practically two years without interest, the case having 
started in January, 1906, and closed up in March, 1908. On cross- 
examination Mr. Garrard testified that as he, representing the 
plaintiff, and Mr. R. M. Hitch, representing the defendant, made the 
application jointly there were no other parties in interest, and there 
was no reason why the judge should not allow the money to be 
placed at interest. 

The action of Judge Speer in thus refusing to allow this large 
amount of money to draw interest without giving any satisfactory 
reason needs no comment. 

ALLEGED USE OF NEWSPAPERS FOR PRIVATE PURPOSES. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. T. J. SIMMONS. 

(Pages 549-572.) 

Mr. Simmons stated that he was the managing editor of the Macon 
News, and had been connected with that paper for about eight years. 
That he was acquainted with Judge Speer and had known him for 


104 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

15 or 20 years; that Judge Speer had written and furnished articles 
about himself to the Macon News for publication, and that he had 
published some of them. In answer to the question as to whether 
Judge Speer was fond of newspaper notoriety Mr. Simmons said, “I 
think he liked it pretty well.” He also testified that he had written 
articles for Judge Speer at the judge’s request about addresses he 
was to make to various organizations, etc. Mr. Simmons then 
identified an article in Judge Speer’s handwriting requesting publi¬ 
cation of matter furnished by the judge. He next identified the 
manuscript of a typewritten article having alterations in the hand¬ 
writing of Judge Speer, which article, Mr. Simmons stated, had been 
sent to him by the judge for publication. 

He testified further that a controversy had arisen over the article 
published, and that he had made an affidavit to Mr. W. D. McNeil, 
an attorney in the case, with regard to the request of the judge for 

E ublication of the article. That Judge Speer had become angry 
ecause he (Simmons) had changed the introduction to the article, 
which was done to improve the newspaper style of it; that in render¬ 
ing an opinion later in the Henry v. Harris case, about which the 
article in question was written, Judge Speer “went for me pretty 
strong in the opinion. I could never understand just why.” That 
in this opinion the judge had excoriated him and spoke of having 
heard “my melodious voice” asking for “advertisements of the bank¬ 
ruptcy cases,” or something to that effect. Mr. Simmons testified 
further that he had at different times suggested to Judge Speer that 
he divide the bankruptcy advertising of the court between his paper, 
the Macon News, and the Macon Telegraph, giving the advertising 
to one paper one year and to the other paper the next. That the 
judge declined to grant his request, stating that he “did not want to 
leave his neighbor on the other paper,” and that he was afraid he 
“might incur the wrath of the Macon Telegraph.” Upon being 
questioned as to whether he was able to procure a copy of the opinion 
of the court which made reference to him (Mr. Simmons) he replied 
that he was never able to do so, and that the opinion was published 
later with the reference to himself eliminated therefrom. On cross- 
examination Mr. Simmons stated that Judge Speer had never 
requested him to publish any article which contained anything 
vicious or unsuitable for publication or seditious in its nature, or 
calculated in any way to disturb the peace. In answer to questions 
as to whether the articles furnished by the judge referring to him¬ 
self personally contained anything which would injure the public in 
any way, Mr. Simmons stated, “No, sir; it might have hurt some¬ 
body’s feelings that did not like the judge. That was tire only 
objection I could see.” That the articles published at the request of 
the judge were generally laudatory of what the judge had said and 
sometimes lauding other people. Mr. Simmons testified further that 
one of the judge’s friends had brought to him for publication an 
“editorial,” highly recommending and indorsing the judge for 
appointment to the United States Supreme Court Bench, and that he 
thought Judge Speer wrote the article. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 105 


TESTIMONY OF GEORGE W. LONG. 

(Pages 573-574.) 

Mr. Long stated that he was the managing editor of the Macon 
Telegraph, and that he occasionally had telephone calls from Judge 
Speer with reference to the publication of articles in his newspaper, 
probably four or five times a year. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN M. BARNES. 

(Page 922.) 

With regard to the desire for newspaper publicity and on the part 
of Judge Speer, Mr. Barnes testified that during the session of the 
court in March, 1904, one Harry Olson had been convicted by the 
court and was the “ worst frightened and most inoffensive prisoner on 
earth, ” but that the judge, being short of sensations, wrote up a news¬ 
paper article to the effect that Olson and his pals had laid plans to 
assassinate the judge; that the judge prepared a beautiful, thrilling 
story on the subject for the paper, and also prepared in advance his 
denial of this story. Mr. Barnes testified further that the judge gave 
the newspapers advance information with regard to the finding of 
indictments before warrants were served by the marshal or even put 
in his hands. 

This and other evidence tends to show that Judge Speer is fond of 
“newspaper notoriety ” and “gets his name in the papers” more often 
than a judge of less modesty might do, but the subcommittee will not 
undertake to condemn him for this weakness, which in this day is 
peculiar to a large portion of our population. 

ALLEGED USE OF DRUGS — IMPAIRED CONDITION OF MIND. 

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS E. PELLEW. 

(Pages 574-590.) 

Mr. Pellew stated that he was a druggist in Macon, Ga., and that 
his drug store was about a quarter of a mile from Judge Speer’s resi¬ 
dence. That Judge Speer traded at his store. That he had filled 
prescriptions containing cocaine for Judge Speer. Upon being ques¬ 
tioned as to the number of times, he testified that he had furnished 
prescriptions containing cocaine “about once or twice during a year” 
for about 10 years. That the same prescription had been refilled 
time after time, only one prescription having been received. That 
the “usual quantity was about 3 per cent solution, sometimes one 
and sometimes two ounces.” He stated that he could not recall send¬ 
ing the drug to the judge through the mails, but could not swear to it. 
That the prescription in question contained nothing but water and 
cocaine. That he could not remember what physician had prepared 
the prescription upon which this cocaine was furnished. That the 
orders for cocaine were always received over the telephone or by 
messenger. 

On cross-examination Mr. Pellew stated that the physiological effect 
of cocaine upon the system was exciting. On redirect examination 


106 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

Mr. Pellew stated that he had declined to answer questions pro¬ 
pounded by the examiner, Mr. Lewis, on this subject, as he understood 
there was a law against selling the drug in this manner and that to 
answer might incriminate himself. 

In answer to questions, Mr. Pellew testified that he had received two 
appointments from the court as receiver for bankruptcy estates. 
That neither of the bankruptcy estates were in the city of Macon, Ga., 
and that the assets in each instance amounted to approximately 
$4,000. One of the estates was at Eastman, Ga., and the other at 
Fitzgerald, Ga.; Eastman being 40 or 50 miles distant from Macon 
and Fitzgerald 75 or 80 miles distant. 

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER AKERMAN. 

(Pages 1058-1059.) 

On this subject Mr. Akerman testified that he had observed that at 
times Judge Speer while' on the bench would be exceedingly restless 
and irritable and his rulings without the usual force and lucidness, 
and that he would leave the bench for a 10-minute recess, after which 
he would return as calm as a man could possibly be and start on with 
the case with a great deal of old-time fire and vigor; that he had 
described these conditions to certain physicians at different times, 
and these physicians all stated it was evidence of some drug habit. 

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE E. WHITE. 

(Pages 1595-1598.) 

Mr. White identified his statement given to tne examiner of the 
Department of Justice with regard to his close and intimate relations 
with Judge Speer and, in answer to questions from the chairman, 
admitted having taken numerous trips to different parts of the coun¬ 
try with Judge Speer. He also stated that in all his experiences with 
Judge Speer he had never seen the judge take an opiate of any kind 
or have one in his possession. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. W. J. LITTLE. 

(Pages 607-615.) 

Dr. Little testified that he had attended Judge Speer in a profes¬ 
sional capacity. He stated that he had never prescribed the use of 
cocaine for Judge Speer and had never given him doses of that drug; 
that he had used a hypodermic injection of morphine on probably two 
occasions in treating Judge Speer. Dr. Little denied that he had 
ever made any statement to anyone to the effect that Judge Speer 
was affected by the use of cocaine. Dr. Little stated that he would 
not prescribe cocaine for hay fever, but that if it should be used it 
should be in the form of a spray solution. He stated also that Judge 
Speer was an unusually sensitive man, and also that his mental con¬ 
dition when he is well is superb, and when he is suffering pain he is 
inclined slightly to hysterical manifestations. In answer to ques¬ 
tion as to whether he had seen any diminution in the judge’s mental 
vigor he stated, “No more than I could notice in any person’s mind. 
He was suffering at the time with pain and severe nausea. Imme- 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 107 

diately on recovery of that there are no aberrations, no delusions or 
illusions. It is simply the nervousness that comes from stomach 
trouble, what may be called dyspeptic nervousness. But I have 
never seen his mind involved in the least.” He stated further that 
although lie attended Judge Speer occasionally he did not consider 
himself his physician. On cross-examination, in response to the 
question from Judge Speer’s counsel as to whether the use of a small 
solutim of cocaine of the strength of 14 or 15 grains to the ounce, 
making about a 3 per cent solution, using 2 ounces of it a year, would 
be likely to produce what is known as the cocaine habit, Dr. Little 
replied that it would not. He also stated that from his observation 
of Judge Speer he had found no trace of anything like the cocaine 
habit. He stated that he considered that the swarthy complexion 
of Judge Speer came from a biliary stone. 

Mr. Alexander Akerman testified that Judge Speer’s conduct con¬ 
vinced him that he was subject to the use of some drug, and Mr. L. E. 
Pellew, druggist, testified that he had furnished Judge Speer with 
a cocaine solution either 1 or 2 ounces, once or twice each year 
during the past 10 years. Mr. Pellew appeared to be quite a willing 
witness when called by the committee, although he had declined to 
answer questions on this subject propounded by the examiner of the 
Department of Justice. It should be noted in this connection that 
Mr. Pellew has been appointed receiver in two bankruptcy cases by 
Judge Speer, and it is thought his testimony as to the amount of this 
drug furnished Judge Speer should be considered in the light of his 

P ersonal interest. It is noted that Mr. George White, who is said 
y certain parties to have made statements relative to the use of 
this drug by Judge Speer denies that he ever made any such state¬ 
ments, and denies that he has any knowledge of such a habit on the 
part of the judge. It is also noted that Dr. W. J. Little testifies 
that he has no knowledge of such a habit on the part of the judge. 

The evidence on this subject is conflicting, as Judge Speer denies 
that he is a user of drugs. The record is not such as would warrant 
the conclusion that Judge Speer is a habitual user of drugs. 

ALLEGED IMPAIRED CONDITION OF JUDGE SPEER’S MIND. 

(Pages 89-93.) 

On this question Mr. John R. L. Smith stated in substance as 
follows: 

That he has been practicing law in the southern district of Georgia 
since 1891, and is acquainted with Judge Speer; that on a certain 
occasion during the session of the district court at Macon, Judge 
Speer stated to him that he (the judge) wished to see him before he 
left the building; that he waited until the court adjourned, and then 
entered the judge’s office, whereupon the judge, after walking up 
and down the room a few times, and stopping occasionally to look 
out of the window, said, “This is not exactly a judicial matter I want 
to see you about,” and after walking back and forth again, the judge 
stated that he wanted to sell him a horse, to which he replied that he 
did not want to buy a horse, and was not able to have one, as it was 
too expensive. To this the judge replied that he would sell the 
horse very cheap, and after some argument stated that he did not 


108 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

know that he (Smith) had changed his mind, because he had told 
him the other day that he wanted to buy a horse. Mr. Smith replied 
that he was mistaken about that, as he had not stated he wished to 
buy a horse. Upon being further questioned Mr. Smith replied that 
this conversation took place during the summer of 1913, and that 
during the conversation the judge offered to sell the horse for $200 
or $250, and stated that it was worth about $750. Mr. Smith stated 
further that he had not spoken to the judge about a horse within 
five years. That during the conversation the judge appeared very 
much surprised that he did not wish to buy a horse. 

In answer to questions as to the mental condition of Judge Speer, 
Mr. Smith replied that in his opinion Judge Speer’s mind was im¬ 
paired. Upon cross-examination Mr. Smith stated that Judge 
Speer’s mind was not as quick as it formerly was, that his grasp was 
not as comprehensive; that formerly Judge Speer’s mind was the best 
of any man he had had to deal with. Judge Speer’s attorney then 
attempted to have Mr. Smith compare Judge Speer’s mental ability 
with certain prominent Georgians, but was interrupted by the chair¬ 
man of the committee. Mr. Smith then testified, on cross-examina¬ 
tion, that he had been associated with Judge Speer for many years 
and had become well acquainted with him, but not intimate. In 
reply to further questions from Judge Speer’s attorney as to the 
reason for the general attitude of the people toward Judge Speer 
and the unpopularity of his court, Mr. Smith replied, “My opinion is 
that it is because Judge Speer’s career on the bench has been high¬ 
handed, domineering, somewhat untrammeled by law, characterized 
in a measure by favoritism to a few, and a correspondingly stern 
antipathy to another clique, which, like the dropping of the water on 
the stone, has gradually worn out the patience of the people.” Mr. 
Smith stated further in response to questions that he thought Judge 
Speer should be taken out of the judiciary. The attorney for Judge 
Speer then presented a number of cases litigated in the southern dis¬ 
trict of Georgia to Mr. Smith and endeavored to have him affirm 
statements testified to by the attorney as to the action of Judge 
Speer in those cases. Mr. Smith appeared to have very little recol¬ 
lection of them, as he was not connected with them. 

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER AKERMAN. 

(Pages 1062-1063.) 

Mr. Akerman stated that since 1907 Judge Speer at times had not 
been right mentally. He then cited several instances to show lapses 
of memory and loss of control on the part of Judge Speer, and stated 
he had gone to Mr. Morgan, Judge Speer’s brother-in-law, his nearest 
relative, and suggested that he (Morgan) take the matter up with 
Mrs. Speer in an effort to get the judge away on a vacation in order 
that he might recover his mental balance. 

TESTIMONY OF H. S. EDWARDS. 

(Pages 1224-1249.) 

Mr. Edwards stated that he was a resident of Macon, Ga., and had 
held the position of postmaster and custodian of the Federal Building 
for a number of years. Mr. Edwards identified a letter written to 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 109 

Mr. A. C. Jenkins with regard to his connection with Judge Speer, 
and upon the request of the chairman read it into the record. This • 
letter refers to the different controversies and unpleasant incidents 
between the Treasury Department and Judge Speer relative to the 
court quarters. Mr. Edwards states in it that he nas long since come 
to regard Judge Speer as unfortunate and a fit subject for the rest 
cure and sanitarium. Also that Judge Speer, after selecting quarters 
a number of times and approving the arrangements in each case, 
declined to accept them after the Treasury Department had spent 
much time and money in preparing them. Mr. Edwards was then 
asked about a communication written by him to the Treasury 
Department during this series of controversies with Judge Speer, and 
identified the letter, which was marked Exhibit “H, ” and read it into 
the record. 

******* 

Mr. Edwards stated this letter was an effort on his part to convey 
the truth in a small way, and there was nothing in it stated as a fact 
but what was true. 

On cross-examination Mr. Edwards testified in response to questions 
that the letter which he read into the record was written to the Treas¬ 
ury Department in response to a request from the Supervising Archi¬ 
tect to find a proper location for the judge’s court. Mr. Edwards 
testified further that Judge Speer was subject to lapse of memory and 
upon being asked by Mr. Howard to explain then stated “ these lapses 
of memory, which my friend Roland Ellis calls interregnums, I believe, 
are questions for physicians, not for philosophers; and stated further 
that a sound mind might be subject to involuntary suspension. Mr. 
Edwards went on to say that he did not mean to attack the mentality 
of Judge Speer particularly, that his trouble was spiritual, rather than 
mental; that he is decadent so far as the moral sensibilities are con¬ 
cerned.” In further describing the mental condition of Judge Speer, 
Mr. Edwards stated “then, Mr. Howard, I will say this to you. There 
are two kinds of spirituality contemplated by modern philosophy, 
one known as constructive, the other destructive. Constructive 
spirituality embraces all those nobler emotions, which developed 
broaden and develop the character, and certainly the soul. De¬ 
structive spirituality embraces those emotions which we classify 
under jealousy, envy, malice, hatred, self-praise, love of praise, and 
desire tor public approbation. Those cover destructive spirituality. 
They are fatal to the soul of any man who will entertain them long 
enough. I think they have Judge Speer in their grasp. That is my 
opinion of Judge Speer.” Mr. Edwards further stated in response to 
questions that Judge Speer was a very able man, but that his habit 
of lapsing from mood to mood is attended with lapse of memory, and 
indecision from one side to the other. 

The evidence on this subject, especially of Mr. Akerman, the United 
States attorney, and Mr. Edwards, the former postmaster and cus¬ 
todian at Macon, while not convincing, should be considered in the 
light of all the irregular conduct charged in the different cases men¬ 
tioned by other witnesses under the different subjects, but the sub¬ 
committee must report that whatever Judge Speer’s mental lapses 
may have been in the past, he certainly showed no signs of mental 
weakness during this investigation in the presence of the subcom¬ 
mittee. 


110 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

ALLEGED ABUSE OF AUTHORITY IN TAKING OR CAUSING 

TO BE TAKEN MONEY FROM COURT FUNDS FOR PRIVATE 

USE. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. W. E. SIMMONS. 

(Pages 728-731.) 

Mr. Simmons testified that during the years 1885 and 1886 he insti¬ 
tuted a large number of suits in the United States court in the south¬ 
ern district of Georgia for various foreign corporations and deposited 
with the clerk of the court between $2,000 and $3,000 as security for 
costs in these cases. That owing to a ruling of Judge Speer con¬ 
trary to the law as administered by the State courts it became neces¬ 
sary for him to dismiss all his cases in the southern district of Georgia; 
that he wired a local attorney at Macon requesting him to have the 
cases dismissed and received a telegram in reply to the effect that 
Judge Speer had refused to dismiss the cases. That he went to 
Savannah in person to dismiss the cases pending in that division, 
and went to the clerk’s office to see about the dismissal of these 
cases, and that the clerk, Mr. Irwin, was present and advised him 
not to dismiss them, stating that Judge Speer had investigated the 
question and that it was now all right. He asked the clerk if the 
judge had directed him to make that statement, to which the clerk 
replied that he could not say that he had. Mr. Simmons then left 
the office of the clerk and in the hall met the marshal, Mr. Lamar, 
who also said to him, “Don’t dismiss your cases down here. You 
are all right.” Mr. Simmons asked him if he had been directed by 
the judge to make this statement, and Mr. Lamar replied, “ I can’t say 
that he did.” And upon being asked if he could say that the judge 
did not tell him to make the statement Mr. Lamar replied, “Wen, 
all I have to say is, you are all right.” Mr. Simmons later went into 
court and asked for an order dismissing all his cases, and Judge Speer 
appealed to him not to dismiss them, and asked why he wanted to 
do so. 

He states that upon being told that the reason was that he did not 
like the judge’s opinion of the law, the judge replied, “You have no 
assurance that I will adhere to it.” But upon being asked whether 
he could assure Mr. Simmons that he would not adhere to his former 
ruling, the judge stated he could make no assurance of that. Mr. 
Simmons states he then took the order dismissing the cases and went 
to the clerk of the court, Mr. H. H. King, for the unconsumed portion 
of his deposits for costs. He states Mr. King was much embarrassed 
and said, “Mr. Simmons, I haven’t got the money.” Upon being 
told that he ought to have the money, as it was a trust fund, Mr. 
King replied, “Judge Speer has it,” and upon being further pressed 
for payment stated he could not pay it at that time. Mr. Simmons 
finally took his note for the money and received payment of it in in¬ 
stallments. Mr. Simmons stated further that he understood Judge 
Speer had borrowed the money from the clerk and paid it back to the 
widow of .Mr. King after his death. This, Mr. Simmons stated, was 
told him in conversation with a gentleman in Savannah. 

In answer to questions as to his testimony on direct examination 
to the effect that he had understood that Mr. King, the former clerk 
of the court, had paid money to the widow of Mr. King, he stated that 
the statement had been made to him by some one in Savannah. Mr. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. Ill 

Simmons was asked to look at a note for SI,200, dated November 8, 
1886, in favor of H. II. King, and given by Judge Speer, and also a 
draft in payment of the note in question, with interest amounting in 
all to $1,465.20, dated at Savannah, Ga., April 11, 1890, and signed 
by Chrrlton ai d Mackall. Mr. Simmons examined these papers, but 
stated he could not see that they had any connection with the money 
which he had paid to the clerk for court fees,^and which Mr. H. H; 
King, clerk of the court, stated had been received by Judge Speer. 
Answering a question from one of Judge Speer’s attorneys, Mr. Sim¬ 
mons stated that the deposits for costs were made by him to the clerk 
of the court, and that his testimony on the subject was as follows: 
“That this money was owing to me on account of deposits that I had : 
made to cover advanced costs, and that when I asked for it the clerk 
did not have it and gave me the excuse for not having it that Judge' 
Speer had the money and was using it,” and that it was a trust fund, 
and Judge Speer had no business with it at all. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. P. W. MELDRIM. 

(Pages 1656-1661.) 

Mr. Meldrim testified that he had been acquainted with the late 
H. H. King, former clerk of the United States court at Savannah and 
was quite friendly with him, and that so far as he had ever learned 
Mr. King was a man of limited means. That he frequently came to' 
him (Meldrim) for his advice, and that in April, 1890, Mr. King came- 
to him very much excited, and used strong language in reference to' 
Judge Speer, and stated that he had let Judge Speer have court funds, 
and that a demand had been made upon him for the money and that 
he could not get it from Judge Speer. Mr. Meldrim told Mr. King* 
that he would not have any trouble in getting his money, but did not/ 
mention that there was a statute on the subject, and suggested that* 
he write a letter to Judge Speer stating he must have the money; 
In response to a question Mr. Meldrim stated that he referred to the 
Federal statute making it a misdemeanor for a judge of the United 
States court to take money out of the registry of the court. Mr. 
Meldrim went on to say that he told Mr. King to state in his letter 
to Judge Speer that the money had been taken out of the court 
fundp and demand having been made upon him the judge must get 
it. He stated further that on the 11th clay of April, 1890, Mr. King 
returned to his office and said he had received on that day from W. W. 
Macall the money due from Judge Speer, amounting in all to 
$1,465.20, there being several years’interest due on the note. Mr. 
Meldrim testified further that he was positive as to his statements in 
this regard, as they were made from memoranda prepared at the time 
the incidents happened. He stated further that some time later 
than this Mr. W. W. Macall happened to be in his office and that he 
showed the memorandum of the statements made by Mr. King to: 
him on account of Mr. Macall having made the payment for Judge 
Speer. 

H. Rept. 1176, 63-2-8 


112 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


TESTIMONY OF MR. W. W. MACKALL. 

(Pages 1734-1738.) 

Mr. Mackall testified that he was an attorney at law at Savannah, 
Ga., and then produced copies of correspondence with Judge Speer 
dated in 1890 relative to the payment of the sum of $1,465.20 to Mr. 
H. H. King, the former clerk of the court at Savannah. This corre¬ 
spondence was a letter from Judge Speer to Mr. MackalFs firm re¬ 
questing them to pay the money to Mr. King, dated April 10, 1890, 
and a letter from the firm of Charlton & Mackall to Judge Speer 
stating that the note of $1,200 dated August 5, 1886, and interest 
from that date to the time of payment amounting to $265.20 had 
been paid and a sight draft drawn upon the judge for the amount. 
Following this was a letter from Judge Speer acknowledging the 
receipt of the draft and stating he had paid it. 

All of the witnesses testifying on this subject are of the highest 
character. It may be, though not clearly proven, that the note pre¬ 
sented by Judge Speer was given to cover this money, as there is no 
conflict in dates, and it may be that it represented other money 
loaned by Mr. King. The fact that Judge Speer attempted to dis¬ 
suade Mr. Simmons from dismissing his cases, and the further fact 
that no interest had been paid on the note mentioned during the four 
years it had been running, also the statement made by Mr. King to 
both Simmons and Meldrim that Judge Speer had this particular 
money, and the judge’s action in telegraphing the arrangement for 
its return, all appear to connect the judge with borrowing court 
funds from the clerk, though not proven that the judge knew it. 

It may have been that Mr. King loaned the judge this money 
from the court funds, though this is not satisfactorily proven, and 
certainly in view of the fact that Mr. King is dead, there is no legal 
proof that the judge ever knew that the money borrowed was court 
funds. In addition to this, Judge Speer emphatically denies that he 
knew the money was court funds. 

ALLEGED IMPROPER USE OF RAILWAY FACILITIES. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. A. R. LAWTON. 

(Pages 1740-1745.) 

Mr. Lawton testified that his firm was general counsel for the 
Georgia Central Railway Co. and had represented that company 
since the early 80’s; that the company had regularly furnished free 
transportation to Judge Speer for his horses, vehicles, and members 
of his family; that the transportation was usually from Macon to 
Savannah and back, from Macon to Albany and back, from Macon 
to Augusta and back, and from Macon to Mount Airy, Ga., and back; 
tbat the Mount Airy transportation went over the Central of Georgia 
fro Atlanta, and they arranged with the Southern Railway to take it 
from that point to Mount Airy; that this free transportation was 
discontinued upon the passage of the Hepburn Act. Mr. Lawton 
testified that no other persons, not even officials of the railroad 
company, had ever received free transportation of freight, and that 
after considerable discussion among the officials of the company it 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 113 


was decided to discontinue this special privilege to Judge Speer, and 
a letter (Record, p. 1742) was addressed to him on December 31, 
1906, politely informing him that the courtesy would be no longer 
extended to him. To this he received the following reply dated 
January 5, 1907: 

Dear Sjr: Your letter of the 31st ultimo received. Since I had no application 
whatever pending for what you state is the exclusive privilege which you have in 
advance of writing me instructed the officers of the Central of Georgia Railway to 
refuse me, I have only to acknowledge the receipt of your communication and recipro* 
cate your seasonable good wishes. 

Very respectfully, 

Emory Speer. 

Mr. Lawton states that in addition to this free transportation of 
freight, regular passes were furnished to Judge Speer for transporta¬ 
tion of himself and family, and that no one in the State of Georgia 
had ever enjoyed the privilege of having horses or vehicles and other 
goods sent free of charge except Judge Speer. 

Mr. Lawton produced telegrams and letters i elating to the use of 
the Georgia Central Railroad and read them into the record as fol¬ 
lows: (Record, pp. 1749-1753.) 

Savannah, Ga., April 1, 1905. 

Mr. T. W. Glaze, Macon, Ga. 

Bill Judge Speer’s horses, vehicles, and attendants free as usual. 

W. E. Estes. 


The next is a letter from F. F. Brown, commercial agent at Augusta, 
April 12, 1905, to Mr. Winburn, second vice president. 


Yours of April 11th. 

The last time Judge Speer’s horses and man moved, his man was handled on a 
ticket, the same as was done this time. When Judge Speer’s court official came to 
our office to see about the movement, it was in the afternoon, and I talked with the 
local agent to see if it could be arranged for the man to go on transportation with the 
horse, and it was his idea that it could not, that he would have to have a ticket. I 
wired Mr. Estes regarding the matter, but did not suppose he would include the man 
on the waybill; that is why I issued the ticket referred to. 

Very truly, 

F. F. Brown, 
Commercial Agent. 


The next is from Mr. Winburn, second vice president, to Maj 
Hanson, president, November 29, 1906; subject “freight rates.” 
“On shipment of horses, traps, and household goods account Hon. 
Emory Speer.” 


Dear Sir: I invite your attention to attached correspondence with reference to 
the freight charges on one horse from Macon to Augusta, account Judge Emory Speer. 

As you have advised, we have heretofore been transporting Judge Speer’s horses, 
traps Jan d household goods without charge. We will not be permitted to do so under 
the law after the 1st of January on interstate shipments. I would like to know if 
you wish the practice continued on purely State shipments, and, if not, whether 
you consider it advisable for us to give Judge Speer any notice of the change in our 
practice in this particular. 

Yours, truly, 

W. A. Winburn, 

Second Vice President. 


Macon, Ga., November SO, 1906. 

W. A. Winburn, Esq., 

Second Vice President, Savannah, Ga. 

Dear Sir: I have yours of the 29th with reference to shipment of horses, traps, and 
household goods account Hon. Emory Speer. I hardly know what to say in reply 


114 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


to your letter. I have never had anything of the kind handled by the steamship 
or railway companies since I have been connected with them on my personal 
account without paying tariff freight rates, and there is no reason why we should 
transport this property for Judge Speer when like service is not performed for the 
officials of the railway company. 

I would like for you to confer with Col. Lawton with respect to the matter, and 
give me the result of your joint advice before passing upon the question finally. 

Yours, very truly, 

J. F. Hanson, 

President. 

Attached is a memorandum: 

A. R. L.: 

This should have gone to you in the first instance. What do you say? W. A. W. 

I he next is a memorandum signed “A. R. L.” 

Memorandum for Mr. Winburn: 

All my inclination is to say that we should stop it and so notify him. We could very 
greatly strengthen our case, however, if we could state as a reason for it that we are. 
applying the provisions of the Hepburn law to interstate transportation of passengers 
and tha t. it would not be consistent not to apply it to intrastate transporta tion of frr ight. 
We will not be doing this before January 1 and it is now uncertain whether we will be' 
doing it then. I think we had better wait awhile and note developments. I should 
like to talk to you about it. 

A. R. L. 

The next is from Mr. Winburn, second vice president, to Mr. Car¬ 
lisle, commercial agent at Macon, dated January 2, 1907: 

Dear Sir: Regarding transportation of Judge Speer’s live stock and other effects: 

Col. Lawton has written Judge Speer a letter advising him that we will not be at 
libery to continue to perform this service free after the 1st of January, 1907. 

Advise the Macon agent verbally of what has been done, and destroy this letter after 
it has served your purpose, so it will not be in your open records. 

Yours, truly, 

W. A. Winburn, 

Second Vice President . 

Mr. Lawton testified that Judge Speer continued to use free passes 
for nis family and to obtain free transportation for his horses, vehicles, 
and attendants over the lines cf the Georgia Central Railway during 
the time it was in the hands of his receiver. On cross-examination 
Mr. Lawton stated that freight transportation for horses, etc., was 
not continued voluntarily, but by request. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. W. V. DAVIS. 


(Page 1794.) 

Mr. Davis testified that while he was employed by the firm of 
Charlton, Maekall & Anderson, who were general counsel for the 
Georgia & Alabama Railway, he saw correspondence with Judge Speer 
in which the judge returned a pass sent to him by the railway com¬ 
pany and asked that his wife be included in the pass. 

The evidence on this subject shows that Judge Speer made a 
practice of using the facilities of the railroads of his district for the 
transportation of freight free of charge, and that many carloads of 
freight were handled for him in this manner by the Central of Georgia 
and the Southern Railway. Special attention is invited to the four¬ 
teen letters taken from the records of the Southern Railway at Atlanta 
which are marked No. 27. These exhibits show letters from the 
officials of the Southern Railway to Judge Speer and from Judge Speer 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 115 

to these parties relative to the handling of this freight free of charge. 
Attention is especially invited to the letter dated November 27, 1902, 
to Judge Speer from Mr. J. S. B. Thompson, one of the officials of 
the Southern Railway, as follows: 

Judge Emory Speer, Macon, Ga. 

My Dear Sir: Your letter of the 25th is received this morning, and I have tele¬ 
graphed our superintendent asking him to place two cars at Mount Airy as soon as 
possible, and later will take pleasure in arranging for the transportation of same from 
Mount Airy to Macon. 

Yours, very truly. 

This correspondence shows that all of these carloads of freight were 
handled free of charge, and also that this was a special privilege 
enjoyed by Judge Speer alone. 

ALLEGED GENERAL UNLAWFUL AND OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT. 
ARBITRARY AND OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT IN RE UNITED STATES v. 

crawley & McClellan. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. A. A. LAWRENCE. 

(Pages 1449-1461.) 

Mr. Lawrence stated that in the peonage cases of United States v. 
Crawley & McClellan he was employed as counsel for the defendants 
and was associated in the defense with Mr. W. M. Toomer; that during 
this trial Judge Speer exerted eveiy effort to have the defendants 
plead guilty, and that as he considered them clearly not guilty he 
resisted all such efforts; that Mr. Talley, then Judge Speer’s stenog¬ 
rapher, had approached Mr. Lee Crawley, a brother of one of the 
defendants, and intimated that they had better plead guilty, and if 
they would do so the only penalty would be a fine of $500, and they 
would be given until fall to pay it; that this proposition was turned 
down and the case proceeded, and after the evidence was in Judge 
Speer sent for Mr. Toomer and stated they had better enter a plea of 
guilty, and that the penalty in that event would be a $500 fine. That 
upon being asked by Mr. Toomer what the penalty would be in case 
they did not plead guilty and were convicted by the jury, the Judge 
replied with a flash in his eye, “Well, I will do my duty;” that at the 
end of the trial the defense moved for a verdict on the ground that 
no case had been made out, and that in overruling this motion 
Judge Speer, in the presence of the jury, delivered the wo^st excoria¬ 
tion of the defense he had ever heard in his life, stating that the 
motion was monstrous and wound up with the assertion that it 
was the last motion in the world he would grant; that this language 
in the presence of the jury so terrified the defendants and some of 
the defendants’ counsel that a consultation was held with regard 
to entering a plea of guilty, but that he and some of the counsel did 
not think the jury was one which could be coerced; that Judge 
Speer’s bitter denunciation was so severe that he did not think 
any of the defendants slept that night; that one of the defendants’ 
mother was suffering with heart disease and that he feared if he 
was sentenced to the penitentiary she would drop dead; and that 
after consultation these young men agreed to accept Judge Speer’s 
terms and enter a plea of guilty, with the distinct assurance that 


116 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

only a fine of $500 would be imposed; that he and his partner, Mr. 
Osborne, were so incensed at this injustice to their clients that they 
declined to be parties to such a transaction and rose in court and had 
their names stricken from the record as counsel before the plea 
of guilty was entered; that these young men and their attorneys 
were so suspicious of Judge Speer’s promise as to imposing the fine 
in case of plea of guilty, that they had their uncle, Mr. John McDonald, 
to accompany their counsel to the judge’s chambers in order to hear 
his assurance when the surrender was made. 

Mr. Lawrence stated further that during the trial of this case 
Mr. Edward McRae, a very fine gentleman and prominent citizen of 
southern Georgia, was on the stand, and Judge Speer turned to him 
and said, “You have been convicted, haven’t you, in this court, of 
peonage? You plead guilty?” to which Mr. McRae replied, “Yes;” 
and Judge Speer then said, “I could have given you 65 years if I had 
seen fit, couldn’t I?” There was a suspended sentence in this case, 
and Mr. Lawrence states this gloating of Judge Speer was the cruelest 
exhibition that he had ever seen in a courthouse of a manifestation 
of power; that this took place in the presence of the jury. Mr. 
Lawrence then testified that the defendants in this case w^ere men of 
good character, one of them being a prominent attorney and the 
other the sheriff of Ware County and that there w T as no case against 
them. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. JOHN C. m’dONALD. 

(Pages 2038-2050.) 

Mr. McDonald gave his profession as attorney and stated that he 
w r as judge of the State court at Waycross, Ga.; that he recalled the 
case of United States v. Crawley & McClellan; that he was connected 
with it only in an advisory capacity; that during the trial there had 
been considerable talk to the effect that Judge Speer was trying to 
get the defendants to plead guilty and that Mr. Akerman informed 
Mr. Toomer, the chief counsel for the defendant, that Judge Speer 
washed to see him in his chambers; that when court adjourned Mr. 
Toomer went to the judge’s chambers, consulted with him and re¬ 
turned and reported to the other counsel for the defendants that the 
judge had advised the defendants to plead guilty and that it would 
be to their interst to do so; later in the evening Mr. Toomer had 
another interview with Judge Speer and again returned wuth the report 
that if the defendants would plead guilty they would receive only a 
nominal fine. That all of the attorneys were opposed to such a plea, 
as they believed the defendants w r ere not guilty. That at the con¬ 
clusion of the Government’s case Mr. Osborne, of counsel for the 
defendants, washed to make a motion to direct a verdict and re¬ 
quested the judge to have the jury retire in order that they might not 
hear the argument on the question, but that the judge refused to have 
the jury retire, stating, “We have a very intelligent jury, men of a 
high order of intellect, and I see no reason why they should be re¬ 
tired.” Mr. Osborne then submitted and argued his motion for 
direction of a verdict,-and Judge Speer rendered his decision on it in 
the presence of the jury and intimated that Mr. Osborne was too good 
a lawyer to take such a position, and stated that under the evidence 
the defendants were clearly guilty and ought to be convicted and 
punished. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 117 

Upon being asked to describe Judge Speer’s manner in delivering 
this opinion Mr. McDonald stated, “You know Judge Speer is one of 
those men that can look right through you. He can look at you and 
scare you out of countenance when he wants to do it, and on the other 
hand when he wants to do so he can almost win you by smiling at you: 
That is my impression of the judge, and that was one of the occasions 
when he looked like he wanted to bore a hole through Mr. Osborne 
with his stares,” and also cast similar looks at the defendants. That 
his expression indicated, “Now, you have either got to plead guilty or 
I am going to push a conviction on you.” This was the impression 
created on the minds of everybody who heard him, whether they 
were interested or not; that this language had a very decided effect 
upon the defense and that they retired and had a conference with 
their attorneys, and after another meeting the next morning it was 
decided to enter a plea of guilty as they feared they would be rail¬ 
roaded to the penitentiary, which might have resulted in the death 
of the mother and sister of one of the defendants who were in very 
feeble health. Mr. McDonald stated that these defendants did not 
have a fair and impartial trial and their lawyers did not have a fair 
opportunity to try the case. In answer to a question with regard 
to the arrangements made for entering the plea of guilty Mr. Mc¬ 
Donald stated that for fear of some “slip up” it was arranged for 
some one connected with the defendants to attend the conference 
with Judge Speer and witness his statements with regard to the pen¬ 
alty to be imposed in case the defendants plead guilty; that as he 
(McDonald) was an uncle of one of the defendants he consented to 
be present at the conference with Judge Speer; that when he accom¬ 
panied Mr. Toomer to Judge Speer’s chamber Mr. Toomer said to the 
judge, “Well, Judge, upon reflection the defendants have decided to 
accept your terms and enter a plea of guilty. I do not think they 
are guilty, but we are going to do this in order to end the matter; 
* * * * * * * 

Mr. McDonald, who is a relative of one of the defendants, has come 
here with me for you to make a statement to him of what you are 
willing to do as you did to me.” That Judge Speer thereupon made 
the statement that he would impose a minimum fine in case the plea 
of guilty was made. Mr. McDonald also stated that before this plea 
was made in open court Mr. Osborne arose and withdrew the name 
of his firm from the case. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. W. W. OSBORNE. 

(Pages 2080-2103.) 

Mr. Osborne testified that he was of counsel for the defense in this 
case and proceeded in substance as follows: McClellan was sheriff of 
the county of Ware and W. L. Crawley was a young lawyer residing 
in Waycross, Ga., a man of fine character and from one of the best 
families in the county. These men were indicted one spring and 
brought to trial nearly a year later the following spring. The evidence 
showed that two incorrigible negro boys residing in Ware County had 
been arrested at the instance of their grandfather, charged with theft, 
convicted, fined about $30 and costs, or in lieu thereof six months in 
jail. There was evidence that the grandfather took this course to get 


118 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


the boys out of the community, as lie could do nothing with them 
and they were a menace to the neighbors. After the trial these boys 
requested Mr. Crawley, who had represented them, to write to one 

McRae, requesting him to come to Waycross and pay their fine on 
the understanding that they would go to his farm and work until he 
had been reimbursed. It developed later, although the sheriff and 
this attorney did not know it, that the State judge in sentencing these 
hoys had not imposed the usual fine, but had only imposed a six 
months’ sentence. Mr. Crawley wrote the letter to Mr. McRae for 
the boys and he came to Waycross, paid the fine and attorney’s fees, 
and took the boys to his farm. The charge against McClellan, the 
sheriff, and Crawley, the attorney, was that they conspired with 
McRae to have the boys taken away and held in peonage. 

In response to a question at this point as to whether any evidence 
to this effect was shown at the trial of Crawley and McClellan, Mr. 
Qsborne stated they never got to that point—that the judge abso¬ 
lutely coerced the men into the plea of guilty before any evidence 
was put in. Mr. Osborne stated there was absolutely no evidence 
upon which Crawley and McClellan could have been convicted—that 
they had no connection whatever with keeping the darkies in peonage, 
and. that Crawley merely wrote the letter at the request of the darkies 
whom he had defended, and that the sheriff merely liberated the boys 
upon the payment of the fine which he had understood had been im¬ 
posed. Mr. Osborne then proceeded to detail the circumstances by 
which these defendants were forced to plead guilty and corroborated 
the statements made by Mr. Lawrence and Mr. McDonald. With ref¬ 
erence to the testimony given by Mr. Toomer on this subject Mr. 
Osborne stated that notwithstanding Mr. Toomer’s present recollec¬ 
tion he stated at the time that from Judge Speer’s manner in making 
the proposition as to what he would do in case these defendants plead 
guilty it was evident that he meant their punishment would be 
greater in the event of conviction than in the event they plead 
guilty and that he meant them to go to the penitentiary. He stated 
that there was absolutely no doubt that this plea was coerced by 
Judge Speer and was entered on account of the fear the men had that he 
would send them to the penitentiary. Mr. Osborne also testified that 
these defendants had been out on bond for a year and a half after 
indictment, but when the trial began the judge had them arrested and 
kept in the custody of the marshal constantly. That when the Gov¬ 
ernment’s case was in he (Osborne) made a motion to direct a verdict, 
which was overruled by the judge in the presence of the jury in a fiery 
stump speech framed in such language as to absolutely terrorize the 
two defendants. He also testified that the judge reflected upon his 
integrity in overruling this motion, stating that he was too good a 
lawyer to make such a motion in good faith, and that the judge did 
not confine himself to the case, “but delivered an unwarranted and 
gratuitous insult to me in open court.” 

Mr. Osborne then recited the incidents leading up to the plea of 
guilty and his action in striking the name of his firm from the case 
pefore the plea was entered. He also corroborated the statements 
mentioned by Gen. Meldrim relative to the alleged cruel manner in 
which Judge Speer questioned Mr. McRae, a witness, forcing him to 
answer questions as to whether he had plead guilty, and whether he 
could have sentenced him to 65 years in the penitentiary, in the 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 119 

affirmative. There was a suspended sentence hanging over this 
witness, and the judge concluded by saying, “ Well, you had better be 
very careful about what you say here.” And Mr. Osborne states that 
the witness after that was no good for the defense. He then testified 
as to conversations with members of the jury who sat on this case, all 
of whom stated to him at different times after the trial that they 
would never have convicted these defendants if the case had reached 
them. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. J. L. CRAWLEY. 

(Pages 2108-2117.) 

Mr. Crawley stated he was an attorney by profession, at present 
being a member of the Georgia House of Representatives; that he is a 
brother of one of the defendants in this case. Mr. Crawley testified 
he had made a statement with regard to the above case for use in the 
investigation, and he was requested to read it into the record, which 
was done (Record, p. 2109). The substance of the statement men¬ 
tioned is as follows: Mr. Crawley was a law partner of his brother, 
one of the defendants, and was intimately acquainted with Mr. Mc¬ 
Clellan, the other defendant, and was positive that these men were 
not guilty of peonage. He then proceeds to give the details relative 
to the offense charged, and the conduct of Judge Speer, and his testi¬ 
mony corroborated in eveiy way that given by Messrs. A. A. Lawrence, 
W. W. Osborne, and Judge McDonald. He states, positively, that 
he was approached by Mr. Talley, the Judge’s stenographer, who in¬ 
formed him that if the defendants would plead guilty they would be 
let off with a fine, while if they refused to plead guilty and were con¬ 
victed it would go exceedingly hard with them; also that Judge Speer 
went so far as to dictate a formal order which would be entered in 
case the plea of guilty was made. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. W. M. TOOMEIl. 

(Pages 1707-1727.) 

Mr. Toomer testified that he was an attorney by profession and 
was employed by the defense in this case. That the defendants, 
Crawley and McClellan, were indicted for peonage, the former being 
an attorney and the latter sheriff of his county; the charge being 
that these men had conspired to have darkies who had been sen¬ 
tenced to the county works released upon the payment of certain 
sums and taken to a plantation, where they were forced to work out 
the advances made to them. That numerous demurrers were made 
and overruled in the case, and when it came up for trial a number of 
other attorneys were associated with him, Messrs. Osborne and Law¬ 
rence, of Savannah, being among them. That when the Govern¬ 
ment’s case was in the attorneys were of the opinion that it had failed 
to make a case, and a motion was made to the judge to direct a ver¬ 
dict, but the motion was overruled by the judge. That the court 
then adjourned and during the evening Mr. Akerman, the district 
attorney, informed him that the judge wished to confer with him in 
his chambers; that he went in and found the judge and the ste¬ 
nographer present, and the judge stated to him that if the plea of 
not guilty should be withdrawn and a plea of guilty substituted the 


120 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

defendants would be let off with a minimum fine and a portion of 
that suspended; that he propounded the question to the judge as to 
whether lie would send these men to prison if they were convicted 
by the jury, and the judge replied, “Mr. Toomer, I vail simply do my 
duty.” Mr. Toomer further stated that he did not get the impression 
that the judge meant to be severe on his clients if they failed to plead 
guilty. He stated further that the sentiments expressed by the 
judge in overruling the motion to direct a verdict had taken the life 
out of his clients and they and some of their friends got the impres¬ 
sion from the utterances made by the judge that all sorts of things 
might happen if the young men were convicted, but that he did not 
get any sucli impression himself. Mr. Toomer went on to say that 
after a long conference the defendants decided to plead guilty, 
although he and the other attorneys were certain no case had been 
made against them and advised them to stand and fight. Mr. 
Toomer also stated that in his opinion his clients were not guilty of 
peonage. In answer to questions as to his opinion of the reasons for 
the efforts of Judge Speer to have these defendants plead guilty in 
view of his statement that he did not think them guilty and that he 
did not believe Judge Speer intended to coerce the plea of guilty, 
Mr. Toomer was unable to offer any explanation. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN W. BENNETT. 

Mr. Bennett has written a letter to the chairman of the subcom 
mittee in which he states the judge used the following language in 
the presence of the jury in overruling the demurrer filed by the 
defendants: “That a chairman of a penitentiary committee of the 
Georgia senate appeared for the prisoners; that a member of the 
House Judiciary Committee in Congress from the district of the 
prisoners contributed a brief in their behalf; that a solicitor general 
of the State court in their judicial district, charged with the prosecu¬ 
tion of such offenses under the State law, sat with the prisoners and 
their counsel during the hearing—taken altogether is somewhat per¬ 
suasive of the conclusion that if there is no system of peonage de jure to 
which the statute applies, there is yet a de facto system of some equiv¬ 
alent sort, which has evoked the liveliest apprehensions of those who 
participate in its operation and emoluments, and of others whose 
sentiments toward it are not wholly antipathetic.” Mr. Bennett 
further states that this was a voluntary insult offered by the judge 
under the cloak of his judicial robe and that had it been offered on the 
streets it would have been promptly resented. Also, that it was an 
effort on the part of the judge to stampede the defendant’s coun¬ 
sel, in order to force them to plead guilty. This case is reported in 
the Fed. Rep. 127, p. 971. The letter of Mr. Bennett will be found 
marked as Exhibit 28. 

The evidence on this subject shows that Judge Speer used every 
influence within his control to induce the defendants to plead guilty 
to the charge of peonage, when as a matter of fact the case made out 
against them was doubtful. The gentlemen giving this testimony, 
Messrs. Lawrence, Osborne, Crawley, and Judge McDonald, are men 
of high standing, and taken in connection with other actions of 
Judge Speer shown during this investigation, there is no doubt that 
his conduct in this case was unjudicial if not oppressive. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 121 


The conflicting testimony of Mr. Toomer is given by one who had 
not resided in the judicial district for eight years. 

Judge Speer denies that his conduct in this case was oppressive 
or improper. 

In connection with this denial the statements of Messrs. Crawley. 
Osborne, and Lawrence, marked as Exhibits Nos. 28-A, 28-B, ana 
28-C, should be read. 


TESTIMONY OF W. W. OSBORNE. 


(Pages 2072-2080.) 

In answer to questions as to cases in which parties were practically 
denied the representation of counsel by Judge Speer, Mr. Osborne 
cited the case of Thomas v. A. C. L. Railroad, in which Gen. P. W. 
Meldrim represented the railroad company. This was a damage 
suit brought by Mrs. Thomas to recover damages for the loss of her 
son, who was killed while crossing the tracks of the railroad in the 
city of Savannah. Mr. Osborne’s firm represented the plaintiff. 
The relations between Judge Speer and Gen. Meldrim were known 
to be strained. Mr. Osborne produced a witness for the plaintiff 
and after examining him turned him over to Gen. Meldrim for cross- 
examination, who proceeded by a proper line of questions to cross- 
examine. The questions were perfectly proper on cross-examina¬ 
tion, but while the examination was at its height Judge Speer, on 
hit own motion objected to the questions upon the ground that they 
were leading, and after a colloquy between Judge Speer and Gen. 
Meldrim, the judge turned to Mr. Osborne and remarked that he 
noticed he (Osborne) had interposed no objections to the line of 
questioning pursued by Gen. Meldrim, and that if counsel did not 
object he saw no reason why he should. This was said inquiringly, 
and the judge paused for a response. Mr. Osborne found the inci¬ 
dent embarrassing, as any tyro in the law would have known the 
judge was wrong, and that if he had agreed he would have stultified 
himself, but he made no response and after waiting long enough to 
make the situation awkward Judge Speer allowed Gen. Meldrim to 

E roceed. Mr. Osborne stated the position of the judge would have 
een recognized as erroneous by a lO-day' law student, and that he 
has always felt that the judge’s action was due to an effort to vent his 
spite on an attorney against whom he had a grudge, though he had to 

E rostitute justice to do it. He stated further that it is impossible to 
ave a fair and impartial trial before Judge Speer if there is any 
hostility on the part of the judge toward either attorney, and that his 
motives in such cases are judicially corrupt. Mr. Osborne stated 
that he made a practice of explaining to prospective clients that to 
employ him might prejudice his case with Judge Speer. 

Mr. Osborne next detailed what he terms the unfair and unjudicial 
manner in which Judge Speer conducted the trial in the Greene and 
Gaynor case (Record page 2079). He stated that it is impossible to 
describe the manner of the judge fully, but that when you leave the 
court room you feel that you are not leaving a place of justice whether 
you win or lose. 


122 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 
ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT IN RE U. S. v. A. C. L. RAILROAD. 

TESTIMONY OF STANLEY S. BENNETT. 

(Pages 2213-2242.) 

Mr. Bennett gave his occupation as attorney and stated he resided 
at Quitman, Ga.; that he was employed in May, 1910, to represent 
the defendants in the case of U. S. v. A. C. L. Railroad Co. in a 
suit under the safety appliance act, and that he had associated Mr. 
J. N. Talley with him; that the district attorney, Mr. Storrs, had 
called upon the defendants to produce certain papers as evidence in 
the case and that when the trial commenced the defense stated to 
the court that they did not recognize the right of the Government 
attorney to call upon them to produce evidence to convict themselves, 
and that they thought the proper way to proceed was for the district 
attorney to hie a petition, and for the court to decide upon the hear¬ 
ing whether the evidence was material and past such order as he saw 
fit; that Judge Speer then put the railroad division superintendent, 
Mr. McRainey, upon the stand and asked him if he had the papers in 
question, and was told that he had not, but that they were in the 
posession of the railroad’s attorney; that the judge then made a 
speech with regard to the law protecting the people of all classes and 
stated the statistics show more people were killed by railroads in the 
past year than had been killed in the three bloody days of the Battle 
of Gettysburg, etc.; that the judge then ordered the district attorney 
to prepare a rule against the railway company to show cause the 
next morning why they should not produce the papers or be consid¬ 
ered in contempt; that the next morning when court convened Judge 
Speer asked Mr. Talley, who was of counsel for the railway company, 
if he had the papers,, to which Mr. Talley replied that they had pre¬ 
pared an answer to the rule nisi issued, and would be glad if the court 
would have a hearing on it, to which the judge replied that he had 
not answered his question, and again asking him if he had the papers; 
that Mr. Talley again tried to evade and stated the papers could be 
produced when the court passed an order requiring their production; 
that>the judge again stated Mr. Talley had not answered his question 
and said he wanted to know where those papers were; that the situa¬ 
tion became very acute and that it looked as if the counsel would have 
to go to jail, and that Mr. Talley finally replied that he had the papers 
with him; that the judge then said, “Mr. Talley, you may turn those 
papers over to the district attorney,” to which Mr. Talley replied, 
‘‘Does your Honor order us to do that?” And the judge said, “Mr. 
Talley, are you not a practitioner at this bar?” * * * When 

you became such did not you take a solemn oath ? Did that make 
you an officer of this court ? 

To all of which Mr. Talley replied in the affirmative, and Judge 
Speer then said, “I direct you as an officer of this court that you turn 
these papers over to the district attorney.” Mr. Bennett states he 
"thought it was time to turn” and so advised Mr. Talley, and the 
papers were delivered to the district attorney; that Mr. Talley then 
asked the judge to note an exception to the ruling, and the judge re¬ 
plied, "What ruling?” That Mr. Talley explained "Your honor has 
directed and ordered us to turn these papers over to the district 
attorney,” and the judge replied, "I didn’t do anything of the kind.” 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 123 

Mr. Bennett states he and the other counsel were simply astounded 
at this statement, and that Mr. Talley stated to the court, “Your 
honor passed a rule nisi yesterday, and we came here in response to 
that ruling, and your honor would not hear us in'regard to it and 
simply directed us to turn these papers over.” That the Judge 
smiled and said, “You have reference to the rule nisi that the court 
passed yesterday morning.” And Mr. Talley replied, “Yes”; that 
Judge Speer then turned to the stenographer and said, “Mr. Stenog¬ 
rapher, take this down, ‘The court on yesterday having issued a rule 
nisi against the Atlantic Coast Line to show cause why it should not 
produce certain papers in this case, and the defendant, by its attor¬ 
neys, having come into court this morning and voluntarily produced 
the papers, the rule is dismissed, as it calls for no order on it.’ ” That 
the case proceeded, and the judge directed a verdict against the de¬ 
fendants; that he thought he had been treated unfairly, and that 
shortly after he left the court room the foreman of the jury came to 
him and said that he did not wish to sign that verdict, and that if it 
had been left to them (the’jury), they would have found a verdict in 
favor of the Atlantic Coast Line; that the order dictated by Judge 
Speer stating that the attorneys had produced the papers voluntarily 
did not speak the truth; also, that he was denied the right of present¬ 
ing the facts to the jury. 

Mr. Bennett testified, in response to questions, that they did not 
appeal the case as they had nothing to appeal on, as the judge had 
made the record show that they had voluntarily produced the papers, 
which was not the truth. 

TESTIMONY OF I>. W. BRANCH. 

(Pages 2243-1252.) 

Mr. Branch testified that he is an attorney and resides at' Quitman, 
Ga., and is a partner of Mr. Stanley S. Bennett, who has already tes¬ 
tified on this subject. Mr. Branch corroborated 1 all the statements 
made by Mr. Bennett, and practically duplicated his testimony, 
stating that the statement dictated by Judge Speer to his stenog¬ 
rapher, to the effect that the papers had been produced voluntarily 
by the attorneys for the railroad, was not true; that the stone graphic 
report produced by the attorneys of Judge Speer was accurate up to 
a certain point, but did not contain all of the proceedings had on 
account ci which complaint is made. 

The evidence in this'case tends to show that Judge Speer made an 
untrue record by dictating to his stenographer an order which mis¬ 
stated the facts, and which prevented the defendants from reviewing 
his conduct in the case upon appeal. 

It is true that Judge Speer denies the statement made by the 
witnesses in this case, ami the issue of veracity is'direct. The judge 
produced a copy of what purported to be a stenographers report of 
these proceedings, but as this* stenographer was his private secretary, 
and as these notes were not transcribed until the* necessity for thorn 
in rebutting the testimony of witnesses in the case'arose, it is thought 
they should be considered merely as a part of Judge Speer’s denial 
of the conduct charged. 

The subcommittee can not say that Judge Speer’s.action in this 
case was corrupt, but it is unfortunate that any United States judge 


124 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

should have failed to make a more faithful statement of the facts 
leading up to the production of the papers in the case. 

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE S. MURPHY. 

(Pages 2120-2138.) 

Mr. Murphy testified he was a merchant and that his home was at 
Augusta, Ura.; that in the year 1910, he was sued by Spring & Co., 
of New York, on an account growing out of brokerage transactions; 
that in this case he was put to the very heavy expense of going to 
Mount Airy with his witnesses for a hearing; that the complainants 
against him had 10 or 12 witnesses present and that he had a number 
of witnesses and much documentary evidence, and that when the 
ease opened, one witness for the complainant had been on the stand 
about 20 minutes and during which time the judge displayed much 
impatience and asked questions about the length of the case, and 
then, “drew himself up and stated that he would render a verdict 
against the defendant for the whole account, with interest and costs 
from date amounting to $15,000 or $20,000;” that his attorneys had 
not been allowed to present one scintilla of evidence and that nothing 
was before the court except his plea; that his attorneys urged that 
they be allowed to make a defense, but were denied that right; that 
the judge refused to allow them to introduce a single witness or any 
evidence whatever and would not hear the case; that the judgment he 
rendered was so contrary to justice and common sense that even the 
opposing counsel in coming from the court room stated that no 
i ssues had been tried; that the attorneys said their only recourse was 
by appealing to the circuit court of appeals and that the court of 
appeals reversed Judge Speer after a hearing of not more than 
twenty or thirty minutes; that the case was sent back for a new trial 
but that on account of Judge Speer’s actions in the first trial and his 
knowledge of the judge, he knew it would be useless to try the case a 
second time before him, and that, therefore, he compromised it; that 
this action on the part of Judge Speer resulted in heavy loss to him 
and that he accepted the compromise for absolutely no other reason 
than to get out of Judge Speer’s court; that his attorneys advised him 
he had a conclusive and absolute defense, but that Judge Speer “has 
the most insidious manner in charging a jury away from you, that 
you have ever seen in your life.” (See volume 200, Circuit Court of 
Appeals, p. 372.) 

Mr. Murphy testified that the people of the district generally 
regarded Judge Speer’s court with fear and trembling and that the 
judge’s manner in holding court is arbitrary, dictatorial, and oppres¬ 
sive; that the jurors and attaches and counsel go around on tiptoe 
and are actually afraid to draw a long breath. 

The argument of the judge, that Mr. Murphy was engaged in 
“gambling speculation,” does not appear to present any very good 
reason for entirely refusing to hear his case, and this argument is 
effectually answered by the action of the circuit court of Appeals in 
reversing him and sending the case back for hearing. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 125 
PEONAGE CASES, ETC. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. THOMAS S. FELDER. 

(Pages 1823-1848.) 

Mr. Felder stated that he was an attorney by profession and was 
holding the position of attorney general in the State of Georgia; that 
in the year 1910 he had represented the defendants in the case of 
United States v. Laidler Branen and John H. Branen; that he thought 
these defendants were entitled to a fair and impartial trial, and that 
the judge took the case away from the Government attorney, Mr. 
Akerman, and directed the prosecution from the bench; that when 
the Government finished its case he (Felder) made a motion to direct 
a verdict, and that the judge in overruling the motion practically 
directed a verdict of guilty in the case in the presence of the jury. 

Mr. Felder also testified that in this case he requested the judge to 
have the jury retire during the argument on the motion to direct a 
verdict, but that the judge refused his request. 

Also that about one year later he was employed to represent the 
defendants in another peonage case entitled United States v. Chancey 
et ah, and that when these men came to him he told them that an 
effort would be made by the judge to coerce them into pleading 
guilty, and that he required a promise from them that they would 
not plead guilty before agreeing to represent them; that after inves¬ 
tigating the facts he was convinced that these men were not guilty 
and did his best to clear them; that Judge Speer at the outset of the 
trial took charge of the prosecution and assisted the district attorney, 
in his statement of the case to the jury, by questions and supple¬ 
menting his remarks; that during the trial of this case he had a num¬ 
ber of character witnesses present, and that the judge inquired what 
that great array of people was for, and upon being informed they were 
character witnesses limited the defense to two or three such witnesses; 
that nevertheless he kept the witnesses at court, and the judge had 
them put in a hot, uncomfortable room without chairs, and kept 
them locked up as if they had committed some crime; that the trial 
lasted nearly a week, and that one of these witnesses was nearly 80 
years old, and some of them kept sending notes to the effect that 
they could not get chairs to sit on, and that he (Felder) would send 
the notes up to the judge, who would ignore them. He stated fur¬ 
ther that when the Government closed its case he made the usual 
motion to direct a verdict and sat down: and that the judge asked 
him if he cared to argue the matter, to which he replied in the negative; 
that the judge then said that he would like to hear the motion argued 
and that he again asked to be excused; that the judge then said, 
“Mr. Felder, I would be glad for you to do so.” He stated that he 
understood that the judge merely wanted him to argue the motion 
in order to get ammunition with which to overrule, and that every¬ 
body was convinced that he was trying to convict the defendants, 
but that in response to Judge Speer’s request he rose and made a 
short argument; that the judge took a recess and came back with a 
typewritten order overruling the motion, condemning the clients, 
dissertating upon the sweetness of liberty and the American flag, 
and winding up by saying that if there ever was a peonage case this 
was it; that this was all stated in the presence of the jury. 


126 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER 


Mr. Felder testified that ho saw from the judge’s conduct and 
language in overruling his motion that the gauntlet was down, 
and that it was merely a question as to who could impress the jury 
more strongly; that in opening the case he attempted to answer 
some of the arguments of the judge, and stated that he knew there 
was something in the Constitution about protecting liberty, but 
there were also other sections in the Constitution, one of which 
guaranteed to defendants an impartial trial in courts of the country, 
and he asked the jury to see that they got it in that case; that the 
judge interrupted him frequently, and finally stopped his state¬ 
ment, and said that he was very tired of hearing the word “nigger” 
repeated, and finally said, “Mr. Felder, I think you are traveling 
within the borders, and if you persist in it, I will strike your name 
from the list of attorneys at this bar before my court.” Mr. Felder 
stated that he knew the judge had no power to do that, as his right 
to practice was a property right, and that the judge made that state¬ 
ment to prejudice him before the jury; that during the trial of this 
case, the conduct of the judge was so outrageous that there was a 
consultation among the attorneys at which they proposed the hold¬ 
ing of an indignation meeting, but that he dissuaded them from 
taking such a step, as it might have looked as if they were attempt¬ 
ing to influence the trial. 

Mr. Felder testified further that after this trial, which resulted in 
a verdict of not guilty for the defendants, it became known that the 
jurors who sat upon the case, among others, had been invited to 
attend a barbecue to be held in Pulaski County on July 4, some 
weeks later; that Judge Speer then had a signed card published in 
one of the Macon papers, warning these jurors not to attend the 
barbecue. The matter received considerable publicity, and Judge 
Speer furnished another long article in which he attempted to quote 
the law and give his reasons for issuing the warning to the jurors. 
The newspapers’ articles were copied into the record, beginning at 
page 1831. In these publications Judge Speer endeavored to make 
it appear that in accepting this invitation to the barbecue, some 
weeks after the trial of the case in question, these jurors might be 
guilty of violation of sections 133 and 135 of the “Revised Code.” 
The warning of the judge was apparently effective, as the barbecue 
was called off, and the reason given that the parties did not wish to 
embarrass the jurors. 

Mr. Felder stated that the barbecue was called off not so much 
because the jurors thought they could be punished for contempt of 
court, but that “they knew that if he did not get them for that, he 
would get them for something else, and they gave up the barbecue.” 

Mr. Felder testified also that during the trial of the Branen case, 
the defendants were out on bond and that when the court adjourned 
at the dinner hour the first day, the marshal arrested the two de¬ 
fendants and said they must go to jail; that he went to the judged 
office and informed him the men were under bond, and that he needed! 
them at his office in conducting the defense, but that the judge de¬ 
clined to allow them to go, and they were kept in jail all during the 
trial, although they were found not guilty and released at its con¬ 
clusion. Mr. Felder stated he never saw this done in any other 
case. He also stated that during the trial of the case, Judge Speer 
would beckon to his associate counsel, and that after a conference 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER, 127 


with the judge, he would return and state that the judge wanted to 
know if he was impressed with the seriousness of the offense, and 
that this was merely an attempt to get these men to plead guilty; 
that the conduct of the judge was enough to make the most innocent 
man plead guilty. 


TESTIMONY OF MR. A. R. LAWTON. 

(Page 1746.) 

After testifying that he had been acquainted with Judge Speer for 
many years and practicing in his court extensively, Mr. Lawton 
stated that he had always considered Judge Speer a man whose tem- 

E erament absolutely disqualified him for judicial office. That he is 
y nature a partisan and much stronger as an advocate than as a 
judge. That he is very apt to take sides from the beginning before he 
has an opportunity to find out what the case is. Mr. Lawton stated 
that he agreed fully with the descriptions of Judge Speer given by 
Mr. A. A. Lawrence and Mr. P. W. Meldrim; that it was his general 
practice to dominate all cases and that his conduct frequently resulted 
m unfair and partial treatment of litigants. 

Mr. Lawton is the senior member of the leading law firm of Savan¬ 
nah and is also the vice president of the Georgia Central Railway. 

He also testified (pp. 1777-1779) that in the case of Tift v. Railway 
Co., Judge Speer made an arbitrary ruling against the company, 
ordering it to pay into court $500,000, being the penal sum of a super¬ 
sedeas bond; that it had not been found that a single cent was owing 
to anyone by the company, and the company appealed to the circuit 
court of appeals, and while the case was pending there a settlement 
was effected; that the attorney for the plaintiff (Mr. Wimbish) then 
went into court and undertook to dismiss proceedings, but that 
Judge Speer refused to allow it to be dismissed, and that it was neces¬ 
sary to go to the circuit court of appeals and get a mandate allowing 
the case to be dismissed, which was the end of the matter. 

CASE OF UNITED STATES v. ROBERTS. 

TESTIMONY OF J. W. PRESTON. 

(Pages 155-174.) 

Mr. J. W. Preston stated in substance as follows: 

That he was a resident of Macon, Ga., and had been a practicing 
lawyer at the bar in that city for about 40 years. He stated that in 
the case of the United States v. Roberts the charge against Roberts 
was for selling stamps over the counter as postmaster at Sandersville, 
Ga., without receiving the cash, and that he was also charged with 
misappropriation or misuse of Government money. He stated that 
that there was a prolonged and heated trial of the case and. that he 
had never doubted that the manner of the judge, whether he intended 
it or not, made such impression upon the jury that the defendant was 
convicted, while the evidence in the case seemed to demand an 
acquittal. He stated that the case of Roberts was principally a tech¬ 
nical violation of the postal laws and regulations, with no intent to 
appropriate any money to his own use. Mr. Preston explained that 

H. Kept. 1176, 63-2-9 


128 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

Mr. Roberts, being a merchant in Sandersville, and also postmaster, 
had considerable business dealings with The J. W. Burke Co., of 
Macon, Ga., keeping an open account with that company, and that 
there was frequently a balance in favor of the company in his pos¬ 
session. The company, in turn, would order stamps and Roberts 
would ship them to the company and take credit on the open account, 
charging the stamps to himself. 

Mr. Preston stated he was under the impression that upon being 
convicted Mr. Roberts was sentenced to eight years in the peniten¬ 
tiary, and in explanation of the conduct of Judge Speer continued as 
follows: 

All I can say is that it seemed to me that the Judge had a strong conviction of 
the guilt of Mr. Roberts in both of these cases and that that strong conviction of his 
was most manifest throughout the whole trial, and it went so far and was so injurious 
and hurtful and disagreeable to me that I thought, as an attorney, that he had deter¬ 
mined to convict him whether or not. 

Mr. Preston testified further that after the conviction of Mr. 
Roberts he immediately proceeded to Washington to make applica¬ 
tion for a pardon, and that the President, Mr. Cleveland, after going 
over the case carefully, granted an absolute pardon to Mr. Roberts as 
to the penitentiary sentence, stating as he handed to Mr. Preston the 
pardon papers, “This case addresses itself more strongly to me than 
any case that has been before me during my administration.” He 
stated that Dr. Roberts was also convicted on the misdemeanor 
charge for selling stamps over the counter without receiving payment 
for them and that the President declined to interfere with the decision 
of the court in that case, which was a sentence to the county jail. 
Mr. Preston stated in response to questions that “Of course, he became 
excited somewhat and, to use a very common expression, I got my 
back up and he (the judge) got his back up, and to be plain about it 
he was fighting me and I was fighting him. He was determined to 
convict the man, and I was determined he should not. He was 
determined to send him to the penitentiary*, and I was determined 
that he should not do it.” Mr. Preston testified further that the 
doctor was not sent to the penitentiary at all but that he was able to 
secure his pardon from the President before he had been conveyed to 
the penitentiary. Upon having his memory refreshed Mr. Preston 
stated that perhaps the penitentiary sentence imposed was two years 
instead of eight years as at first testified. Mr. Preston expressed the 
firm belief that the offense committed by Mr. Roberts was technical, 
and that his intentions were honest, and that the Government had 
lost nothing by the transaction. 

Mr. Preston also stated during his examination that he considered 
Judge Speer one of the finest presiding officers who had been known 
to him, and that he had exceptional mental ability. 

Upon being recalled (pp. 452-456) Mr. J. W. Preston stated that he 
had noticed in the morning papers a statement to the effect that he 
had testified that he considered Judge Speer the best judicial officer 
he had ever known and of exceptionally strong mental attainment. 
Mr. Preston went on to say that while this was practically true it was 
misleading in connection with other statements he had made; that in 
his first examination he had aot made it clear as to the offense com¬ 
mitted by Mr. Roberts in connection with the issuance of money 
orders, and that the facts were as follows: 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 129 


Roberts had a bill of about $500 that was due and should have been paid at once, 
but he did not have but $300 in the post-office treasury at that time. He went out and 
borrowed, just borrowed, from a merchant, a thing which he stated at that time he 
frequently did. The name of the merchants there in Sandersville was Newman Bros. 
He stepped out, as he has frequently done, and borrowed $200 to make the $500. Well, 
in two or three days one of the Newmans came over to me and called for the $200. He 
then had the $200 and more in his drawer and had taken the money out of the drawer 
to hand it to Mr. Newman, or was taking it out, and Mr. Newman said, “I want some 
post-office orders myself. I want to send off some, and if you will give me some post- 
office orders for a part of it, I would be obliged to you.” Well, he put the money back 
in the drawer and drew two or three small post-office orders and handed them to Mr. 
Newman. Now, that is the transaction. Well, now, the point was made under the 
law that he had no right to have done that. Judge Speer used the language that he 
had no right, for one moment, to issue post-office orders instead of paying him cash, 
and it was therefore, as I regarded it then and regard it to this day, merely technical. 
There was no criminality, and I say for that reason I thought then and think now that 
Dr. Roberts was convicted wrongly, and I must say in the interest of truth that the 
very persuasive and overpowering influence of Judge Speer on that occasion resulted 
in his conviction or was the cause of it. That is all I can say. As a presiding officer his 
conduct was always polite to me and to other members of the bar, and he was a typically 
fine presiding officer. 

Upon being asked what he meant by the overpowering influence of 
the judge, Mr. Preston stated that it was just simply his manner on 
the bench and his apparent intense personal purpose to enforce a 
conviction in that particular case was unmistakable. No juror, and 
no witness, and no party present could help but feel that his purpose 
was to convict Roberts. Mr. Preston stated further that he did not 
think Dr. Roberts had a fair trial and had never thought so, but went 
on to state that he wanted to be cautious enough to say that he did 
not charge Judge Speer with willfully and wrongfully perverting or 
violating the higher obligations of his office, etc. 

Upon cross-examination Mr. Preston testified that he applied for a 
pardon in the Roberts case because he thought the matter would 
appeal to the conscience of the President, and thought it would be the 
most direct way of disposing of it. In answer to the question as to 
whether he thought it would be better to ask for mercy from the 
President than to pursue justice in the courts, Mr. Preston replied: 

Well, from what I have witnessed from my experience in the_trial of the case, and 
knowing who was in control of things, I thought it would be easier for us to reach the 
conscience of the President than the conscience of the court. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. W. D. NOTTINGHAM. 

(Pages 994-1000.) 

Mr. Nottingham stated he was an attorney practicing in the courts 
at Macon, Ga., and recalled the case of United States v. Roberts, in 
which he was engaged as associate counsel; that the judge appeared 
to be seriously impressed with the guilt of the defendant, and that 
the jury agreed with the judge and found the defendant guilty. 
That during the progress of the case he went to Judge Speer and asked 
him if the defendant would have to undergo any penal servitude if he 
was convicted or if he pleaded guilty; that the judge replied that it 
was a grave charge, and that if the jury convicted him or the doctor 
pleaded guilty, he would have to serve a term in the penitentiary. 
That Dr. Roberts was charged with two offenses, one for selling post¬ 
age stamps otherwise than for cash and the other for selling money 


130 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

orders otherwise than for cash. That Dr. Roberts decided not to 
plead guilty, and that the case went to trial and was very strongly 
contested; that the jury found Roberts guilty, and the judge gave 
him two years in the penitentiary on one charge and 12 months 
in jail on the other; that Mr. Preston, one of the counsel in the case, 
then went to see the President, Mr. Cleveland, and secured a pardon 
in so far as the penitentiary sentence was concerned; that Mr. Pres¬ 
ton told him that he had seen the judge and that the judge had agreed 
that one of the officers of the court would guard Roberts overnight, 
and that he would not be put in jail pending his removal to the jail 
the following day; that notwithstanding, the marshal came and 
stated he was going to take Dr. Roberts to jail, whereupon he [Mr. 
Nottingham] hurried out and found the judge and asked him if he 
would not grant an order as Col. Preston had understood he would; 
that Judge Speer replied: “No, I will not give any order in connec¬ 
tion with the case. 5 ’ Mr. Nottingham states he informed the judge 
that the public was greatly in sympathy with Dr. Roberts on account 
of his technical violation of the law, and that a heated argument fol¬ 
lowed, after which he left the judge. Mr. Nottingham stated further 
that he could not say that Judge Speer had done anything improper 
in the case. 

The testimony on this subject is given by Mr. J. W. Preston and 
Mr. W. D. Nottingham. Mr. Preston testified that Judge Speer con¬ 
ducted this case in a most unfair and tyrannical manner and that he 
was determined to convict the defendant, “whether or no. 55 

Judge Speer denies that his conduct was improper. Mr: Notting¬ 
ham stated that Judge Speer required the marshal to keep this defend¬ 
ant in custody although he was out on bond. 

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE S. JONES. 

(Pages 1315-1323.) 

Mr. Jones testified that during the trial of Rankin v. Louisville & 
Nashville Railway Co. he was fined for contempt by Judge Speer 
unjustly as ne thought; that he was ordered to sit down and to stand 
up, and his witnesses taken out of his hands and cross-examined by 
the court frequently; that Judge Speer, on his own motion, called 
Cook Ciayton, who was at the time crier of the court, and examined 
him as to the shooting of a rifle, etc., in order to disprove and discredit 
some of the evidence introduced by Mr. Jones; that the judge also 
called another witness in the same manner and that the testimony of 
these persons interrogated by the judge was wholly irrelevant. That 
this conduct on the part of the judge appeared to show that he wished 
the plaintiffs to recover from the railway company, and that he was 
not satisfied with the conduct of the case by the plaintiff’s attorney 
and undertook to help him out; that the judge makes a practice of 
being rather free in the examination of witnesses and tnat it is cus¬ 
tomary for him to take sides with one side or the other. That he tries 
to get the case before the jury as lie thinks they ought to see it, and 
that this effort on his part usually begins early in the case before much 
evidence has been taken; that at the time he [Jones] was fined by 
Judge Speer, the judge refused to allow the case to proceed until the 
fine was paid and criticized Mr. Jones’s conduct, to which he excepted 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 131 

on the grounds that it would prejudice his client's case before the 
jury; that he considered the jury was influenced by this conduct of 
the judge, and that he took an appeal to the circuit court of appeals; 
that he could not get the judge’s manner into the bill of exceptions 
and that he considered the judge’s manner and tone on the bench 
affected the verdict of the jury. 

TESTIMONY OF WALTER A. HARRIS. 

(Pages 1251-1262.) 

Mr. Harris testified that in the case of Matthews v. The Brother¬ 
hood of Locomotive Engineers, Judge Speer declined to consider a 
demurrer filed by counsel for the plaintiff in the case, upon the 
ground that it had not the certificate of counsel required in equity 
cases, although the case on trial was one at law. Mr. Harris stated 
that this ruling was improper, as the demurrer in the case at law did 
not require the certificate of counsel. 

In answer to questions as to arbitrary, dictatorial, unfair, and par¬ 
tial conduct on the part of Judge Speer, Mr. Harris stated that he 
thought the judge was arbitrary and unfair in the case of Johnson v. 
Southern Railway; that Mr. Johnson was the bailiff of Judge Speer’s 
court and had been injured in a railway wreck; that Judge Speer on 
his own motion called Mr. Cecil Morgan, his brother-in-law, to the 
stand and endeavored to show from him that Johnson’s physical 
condition after the wreck was different from that before the wreck. 
Mr. Harris also stated that on the second day of the trial, one of the 
jurors, Mr. George R. Turpin, was missing from the jury box, and 
Judge Speer stated that he had excused him; Mr. Harris then stated 
he would go on with 11 jurors, to which the district attorney, 
Mr. Akerman, objected. Mr. Harris then asked that the case be 
postponed until the next day to see if Mr. Turpin did not recover 
sufficiently to act on the jury. That Judge Speer replied that he did 
not feel disposed to show any favor to the defendant as he had not 
let the plaintiff know that a number of witnesses called were present. 
Mr. Harris replied that he had called their attention to this fact, 
and that it would not have been a surprise to the plaintiff if he had 
been ready for trial; that the judge then declared a mistrial. Mr. 
Harris stated he called on Mr. Turpin, the excused juror, the following 
morning and found him at his desk, and stated, “Good morning, I 
am glad to see you looking so well,” to which Mr. Turpin replied, 
“I was not sick.” Mr. Harris stated the case was later compromised. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Harris stated that he had cause for criti¬ 
cism of nearly every case he had tried before Judge Speer. 

If it is true, as Mr. Harris intimates, that this juror was excused 
by Judge Speer and the announcement made that it was on account 
of sickness, for the purpose of preventing the railway company from 
winning against Johnson (the judge’s bailiff), it was certainly a high¬ 
handed, if not corrupt, transaction. This imputation is not denied 
by the judge, but the subcommittee can not say that this was his 
motive, but the evidence does show Judge Speer’s unfailing inclina¬ 
tion to “take sides” in a case according to his whim or caprice. 


132 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


IN RE FARMERS’ SUPPLY CO. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. R. C. ELLIS. 

(Pages 833-872.) 

Mr. Ellis testified that he Was one of the attorneys connected with 
the bankruptcy proceedings in re Farmers’ Supply Co. and repre¬ 
sented about a dozen corporations who had claims against the com- 

E any. That when a dividend of 23 per cent was declared in the case 
y the referee he promptly paid the money over to his clients and 
supposed the matter was disposed of. That he had nothing to do 
with the computing of the dividend and did not know that it had been 
declared until he received the check. That some time later he was 
advised the referee had made an error in computing the dividend 
and subsequently received a letter from the trustee enclosing an 
order from the referee demanding the return of 12J per cent of the 
dividend declared. That later the referee passed an order or issued a 
rule nisi against the attorneys representing the creditors who had 
received the dividend mentioned requiring them to show cause at 
Albany, Ga., at 10 o’clock a. m. ; January 12, 1912, why the money in 
question should not be returned to the trustee, and upon their failure 
to do so to show cause why they should not be adjudged in contempt; 
and the matter referred to Judge Speer for such action as he might 
think proper. That he made answer to this rule to the effect that he 
had received the dividend and paid it over to his clients in good faith 
some months since and that he had requested these clients to refund 
in pursuance to the rule mentioned, but they declined to do so. 
That the rule nisi mentioned did not include all of the attorneys who 
had received this dividend and transmitted it to their clients, R. E. 
Densmore being one of them. 

That later a second order was issued directing the creditors in this 
case to refund the money. That the next step in the matter so 
far as he knew was the receipt on April 3, of a telephone message 
from Albany informing himself and the other attorneys in the case 
that Judge Speer had passed an order for their arrest, and that the 
newspapers came out the next day and published the article announc¬ 
ing that the attorneys mentioned had been ordered arrested. The 
Savannah Morning News stating that it was a very serious matter 
and involved a large sum of money. That the matter was heralded 
through all the newspapers throughout the land. That he did not 
go to Albany in response to the telephone message, and that on the 
5th of April he was served with a rule to which he filed an answer and 
appeared in court and demanded a trial at once, but that the judge 
put the matter off a few days and when it was finally heard the judge 
continued the case, although he insisted that the hearing go on, 
and that judgment be rendered exonerating himself and the other 
attorneys. He stated he was later informed by one of the other 
attorneys who happed to be at Albany that the matter was dismissed 
by the judge at the next term of court some 6 or 12 months after¬ 
wards. That the judge could have entered an order when the matter 
was first heard dismissing the case, but instead kept the attorneys 
“tied up there and wouldn’t let us get out. I don’t know whether it 
was to keep our mouths closed or not. It might have been to keep 
us in fear that we would come into contempt of court.” Upon 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMOEY SPEEK. 133 

being further questioned, Mr. Ellis testified that at the time the hear¬ 
ing was continued by Judge Speer he directed the district attorney, 
Mr. Akerman, to draw an order bringing the creditors into court, 
and then turned to the marshal and asked him to serve it, and said if 
they did not come to arrest them and bring them into court. That 
at this time it was brought to the attention of the judge that one of 
these creditors, Mr. W. W. Timmons, of Tifton, who had already 
been served with a rule nisi to appear and refund the money, was in 
court in answer to the rule which required him to refund about $800, 
and that if this was refunded it would complete the amount necessary 
to pay the dividend desired; and Judge Speer upon being told this 
stated, “Well, if Mr. Timmons is in court and pays that back, will 
that settle it ? ” Mr. Ellis stated further that the judge had previously 
announced that every man should receive justice in his court and 
all should be treated alike, but that when he learned the facts about 
Mr. Timmons he was willing to let one man shoulder the burden of 
the others. 


TESTIMONY OF MR. J. S. RIDGDILL. 

(Pages 803-819.) 

After being sworn, Mr. Ridgdill stated that he was an attorney by 
profession and resided at Tifton, Ga., and testified in substance as 
follows: The Farmers’ Supply Co., of Tifton, went into bankruptcy in 
February, 1910. There were a considerable number of attorneys 
representing creditors, and a dividend of 23 per cent was declared in 
the case and checks sent to these attorneys for the amounts due their 
clients, which were in turn paid over to said clients; that about a 
year later it was found that this dividend was erroneous, and these 
attorneys were cited to appear before Judge Speer in Albany to show 
cause why they should not pay back 5 per cent of the amount which 
their clients had received; that he was one of the attorneys served 
with the rule, and in order to avoid the expense of going to Albany 
to answer the rule sent his personal check to the clerk of the court 
for the amount of the money called for, stating at the same time that 
while he was not legally bound to do so he took the action to avoid 
the necessity of answering the rule; that later on he was again served, 
together with all the attorneys in Tifton, to appear before Judge 
Speer at Albany; that he proceeded to Albany, and when the case 
was called there was no answer other than by himself, and the judge 
from the bench ordered the marshal to go at once to Tifton and arrest 
those attorneys and bring them to Albany at the expense of the 
Government. After this announcement was made he [Mr. Eidgdill] 
arose and stated to the court that he was one of the attorneys from 
Tifton and if he had violated any rule of law or ethics was ready to 
answer; that the judge replied that it was an inopportune time and 
that he would not hear from him then, but would hear from all the 
attorneys together, and he states the judge further remarked that 
it seemed to be a very serious offense and that he wanted to hear all 
the attorneys and learn what they had to say; that the matter was 
extensively advertised through all the newspapers of the State on 
account of this statement from the judge; that at the time the judge 
made this statement he had information that he [Ridgdill] had 
already complied with the order. Mr. Eidgdill then produced the 


134 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

paper in which this incident was published and read from the Albany 
Herald: 

Officers from the United States marshal’s office went this morning to Tifton and 
Valdosta to arrest and bring into court the attorneys against whom charges of contempt 
had been made by the referee in bankruptcy for alleged failure to obey an order to 
pay back to the trustee in a bankruptcy case certain funds. One of these attorneys, 
J. S. Ridgdill, is already here, having come of his own accord yesterday. The others 
are J. B. Morrow, Roble'y Smith, George E. Simpson, and L. P. Skeen. 

Mr. Ridgdill also submitted an article on this subject published in 
the Atlanta Georgian, April 3: 

Judge Speer to-day ordered the arrest of Robley D. Smith, L. P. Skeen, R. C. Ellis, 
J. S. Ridgdill, of Tifton, and George E. Simpson, of Valdosta, all lawyers, charged 
with contempt of court for refusing to turn over certain funds in their posses¬ 
sion. * * 

Mr. Ridgdill stated that similar articles were published in the 
newspapers all over the State. In response to a question from the 
chairman as to whether he or any of the attorneys had been actually 
arrested on this order Mr. Ridgdill stated that they had been advised 
by telephone of the order, and they immediately proceeded to 
the court in order to escape arrest. Mr. Ridgdill read into the 
record a letter from a Mr. W. A. Dodson, who was one of the moving 
attorneys in the petition to have the money in question refunded, in 
which Mr. Dodson admits that the remedy of the interested party 
was through suit against the bondsmen of the referee and trustee. 
He stated further that Judge Speer issued an order to have the 
attorneys in question arrested when no application for such action 
was before him, and in addition gave the order for the execution by 
criminal process, of the rule nisi issued in the case, which was in its 
nature a civil proceeding. Mr. Ridgdill stated the only way he 
could account for this action on the part of Judge Speer was that it 
was reported currently that the referee in the case had never given 
any bond, so that action against him for the recovery of the money 
improperly paid would be unavailing, and Judge Speer, possibly 
feeling responsible, thought he must try to get the money some other 
way, and would sacrifice the reputations of tne attorneys by publish¬ 
ing to the world that they had collected money from their clients and 
refused to turn it over, three or four papers with great glaring head¬ 
lines having stated that the Tifton attorneys had collected money 
from their clients and refused to turn it over. Mr. Ridgdill stated 
that this advertising was very humiliating, and that he had received 
communications from several friends asking what the trouble was 
and whether he had turned out crooked after leaving home with a 
reputation for honesty and veracity. On cross-examination, Mr. 
Ridgdill stated that the complaint was not that the attorneys in 
question had been actually arrested by the marshal in pursuance of 
the order of the judge, but that the judge had made the improper 
order from the bench which caused the injury to their reputations, etc. 

This conduct is to be condemned, and the motive suggested, that 
is, that the judge felt responsible on account of failing to have the 
referee properly bonded, while not denied, is not clearly proven. 

The gist of the complaint in this case is that Judge Speer ordered 
the arrest of a number of attorneys and made uncalled-for statements 
from the bench reflecting upon their integrity unjustly, which state- 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 135 

ments were widely published in the papers of the State and resulted 
in the loss of reputation to these gentlemen. 

If it is true that the judge deliberately sacrificed the good name of 
these gentlemen in his efforts to force them to refund the money 
which the trustees should have refunded, and that his motive was to 
shield his own negligence or that of the referee in not requiring a bond 
from the trustee, it was certainly oppressive and tyrannical, if not 
corrupt. # 

The judge does not dispute the facts in this case, nor that he made 
the order complained of, but states that the attorneys were not 
actually arrested in pursuance of the order, but the attorneys testi¬ 
fied they came to court in advance in fear of being attached. 

Judge Speer’s conduct in this case shows a recldess tendency to use 
his summary power for which the committee has criticised him in 
other cases. 

THE J. C. TITZELL CASE. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID C. BARROW. 

(Pages 2139-2149.) 

Mr. Barrow testified that he was an attorney by occupation and 
had practiced in the courts at Savannah since 1896; that in January, 
1913, he was employed by Mr. J. C. Titzell, who was a dredging con¬ 
tractor engaged in harbor work, and who had become financially 
involved; that there was due to Mr. Titzell from the A. B. & A. Rail- , 
road $13,000 on a completed contract, and that as he was attempting 
to collect this money to pay it to the creditors, a petition was filed 
in the Federal court by Mr. Max Isaacs, on behalf of certain parties at 
Brunswick, Ga., to whom Mr. Titzell owed $3,362, asking that a 
restraining order be granted to prevent Titzell from collecting thii 
money due from the railroad; that Judge Speer granted the order 
in an ex-parte hearing without notice, and refused to modify the 
order, even to the extent of releasing the money in excess of the 
claim represented by Mr. Isaacs until Mr. Isaacs had been consulted; 
that the money in excess of the claim represented by Mr. Isaacs, and 
a sufficient amount to pay his fee, was finally released and that he 
later filed a motion to dismiss the restraining order as to the balance 
of the money, and also asked for the dismissal of the injunction which 
had been issued; that upon the hearing of the case, Judge Speer 
declined to grant the injunction asked for by Mr. Isaacs, but at the 
same time declined to grant an order for the release of the money 
held. Mr. Barrow stated further that a few months after this occur¬ 
rence, Mr. Isaacs formed a partnership with Mr. Heyward, Judge 
Speer’s son-in-law. He complains that the action of Judge Speer 
was arbitrary in granting a restraining order without notice and in 
holding the money due Mr. Titzell without reason. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. W. E. SIMMONS. 

(Pages 721-727.) 

In answer to questions Mr. Simmons, testified that he had been 
practicing in Judge Speer’s court since 1888, and that so far as his 
experience is concerned the judge is rather more partisan than judi- 


136 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

cial and that "he was the strongest counsel on the other side against 
me uniformly;” that Judge Speer is very vindictive by nature, 
and is not capable of doing exact justice to a lawyer whom he does 
not like. He testified that the original estrangement between him¬ 
self and Judge Speer grew out of politics; that he had never known 
Judge Speer to decide a legal question correctly in a case in which he 
was interested. In answer to questions as to the decisions of Judge 
Speer, Mr. Simmons stated that ‘ ‘the judge would rather be charged 
with anything else than with being a fool. It is rather a peculiar 
coincidence, though, but I do not think he ever made a decision upon 
a legal question for me that I carried up in which he was not reversed. 
I think the judge could not do justice to any man whom he personally 
disliked. He is vindictive, tyrannical, arbitrary to those of our bar 
who do not bootlick him”; that this treatment was accorded to 
other lawyers as well as himself, and that he had seen the judge treat 
other lawyers in the courthouse shamefully; that he used to be 
sorry for Mr. Darnell, district attorney in this district, because of his 
treatment by the judge. He would ridicule him and make sport of 
him while he was on the bench. He stated further that he formerly 
had a large business in the Federal court, but could not get along in 
it satisfactorily, and therefore dismissed all his cases in ordei to get 
from under Judge Speer’s jurisdiction; that he was the State attorney 
for several English corporations, and one corporation in Boston, The 
New England Mortgage Security Co., all of which had large business 
in Georgia; that upon trying one of his cases in the Federal court 
Judge Speer had decided it contrary to the holding of the State courts, 
and had stated from the bench that he did not believe the Supreme 
Court o'i Georgia had rendered any such decision; that although 
he was forced to dismiss all of his cases in the Federal court in the 
southern district of Georgia on account of this attitude of Judge 
Speer, he continued to take all such cases to the Federal court in the 
northern district of Georgia, and was sustained by the Federal court 
there. 

In answer to further questions of the chairman as to the instances 
of partial, arbitrary, or unjudicial conduct on the part of Judge Speer, 
Mr. Simmons stated (pp. 732-747) that he recalled the action of the 
judge in the case of the New England Mortgage Security Co. v. 
Annie P. Tarver, in which a note and mortgage had been given to 
secure a loan of $35,000; that when he came to foreclose the mortgage 
the loan was bought in by Mrs. Tarver’s husband and resold to her 
brother. After detailing the circumstances in this case Mr. Simmons 
testified that Judge Speer refused to allow a settlement of the case, 
although all the parties interested were present by their attorneys. 
That a written agreement was entered into by all the parties, and 
that when the matter was brought up in court Judge Speer asked if 
Mrs. Tarver was present, and was told that she was represented by 
counsel. That the judge was not satisfied with this, although her 
husband was present, and got up in court and stated that the settle¬ 
ment was desired and that they wanted the decree taken. He states 
Judge Speer insisted upon having the case postponed, and Mrs. Tarver 
brought into court, and when she arrived Judge Speer took her into 
his private room and undertook to persuade her not to agree to that 
decree. Mrs. Tarver, however, declined his advice and the settlement 
was made. Mr. Simmons states the judge remarked from the bench 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 137 


that he had talked to Mrs. Tarver about the case and told her that she 
was throwing away a principality. Mr. Simmons stated that Mrs. 
Tarver did not have any real interest in the property, although it was 
in her name, the property interest actually being in her husband. 

Mr. Simmons testified further that after this agreement was made 
the parties in possession of the property refused to vacate and that 
he was about to apply for a writ of assistance to put them out of posses¬ 
sion; that at this stage of the case Judge Speer, without any bill being 
filed, granted an injunction against the issuance of a writ of assistance 
to put his [Simmons’s] client in possession of the property. Mr. Sim¬ 
mons then read into the record the order which follows, and which he 
states was made upon verbal application of counsel for Mrs. Tarver: 

United States Court for the Southern District of Georgia. 

The New England Mortgage Security Co. v. Annie P. Tarver et al. Cost appeal 

petition, etc. 

THE UNION REAL ESTATE TRUST CO. INTERVENTION. 

Upon motion of counsel of Mrs. Tarver, it is ordered by the court that the Union 
Real Estate Trust Co. do not sue out a writ of assistance to enforce said final decree 
of January 10, 1891, without first making formal application to the court to sue out 
said writ of assistance, and shall serve Mrs. Annie P. Tarver with notice of said appli¬ 
cation. 

This January 7, 1892. 

(Signed) Emory Speer, Judge. 

Mr. Simmons stated that he took an appeal from this injunction to 
the circuit court of appeals, and that Judge Speer was reversed. Mr. 
Simmons then presented a transcript of the record in this appeal 
case and stated, “I do not think any honest man can read that with¬ 
out a shudder of horror.” 

Mr. Simmons cited another experience had by him in which he con¬ 
sidered the conduct of Judge Speer arbitrary and oppressive, as fol¬ 
lows: The American Freeholding Land & Mortgage Co. of London, 
through its attorney, Fred Lockwood, of Augusta, had brought suit 
in the eastern division of this district, at Savannah, upon a promis¬ 
sory note in the sum of $5,000. Judgment was taken, execution 
issued, and the land sold by the marshal in November, 1888, to Mr. 
W. G. Wheeler. Two years after this one Turner Thomas, of Au¬ 
gusta, made a motion to set aside that judgment, the execution, 
and the deed made by the marshal by virtue of that sale. The 
motion was made in the western division by consent of counsel. 
Judge Speer granted the motion to vacate the sale made by the mar¬ 
shal, and Mr. Simmons was employed to take an appeal from the 
action of the court on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to set 
aside the sale after the end of the term of the court, such power being 
only in the court of appeals. Mr. Simmons states that when he 
arose to argue the case Judge Speer picked up his pen and began 
writing, and paid no more attention to him than if he had been a 
post; that he was very much offended and stated to the court, 
“Will you please lay down that pen until I get through? I treat 
courts with respect, and I demand it of you.” He states this 
incident created considerable excitement in the court room, and that 
the judge adjourned court until 10 o’clock next morning; that he was 
advised later that there was a meeting in the judge’s room with 


138 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


regard to the incident, and that the attorneys present had decided 
that apologies were due from the judge to Mr. Simmons and from 
Mr. Simmons to the judge, but that he [Simmons] had stated he 
would make none to the judge. 

Mr. Simmons stated further that the case was argued the next day, 
and that finally during the vacation Judge Speer entered a ruling 
against his client, and that when he appeared in court to ask for the 
allowance of appeal the judge asked him if the other side had been 
notified, to which he replied that it being an ex parte proceeding 
there was no necessity for notifying the other party; that Judge 
Speer replied that he would set it down for the next term of court at 
Augusta and that the other side had to be notified. Mr. Simmons 
then stepped up to the desk and took his papers of application and 
left the court room, after which he proceeded to New Orleans and 
presented the matter to Judge Pardee and had the appeal granted. 
That at the next term of court he was present at Augusta, and 
after the completion of the session of court Judge Speer, seeing that 
he was preparing to leave, said, “Mr. Simmons, I see you are preparing 
to leave the court. You are not through with your business.” 
Mr. Simmons said, “I have no further business here.” The judge 
then replied, “You remember I set that application for hearing on 
allowance of appeal in the Thomas case,” to which Mr. Simmons 
replied that the appeal had long since been allowed, and upon being 
asked by Judge Speer who had allowed it Mr. Simmons informed 
him that it had been allowed by Judge Pardee. Judge Speer had his 
stenographer take down these proceedings and forward a copy of 
them to the circuit court of appeals, to be incorporated as a part of 
the record. That he also put a copy of his remarks in his transcript, 
and when he was arguing the case before the circuit court of appeals 
one of the justices said, “I thought the judge quit when you ap¬ 
pealed,” to which Mr. Simmons replied, “Everybody else does, but 
Judge Speer never quits with me”; that in the argument before the 
court of appeals with regard to the action of Judge Speer in attempting 
to interfere with his appeal, “I was making rather a seditious sort 
of speech, and Mr. Miller, the opposing attorney, who is a good 
lawyer and a gentlemen, became rather nervous, and he finally 
asked me if I would permit an interruption, which I granted.” He 
then said, “I want to state to the court that I want to indorse 
everything Mr. Simmons has said about this motion. Judge Speer 
prepared and asked us to present it.” Mr. Simmons stated further 
that the court of appeals reversed Judge Speer in this case also. 

Upon being questioned as to whether he knew one J. W. Cabiness, 
Mr. Simmons replied that he was acquainted with Mr. Cabiness and 
knew that Judge Speer had appointed him a receiver in the Tarver 
case. That he did not know of any service Mr. Cabiness had per¬ 
formed except to collect the rent and take notes, etc., and that for 
these services Judge Speer allowed Mr. Cabiness $1,000. In answer 
to further questions Mr. Simmons stated he did not know of any other 
services that Mr. Cabiness had performed. On cross-examination 
Mr. Simmons stated with regard to the action of Judge Speer in 
ridiculing the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia, 
that in arguing the case before the court of appeals, Judge Hammond, 
who was associate counsel in the case, told the judges of the language 
of Judge Speer in declining to recognize the ruling of the Supreme 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 139 

Court of Georgia, and that the judges were very much displeased. 
Upon being questioned by Judge Speer’s attorney as to whether he 
had finally lost the case in question upon carrying it to the supreme 
court, Mr. Simmons stated that he had not; that it was not decided 
on its merits; the supreme court merely deciding that the amount 
involved was less than the jurisdictional amount. That shortly after 
this occurrence he was in Macon and noticed in a copy of the Macon 
Telegraph a long editorial, written supposedly by a reporter, in which 
it was made to appear that Judge Speer had been upheld by the 
supreme court; when as a matter of fact, the supreme court had 
merely dismissed the case on account of the jurisdictional limit. Mr. 
Simmons testified he went to the editor of the Telegraph and asked 
where his reporter got the information in this case, to which the editor 
replied, “Judge Speer wrote that and sent it in here.” He states he 
then requested permission to prepare an editorial setting the matter 
straight, which was granted, and that the article appeared in the issue 
of the paper the following day. 

An examination of the record in the Tarver case shows that Mrs. 
Tarver did not have any interest in the property in question and that 
it was conveyed to her in order that a loan might be placed upon it by 
her husband and his brother. Mr. Simmons states Judge Speer’s 
action was due to personal ill feeling toward himself. 

The judge contends that he is free from blame in this case. 

TESTIMONY OF A. A. LAWRENCE. 

(Pages 1498-1563.) 

Mr. Lawrence testified that in the Greene and Gaynor case Judge 
Speer made several stump speeches in trying to get the jury under 
his control which were “awful,” “horrible”; that the worst trouble 
with him is that he is a misfit and should never have been a judge; 
would have made a great advocate, etc.; that Judge Speer had a 
very bad reputation all around and that the people feel that they 
can not get justice; that certain attorneys avoid the Federal court, 
because they feel they can not get a case fairly tried; that if there 
was a good judge sitting there the court would be filled with cases; 
that in a certain case he represented a client who had a mortgage for 
$50,000 on a piece of property in the district and that he prepared a 
bill asking for a receiver and presented it to Judge Pardee, as he 
knew if he presented it to Judge Speer he would appoint as receiver 
some satellite of his; that Judge Pardee declined to sign the order 
and stated that if he undertook to sign all such papers he would 
never have any time to devote to the business of the circuit court of 
appeals, to which Mr. Lawrence replied, “Well, you are going to 
deprive me of my right in the Federal court,” and that he returned 
to Savannah and recast his petition so as to bring the case in the 
State court rather than take it before Judge Speer. In response to 
a question as to what he meant in stating that. Judge Speer would 
appoint some satellite of his, Mr. Lawrence stated that he meant 
some one who is under obligations to him like George White, or 
somebody of that kind. He also stated that when the case gets into 
Judge Speer’s court “they kiss it good-by.” That other judges in 
appointing receivers, if the parties will agree upon a competent man 


140 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER, 

and make the recommendation, that man will be appointed, but not 
so with Judge Speer. He also testified that Judge Speer has favorites 
among the members of the bar. 

See affidavit of Mr. Lawrence marked “ Exhibit 8-A.” 

Mr. Lawrence testified (pp. 1416-1465) that he had observed the 
treatment accorded to Assistant District Attorney W. R. Leaken 
while he was conducting cases for the Government, and that the 
judge “was very rude to him and would insult him every time he 
came into court and got up and opened his mouth.” 

He also testified that in a certain case he was employed by an old 
negro client to represent her grandson, a small boy, who, with another 
boy, was charged with robbing the mail; that upon investigating the 
matter he found the boy was clearly guilty and had a plea to that 
effect entered and the boy was sent to the reform school; that the 
other boy did not plead guilty and was prosecuted by Mr. Leaken on 
behalf of the Government and, although the boy was guilty, Judge 
Speer, on account of dislike for Mr. Leaken, made a very strong argu¬ 
ment for the defense in his charge, but as the boy was manifestly 
guilty the jury so found ; that Judge Speer sentenced this boy to one 
year after he stood trial and was convicted, and gave the other boy 
(Mr. Lawrence’s client) who had plead guilty two years. 

ALLEGED ARBITRARY CONDUCT—IN RE UNITED STATES v. GEORGE 

C. HALL. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN R. L. SMITH. 

(Pages 101-106.) 

Upon being questioned as to his connection with this case Mr. 
Smith replied that he was employed as special attorney for the Govern¬ 
ment, and proceeding further stated that “the attitude and conduct 
of the judge toward the United States attorney in the trial of the case 
of the United States v. George C. Hall, in which I had the honor to be 
the special assistant district attorney, can not be described by me, 
except upon the general statement that it manifested a disposition to 
run the United States attorney out of court.” In further describing 
the conduct of Judge Speer, Mr. Smith stated that it was a dispo¬ 
sition to sneer at everything the district attorney had to say, and to 
express disapprobation of all his motions, and to express a doubt and 
distrust of the truth of his statements, suggestions, agreements pro¬ 
posed, and matters of that kind.” That during the trial Mr. Akerman 
proposed to have the jury examine the indorsement on a check or bill 
of exchange with a magnifying glass, and the judge not only refused to 
allow that to be done, but his expression, and the manner of making 
this expression “to my mind indicating that Mr. Akerman had done 
something extremely wrong and unprofessional;” that he [Akerman] 
was taking some undue and unfair advantage, or undertaking to do 
so. Mr. Smith stated further that he had been told that there was 
some estrangement between Judge Speer and Mr. Akerman, and that 
Mr. Akerman stated this feeling was due to the fact that Judge Speer 
had turned Democrat and wanted to get him a Democrat for district 
attorney, and had made up his mind for that purpose to run him out 
of court, and was about to succeed in doing so; that he had not con- 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 141 

vie ted anyone in many months, etc., and that he did not think he 
would ever be able to convict anybody as long as Judge Speer was 
on the bench. Mr. Smith stated further that Hall was acquitted in 
this trial, and was later convicted upon similar evidence with Judge 
Grubb presiding. 

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER AKERMAN. 

(Pages 1091-1093.) 

Mr. Akerman testified that in the trial of this case, Judge Speer was 
very abusive and insulting to him throughout; that he [the judge] 
would interrupt his argument and abuse him particularly with regard 
to an attempt made to have the jury use a magnifying glass in looking 
at a signature on the back of a check; that when he attempted to do 
this, Judge Speer came down with his gavel, and said: “Stop, Mr. 
Akerman, stop. That is manifestly unfair to the defendant;” that 
he endeavored to show to the judge that it was a very common and 
proper use of a magnifying glass, but that the judge insisted and 
refused to allow its use even after he had presented authorities on the 
subject; that the same man was tried later for an offense involving 
the same evidence, before another judge, and was convicted. Upon 
asking to describe the manner of the judge, Mr. Akerman stated that 
it appeared the judge was trying to discountenance him before the 

jury. 

The testimony in this case is given by Mr. John R. L. Smith and 
Mr. Alexander Akerman. These gentlemen both testified that Judge 
Speer treated the district attorney in a most unbecoming and unfair 
manner, his whole conduct evidencing a desire to “run him out of 
court,” particularly refusing to allow him to have the jury examine 
the indorsement of a check with a magnifying glass, and criticizing 
his action as unfair. 

The argument presented by Judge Speer and his attorneys is to the 
effect that this magnifying glass should have been introduced as 
evidence, and also that proof of the character of the lense should 
have been made. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. JOHN M. BARNES. 

(Pages 899-937.) 

Mr. Barnes testified that he was a resident of Georgia and had 
occupied the position of United States marshal from 1897 to 1904; 
that during the seven years that he was United States marshal Judge 
Speer kept him walking the tight rope all the time, except at inter¬ 
vals ; that at the end of the seven years his efforts to do his duty and 
at the same time preserve his integrity had resulted in making him 
a nervous wreck. Mr. Barnes then recited an incident wherein several 
prisoners had been convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary at 
Columbus, Ohio, and in which he engaged guards to accompany the 
prisoners, but was not allowed to use them on account of Judge 
Speer's desire to have “some of his hangers-on to go as guards;” 
that he was forced by this action to pay traveling expenses and board 
of the men engaged by him while they were waiting the action of 


142 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

Judge Speer; that the judge makes the practice of engaging actively 
in politics, and in 1908 went personally to the Republican national 
convention at Chicago, where several of his court officials and 
appointees were delegates, and made every effort to have Judson W. 
Lyons, a colored lawyer, elected national committeeman; that Judge 
Speer is inordinately j ealous of any attention or prominence given 
any of the other court officials or employees, and tries in every way 
to minimize and humiliate them, until they appear his servants or 
menials; that he calls them by snapping his fingers at them as he 
does his dogs; that he requests these court officers to load and unload 
his horses and dogs on the train, and when the court moves from 
division to division he puts a notice in the paper that Judge Speer 
and his “entourage” are going here or there, never mentioning the 
other officers by name, except along with his horses and luggage; 
that none of the court officials ever knew when or where he was going 
to hold court until the last moment, and must fall over themselves 
to get ready. That Judge Speer claims jurisdiction over everything 
under the sun, and as an illustration of this point Mr. Barnes cited 
the following incident: 

A seaman was knocked overboard from a merchant vessel at Sa¬ 
vannah, and while in the water a shark bit off one of his legs. A 
damage suit was brought, and the question was being argued before 
Judge Spear as to whether the case was one “in rem” or “in per¬ 
sonam”; that is, against the ship itself or the owners of the ship, and 
while Judge Charlton was in the midst of his argument Judge Speer 
interrupted him, as is the custom to interrupt a lawyer at the most 
telling point in his speech in order to break the force of his argument, 
and said: “Judge Charlton, the court has listened to the argument 
of counsel in this case, and it rather seems to me that your action is 
against the shark.” Judge Charlton was irritated, but promptly 
replied: “Well, your honor, we considered that matter and discussed 
it among ourselves, but we finally decided that if there was anything 
on earth, or in the air over the earth, or in the waters of the sea over 
which your honor did not claim jurisdiction, perhaps it was the fishes 
of the sea.” Mr. Barnes mentioned another incident, in which sev¬ 
eral men from Pulaski County, having been acquitted on the charge 
of peonage in Judge Speer’s court, and their friends having proposed 
to give a barbecue to the friends of these men and the jurors who 
acquitted them, Judge Speer issued a warning through the newspapers 
and intimated that the jurors and these defendants might be pun¬ 
ished for contempt of court if they attended the barbecue; that Judge 
Speer wrote him [Barnes] up in the newspapers in an article which 
purported to be a reporter’s story, but which he learned was written 
by Judge Speer, and that “I came back at him in an article which 
quenched his thirst for a newspaper controversy with me.” That 
Judge Speer had him removed from the marshalship, and that when 
he was shortly thereafter appointed postmaster at Thompson, Ga., by 
the President, Judge Speer bitterly fought the appointment; that he 
never forgives or lets up on those who are guilty of the mortal offense 
of lese majeste; and, fighting from behind the breastworks of his 
great office, you can not get at him, man to man. 

Mr. Barnes stated further (pp. 914-915) that Judge Speer bitterly 
opposed the appointment of a colored man as court bailiff, and also 
the summoning of colored men for jurors. That this resulted in 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 14& 

several collisions between himself and the judge, and that the judge 
contended such things offended southern traditions and prejudices. 
Mr. Barnes testified that (pp. 922-931) Judge Speer interferes with 
the marshal’s appointments, such as deputies, bailiffs, guards to 
prisoners, etc., and that the class of men recommended by the judge 
are of such inferior character that they are worthless. He produced 
letters with regard to the appointment of Mr. Nelson and Mr. Moseley 
substantiating this testimony. Mr. Barnes then related the incident 
which led up to his dismissal as marshal, and stated that the judge 
had interfered with him and his deputies to such an extent that he 
could not properly conduct the office; that the judge overheard him 
reprimanding a deputy for failing to go and serve process on account 
of a conflicting order from the judge, in which reprimand he was pay¬ 
ing his respects to the judge in forcible language, and that this re¬ 
sulted in the judge making a trip to Washington and having him dis¬ 
missed; but that the President promptly appointed him as postmaster 
of Thompson, Ga., which position he still holds. 

Mr Barnes stated further that he had been removed as marshal 
because he dared to do his duty, and tried to preserve his integrity, 
and that the President stated to him that his removal from office 
would not bar him from future appointment, after which the appoint¬ 
ment as postmaster was made. 

Mr Barnes is a man of education and ability. He appears to be 
somewhat high spirited. and independent, and he is undoubtedly 
prejudiced against the judge. 

Judge Speer denies the charges of Mr. Barnes, and attacks his 
character. 


TESTIMONY OF W. A. HUFF. 

(Pages 676-704.) 

Mr. Huff identified a statement given to the examiner, Mr. Lewis, 
in which he stated that he stood read^ to prove Judge Speer a judicial 
exploiter of the most glaring sort, a limelighter and notoriety seeker 
of the worst type, etc. Mr. Huff then testified that he had been on 
friendly terms with Judge Speer up to the time of the commence¬ 
ment of the litigation in question, and that since that time he has 
only communicated with the judge in writing. In answer to ques¬ 
tions, Mr. Huff testified that there was a great prejudice in the public 
mind against Judge Speer as a judge, that he is unpopular and dic¬ 
tatorial, tyrannical, despotic, and absolutely selfish; also that the 
business people in general feel insecure on account of Judge Speer’s 
prejudices, his despotic nature, and his determination to have things 
his own way. That there is generally manifested a great fear that 
business institutions may be thrown into the hands of a receiver, 
and that the people do not know what their rights are or who can 
protect them. He also stated that he did not believe he would 
receive any money whatever from the sums placed in bank on account 
of sales of his property, and that he did not believe his children 
would receive the money coming to them. That these children were 
not involved in any way in the litigation, and none of the claims had 
any reference to their interest in the estate. On being asked as to 
how Judge Speer was regarded by the attorneys in his district Mr. 
Huff stated that a great many of them were afraid of him, and upon 
H. Kept. 1176, 63-2-10 


144 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

being asked to explain stated, “They are afraid to open their mouths 
here. You have the evidence of that. You can just pick them out. 
They know that if he escapes impeachment and comes back here their 
business is gone. They might just as well move out of town. That 
is the character of the man. The fact that they won’t talk, the fact 
that they are afraid to talk, shows what the man is. I was sitting 
back here the day before yesterday and heard them cursing him 
under their hat brims, and you put them on the stand here and they 
begin to squirm and twist like some of the lawyers have, and are 
afraid to talk before him. They won’t do it.” Mr. Huff testified 
further that the attorneys were afraid to incur the “eternal wrath” 
of Judge Speer and that many of them had been forced to refuse to 
take business in the Federal court because they were not on good 
terms with Judge Speer. In response to a question as to the favoring 
of pets and favorites in the court Mr. Huff stated that Judge Speer 
gave the appointments to the marshals and deputy marshals, clerk, 
and some of the lawyers, naming Mr. Talley as one of the favored 
few. Mr. Huff testified that he understood also that the partner¬ 
ship between Mr. Heyward and Mr. Talley had been made and drawn 
in the presence of Judge Speer, and that he, perhaps, supervised it. 
Upon being asked by Judge Speer’s attorney as to where he received 
this information he stated that Mr. McNeil was the first to speak to 
him about it. 


TESTIMONY OF MR. W. D. NOTTINGHAM. 

(Pages 1001-1002.) 

Upon the subject of unjust, unfair, and tyrannical conduct Mr. 
Nottingham stated that you could hear some men make these state¬ 
ments about Judge Speer, which were also made about other judges. 
That Judge Speer had made strong friends and bitter enemies, as every 
man with a strong personality must. 

ALLEGED GENERAL ARBITRARY AND OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. J. W. PRESTON IN RE CASE OF LUCIUS WILLIAMS. 

(Pages 457-473.) 

In this case a party named Lucius Williams had been adjudged 
guilty of contempt of court for failing to give possession of property, 
title to which had been found by the court to be in other parties. This 
man was killed by certain deputy United States marshals, and they 
were indicted for murder, the prosecution claiming that the man was 
killed while asleep on his porch. On this subject Mr. Preston stated 
that during the trial of the case Judge Speer took the “bit in his 
mouth” and practically conducted the case; that is, he “controlled 
that case from the beginning to the end of the prosecution.” That 
the judge took too much interest, more than the necessary interest, 
as a judge, in defending his deputies. That he took sides from the 
beginning of the case. Upon being asked by the chairman of the com¬ 
mittee as to the actions of Judge Speer, Mr. Preston replied, “Well, 
I ought to explain that, if you will allow me. Judge Speer controls 
everything about this courthouse. He keeps the best order in court 
that I ever saw, etc. The whole of them stand in awe and go tip- 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 145 

toeing, etc. These men were his deputy marshals, who went out and 
killed old man Williams who had been ruled in contempt of the law, 
and they killed the old man while he was asleep.” Mr. Preston testi¬ 
fied that this case and the case of United States v. Roberts were the 
only two in which he was engaged personally wherein Judge Speer 
had acted improperly, but he had seen other cases when he happened 
to be present and heard the facts, but he had nothing to do with the 
cases nimself. Mr Preston stated further that the case of Lucius 
Williams was outrageous. “I called them murderers in this court 
and I call them murderers now. They are, but I think one or two of 
them died shortly after, and one of them disappeared. They mur¬ 
dered the old man. No doubt about that.” Upon being questioned 
as to the general conduct of Judge Speer in the trial of cases Mr. Preston 
stated that the judge’s inclination generally was to jump to conclu¬ 
sions quickly, and to drive to that conclusion all the way through. 
He went on to say that the judge’s perception was like lightning, and 
that he was a man of tremendous mental power, etc., out that he 
arrived at a conclusion too soon for a judge. That he carried every¬ 
thing his own way. That his power was frequently overpowering, and 
he carried cases frequently to unjust conclusions. That the judge was 
partial and had a very selfish mind. That “he is a man of superior 
mind, but he knows it too well sometimes.” 

In response to questions from Judge Speer’s attorney as to the 
actions of the judge in the Williams case he stated, “I don’t mean, 
and don’t understand me to say, that there was any corruption in the 
matter, but anybody who had the faintest grain of sense, or one eye, 
could see that Judge Speer’s feelings were in favor of those deputy 
marshals, those murderers, as I call them.” Upon being asked by 
Judge Speer’s attorney to refresh his memory as to the proceedings in 
the Williams case, Mr. Preston replied that he could not recall after 
so long 'a time how the case sounded, that he had forgotten just how 
the pleadings were, but that the issue was as to the conduct of the 
deputy marshals in killing Williams. That “whatever the proceed¬ 
ings were, the issue of murder was involved. I contended that they 
had not only absolutely violated their duty as officers of the law, but 
that they had actually committed murder.” He stated further in 
answer to questions of the chairman that the case was tried before 
the judge and the deputy marshals discharged. 

This case attracted much attention at the time, and the evidence 
is to the effect that the deputy marshals killed Lucius Williams. The 
men were indicted in the State court, and it was upon habeas corpus 
proceedings before Judge Speer by which they were taken from the 
State authorities; that the judge is said to have so conducted the 
hearing that the men were allowed to go free. 

The judge denies the charge made. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID 0. BARROW. 

(Pages 2149-2154.) 

Mr. Barrow testified that he was an attorney and had been practic¬ 
ing in the courts at Savannah since 1896. Mr. Barrow is collector of 
the port at Savannah. He stated that “the atmosphere about 
Judge Speer’s court is simply, to a man of intelligence, absolutely 


146 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

intolerable. I have seen things occur in this court room—native 
Georgians, men of standing and character, cringe before Judge 
Speer, and it seems to me that of the many things that have been 
charged against Judge Speer, that the fact that he has, by his con¬ 
duct and by his misuse of the power of Federal judge, brought about 
a condition among his own people of fear and intimidation, destroyed 
their independence, their feeling of independence and manhood—is 
one of the worst things that he has done.” That the attorneys of the 
Savannah bar go to the extreme in the settlement of cases outside of 
court, rather than try them in Judge Speer’s court for this reason. 
Mr. Barrow testified that Judge Speer bears a general reputation of 
being unjust and showing favoritism in the management of cases. 

TESTIMONY OF W. W. MACKALL. 

(Pages 1738-1739.) 

After. stating that he had been a practicing attorney in the dis¬ 
trict for 35 years Mr. Mackall stated that in his opinion, based on 
common reports and from what he had seen and heard and read, 
Judge Speer is unfit to be a judge in a free and independent country. 
He stated further that he had never had any difficulty with the 
Judge or any grievance against him. He stated further that Judge 
Speer has his faults and his virtues, but that his faults make him 
unfit to be a judge. His virtues might make him a useful citizen. 

TESTIMONY OF W. W. OSBORNE. 

(Pages 2052-2054.) 

Mr. Osborne stated that he was an attorney by profession and 
had been practicing at the Savannah bar since 1886. That he had 
understood Mr. Toomer in his testimony the previous day to state 
that in his opinion the majority of the plain people favor Judge 
Speer, and that this question might be tested by attempting to take 
any county from the northern district of Georgia into the southern 
district or vice versa, Judge Speer presiding in the southern dis¬ 
trict and Judge Newman in the northern district, and that you 
would find there would be pretty strenuous objection to it. 

TESTIMONY OF JUDGE H. D. D. TWIGGS. 

(Pages 2195-2212.) 

Mr. Twiggs stated he was an attorney by profession and has 
been practicing in the southern district of Georgia 20 years; that 
he had been acquainted with Judge Speer from boyhood and that 
he was a candidate for the judgeship now held by Judge Speer at 
the time Judge Speer was appointed. Mr. Twiggs then detailed 
the circumstances relative to his candidacy for the judgeship. He 
stated that Judge Speer conceived against him a most inveterate 
hostility on account of his application for the position of judge, 
and that this hostility appeared in his first case before Judge Speer; 
that the judge arbitrarily declined to postpone an important case 
in which he was retained at a time when he had other important 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMOEY SPEEE. 147 

cases set for trial in the State court, and in declining his applica¬ 
tion wrote a curt letter as follows: “Your letter received. Your 
application denied. Emory Speer.” That Judge Speer’s manner 
toward him in court was “so freezing and discourteous, almost 
insulting, that I could not stand it.” That it was so objectionable, 
tyrannical, and oppressive that it was noticed by the bar and reached 
such an extent that he finally had to retire from practice in the 
Federal court; that this conduct of Judge Speer deprived him of 
a large and lucrative practice, and that he found it necessary to 
advise gentlemen who came to employ him that his connection 
with the case would do them more harm than good; that he knew 
it would be fatal to their interests. In answer to questions Mr. 
Twiggs stated it was the almost unanimous opinion of the bar that 
Judge Speer is utterly unsuited temperamentally to be a judge on 
account of his irascibility, his tyrannical, overbearing, and oppressive 
conduct and Ins intense partisanship; that no member of the bar, no 
matter how good a case he has got can win it if Judge Speer wants 
him to lose it, and no matter how bad a case he has he can not lose 
it if the judge wants him to win it; that this is the general opinion 
of the bar and that he has never heard it expressed otherwise; that 
no man in the courthouse who listened to the case tried, no matter 
how dull he may be, could fail to predict the verdict when the jury 
retires, owing to the manner in which they are dominated and 
controlled by the judge; that owing to this parties are denied trial 
by jury, such as is guaranteed every citizen, as a general rule; that 
the administration of Judge Speer has been a travesty of justice. 

Mr. Twiggs further testified that Judge Speer had allowed his integ¬ 
rity to be impugned by one of the criers of the court and refused 
to take any steps for redress, and took sides in defense of the crier. 
(Record, p. 2209.) 

TESTIMONY OF MR. J. S. RIDGDILL. 

(Pages 820-822.) 

Mr. Ridgdill stated that the lawyers of the district considered 
Judge Speer tyrannical in his conduct and the people generally 
thought him arbitrary. He cited in instance in which he represented 
Tift County in a damage suit in which he endeavored to address the 
court and present a demurrer, but Judge Speer paid no attention to 
him whatever and ignored his request. He also stated the people of 
the distr'et do not feel that they can get equal justice in Judge Speer’s 
court and that he has heard some of them state that they would sooner 
give away their property than go into his court; that is, that they 
would rather lose their claims than take them into his court. Also 
that “you hear it said by every lawyer in that part of Georgia that 
unless you have a pull with the judge or can reach him in some way 
you stand no show in court.” 

TESTIMONY OF MR. ALEXANDER AKERMAN. 

(Pages 1105-1117.) 

Mr. Akerman recited instances in which Judge Speer declined to 
allow internal-revenue cases to be compromised upon the recommen- 


148 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


dation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the United States 
attorney, and also refused to allow orders nolle prosequi entered. 
He stated that the unbroken line of authorities on this subject was 
that the judge had nothing to do with the case when the Government 
desired to nol-pros them. 

On cross-examination, Mr. Akerman stated that early in his career 
he had been appointed referee in bankruptcy and later recommended 
for appointment as assistant district attorney by Judge Speer, and 
had been on cordial relations with the judge for a number of years 
prior to the first estrangement, due to his failing to recommend the 
judge’s son-in-law as his assistant. 

When the internal-revenue cases mentioned by Mr. Akerman were 
presented to Judge Sheppard for dismissal the order was entered as a 
matter of course. 


TESTIMONY OF JUDGE S. B. ADAMS. 

(Pages 2471-2485.) 

Mr. Adams testified that he was an attorney practicing at Savannah, 
and had been a member of the supreme court of the State of Georgia; 
that he has been acquainted with Judge Speer since 1868; that 
Judge Speer is highly intellectual and an eloquent man; that he is 
essentially partisan, emotional, moody, uncertain, unreliable, and can 
not help taking sides and endeavoring in every way to have the 
favored side prevail, asserting not only the proper prerogatives of a 
judge, but even that of counsel and,also jury commissioner; that 
Judge Speer makes a practice of rendering long opinions in the nature 
of a dissertation in the presence of the jury, and that he considered 
it very bad practice and unfair to the party against whom the court’s 
mind was made up; that this practice of Judge Speer in making 
speeches in overruling motions seriously interfered with the rights 
of parties to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge Speer is a very 
eloquent and persuasive man, and that his influence on the jury is 
inevitable; that the members of the bar generally do not approve of 
Judge Speer. 

Judge Adams then related an incident relative to the case of U. S. 
v. A. C. L. and others, in which he was representing some of the 
common carriers, stating that Judge Speer sent for him and told him 
that if his clients would plead guilty a moderate fine only would be 
imposed, but intimated that if they did not the powers of the court 
were very large and the fine would be made very heavy; that he 
replied to the judge that he would submit the proposition to his 
clients, and that the judge then asked him if he [Adams] thought the 
same proposition should be made Messrs. Osborne and Lawrence, 
stating that their clients were individuals and could be sent to the 
penitentiary; that Judge Speer asked him if he thought it would be 
proper for a judge to make such a suggestion; that he [Adams] was 
embarrassed, but replied that assuming that it was proper for the 
judge to make the suggestion to him [Adams] it followed that it 
would be proper to make it to other gentlemen. Mr. Adams testified 
further that it was not customary' for a State judge to send for 
counsel and telj. them in substance “You had better plead guilty or 
it will go hard with your clients”; that he had never known it to be 
done in other courts. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 149 


TESTIMONY OF MR. P. W. MELDRIM. 

(Pages 1636-1640, 1700.) 

Mr. Meldrim testified that he was a practicing attorney residing 
at Savannah, Ga., was 65 years of age, and has held the position 
of president of the Georgia Bar Association. He stated further 
that he is chairman of the committee on jurisprudence and law 
reform of the American Bar Association and a member of the execu¬ 
tive committee as well as one of the general counsel. He stated he 
had known Judge Speer for 52 years and that they were boys to¬ 
gether. That there was a time when his practice in Judge Speer’s 
court was very considerable, but that in recent years he had not 
practiced in that court willingly. Mr. Meldrim stated that this was 
due to the fact that Judge Speer had insulted him from the bench 
to the bar and recited the following circumstances: 

During the Greene and Gaynor case Judge Speer had been making 
little speeches to the jury, and the counsel associated with him 
[Meldrim] had been insisting that he except to the speeches. That 
finally the judge turned to the jury and stated that the gentlemen 
should not “weary in well-doing”; that this was the greatest case, 
perhaps, that had ever been tried in the courts of the United States, 
and that they should treat it just as if in their own county a default¬ 
ing tax collector had converted to his own use their hard-earned tax 
money. Mr. Meldrim rose and bowed respectfully and asked that 
an exception be allowed. The court replied, “The court will con¬ 
sider whether it will allow the exception.” Mr. Meldrim bowed, 
and the following day no reference was made to the matter; and 
the succeeding day his associate counsel insisted that he call the 
attention of the court to the matter, which he did, and the judge 
then turned to him and said, “Mr. Meldrim, the court has long 
known your views, and this court is unable to reconcile your views 
with the oath which you took to be admitted to this bar.” Mr. 
Meldrim stated he took a step toward the bench, but thought better 
of any unseemly exhibition, and then went downstairs and waited 
at the entrance, thinking he would say something to the judge when 
he came out, but when the judge appeared he had a deputy on either 
side of him. Mr. Meldrim states the insult was entirely uncalled for, 
and that he has not spoken to the judge since that time. 

Mr. Meldrim testified (pp. 1661-1701) that the conduct of Judge 
Speer on the bench is unjudicial and discourteous; that the lawyers 
of the bar of the State wish to get rid of Judge Speer, and that the 
feeling of the bar generally and of the people of the southeastern sec¬ 
tion of Georgia is unfavorable to the continuation of Judge Speer on 
the bench. He stated he had retired from a number of cases owing to 
the fact that he realized his connection with them would be detri¬ 
mental to his clients’ interests. Also that Judge Speer as an advo¬ 
cate was superior, but that he did not know of any man who was less 
adapted for judicial work; that the judge is the strongest prosecuting 
counsel from the bench he has ever heard. He testified further that 
in the Hester damage case, in which Talley & Heyward, as plaintiff’s 
attorneys, were employed on a contingent fee, the judge took charge 
of the case, and that, therefore, the plaintiff’s counsel did not have 
any trouble, and secured judgment for $5,000. 


150 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


Judge Speer’s conduct in this case and the verdict for the firm of 
his son-in-law, which was employed on a contingent fee, should be 
considered in connection with the judge’s statement that he had not 
“consciously” presided in a case in which his son-in-law was inter¬ 
ested in a contingent fee. 

Mr. Meldrim testified (pp. 1645 to 1652) that in the case of McKee- 
ver v. The Florida Peninsula Railway Co. he was employed by the 
plaintiff to recover damages for the death of plaintiff’s son, who had 
been knocked from a freight train by the train crew and killed. 
That the suit came on for trial January 16, 1899, Judge S. B. Adams 
representing the railroad company, and that Judge Speer decided the 
case in the face of at least half a dozen similar Georgia cases and 
others in Pennsylvania, Illinois, Texas, Iowa, and Kansas. Mr. 
Meldrim then cited the cases referred to. He stated that no lawyer 
could ever have disputed the proposition, but that Judge Speer held 
contrary to all these decisions and proposed to direct a verdict; that 
he (Meldrim) thereupon dismissed the case in the Federal court and 
brought it again in the State court. That Judge Speer then threat¬ 
ened to have him attached for contempt for dismissing the case out 
of his court and having it brought in a State court; that he left the 
office and sent one of his clerks to the stenographer, Mr. Talley, to get 
a transcript of the proceedings and the language of the judge, but 
that the young man returned with the statement that Mr. Talley was 
too busy, and that he tried the following day to get a copy of the 
proceedings and finally obtained a portion of it, but that the language 
of Judge Speer calling on Mr. Adams, the attorney for the railroad 
company, to rule Meldrim for contempt for dismissing the case was 
not in the report. That the matter was left in that state, and that 
some time later he saw Mr. Talley upon a railroad train and asked 
him why he had left out that part of the proceedings from the report 
furnished, and that Mr. Talley replied that Judge Speer had told him 
to leave it out. Mr. Meldrim stated he supposed Judge Speer had 
thought better of the matter, but that it was a fact that he had in 
open court directed Judge Adams to proceed against him for con¬ 
tempt because he had dismissed the case out of Judge Speer’s court 
and taken it into the State court. 

He testified further that Judge Speer had arbitrarily declined to 
allow the case to be postponed upon his request, when there was no 
reason for such arbitrary conduct. 

Mi*. Meldrim is recognized as among the foremost lawyers in the 
State of Georgia, and he is a gentleman of the highest character and 
standing. 

The gist of the complaint in the McKeever v. F. P. Ry. case is that 
Judge Speer took sides with the defendant and went so far as to 
request the defendant’s attorney to rule the plaintiff’s attorney for 
contempt, and later instructed his stenographer to eliminate his 
remarks on this subject and prevented the defendants from obtaining 
a copy. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. R. L. COLDING. 

(Pages 1956-1978.) 

Mr. Colding stated that he was an attorney and had been practicing 
in the courts of Savannah, Ga., for 17 years. That he had noticed 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 151 

the conduct of Judge Speer toward the assistant district attorney, 
W. R. Leaken, to be discourteous on more than one occasion. That 
he recalled the case of United States v. Charles Craig, who was under 
indictment for having counterfeit money in his possession. That 
during the case the assistant district attorney spoke of one Jennie 
Williams. That the judge inquired who was this “mythical person, 
some imaginary person, some will-o’-the-wisp, or was she real flesh 
and bone,” to which Mr. Leaken replied that she was a real person, 
but that the Government did not desire her testimony, and the judge 
then said, “Was she, then, indeed, such a bad witness for the Gov¬ 
ernment that in the exercise of a wise discretion you thought best 
not to put her up?” and further, “Well, a bad witness for the Gov¬ 
ernment is necessarily a good witness for the defendant. Go on 
with the case.” 

Mr. Colding was representing the defendant in this case and he 
stated the judge helped him out a great deal during the trial and in 
overruling a motion to direct a verdict, made a gocd argument for the 
defense, stating among other things “as Mr. Colding has argued to 
you the gist of this offense lies in having counterfeit money in his 
possession.” (Mr Leaken had at this moment picked up from the 
table some of the counterfeit money used in the trial and was holding 
it in his hand). The judge proceeded to say, “If the crime consisted 
in having counterfeit money in his possession how could our district 
attorney hope to escape at this moment?” Mr. Colding states the 
jury promptly returned a verdict in favor of the defendant and that 
as he was leaving the courthouse one of his friends said, “Did you 
win your case ?” to which he replied, “No, I didn’t win the case, but me 
and the judge together, we won it all right.” Mr. Colding also stated 
that after the judge’s charge to the jury there was nothing left for 
them to do but acquit the defendant. Mr. Colding stated that 
Judge Speer had never been discourteous to him personally. 

He testified that in the case of United States v. Harry Olson, in 
which he represented the defendant, Judge Speer intimidated wit¬ 
nesses and practically coerced a verdict of guilty. That when he 
produced a witness for the defense the judge turned to the man and 
said: “Do you know that you are sworn here to tell the truth? Do 
you know what will happen to you if you do not tell the truth ? You 
will not be permitted to leave the court room. You will be sent to 
jail.” That this frightened the witness to such an extent that he 
suffered a lapse of memory and was of no use and that it had such 
an effect on his other witnesses that he would not introduce them. 
Mr. Colding testified in answer to a question from the chairman as to 
general conduct, that Judge Speer always takes sides in the trial 
of cases and assumes the role of attorney for one side or the other. 
That it is not a question of whether the case is good or bad, but as 
to how the judge looks at it. That he can sum up a case in a way 
that it has never been summed up before. That it is not a question 
of a lawyer on either side and a judge acting in a judicial capacity, 
ruling in a case in an orderly and impartial way, but a question of 
the judge taking a position on one side or the other. That a trial 
by jury in a court presided over by Judge Speer is a farce. That 
the judge injects himself into every case and that the jury is never 
left long in doubt as to his position. That he has never known of 


152 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

but one or two ca c es where the judge did not dominate everything 
in sight, and literally domineer the bar in everything that was done. 
Mr. Colding stated on cross-examination that Judge Speer’s influence 
on the juries often results in a miscarriage of justice, and that an 
ignorant jury, taking everything from the judge as gospel, the state¬ 
ments of law and facts are mixed up to such an extent that the jury 
can not differentiate as to where one ends and the other begins. 

Mr. Colding is an attorney of prominence in Savannah, and his state¬ 
ment relative to the conduct of the judge in the case of United States 
v. Charles Craig, that the judge’s misconduct assisted him in winning 
the case is ceitainly not tainted with self-interest. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. W. M. TOOMER. 

(Pages 1728-1733.) 

While on the stand in the Crawley case, Mr. Toomer was asked by 
Judge Speer’s attorney to express an opinion of Judge Speer as an 
official, and in reply stated that he had always considered Judge 
Speer a very hard worker, that he was a man of commanding capac¬ 
ity as a lawyer and as a literary man. That Judge Speer had never 
granted him any favor or appointment in a financial way and that 
he had never been able to consider the judge as not personally and 
judicially honest. He stated further that in his opinion the rank 
and file of the plain people and business men of southern Georgia find 
Judge Speer and his court a perfect terror to evildoers, not because 
of the severity of the sentence he is going to impose, but because of 
the certainty of conviction in his court. 

Mr. Toomer has not been a resident of the southern district of 
Georgia for about eight years. 

The following-named gentlemen testified that Judge Speer’s con¬ 
duct on the bench was arbitrary, tryannical, oppressive, partial, or 
insulting, etc.: 

Hon. John R. L. Smith, attorney, Macon, Ga. 

Mr. J. W. Preston, attorney, Macon, Ga. 

Mr. W. E. Simmons, attorney, Lawrenceville, Ga. 

Mr. J. T. Hill, attorney, Cordele, Ga. 

Mr. John M. Barnes, postmaster, Thomson, Ga. 

Mr. R. C. Ellis, attorney. 

Mr. W. H. Burwell, speaker Georgia House of Representatives. 

Hon. Alexander Akerman, United States attorney, southern district of 
Georgia, Macon, Ga. 

Mr. E. P. Davis, attorney, Warrenton, Ga. 

Mr. Walter A. Harris, attorney, Lincoln, Ga. 

Mr. George S. Jones, attorney, Lincoln, Ga. 

Mr. A. A. Lawrence, attorney, Savannah, Ga. 

Mr. John Rourke, Jr., attorney, Savannah, Ga. 

Mr. Gordon Saussy, attorney, Savannah, Ga. 

Hon. A. R. Lawton, vice president Georgia Central Railway, Savannah, Ga. 

Gen. P. W. Meldrim, attorney, Savannah, Ga. 

Mr. W. W. Mackall, attorney, Savannah, Ga. 

Mr. W. V. Davis, president Savannah Trust Co., Savannah, Ga. 

Mr. Anton P. Wright, attorney, Savannah, Ga. 

Hon. Thomas S. Felder, attorney general of Georgia. 

Mr. R. L. Colding, attorney, Savannah, Ga. 

Col. William Garrard, attorney, Savannah, Ga. 

Mr. W. W. Osborne, attorney, Savannah, Ga. 

Mr. George S. Murphy, merchant, Augusta, Ga. 

Mr. David C. Barrow, collector of customs, Savannah, Ga. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF J <JD(\E EMORY SPEER, 153 - 


Judge J. H. Twiggs, Savannah, Ga. 

Hon. Jacob Gazan, attorney, Savannah, Ga. 

Mr. R. L. Bennett, attorney, Waycross, Ga. 

Judge Samuel B. Adams, attorney, Savannah, Ga. 

Mr. J. S. Ridgdill, attorney, Tifton, Ga. 

Mr. W. C. Snodgrass, attorney, Thomasville, Ga. 

Mr. W. A. Huff, Macon, Ga. 

The substance of the statements made by these parties has been 
heretofore mentioned. 

They are all gentlemen of high standing, with large experience in 
the courts and business world, and the list includes many of the most 
prominent attorneys and men in public life in both political parties. 

In connection with the statements made by Judge Speer in his 
brief that many of the parties testifying against him had previously 
indorsed him very strongly for appointment to the circuit court of 
appeals, especially members of the Savannah bar, attention is 
invited to the following letter from Mr. Anton P. Wright to the chair¬ 
man of the subcommittee, and to the letters which follow it, from 
Mr. J. N. Talley, the judge’s stenographer, to Mr. Wright, showing 
that the indorsement of the Savannah bar was only obtained after 
written request from the judge’s stenographer to Mr. Wright, who 
then had the memorial to the President prepared and circulated it 
among the attorneys who signed it. The letter follows: 

March 19, 1914. 

Hon. Edwin Y. Webb, 

House of Representatives, Washington , D. C. 

Dear Mr. Webb: I have recently seen the brief presented by Judge Speer to the 
Judiciary Committee and have been much struck with the fact that the judge has 
seen fit to include in that document a photographic copy of the indorsement of the 
Savannah bar of himself for judge of the circuit court of appeals of this circuit. The 
judge seems to take great satisfaction in the fact that most of those who were called 
upon by sense of duty to testify against him voluntarily signed the memorial. As I 
happen to be cognizant of the history of that indorsement, I am taking the liberty of 
communicating it to you. 

At the time that this memorial was prepared, I had been in the practice of my pro¬ 
fession but a short time and it is true that Judge Speer, from time to time, manifested 
a friendly feeling toward me, having on a number of occasions appointed me special 
master to pass upon the compensation to be allowed counsel in bankruptcy matters. 
Probably for this reason the judge considered that he had “a claim” upon my services. 
At any rate, when it was thought that Judge Speer would be appointed by President 
Roosevelt to the circuit court of appeals, I received a letter, copy of which I inclose, 
from Mr. J. N. Talley, who at that time was the official stenographer of Judge Speer’s 
court. I got the Hon. Walter G. Charlton, now judge of the superior court of this 
county, to draw the memorial indorsing Judge Speer, and Mr. Gordon and Mr. Saussy 
circulated it among the local bar. I did not myself, as I recollect it, request anybody 
to sign the memorial, but if I recollect correctly both Mr. Gordon and Mr. Saussy 
stated to me that a great majority of the bar signed it, expressing the hope that it 
would remove Judge Speer from the southern district of Georgia and put him some¬ 
where that would relieve us of his presence. 

The point I am making, however, is that the memorial was not quite as spontaneous 
as the judge would have Congress believe, but was gotten up upon the suggestion from 
the judge conveyed through his court stenographer. I think an investigation of the 
recent grand jury indorsements would probably develop the same facts. 

I do not know that this is important, but it certainly is explanatory in a measure of 
the methods which the judge has pursued in order to obtain indorsements of himself. 

I beg you to note that Mr. Cunningham, to whom he refers, was at that time and now is 
a member of the firm of Lawton & Cunningham, about whom he has had so many things 
to say of an uncomplimentary nature as representing the great railroad interest, etc. 

1 give this to you for what it is worth. 

Very truly, yours, (Signed) Anton P. Wright. 

W/P. 

2 inclosures. 

I have just succeeded in finding the original letters. 


154 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


Copy.) 

Macon, Ga., January 24, 1903. 

Mr. Anton P. Wright, 

Savannah , Ga. 

Dear Mr. Wright: While it is practically certain that the President will appoint 
Judge Speer to the vacancy on the circuit court of appeals made by the retirement of 
Judge McCormick, I am satisfied that the judge would be gratified to have presented 
to the President a memorial from the bar of Savannah expressing what I am sure is 
the kindly estimate of the bar of his judicial character. Do you not think it would 
be well for yourself and one or two active friends like Mr. T. M. Cunningham, jr., 
Mr. W. W. Gordon, jr., and Mr. Fred T. Saussy, or any other whose name might occur to 
you to take this matter in hand. It would be well, I think, to have a carefully written 
paper such as would arrest the attention of the President and the Attorney General. 
The bar here will take that action, and I am satisfied will in Augusta and Valdosta also, 
and perhaps elsewhere. I would be glad to hear from you on the subject. 

With warm regard, very truly, yours, 

J. N. Talley. 


(Copy.) 

Macon, Ga., January 29 , 1903 . 

My Dear Wright: I have rarely seen the judge more delighted than he was with 
the memorial of the Savannah bar to the President in his behalf. He spoke not only 
of the cordial tone of the letter but of the memorial and of the high literary excellence. 
He thinks it is a document of such great importance that it should be sent on from 
Savannah accompanied with a personal letter from yourself or such others as you may 
suggest, calling attention of the President to the memorial. I return it herewith with 
the request that you will give it that direction. It was shown to several members of 
the Macon bar, and while they adopted very fine resolutions themselves, they speak 
in the highest terms of your paper. 

I thank you very much for giving the judge the opportunity of seeing the memorial. 

With cordial regards, sincerely yours, 

J. N. Talley. 


This correspondence shows that the indorsement of the attorneys 
was made by request to the judge’s secretary, and that after receiving 
the memorial w T ith the signatures attached, the judge asked that it 
be returned to Savannah and sent to the President with a personal 
letter from Mr. Wright. It also shows that in making the request for 
this indorsement from the Savannah bar, Mr. Talley took pains to 
ask that the memorial be written in such a manner as to arrest the 
attention of the President and the Attorney General. 

The testimony of a number of witnesses should also be noted to 
the effect that they signed the memorial indorsing Judge Speer in the 
hope that he would receive the appointment and thus the district 
would be rid of his presence. Some of them stated they considered 
he could do less harm on the circuit court of appeals than as a trial 
judge. 


JUDGE SPEER’S PERSONALITY AND FACTS SURROUNDING HIS APPOINT¬ 
MENT. 


None of the members of the committee had ever seen Judge Speer 
prior to these hearings. From their personal observation of him, his 
manner in the presence of the committee, his conduct as detailed 
by the several witnesses, and from the brief in his behalf which he 
was permitted to file with the committee within 30 days, a copy of 
which is appended to the volume of the hearings heretofore pub¬ 
lished, the subcommittee has been able to form an opinion of this 



CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 155 

His physical condition, though in the sixty-sixth year of his age, 
portrays one who has endeavored to preserve his physical strength. 
His quick step, lofty bearing, and keen eye at once portray the active 
intellect, proud nature, and grim determination which have char¬ 
acterized his conduct as a public officer in various capacities for more 
than 40 years. Every fiber in his make-up portrays contention. 

Judge Speer came to the bench in the southern district of Georgia 
in 1885. He was a Confederate veteran and came from a Demo¬ 
cratic family; was elected to the Congress as a Democrat; became so 
popular while in Congress with the Republican administration that 
he was appointed United States district attorney in 1883, serving in 
that capacity until 1885, when he was appointed United States 
district judge by President Arthur, since which time he has regarded 
himself as a Republican, participating in Republican conventions of 
various shades of importance until recently, when, it was stated by 
one of the witnesses, Judge Speer has esteemed himself a Democrat. 

It may be that the peculiar circumstances surrounding his appoint¬ 
ment, including the fact, as stated by one of the witnesses, that he 
was confirmed by but one vote in the Senate, is more or less respon¬ 
sible for the deplorable condition discovered by the committee upon 
this investigation. 

The testimony taken is full of evidence of the fact that Judge 
Speer went to the bench in 1885 well equipped with experience and 
training as well as a full knowledge of the tremendous powers vested 
in the judges of the United States by law, and the ability and dis¬ 
position to exercise them. The change in his political career and his 
positive, arbitrary, and arrogant manner were such as to make it 
easily ascertainable what persons were unfriendly to him politically, 
as well as personally. 

A reading of the record makes it plainly evident that throughout 
the long period of his service of almost thirty years, there has been 
an utter lack of harmony between the judge of the United States 
court for the southern district of Georgia, and the bar of the district, 
as well as the people. The committee found a revengeful spirit, evi¬ 
denced frequently by the testimony of witnesses toward Judge Speer 
and, on the other hand, a superior consciousness of the great power 
of the judge over all matters coming before him and the rights of the 
people of his district. There has been an absolute want of effort on 
the part of the court to make the people of that district feel that 
their Federal court was the bulwark of their liberties, but rather a 
disposition has been evident on the part of the judge to punish those 
who were unfortunate enough to be brought into his court in civil 
as well as criminal matters. 

An examination of the record in this case is suggestive of the fact 
that early in his judicial career Judge Speer ascertained the limit 
to which he could go before liability to impeachment for official con¬ 
duct would accrue and went as close to the line upon many occasions 
as safety would permit. 

Having literary attainments, oratorical ability, and a keen intellect 
knowing the privileges of a judge sitting in the trial of cases before a 
jury, it was rare, indeed, that a jury was permitted to return a ver¬ 
dict contrary to his wishes, regardless of all the facts. The right 
recognized in the jurisprudence of United States to judges to sum up 
the facts in jury cases has been used with tremendous effect by the 


156 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

judge. A motion at the close of plaintiff's testimony, or of the Gov¬ 
ernment's evidence, to instruct the jury, has frequently been made 
to afford an opportunity to deliver speeches prejudicial to the rights 
of the parties to the case. In this manner the sitting judge was 
enabled to repeatedly punish counsel whom he did like, as well as 
litigants. These practices have been indulged in with such frequency 
as to lend color to the charge frequently made among members of 
the bar of the southern district of Georgia to the effect that the 
right of trial by jury has practically been suspended for more than a 
quarter of a century. 

FINDINGS UPON THE SEVERAL CHARGES. 

Section 67 of the Judicial Code provides: 

No person shall be appointed to or employed in any office or duty in any court who 
is related by affinity or consanguinity within the degree of first cousin to the judge of 
such court: Provided , That no such person at present holding a position or employment 
in a circuit court shall be debarred from similar appointment or employment in the 
district court succeeding to such circuit court jurisdiction. 

It has been held by the circuit court of appeals of the eighth cir¬ 
cuit, of an appointment in violation of section 67, supra, that— 

That an attack on an appointment made under this provision must be made by a 
motion to set aside the order appointing.” (Seaman v. Northwestern Mutual Life 
Ins. Co., 86 Fed., 493.) 

Mr. A. H. Heyward, a practicing attorney at the Macon bar, is a 
son-in-law of Judge Speer. For a number of years he was in partner¬ 
ship in the practice with Mr. J. N. Talley, who prior to the organi¬ 
zation of the partnership had been the judge's private secretary and 
court reporter. About January 1, 1913, that partnership was dis¬ 
solved and in the spring of 1913 a new partnership was formed, com¬ 
posed of Mr. Heyward and a Mr. Max Isaacs, of Brunswick, Ga. The 
latter, prior to the formation of the partnership, having been one of 
the referees in bankruptcy of the district court, by appointment of 
Judge Speer. The firms of Talley & Heyward and Isaacs & Hey¬ 
ward handled many bankruptcy and other cases in Judge Speer's 
court. 

In one case, a damage suit, the firm of Talley & Heyward repre¬ 
sented a plaintiff and were to receive for their services a contingent 
fee. In this latter case the evidence shows there was a private dis¬ 
cussion between counsel relative to Judge Speer's right to hear the 
case. However, the question was never raised and Judge Speer was 
not called upon to recuse himself. In none of the other cases was the 
point directly raised. There is an intimation in the evidence that 
this question was not raised by attorneys for the reason that they 
were fearful of the consequences which they might be called upon to 
bear at the hands of Judge Speer, it having been stated by one of the 
witnesses where the matter was discussed by the witness and Judge 
Speer in chambers, that if anybody raised that question “somebody 
would go to jail." 

In all of the testimony there is no evidence of any direct appoint¬ 
ment by the judge himself of Mr. Heyward, the judge's son-in-law, 
to any official position. The appointments ran to J. N. Talley, who 
was Mr. Heyward's partner; that is, where made by the judge. 
Frequently, however, he was employed as attorney for receivers and 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 157 

trustees, but in those cases the fees were allowed, where they were 
allowed directly to Mr. Heyward, by receivers in bankiuptcy, trustees, 
or special master*, and where Mr. Heyward would be allowed a fee as 
receiver or trustee, this fee would first be fixed by the master-in¬ 
chancery or special master, as the case might be. The fees and 
emoluments coming to tne firm of Talley & Heyward from its 
inception, July 1 , 1906, down to and including December 31, 1912, 
have been estimated to amount to between $40,000 and $50,000. 

Mr. Heyward is a gentleman of pleasing personal manner and a 
man of character, although not at all proficient in the practice of the 
law. Yet, he was permitted to share in the earnings of the partner¬ 
ship, and there is evidence tending to show at times the fees of the 
partnership were quite substantial, yet had Mr. Heyward been thrown 
upon his own resources it is plainly evident that he would have been 
able to have procured but a very small portion, if any, of the fees 
earned by the firm on account of his lack of professional ability. 

For some unknown reason, at the close of the year 1912, Mr. Talley, 
a capable and active practitioner, and Mr. Heyward found it desir¬ 
able to dissolve partnership, and there is substantial evidence tending 
to show that Judge Speer then sought to assist his son-in-law in the 
formation of a new partnership by an alliance with some reputable 
practitioner in the district. A very strong intimation was made by 
the judge himself to a Mr. Bennett that he should move to Macon 
and form a partnership with Mr. Heyward. However, after giving 
the matter consideration, Mr. Bennett declined the invitation. Fi¬ 
nally, a Mr. Max Isaacs, a practicing attorney of Brunswick, in the 
district, who had been one of Judge Speer’s referees in bank¬ 
ruptcy and had frequently given Mr. Heyward, the judge’s son-in- 
law, such appointments as receiver and trustee, came in to attend 
court in Savannah and publically tendered his resignation to Judge 
Speer. The judge sitting upon the bench, in accepting the resigna¬ 
tion of Mr. Isaacs, took occasion to very generously laud Mr. Isaacs 
from the bench for his services as referee, and commended his attain¬ 
ments as a practitioner. Shortly after this event, Mr. Heyward, 
whose home was in Macon, was seen in Savannah. He held fre¬ 
quent conferences with his father-in-law, sitting with him on the 
bench during the trial of cases. In the evenings Judge Speer, Mr. 
Isaacs, and Mr. Heyward would be seen together at the De Soto Hotel. 
Following closely upon the happening of these events, the new part¬ 
nership of Isaacs & Heyward was announced. 

Shortly after the formation of this partnership three of the largest 
concerns in southern Georgia were called upon to defend against 
petitions in bankiuptcy in Judge Speer’s court, filed by the firm of 
Isaacs & Heyward, acting as attorneys for the petitioning creditors. 
The Beach Manufacturing Co., the Gray Lumber Co., and the L. 
Carter Co. cases probably present the strongest suggestion of judicial 
corruption in the record, and yet there is no direct testimony con¬ 
necting Judge Speer with the instigation of these cases. There is 
evidence tending to support the contention that the judge was instru¬ 
mental in procuring the partnership of Isaacs & Heyward. That 
Mr. Isaacs was very influential with the court was known to all famil¬ 
iar with the business of the United States court in the southern district 
of Georgia. He had frequently complimented Mr. Heyward with 
appointments while he (Mr. Isaacs) was acting in the capacity of 


158 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

referee in bankruptcy. There is evidence showing that the judge 
attempted to procure a partnership with Mr. Bennett, one of the 
strongest practitioners in the district, but was unsuccessful. Follow¬ 
ing the formation of the new partnership came the three bankruptcy 
cases alluded to, in which Judge Speer showed a disposition to pass 
almost any order requested by counsel for the petitioning creditors to 
enable them to get these large estates into court. As the fees due 
the attorneys for petitioning creditors in bankruptcy cases depend 
almost entirely upon the contingency of the respondent being adjudi¬ 
cated a bankrupt, the fees of the firm of Isaacs & Heyward in these 
cases were to this extent of a contingent character. 

In the Beach case, in an ex parte hearing, without notice, upon the 
petition of Isaacs & Heyward, Judge Speer appointed a permanent 
receiver for the company. No rule nisi was issued requiring the 
company to show cause why the permanent receiver should hot be 
appointed. Attorneys for the company answered, denying the acts 
of bankruptcy and denying insolvency. They also filed a petition 
asking for the vacation of the receivership as there was no necessity 
for it, and was granted in an ex parte hearing and without notice. 
Counsel for the respondent and interested creditors in that case 
vigorously contested and had the case set down for a hearing upon a 
motion to dissolve the receivership. This hearing was set For April 
3, 1913. During the course of these hearings Judge Speer once or 
twice intimated to counsel that they should settle the case; that it 
looked bad indeed for the defendant, etc. As it apparently looked 
to counsel as though Judge Speer had decided the case in advance, 
the motion to dissolve the receivership was withdrawn, but later the 
case went to a hearing and the jury found that the company was 
solvent and had committed no act of bankruptcy. It was found 
that the defendant had assets of between $350,000 and $400,000, 
while the indebtedness of the company, bonded and otherwise, 
amounted to but $270,000. 

About a year before the commencement of the bankruptcy suit by 
Isaacs & Heyward dissatisfied creditors had sought to throw this 
same company into bankruptcy. Upon that occasion the general 
counsel for the company, conceiving it to be wise to interest the law 
firm of which Judge Speer’s son-in-law was then a member, to wit, 
Talley & Heyward, employed them, and they resisted the application 
of creditors vigorously. In that proceeding the side of the case in 
which Judge Speer’s son-in-law was interested was successful, but 
later, when another firm in which the judge’s son-in-law was inter¬ 
ested filed a petition in bankruptcy, it required a strenuous effort 
and a strong showing to get the estate out of Judge Speer’s court. 

These three large bankruptcy cases and the arbitrary manner in 
which they were handled, as well as the ease with which the firm of 
Isaacs & Heyward could throw almost any concern with large assets 
into the bankruptcy court, sent a shock through the entire district. 
Receivers were appointed in these cases who retained Isaacs & Hey¬ 
ward as their counsel, and the impression gained circulation that 
the presiding judge was assisting this firm in its effort to throw large 
estates into bankruptcy for the purpose of plundering them. Busi¬ 
ness men felt unsafe, and many concerns which had a few bills past 
due felt that they were “marked” and might possibly be the next 
victims. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 15^ 

There are some suspicious circumstances surrounding the relations 
of the judge and the firm of Isaacs & Heyward in connection with 
these cases, but the committee was unable to find evidence which in 
its judgment would enable the Senate to sustain articles of impeach* 
ment based upon the conduct of the judge in these particular cases; 
To say the least, Judge Speer exercised exceedingly poor taste and 
was guilty of indisc retions unbecoming a high judic ial official in par* 
tic ip a ting in the organization of this firm and apparently passing 
orders of grave'importance, involving great wealth and the savings 
and accumulations of many of the most active people in the district; 
without due consideration. 

The conduc t of these cases by Judge Speer, as well as other cases 
which came to his court during many years prior, have had the effect 
of destroying the usefulness of his court to the people. Whether 
justly or unjustly, the people of the southern district of Georgia have 
ceased to feel that the United States court for the southern district 
of Georgia is a forum in whic h their c onstitutional r ights and liberties 
can be vindic ated and their proper ty protec ted. He has, by his cosh 
duct, made his very high and honorable position one to excite the 
fear and suspicion, rather than to command the respect and con* 
fidenee of litigants. 

That he allowed his personal friends very liberal fees in bank¬ 
rupt' y cases there is no question. He violated the laws with reference 
to drawing jurors, for whi« h he was criticized by the circuit court of 
appeals; but in a particular case, while criticizing the manner in 
whi h the law had been violated, the latter court refused to set aside 
the judgment of the lower court, on the ground that no actual injury 
had been shown. 

Technically, the judge did violate the mandate of the Supreme 
Court of the United States in this: A negro, who had, at times, worked? 
for the judge’s wife, was drunk and disorderly on the streets of Macon* 
He was arrested, tried in the city court of Macon, and sentenced to* 
work on the county chain gang. At the instance of the judge, % 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus was sued out, in his own court, and 
the defendant was taken from the custody of the city officers. Th$ 
city of Macon prosecuted an appeal to the Supreme Court of thfc 
United States. In a brief opinion the Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment of the district court upon the theory that the prisoner had 
not exhausted his rights in the State courts before appealing to thet 
Federal courts and that therefore the district court was without juris¬ 
diction. The city attorney of the city of Macon procured the man* 
date of the Supreme Court, sought the cooperation of the attorney im 
the prisoner in an effort to have the mandate of the Supreme Court* 
made the judgment of the district court. The attorney who sued ou% 
the petition for the writ carried the mandate to the home of Judge? 
Speer and there conversed with him concerning it without success* 
Later, the city attorney of Macon presented the mandate, together* 
with a petition to Judge Speer, asking that it be made the judgment 
of the district court, whereupon the judge, who was then sitting in 
bankruptcy, said the court was not open for the transaction of business 
of that character, but requested the city attorney to file the petition* 
and mandate with the clerk of the court, where it was permitted to 
rest for many months. Immediately after the filing of the mandate 
as directed the city authorities took possession of the prisoner and 
H. Kept. 1176, 63-2-11 


160 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

recommitted him to the chain gang. Another petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus was then presented to the Superior Court of Georgia 
and the prayer thereof denied. The next day after presenting the 
mandate to Judge Speer the latter cited the city authorities to appear 
and show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of 
Court for taking the custody of the prisoner before he had made the 
mandate of the Supreme Court the judgment of his court and later, 
after a new condition had arisen, a new habeas corpus proceeding 
was instituted in the United States Court. 

. The city authorities answered, the contempt cases were continued 
from time to time and were later dismissed, some years after, but the 
mandate of the Supreme Court was not made the judgment of the 
district court for a period of some seven months after it had been 
presented to Judge Speer while holding court. The city authorities 
treated the judgment of the district court as set aside absolutely by 
the reversal order of the Supreme Court, without the mandate of the 
Supreme Court technically having been made the judgment of the 
district court, while Judge Speer declined to enter the formal order 
relative to the mandate until after a new condition had arisen, making 
the basis for another proceeding similar to the first based upon a 
different state of facts. 

Judge Speer was hostile to the law under which the negro had been 
committed to the chain gang; had lectured against it to his law class 
in a local school, and was quite a partisan against that law. 

In this record there is evidence tending to show the judge went 
out of his way to get jurisdiction in this case and, after having taken 
jurisdiction, acted, and been reversed by the Supreme Court, his fail¬ 
ure in making the mandate of the Supreme Court the judgment of his 
court in that particular case was such as to make him technically 
guilty of that charge, although the courtesy of counsel toward a court 
in which there was less contention between the bench and the bar than 
in Judge Speer’s court would have required that counsel for the city 
of Macon wait until the presiding judge had formally made the man¬ 
date of the Supreme Court the judgment of the district court. On the 
Other hand, proper practice on the part of the court would have 
required that in an extraordinary proceeding of this character, the 
mandate of the Supreme Court should have been made the judgment 
of the district court at the earliest possible moment reasonably con¬ 
sistent with orderly procedure. 

This entire charge involves a technicality on the one hand and a 
courtesy on the other and is of no particular force in determining the 
issues presented by the charge. However, it tends to show the feel¬ 
ing on the part of the citizens and the members of the bar toward 
the presiding judge of the United States court of that district, and, 
on the other hand, it shows the partisanship of the judge toward 
a matter over which he had no jurisdiction and his prejudice against 
the local authorities of the city of Macon. Litigants and counsel 
for years have been contending in a court toward which they felt 
as shown in this particular instance and before a judge who felt to¬ 
ward them as shown by this particular case, and the result has been 
the unpleasant situation in which the judge of that court finds him¬ 
self to-day and the very unsatisfactory condition in which the Govern¬ 
ment of the United States finds one of its dignified courts. 


CHARGES OE ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 161 

The charge that the judge is guilty of unlawful and corrupt conduct 
in proceedings in cases wherein his son-in-law had a contingent fee, 
is not sustained, except to the extent in bankruptcy cases heretofore 
specified and in the one particular case where opposing counsel dis¬ 
cussed whether or not the point should be raised and concluded not 
to raise it. 

The corrupt and unwarranted abuse of official authority in using 
court officials who were paid by the Government as private servants 
without rendering any service to the Government, is not sustained 
to the extent that the subcommittee feels it should be made the basis 
of an article of impeachment. 

The charge that the judge has been guilty of oppressive and cor¬ 
rupt conduct in allowing the dissipation of assets of bankruptcy es¬ 
tates by the employment of unnecessary officials and the payment of 
excessive fees, is not sustained to the extent that the subcommittee 
feels it should be made the basis of an article of impeachment, 
although the subcommittee feels that the administration of cases in 
Judge Speer's court and the dissipation of assets in bankruptcy 
matters is deplorable. 

The charge of oppressive and corrupt abuses in granting orders ap¬ 
pointing receivers for property without notice to the owners and with¬ 
out just cause, resulting in great loss to the parties, is not sustained to 
the extent that the subcommittee feels it should be made the basis of 
an article of impeachment, as well as of the charge of refusing to allow 
the dismissal of litigation, for the purpose of permitting relatives and 
favorites to profit by the receipt of large fees. 

However, in these several cases, while the committee feels that the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain articles of impeachment, we do feel 
that the judge's conduct has been injudicial to the extent of warrant¬ 
ing severe criticism of his acts with reference to these particular 
charges. It appears in several cases that where large estates were 
gotten into court it was extremely difficult and intensely expensive 
to get them out, more so than would be in a court where law and 
equity should reign supreme. 

The circuit court of appeals found it necessary frequently to 
criticise Judge Speer for the improvident and reckless issuing of 
injunctions, but this warning seems to have had no effect upon him. 

The charge that the judge was guilty of improper if not corrupt 
abuse in taking, or causing to be taken, money from the court fund 
for his personal use, is not sustained. The evidence upon this 
charge is quite unsatisfactory. The judge did procure a loan from 
a Mr. King, who, many years ago, was the clerk of his court, but is 
now deceased. A number of years after the clerk demanded his 
money and was paid. The notes and correspondence were exhibited 
to the committee, copies of which will be found among the exhibits 
in this case. While it is an established fact that the judge did bor¬ 
row money from the clerk, the record shows that the loan was made 
by the clerk in his individual capacity and not officially, and if the 
funds which were loaned were the court funds appropriated for that 
purpose by the clerk, the subcommittee was unable to procure anv 
evidence to the effect that Judge Speer knew that the funds which 
he borrowed were court funds. 


162 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

The subcommittee feels that the charge that the judge was guilty 
of oppressive conduct in entertaining matters beyond his jurisdic¬ 
tion, fining parties and the like, is not sustained to the extent which 
the subcommittee feels would warrant recommending it as the basis 
of an article of impeachment. But the record does show that it 
was not an unusual thing for the judge to entertain jurisdiction in 
cases over which it was clear he had no jurisdiction; that he reck¬ 
lessly and indiscreetly announced from the bench that he would 
impose fines upon parties; that he did not do so except in rare in¬ 
stances and particularly a case where he presumed to regulate the 
janitors of the building by fining them for contempt of court for failing 
to clean the spittoon, or the court room, or his chambers, which he 
and his counsel contend was a joke, and the fine was paid by the judge 
himself, and yet it was a most indiscreet and unwarranted abuse of 
the high prerogatives of the court. 

The charge that he was guilty of unlawful and oppressive conduct 
in disregarding the mandate of the circuit court of appeals is not sus¬ 
tained to the extent that the subcommittee feels should be made the 
basis of an article of impeachment. 

When it was presented he was at his summer home in Mount Airy, 
Ga., outside his district. He stated that he would be in Savannah 
on a certain day, at which time he would hear counsel upon the ques¬ 
tion as to whether or not the circuit court of appeals had the power 
to reverse the judgment of his court in that particular case. In this 
way he held up the mandate of the circuit court of appeals until a 
new proceeding, avoiding the errors which intervened in the original 
proceeding, could be started and a new injunction granted before the 
date set by him when he would hear counsel upon the motion to make 
the mandate of the circuit court of appeals the judgment of his court. 
Judge Speer’s conduct with reference to this equity proceeding is 
illustrative of the peculiar temperament of the individual and the 
high esteem in which he holds himself. The tremendous powers and 
the wide discretion conferred upon judges of the United States courts 
by law for the protection of the people, their rights and properties, 
seems to have been appropriated by Judge Speer for the purpose of 
impressing upon all those with whom he comes in contact, officially 
and otherwise, with his great personal superiority. No corruption 
is shown in the equity case. Apparent^ it was considered by the 
judge that his will was the law in the southern district of Georgia, and 
he denied even the right of the circuit court of appeals for the circuit 
in which his district was located to question that fact. 

The charge that Judge Speer has been guilty of oppressive conduct 
in allowing money to remain on deposit without interest in banks in 
which relatives and friends were interested is not sustained to the 
extent that the subcommittee feels it would be warranted in recom¬ 
mending it as the basis of an article of impeachment. Large funds 
were permitted to accumulate and remain in the bank in Macon in 
which relatives and court officials were interested. How T evcr, the 
evidence upon this question tends rather to show that there was 
negligence m the management of those court funds on the part of 
the court rather than corruption. 

The charge that Judge Speer has been guilty of allowing excessive 
fees to receivers in cases and other improper allowances as court 
costs is not sustained to the extent which the committee feels would 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 163 

be sufficient to sustain an article of impeachment, although the com¬ 
mittee does feel from the evidence that Judge Speer has been more 
or les3 indiscreet in matters of this character. For instance, in the 
Huff case. 

In a creditor’s bill upon indebtedness aggregating $3,900, he ap¬ 
pointed a receiver to take possession of all of the property and assets 
of a defendant. These assets aggregated more than $100,000. The 
proceeding by which this receiver was appointed was attacked and 
upon review was sustained by Judge Speer, but upon appeal to the 
United States circuit court of appeals the judgment of Judge Speer 
was reversed. 

In this case a $10,000 fee was allowed complainant’s solicitors, but 
following the appointment of the temporary receiver Judge Speer 
had an informal conference, procured, by acquiescence, the consent 
of counsel for Mr. Huff to the appointment of a permanent receiver. 
The attorneys acted as attorneys for receivers and commissioners 
throughout the sale of almost $100,000 worth of property, amounting 
practically to an administration upon the estate of the defendant 
litigant. However, the court of review disallowed this claim. 

The evidence with reference to the Huff case presents a deplorable 
state of facts and is detailed minutelv in other parts of this report. 
In the first part of the litigation the first great error in the case was 
made when the temporary receiver was appointed, apparentlv with¬ 
out cause, but was later acquiesced in tacitly by counsel for Mr. 
Huff. The subcommittee feels that in this case the great powers of 
the Federal court should have been exerted in the interest of pro¬ 
tecting the estate of Mr. Huff even against the blundering errors of 
his own counsel handling the case during the earlier stages of its 
history. It seems to the subcommittee that the rights of Mr. Huff, 
who is now an octogenarian, were not given any conscientious and 
meritorious consideration until Mr. Felter, the present attorney 
general of Georgia, became his counsel. 

It is almost incredible that a case such as the Huff case could be 
permitted to drag its devious way through all the years of its history 
with insufficient evidence to establish corruption on the part of the 
presiding judge, where the judge himself is a man of intelligence and 
experience. 

There is not sufficient evidence in connection with the Huff case 
to show that the management of it, so far as the court is concerned, 
was for the express purpose of holding the estate in court as a delec¬ 
table morsel for attorneys and court officers. And yet the files of that 
case show that upon two claims, one of which was secured, the other 
whose collectibility was never questioned, both of which aggregated 
$3,900, could be the means of destroying the accumulations of a life¬ 
time, aggregating more than $100,000. That case has now wended 
its way through Judge Speer’s court with various appeals, in some 
of which the higher court has criticized the judge’s conduct and 
rulings severely, from the little $3,900 indebtedness to the sale of 
more than $100,000 worth of property, the accumulation of a tre¬ 
mendous bill of costs, the loss of many years of earnings, with the 
debts unpaid, and with a fair prospect that nothing will be left for 
distribution to the original defendant.. 

This suit was commenced by the filing of a creditor’s bill, April 5, 
1899, against Mr. W. A. Huff, individually and as trustee for his 


164 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

children. The original complainants had two claims which aggre¬ 
gated, including interest due up to that date, the sum of $4,922.77. 
On that bill on an ex parte hearing and without notice to the defend¬ 
ant a receiver was appointed, who took charge of the property, which 
has since been sold in the progress of the case at $103,000. It has not 
all been sold yet, however, one piece remaining which is estimated 
to be worth between $12,000 and $15,000. One of the claims, the 
principal debt of which was $1,714, was the first lien on a piece of 
property in the business part of the city of Macon which was after¬ 
wards sold in the progress of the case for $21,500. After the suit 
was commenced, other indebtednesses which were funded were 
brought in and allowed, not, however, until after the owners of the 
other indebtedness vigorously fought the receivership with no effect. 

The total indebtedness of every kind and character of Mr. Huff at 
the commencement of the suit was $34,500. The case is still in court, 
and just prior to the investigation by the subcommittee Attorney 
General Felter had advised Mr. Huff that it was indeed questionable 
whether anything would be left for him out of the $103,000 which 
had been raised from the sale of the property, after paying the debts, 
accumulated interest, court costs, and other incidental expenses. 

Yet after a thorough investigation of the Huff case we do not feel 
that the evidence is sufficient to sustain an article of impeachment 
of Judge Speer. 

The charge that he attempted to bribe officers appointed to act as 
custodians is not sustained. 

The charge of oppressive conduct in unlawfully seizing and selling 
property is not sustained to the extent which the committee deemed 
necessary to sustain an article of impeachment. 

The charge of the excessive use of drugs is not sustained. The 
evidence upon that point shows that for a number of years, probably 
twice a year, Judge Speer would procure from his druggist a solution 
of cocaine, ostensibly for treating his hay fever. The evidence upon 
this point is quite insufficient. 

The charge that he was guilty of general and unlawful oppressive 
conduct for his own private ends is not sustained to the extent neces¬ 
sary to sustain articles of impeachment. 

CONCLUSION. 

The conclusion of the subcommittee, deduced from the evidence 
taken and from the construction of the precedents of impeachment 
trials, is that at the present time satisfactory evidence sufficient to 
support a conviction upon a trial by the Senate is not obtainable. 

In the conduct of the hearings the committee was extremely 
liberal and did not confine the witnesses to the giving of technically 
legal evidence. Some evidence of a hearsay nature was received. 
The committee felt justified in such a course in the light of the fact 
that it came to the attention of the committee that many witnesses 
were apprehensive of the consequences of giving evidence against 
Judge Speer in the event of his acquittal. This feeling and the general 
disposition on the part of individuals to protect themselves against 
what was termed the “ wrath” of Judge Speer kept from the commit¬ 
tee the. names of the witnesses and a knowledge of the facts in their 
possession. Some of the witnesses whose testimony would be abso¬ 
lutely necessary to sustain some of the charges made are dead. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 165 

Others have removed from the southern district of Georgia and their 
whereabouts are unknown. 

Another phase of the record is that it details a large number of 
official acts on the part of Judge Speer which are in themselves 
legal, yet, when taken together, develop into a system tending to 
approach a condition of tyranny and oppression. There has been 
an inequitable exercise of judicial discretion, many instances of 
which have been frequently criticised where the cases in which they 
were committed have been reviewed by the courts of appeal, while 
in others litigants were unable, financially, to prosecute appeals. 
That the power of the court has been exercised in a despotic and 
autocratic manner by the judge can not be questioned. 

The Jamison case is one of many instances shown by the record 
where the judge, without taint of individual corruption and with the 
apparently laudable purpose of purifying the community and inau¬ 
gurating a civic reform, disregarded the law and apparently consid¬ 
ered that the end justified the means. 

The record shows instances where the judge sitting in the trial of 
criminal cases, apparently forced pleas of guilty from defendants 
or convictions and there is strong evidence tending to show that in 
one case, at least, he forced innocent parties to enter such pleas 
through a fear of the consequences in the event of an unfavorable 
verdict at the hands of a jury presided over by the judge in the manner 
peculiar to himself. 

As was said by the Committee on the Judiciary in reporting a 
similar case: 

Terror to evildoers, if purchased at the price of judicial fairness and overstrained 
legal authority, is achieved at too gieat an expense, for it defeats its own high aim 
and warps the very fabric of the law itself. 

The temptation of an honest judge to 

“ Wrest once the law to his authority, 

To do a great right—do a little wrong—” 

is fraught with such danger to our whole system of remedial justice that it merits the 
condemnation of every legal mind. 

The subcommittee regrets its inability to either recommend a 
complete acquittal of Judge Speer of all culpability so far as these 
charges are concerned, on the one hand, or an impeachment on the 
other. And yet it is persuaded that the competent legal evidence 
at hand is not sufficient to procure a conviction at the hands of the 
Senate. But it does feel that the record presents a series of legal 
oppressions and shows an abuse of judicial discretion which, though 
falling short of impeachable offenses, demand condemnation and 
criticism. 

If Judge Speer’s judicial acts in the future are marked by the 
rigorous and inflexible harshness shown by this record, these charges 
hang as a portentous cloud over his court, “ impairing his usefulness, 
impeding the administration of justice, and endangering the integrity 
of American institutions.” 

The special subcommittee recommends the adoption of the fol¬ 
lowing resolution: 

Resolved , That no further proceedings be had with reference to 
H. Res. 234. 

E. Y. Webb. 

Louis FitzHenry. 








































































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* • 




% 


















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* 






































IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HON. EMORY SPEER 
JUDGE OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA. 


Mr. Volstead, from the special subcommittee appointed to investi¬ 
gate charges against Judge Speer, submitted the following 

MINORITY REPORT. 

To the Committee on the Judiciary: 

The two other members of the subcommittee appointed with me 
to investigate certain charges against Hon. Emory Speer, judge of 
the southern district of Georgia, have prepared a report to which my 
attention has been called. Though a member of that committee, I 
have not been invited to participate in its preparation and I find on 
examination that in many respects it does not meet my views either 
as to facts established by the evidence or the conclusions drawn from 
the facts and I ask leave to submit this minority report in which it 
is my purpose to deal briefly with all of the charges and the evidence 
that has any bearing on those charges. 

At the outset it may be remarked that the evidence introduced 
upon this hearing was nearly all either hearsay or secondary evidence. 
The contents of the court records were established in nearly every 
instance by the recollections of witnesses, though the transactions 
took place many years ago and the records were at hand to show the 
actual facts, and instead of requiring conclusions to be established 
by the facts that would point to such conclusions, some party that 
felt aggrieved was permitted to give his opinion as to the proper con- 
clu ions. This short-cut method of arriving at the guilt or innocence 
of the judge has created a confusion as to the actual facts, that 
illustrates how dangerous it is to wander very far from the course 
sanctioned by the experience of long-time usage. No serious attempt 
has apparently been made to distinguish between a fact established 
by competent testimony and that resting solely on hearsay or other 
equally worthless evidence. And throughout the report wiil be found 
repeated, reiterated, and emphasized the expressions of all sorts of 
opinions by disappointed attorneys, who appear to account it a virtue 
that they are bitterly hostile toward the judge. 

If the judge has been guilty of any violation of the law, if he has 
done anyone any injustice, the law that has been violated can be 

167 



168 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

pointed out and the injustice that has been done can he specified. 
This is what our laws require in every case. A man can not be con¬ 
victed upon the testimony of some one saying that he is guilty. The 
facts that show guilt must be sworn to, but in this case the great bulk 
of the testimony and that upon which the majority report predicates 
nearly all of its criticism is insinuations and opinions. Why should 
not a judge be protected by the same laws of evidence that protect the 
humblest citizen? Why should a congressional investigation make 
him a target against which his bitter and vindictive enemies may 
direct their poisoned arrows of malice? How the committee can 
justify this course is not easy to understand. Why should they deny 
to the judge the presumption of innocence until the facts, not malicious 
gossip, point to guilt ? 

The first charge to which the majority report directs attention is 
an alleged violation of section 67 of the Judicial Code. But in con¬ 
nection with that charge is the further charge that the judge has 
permitted bankruptcy estates to be dissipated through the allowance 
of large fees to the firm of Tally & Heyward and other alleged favor¬ 
ites. Mr. Heyward is the judge’s son-in-law. 

The latter charge will be first considered as the most logical course. 
It is quite easy to express the opinion that bankruptcy estates have 
been wasted. That is all of the evidence there is in the record. Yet 
the report gives countenance to this charge. It is very unfair to thus 
throw the burden of proof upon the judge. It would be impossible 
for him to meet the charge except for the fact that all bankruptcy 
cases are reported to the Attorney General and by comparing the 
expenses of administration in other districts with the expenses in 
Judge Speer’s district a conclusion can be arrived at. 

Statement showing cost of administration of bankruptcy assets for the southern district of 

Georgia as compared with the district of the residence of each member of the Judiciary 

Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT. 


District. 


1899. 

Judge Spear’s district (southern district of Georgia) 

Clayton, Alabama. 

Webb, North Carolina.. 

Carlin, Virginia.. 

Floyd, Arkansas. 

Thomas, Kentucky. 

Dupre, Louisiana. 

McCoy, New Jersey. 

Davis, West Virginia. 

McGillicuddy, Maine. 

Beall, Texas. 

Taggart, Kansas... 

FitzHenry, Illinois. 

Carew-Chandler, New York. 

Peterson, Indiana. 

Volstead, Minnesota. 

Nelson, Wisconsin. 

Morgan, Oklahoma. 

Danforth, New York. 

Dyer, Missouri. 

Graham, Pennsylvania. 

General average of expenses. 

Administration in Judge Speer’s district at less. 


Assets. 

Expenses. 

Per cent. 

$543,166.20 

$9,582.74 

0.017 

377,830. 47 

1,248.47 

.003 

28,065.87 

2,996.31 

.106 

227,926.92 

3,970.56 

.013 

81,500.00 

4,771.00 

.057 

521,268.29 

19,571.74 

.037 

702,051.55 

4,157.07 

.005 

1,208,846.22 

7,691.88 

.003 

142,172. 42 

2,570.23 

.017 

306,125.43 

6,603.33 

.021 

646,915.73 

5,707.36 

.008 

286,513.66 

6,345.80 

.021 

184,034.13 

5,889.55 

.032 

1,308,830. 46 

29, 718.85 

.022 

2,230,617.52 

13,899.49 

.006 

2,362,983.62 

24,058. 49 

.010 

358,374.21 

3,939.60 

. .010 

61,740.09 

3,422.85 

.055 

1,308,830. 46 

29,718.85 

.022 

283,110.36 

815.14 

.002 

624,762.31 

6,322.59 

.008 

.023 

.006 



































CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 169 


Statement shoiving cost of administration of bankruptcy assets for the southern district of 
Georgia as compared with the district of the residence of each member of the Judiciary 
Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States —Continued. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT—Continued. 


District. 


Assets. 


Expenses. 


Per cent. 


1900. 


Judge Speer’s district. 

Clayton, Alabama. 

Webb, North Carolina. 

Floyd, Arkansas. 

Thomas, Kentucky. 

Dupr6, Louisiana.'. 

McCoy, New Jersey. 

Davis, West Virginia. 

McGillicuddy, Maine. 

Beall, Texas.;. 

Taggart, -Kansas. 

FitzIIenry, Illinois. 

Carew-Chandler, New York 

Peterson, Indiana.. 

Volstead, Minnesota. 

Nelson, Wisconsin. 

Morgan, Oklahoma. 

Danforth, New York. 

Dyer, Missouri. 

Graham, Pennsylvania. 


$319,401.53 
75,576.06 
66,740.93 
67,741.43 
799,529.82 
552,790. 04 
1,209,467. 90 
138,119.09 
1,264,360.91 
301,535.27 
191,283. 61 
121,582.00 
6,298,313.59 
606,942.06 
1,594,844. 73 

311.141.36 
42,228.22 

286,845.50 

283.110.36 
1,976,424. 68 


$2,041.16 
579.23 
4,780. 89 
4,516.51 
18,775. 45 

3.176.70 
7,3yl. 53 
6,180.50 
8,015.09 
6,473.17 
4,370.92 
8,714. 39 

31,292.09 
6,307.05 
17,102.12 

1.792.71 
1,318. 79 
3,738.82 

815.14 
7,769.07 


0.00ft 

.007 

.071 

.066 

.023 

.005 

.006 

.044 

.006 

.021 

.022 

.071 

.004 

.010 

.011 

.005 

.031 

.013 

.002 

.003 


General average of expenses. 

Administration in southern district of Georgia at less 


.020 

.014 


1901. 

Judge Speer’s district. 

Clayton, Alabama. 

W e'b b, N ort.h Carolina. 

Floyd, Arkansas. 

Thomas, Kentucky. 

Dupr6, Louisiana. 

McCoy, New Jersey. 

Davis, West Virginia. 

McGillicuddy, Maine. 

Beall, Texas. 

Taggart, Kansas. 

FitzHenry, Illinois. 

Carew-Chandler, New York. 

Peterson, Indiana. 

Volstead. Minnesota. 

N elson, W isconsin. 

Morgan, Oklahoma. 

Danforth, New York. 

Dyer, Missouri. 

Graham, Pennsylvania. 


113,939.58 
53,749.25 
21,900.39 
110,447.39 
586,544. 74 
57,881.02 
50,962. 49 
41,797.28 
20,241.92 
36S, 188.06 
97,837.50 
149,448.14 
154,913.52 
270,051.64 
2S4,828. 78 
399,128. 69 
11,656. 98 
346, 758. 62 
91,669.58 
277,067.38 


8,881.80 

2.910.30 

3.378.31 
14,784.39 

150,535. 49 
789,891.26 
7,808.70 
10,048.17 
8* 754.92 
15,492. 50 
35,847. 47 
17,247.02 

47.561.32 
22,471.77 
36,982.01 
22,298.58 

2,574.80 

45.593.33 
9,063.30 

50,100.03 


.077 
.054 
.156 
.133 
.256 
13. 660 
.153 
.240 
.432 
.042 
.358 
.114 
.306 
.083 
.130 
.055 
.220 
.132 
.094 
. 1S8 


General average of expenses. 

Administration in southern district of Georgia at less 


.813 

.736 


1902. 


Judge Speer’s district. 

95,121. 75 

12.104.42 

Clayton, Alabama. 

25,144.54 

3,146.88 

Webb, N^rth Carolina. 

38.648. 70 

5.461.32 

Carlin, Virginia. 

84,304.13 

11.323.18 

Flovd, Arkansas. 

55,749.00 

4,93'. 00 

Thomas, Kentucky. 

167.901.30 

28.823.88 

Dupr<b Louisiana. 

143.018.85 

25.520. 82 

McCoy, New Jersey. 

104.899. 00 

21.196. 39 

Davis, West Virginia. 

53.989.19 

7,954.33 

McGillicuddy, Maine... 

78.211.25 

13.516.87 

Beal, Texas. 

179,916 86 

7.730. 30 

Taggart, Kansas.. . 

208.870.15 

16.016. 62 

Fitzllenrv, Illinois. 

33.676.47 

3,104.31 

Carew-Chandler, New York. 

527.441.15 

54,067. 68 

Peterson, Indiana. 

724,506. 03 

35.912.74 

Volstead, Minnesota . 

517,127.30 

59.796.78 

Nelson, Wisconsin.. . 

201.518. 86 

19.742.48 

Vforvnn, Oklahoma. . 

5.103.85 

590.10 

Danforth, New York. 

266.153.41 

22.3S5.71 

Dyer Missouri . . 

515,904.25 

47.121.63 

Grgham Pennsylvania. . 

466,3S5.45 

77,037. 74 

Oaneral averave of expenses . . 

Administration in southern district of Georgia at more. 




.126 

.121 

.141 

.134 

.088 

.171 

.178 

.201 

.14? 

.172 

.042 

.078 

.092 

.104 

.049 

.115 

.075 

.154 

.084 

.091 

.165 


.119 

.007 














































































170 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER, 


Statement showing cost of administration of bankruptcy assets for the southern district of 
Georgia as compared with the district of the residence of each member of the Judiciary 
Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States ■—Continued. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT—Continued. 


District. 

Assets. 

Expenses. 

Per cent. 

1903. 




Judge Speer’s district . 

$158,984.21 

$11,054.44 

0-069 

Clayton, Alabama. 

40.040.51 

3.255. 00 

.081 

Webb, North Carolina. 

28,178.31 

3.718. 89 

. 132 

Carlin, Virginia.. 

68,960.86 

7,999.84 

.116 

Floyd, Arkansas... 

45,734. 52 

5.202.82 

.113 

Thomas, Kentucky. . 

186.092. 43 

35,066. 72 

.188 

Dupre, Louisiana. 

69.366.88 

16.544.93 

.238 

McCoy, New Jersey. 

267,316.43 

27.778.13 

.103 

Davis, West Virginia. 

32.943.23 

6,666.71 

.202 

McGillicuddy, Maine. 

104. 775.63 

17,482.92 

.166 

Beal, Texas . 

198.724.19 

12,391.80 

.062 

Taggart, Indiana .. 

175,321.36 

17,207.68 

.092 

FitzHeriry, Illinois. . 

110.345.39 

17,675.72 

.160 

Carew-Chandler, New York . 

678.682.91 

116.778.96 

.172 

Peterson, Indiana . 

292.089.23 

47.655.- r 4 

. 163 

Volstead, Minnesota . 

347,879.36 

51.356.10 

.147 

Nelson, Wisconsin. 

77,282.88 

13.689. 75 

. 177 

Morcari, Oklahoma . 

13.588.28 

2,917.15 

.214 

Dan forth, New York . 

268.350.51 

33.050.81 

.123 

Dyer, Missouri . 

347.240. 92 

63.897.13 

.183 

Graham, Pennsylvania . 

313. 636. 67 

84,003.58 

.267 

General average of expenses. 



. 155 

Administration in southern district of Georgia at less. 



.086 

1904. 




Judge Speer’s district. 

327,500.24 

12,501.55 

.038 

Clayton, Alabama. 

83,541.44 

10,683.72 

.127 

Webb, North Carolina. 

19,606.15 

1,497.86 

.086 

Carlin, Virginia. 

114,898.32 

22,508.83 

.195 

Floyd, Arkansas. 

137,248.50 

9,363.15 

.068 

Thomas, Kentucky. 

115,305.68 

21,998. 87 

.190 

Dupre, Louisiana . 

60,607.97 

17,802. 79 

.293 

McCoy, New Jersey . 

241,018.01 

8,161.67 

.033 

Davis, West Virginia . 

90,160. 71 

15,847.69 

.164 

McGillicuddy, Maine . 

102,113.34 

24,873.37 

.243 

Beall, Texas . 

201,721.53 

6,600. 86 

.032 

Taggart, Kansas . 

92,491.50 

11,552. 72 

.124 

FitzHeriry, Illinois . 

43,154.56 

7,833.52 

.181 

Carew-Chandler, New York . 

1,687,256.10 

83, 408. 84 

.049 

Peterson, Indiana . 

351,860.95 

41,492.47 

.117 

Volstead, Minnesota . 

451,261.33 

52,828. 75 

.117 

Nelson, Wisconsin . 

325,972. 48 

7,028.15 

.021 

Morgan, Oklahoma . 

44,051.22 

5,683.06 

.129 

Dariforth, New York . 

586,459.63 

46,733.08 

.079 

Dyer, Missouri. 

243,047.00 

37,574.37 

.154 

Graham, Pennsylvania. 

489,762.20 

76,775.10 

.156 

General average of expenses. 



. 119 

Administration in southern district of Georgia at less. 



.081 

1906. 




Judge Speer’s district. 

235,773. 27 

22,773.00 

.096 

Clayton, Alabama. 

160,763.09 

8,751.25 

.054 

Webb, North Carolina. 

75,328.56 

6,559.31 

.087 

Carlin, Virginia. 

136,138. 32 

16; 705. 43 

.122 

Floyd, Arkansas. 

98,368. 79 

14,400.22 

.146 

Thomas, Kentucky . 

116,699. 84 

21,508. 86 

.184 

Dupr6, Louisiana . 

122,978. 60 

26,682.60 

.216 

McCoy, New Jersey . 

132,242. 34 

16,735.12 

.126 

Davis, West Virginia . 

114,829.83 

17,297.97 

.159 

McGillicuddy, Maine. 

170,399. 84 

18,961.30 

.111 

Beall, Texas . 

179,210.28 

4,431.72 

.024 

Taggart, Kansas . 

226,399.12 

30,353.03 

.134 

FitzHenry, Illinois . 

30,492.11 

6; 189.98 

.203 

Carew-Chandler, New York. 

1,106,631.70 

224;443.69 

.202 

Peterson, Indiana . . . 

407,430. 27 

57,649.07 

.141 

Volstead, Minnesota . 

408,761.92 

64; 574. 75 

.133 

Nelson, Wisconsin . 

180,610.17 

73,910.91 

.409 

Morgan, Oklahoma. 

133 j 757. 83 

24,312.28 

.181 

Danforth, New York. 

455,890.48 

74,300.26 

.162 

Dyer, Missouri. 

238,598.52 

35,605.40 

.149 

Graham, Pennsylvania. 

496,797.09 

16i;091.47 

.324 

General average of expenses. 



16$ 

Administration in southern district of Georgia at less. 



.069 


















































































CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 171 


Statement showing cost of administration of bankruptcy assets for the southern district of 
Georgia as compared with the district of the residence of each member of the Judiciary 
Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States —Continued. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT—Continued. 


District. 

Assets. 

Expenses. 

Per cent. 

1907. 




Judge Speer’s district. 

§183,310.63 
83,679.12 
90,161.71 
108,061.30 
75,455.55 
133,955.94 
58,233.41 
325,091.35 
31,125.97 
202,257.93 
58,016.57 
345,337.57 
134,160. 78 
1,478,812.19 
667,376.63 
675, 406.37 

$17,537.33 
10,190.10 
13,686.23 
22,018. 76 
10,167.(9 
28,691.87 
32,133.01 

0.095 

121 

Clavton, Alabama. 

Webb, North Carolina. 

. 162 

Carlin, Virginia. 

.203 

Floyd, Arkansas. 

Thomas, Kentucky. 

Dupre, Louisiana/. 

.551 

McCoy, New Jersey. 

32,194.26 
6,176.41 

.099 

Davis, West Virginia. 

. 198 

McGillicuddv, Maine. 

33;471.13 
4,251.39 

. 165 

Beall, Texas... 

.073 

Taggirt, Kansas. 

15,084.32 

20,777.59 

.043 

FitzHenry, Illinois. 

. 154 

Carew-Chandler, New York. 

311,125.99 

.210 

Peterson, Indiana. 

8L945.10 
103,136.22 

. 131 

Volstead. Minnesota.. 

. 151 

Nelson, Wisconsin. 

815,839.17 
85,343.01 

94; 071. 46 
25,347.67 
38,973.57 
58,256.82 
153,886.64 

.115 

Morgan, Oklahoma. 

.297 

Dan forth, New York. 

233,932.61 
941,248. 49 

. 166 

Dver, Missouri. 

. 061 

Graham, Pennsylvania. 

817,011.63 

.188 


General average of expenses. 



. l"9 

Administration in sou them'd istrict of Georgia at less. 



.084 

1908. 



Judge Speer’s district. 

244,456.15 
207,455.93 

41,305.94 
122,213.64 
46,513.65 
34,344.44 

27,673.91 
39,813.41 
8,963.11 
23,020.23 
8,530. 43 
4,327. 34 

31.902.34 

84.154.34 
24,909.48 
33,238.03 
14,681.47 
60,104.32 
41,089.50 

303,428.05 

. 113 

Clayton, Alabama . 

. 190 

Webb, North Carolina. 

.216 

Carlin, Virginia . 

. 188 

Floyd, Arkansas . 

. 185 

Thomas, Kentucky. 

. 125 

Dupr^, Louisiana . 

123', 067.56 
354,329. 83 
313,701.63 

.251 

McCoy, New Jersey. 

.237 

Davis, West Virginia. 

.079 

McGillicuddy, Maine. 

103,965.13 
464,006.14 
319,148.47 
367,590.19 
1,500,370.19 

.319 

Beall, Texas. 

.031 

Taggart, Kansas . 

.181 

FitzHenry, Illinois . 

• 111 

Carew-Chandler, New York . 

.202 

Peterson, Indiana . 

606,365.03 
768,368.25 
18, 746.68 

96,196.62 
81,494.26 

.158 

Volstead, Minnesota . 

.105 

Nelson, Wisconsin . 

11,440.53 

.610 

Morgan, Oklahoma . 

30,583.28 
544,987.19 

8,001.37 
99,773.68 
32,079. 24 

.264 

Danforth, New York . 

.183 

Dver, Missouri . 

206,424.24 

.155 

Graham, Pennsylvania . 

1,774; 757.93 

258,116. 38 

.145 



General average of expenses . 



.197 

Administration in southern district of Georgia at less . 



.084 

1909. 



Judce Speer’s district ... 

314,070.04 
191,160.00 
76,057.33 
243,369.33 
40,147.39 

38,552.98 
37,619. 00 

.122 

Clavton 41a’ ama . 

.196 

We' h North Carolina . 

9,717.95 

19,371.73 

9,693.23 

.127 

Carlin Virginia. . 

.079 

Floyd Arkansas. 

.241 

Thomas Kentucky . 

239,240.94 

58,418.56 

31,179.91 

. 130 

Dunr6, Louisiana . 

16,673.09 
25,452.25 

.285 

McCoy New Jersey . 

156.028.30 

.163 

Davis* West Virvina . 

237,291.12 
377,385.87 
434,320.92 
1,320,255.00 
184,785. 69 
1,009,325.95 
301,839. 9 9 

32,401.29 
41,282. 97 

.136 

MeCillionddy Maine . 

.109 

Refill Texas ....................... 

39,359.60 

83,313.16 

.090 

Tevcart Kansas ___............. 

.063 

■pft.'/TTenrv Illinois ..... 

34,657.04 
245.167.94 
53,767. S9 

.187 

Carew-Chandler New York __...... 

.242 

ppfpfSOTl T tv! in Tin ... 

.178 

V oRtesd Afinnesnta ...... 

1,236,452.56 

165,981.35 

17L 887. 40 

.139 

NeRrm Wisconsin . 

13,331.87 

.080 

Mor°an Oklahoma ... 

105,763. 65 

15,001.69 

.141 

TycmfTvrtTi 7\J ow V^nrlr . 

364,243.05 
142,533.20 
975,174.78 

65,480.95 

.179 

P>ver Afissonri ..... 

28,783.13 
137,608.09 

.201 

Graham Pennsylvania ... 

.141 



fieneral a-ireraeA nf exnonses ... 



. 159 

Administration in southern district of Georgia at less. .... 



,037 

















































































172 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER, 


Statement showing cost of administration of bankruptcy assets for the southern district of 
Georgia as compared with the district of the residence of each member of the Judiciary 
Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States —Continued. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT—Continued. 


District. 


1910. 


Speer’s district. 

Clayton, Alabama. 

Webb, North Carolina. 

Carlin, Virginia. 

Floyd, Arkansas. 

Tnomas, Kentucky. 

Dupre, Louisiana. 

McCoy New Jersey.. 

Davis, West Virginia. 

McGillicuddy, Maine. 

Beall, Texas. 

Taggart, Kansas. 

Fitzllenry, Illinois. 

Carew-Chandler, New York. 

Peterson, Indiana. 

Volstead, Minnesota.. 

Nelson, Wisconsin. 

Morgan, Oklahoma. 

Dani'orth, New York. 

Dyer, Missouri. 

Graham, Pennsylvania. 


General average of expenses.. 

Administration in southern district of Georgia at less. 

1911. 

Judge Speer’s district.. 

Clayton, Alabama. 

Webb, North Carolina.. 

Carlin, Virginia.. 

Floyd, Arkansas.... 

Thomas, Kentucky. 

Dupr<$, Louisiana...... 

McCoy, New Jersey. 

Davis, \\ est Virginia. 

McGillicuddy, Maine. 

Beall, Texas.... 

Taggart, Kansas. 

FitzHenry, Illinois..... 

Carew-Clmndler, New York... 

Peterson, Indiana.^. 

Volstead, Minnesota.j. 

Nelson, isconsin... 

Morgan, Oklahoma. 

Danforth, New York... 

Dyer, Missouri. 

Graham, Pennsylvania. 


General average of expenses. 

Administration in southern district of Georgia at more. 


1912. 


Judge Speer's district.;. 

Clayton, Alabama.. 

Webb, North Carolina. 

Carlin, Virginia. 

Floyd, Arkansas. 

Thomas, Kentucky..;. 

Dupr£, Louisiana. 

McCoy, New Jersey. 

Davis, v\ est Virginia. 

McGillicuddy, Maine... 

Beall, Texas. 

Taggart, Kansas. 

FitzHenry, Illinois.. 

Carew-Chandler, New York. 

Peterson, Indiana.j. 

Volstead, Minnesota. 1 .__ 

Nelson, >. isconsin. 

Morgan, Oklahoma.. 

Danforth, New York. 

Dyer, Missouri.. 

Graham, Pennsylvania..... 


Assets. 


$1,206, 

85, 

60, 

162, 

48, 

1,088, 

202 , 

336, 

239, 

430, 

500, 

1,359, 

115, 

8 , 201 , 

615, 

1,826, 

82, 

109, 

395, 

270, 

1,406, 


718.78 
017.00 
853.22 
843.81 
632. 94 
113. 90 
062.23 
048.17 
196.85 
341. 72 
939.53 
176.33 
779. 68 
792.17 
003. 67 
484.38 
416.01 
718.73 
872.95 
856.16 
762.57 


Expenses. 


284.209.36 
203,701.06 
181,090. 72 

238.447.26 
60,042.55 

274.973.37 
108,131.41 
146,547. 78 

153.730.27 
152,000.02 
406,496.67 

3,052,922.14 
168,247.63 
7,021,759.68 
896,278.78 
534,338.85 
117,726.87 
115,839.40 
683,066.84 
446,783.34 
1,131,436.59 


General average of expenses. 

Administration in southern district of Georgia at more. 


364,090. 74 
112,896.52 
517,343.45 
268,178.83 
217,003.27 
284,460.35 
183,646.56 
1,414,452.51 
460,219.23 
217,767.15 
473,032.37 
414,236.13 
84,556.03 
3,121,556.68 
740,980. 77 
4,288,989.36 
92,301.38 
376,114.67 
1,044,588. 73 
444,176.92 
l r 934,839.52 


$79,387.39 
13,520.00 
8,961.98 
25,375.52 
7,301.36 
159,663.20 
30,490.24 
86,393.07 
45,825.84 
44,613.28 
29,032.61 
257,262.46 
30,034.66 
727,373.19 
96,330. 77 
416,353.33 
19,239. 44 
24,017. 84 
69,905. 01 
54,662. 47 
315,937.96 


62,336.75 
33,891.90 
47,998.96 
37,763.93 
14,010.47 


34,885.27 
44,170.19 
37,287.73 
20,348.01 
44,241.79 
216,698.94 
23,844.45 
697,590.67 
118,988.69 
84,348.54 
35,241.00 
33,030.63 
167,375.45 
77,975.83 
313,711.39 


71,095.12 
14,266.30 
48,002.60 
42,669. 79 
22,165.32 
44,543.64 
34,934.08 
364,678.92 
88,866.98 
21,870.79 
57,571.52 
81,953.85 
16,157.35 
657,655.32 
110,925.56 
238,810.39 
41,293.50 
50,552. 72 
371,979.12 
140,361.25 
247,016.67 


Per cent. 


0.065 
.159 
.146 
.155 
.150 
.146 
.150 
.257 
.191 
.103 
.057 
.189 
.259 
.088 
.156 
.227 
.233 
.228 
.176 
.201 
.224 


.165 

.100 


.219 

.166 

.265 

.166 

,233 


.322 

.301 

.242 

.133 

.108 

.071 

.201 

.099 

.133 

.157 

.299 

.285 

.245 

.174 

.277 


.199 

.025 


.195 

.126 

.092 

.150 

.102 

.156 

.190 

,257 

.193 

.100 

.121 

.197 

.191 

.210 

.149 

.055 

.447 

.134 

.355 

.316 

.127 


.185 

.010 






















































































CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 173 


GRAND AVERAGES OF EXPENSES. 

Grand averages of the districts of the members of the committee for the years from which this state¬ 
ment is made. 0 192 

For the southern district of Georgia. .095 

For the western district of North Carolina, Mr. Webb’s district!!!. 137 

For the western district of Arkansas, Mr. Floyd’s district.!!!!!!!!!!”!!!!!!!!!!"” .132 

For the district of Minnesota, Mr. Volstead’s district... . 115 

For the southern district of Illinois, Mr. FitzHenry’s district.!!!!!!.'!!!!!....!..!!!.!!...!.!!..!!..' ! 150 

Administration in southern district of Georgia was 0.097 less than the average of the several districts 
making up this statement. 

Note.— The Attorney General’s report for 1905 was not available when this was prepared. 


The facts set forth in this comparison are taken from the Attorney 
General’s report and cover 13 years, from 1899 to and including 1912, 
except 1905. It shows that during these years the expenses in Judge 
Speer’s district were much less than the average of the expenses in 
these 21 districts. The average of expenses to assets in Judge Speer’s 
district during this period was 0.095, while the average in the other 
districts was 0.192, or more than twice as much. In only three years 
did the expenses in Judge Speer’s district exceed the average of the 
other districts, namely, in 1902, 1911, and 1912. The very slight 
excess over this average in 1911 and 1912 is easily explained by the 
fact that in 1910 some very large estates were placed in bankruptcy 
in Judge Speer’s district, the assets amounting to $1,206,718.78 (not 
$206,718.78, as the figures appear in the record), while the expenses 
of administering this vast sum in 1910 was only about one-third of 
the average of the expenditures in other districts. Fees for the 
administration of this asset were no doubt necessarily allowed in 1911 
and 1912 and account for this increase. To compare one year with 
another may be very unfair, but a comparison of a number of years 
must necessarily bring out the truth. 

It would appear that this showing establishes beyond any question 
that the administration of bankruptcy matters in Judge Speer’s court 
has been conducted much more economically than ordinarily done 
in other courts. It is contended, however, that there has been an 
increase in these expenses during the last six years and it is sought to 
connect that increase with the activities of Talley & Heyward though 
there is absolutely no testimony upon which to base any such finding. 
It is true that there has been an increase but it is not an increase that 
is confined to Judge Speer’s district. The Attorney General has 
called attention to the fact and explained the reasons why there has 
been this general increase. Herewith is submitted a table showing 
the increase in the Judge Speer’s district and in the districts of the 
members of this subcommittee and that of Mr. Floyd who was at one 
time a member thereof. This table does not only show an increase 
in each one of these districts but shows also that despite the activi¬ 
ties of Messrs. Talley & Heyward, the cost of administering bank¬ 
ruptcy estates is less in Judge Speer’s district than in any of the other 
districts referred to. The table follows: 



1899-1904 

1806-1912 

Increase. 

Southern district- of GAfvrp"i» . 

0.056 

0.128 

0.072 

Wpstpm district of North Mr. Wcbh^ district__........ 

.115 

.156 

.040 

Western district of Ark&nsss Mr. Flovd/s district... 

.087 

.170 

.08* 

District of Minnesota Mr Volstc&ddistrict... 

.088 

.138 

.050 

fiAnfbprn dictriot of Illinois Mr T?it7.TTAnrv , 5? district_............ 

.108 

.186 

.078 


























174 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

This shows an increase in Judge Speer’s district of about 7 per cent 
during the last six years over the precedi, g seven years. During 
the period of 1906 to 1912 the total actual assets realized in the 
southern district of Georgia were $2,832,634.97. 

The total fees of Talley & Heyward and the members of their firm 
arising from bankrupt-y cases from all sources during the six and 
ore-half years of their partnership were as follows: 


Talley & Heyward, as attorney. $10,259. 59 

J. N. Talley, receiver and trustee. 4, 715. 97 

J. N. Talley, special master. 1, 886. 50 

A. H. Heyward, receiver and trustee. 8,064. 05 


Total. 24,926.11 


To convict Judge Speer of having caused an increase of 7 per cent 
in the cost of ad it i: istration duri g these years by the allowances 
made to Talley & Heyward, it would be re. essary to prove that these 
amounted to $198,28*4.44 of the assets instead of $24,926.11. 

From the list of cases fur: ished by Mr. Talley showing the cases 
in which he was appointed receiver or elected trustee, it appears 
that during six and one-half years of the partnership of Talley & 
Heyward, he was appointed receiver and elected trustee in 7 cases, 
was appointed receiver in 2 cases in which he was not elected trustee, 
and was elected trustee in 5 cases in which he was not appointed 
receiver, thus making a total of 14 cases during the period of six 
ard one-half years in which he acted as receiver or trustee or both. 
Assuming that there were trustees in 1,500 cases, ard this is a low 
estimate, ai d receivers in 500 cases, it appears that Mr. Talley was 
receiver or trustee in less than 1 per cent of the cases, or less than 1 
in 100. His compensation as receiver during the six and one-half 
years amounted to $1,693.63, or less than $300 per year. In the cases 
m which he was elected trustee his commissions as such amounted 
to $3,022.34. There is no reason to charge to Judge Speer the elec¬ 
tion of Mr. Talley as trustee by creditors. This action of the creditors 
takes place in the referee’s office ard would in most cases be u: known 
to Judge Speer. A judge has no right, without cause, to preve: t 
creditors from selecting a trustee of their choice. The comn issiors 
were, of course, fixed by the bankruptcy act and in no case by the 
district judge. 

It appears from the same statement that from July 1 , 1905, to 
December 31, 1912, for a period of seven and one-half years, Mr. 
Heyward was appointed receiver or elected trustee, or both, in 33 
cases out of over 2,000, or in about 1£ per cent of the number of cases. 
It will be noted that in the tabulation the earnings of Mr. Heyward, 
as receiver and trustee, has been calculated for seven and one-half 
years instead of six and one-half years, as in the cases with Talley Sc 
Heyward. The following cases arose before the formation of the 
partnership of Talley & Heyward: F. II. Brantley, B. Mandell & Son, 
Hines & Vaughn, and F. W. Shelton; and the following cases arose 
during 1913 after the dissolution of the partnership of Talley & 
Heyward: Hyman Sater, E. E. Cox, and Union Dry Goods Co. 
The total compensation as receiver and trustee in those cases 
amounted to $1,472.98. Deducting this from the total amount 
received by Mr. Heyward during the entire period, we have $8,064.05 
as the amount received during the life of the partnership, or an 
average of about $1,300 per year. 








CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 175 

From the list of cases referred to, J. N. Talley, as special master to 
fix fees, it appears that during the period of six and one-half years he 
received from that source a total of $1,886.50, or a little over $250 per 
year. The compensation in these cases was uniformly small and 
were allowed in pursuance of a practice adopted by Judge Speer 
shortly after the enactment of the bankruptcy law. 

When it is remembered that during the period of six years from 1906 
to 1912, $2,832,634.97 was disbursed through the bankruptcy court 
of the southern district of Georgia, and that on an average of 200 
cases a year are disposed of, it is quite evident that Judge Speer was 
justified in allowing small amounts to masters for the purposes 
aforesaid. It should be borne in mind that applications are made for 
compensation by attorneys for bankrupts, attorneys for petitioning 
creditors, attorneys for trustees, attorneys for receivers, and formerly 
receivers. On account of the great number of cases it is manifestly 
true that Judge Speer could not give the necessary time to thoroughly 
understand the condition of each estate and the character of services 
rendered by each applicant, and give them due notice and opportunity 
for taking testimony. No doubt this practice of appointing masters 
accounts for the fact that the cost in bankruptcy cases in Judge 
Speer’s district appears to have been lower than in most other dis¬ 
tricts. 

Criticism is made because cases were referred to Mr. J. N. Talley 
as standing master, and that Mr. Heyward received a part of 
his compensation, and that, therefore, in some way Judge Speer 
should be held responsible for reprehensible conduct. It appears 
from the list of cases furnished by Mr. Talley, as standing master, that 
during the period of his partnership he acted in 12 cases. Four of 
these, to wit, Barnard & Leas Mfg. Co. v. Blanchard, Crawford v. 
McCook, H. H. Tift v. Southern By. Co. et al., W. L. Bidwell v. W. A. 
Huff, were referred to Mr. Talley before the formation of the part¬ 
nership of Talley & Heyward. More than one-half of these fees were 
earned in these cases. 

In three other cases fees have not been fixed, to wit, Atlantic Coast 
Line R. R. Co. v. Jackson & Brown, United States v. Aycock, and 
Harnsberger v. Kilpatrick. In the latter case Judge Sheppard con¬ 
firmed the master’s report and this was affirmed by both the circuit 
court of appeals and the Supreme Court of the United States. 

In the case of W. J. Oliver v. Savannah, Augusta & Northern Rail¬ 
way Co., the only important reference made to Mr. Talley during said 
period, the reference was by ‘‘consent of parties,” and his compensa¬ 
tion was likewise fixed by “consent of parties.” As appears from 
Mr. Talley’s statement, the main issues involved $300,000, and two 
collateral" issues involving $20,000 each. Mr. Talley’s report was 
confirmed by Judge Speer and all three cases were carried to the 
circuit court of appeals, where his reports were also confirmed. 

In the Tift case, after Judge Speer had declined to pass on Mr. 
Talley’s compensation, an agreement and settlement was reached by 
the parties by which he received $4,000. It appears that nearly all 
the fees received by Talley as standing master since the formation 
of the partnership came to him from cases referred to him before its 
formation or from cases referred to him by consent of parties. The 
fees paid Talley from cases referred to him without such consent 
during the partnership amounted to $720; of this amount $500 has 

H. Kept. 1176, 63-2-12 


176 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

been approved on appeal. As standing master Talley was ap¬ 
pointed by the circuit court of appeals and Judge Speer. No law 
forbade Judge Speer to refer cases to him because of his relationship 
to Heyward and it would not be fair to discriminate against him on 
that account. In no case was objection made to such reference. 

The majority report appears to base its complaint on the theory 
that Talley & Heyward secured employment, not because of their 
capacity to do the work, but because of Mr. Heyward's relation¬ 
ship to the judge. Suppose that this relationship did aid them, 
how does that contention become material, without showing that 
Judge Speer favored them improperly in some way? If they were 
honest, capable attorneys, it would not be corrupt to favor them 
to the extent of giving them work. It would be necessary to show 
in addition that he corruptly favored them in his decisions. There 
is no evidence that he ever did either. Colton Lewis, the examiner 
of the Department of Justice, spent a great deal of time in trying 
to establish that the judge gave to Talley & Heyward or to 
Mr. Heyward appointments or fixed their fees. In his report he 
states that he did not find any instance where the judge had appointed 
the firm of Talley & Heyward or Mr. Heyward to any position or 
fixed the fees of either, nor did the committee discover any instance 
where that had been done. The judge denied any such charge in his 
evidence. 

There is abundant evidence in the record to show that the firm of 
Talley & Heyward upon their own merits had a standing that war¬ 
ranted people in intrusting to them the kind of cases in which these 
fees were earned. This is glossed over in the majority report by 
the immaterial charge that Mr. Heyward has no capacity as a lawyer, 
but that is not in point so long as no one disputes the standing and 
ability of Mr. Talley. Before the partnership was formed Mr. 
Talley was appointea by Judge Speer referee in the Tift v. The 
Southern Railway Co. case. In this case Talley was allowed by 
consent of parties a fee of $4,000. Judge Speer had no interest 
then in appointing him except to secure an honest and able man. 
No one complained that he failed to measure up to that require¬ 
ment. No small pettifogger would ever be appointed to such a 
place. In the case of Oliver v. Savannah-Augusta Northern Rail¬ 
way Co., Talley was appointed referee by consent of counsel. 
His findings were affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. This 
involved some $340,000. By consent of counsel he was allowed 
a fee of $3,000. No one can doubt the estimate placed by these 
parties upon Mr. Talley. That Mr. Heyward is a man of char¬ 
acter and pleasing personality is the finding in the majority report 
and the only evidence against his ability as a lawyer is Mr. Aker- 
man’s statement that he does not try cases alone in court, but that 
is no reason why he was not a valuable member of the firm. The 
office lawyer is often as valuable as the trial lawyer. That the public 
has faith in him is amply demonstrated by the record. Despite the 
finding in the -majority report that Mr. Heyward can not prepare a 
case for trial there is no such evidence. 

There is another circumstance that makes plain beyond contro¬ 
versy the estimate placed by the public upon the firm of Talley & 
Heyward, and that is the fact that they were in a number of instances 
retained by lawyers to assist them in the trial of cases and a large 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 177 

part of their fees were earned in cases where they were so employed. 
Lawyers select men in whom they have confidence; men who can 
aid them, and they know who is worth employing. The fact that 
they were so selected in a number of instances appears in the record. 
S. S. Bennett, division counsel for the Atlantic Coast Line Railway, 
testified that he employed Mr. Talley because of his familiarity with 
the Federal practice (787). To overcome the unmistakable inference 
from that fact malice suggests that the selection was made because 
the firm was believed to have the ear of the court, but none of the 
attorneys who employed them testified to any such reason. Talley 
had been court stenographer for 14 years, for many years he had 
held the position of standing master of the court appointed by Judge 
Speer and the judges of the circuit court of appeals. He has lately 
been appointed referee in bankruptcy by Judge Sheppard. Nearly 
every lawyer in the district knows Mr. Talley and not one of them 
but speaks of him in the highest terms, not only of his character, but 
also of his ability. Why should not this firm of Talley & Heyward 
have received a fair share of the business? The committee will in 
vain search the record to find a syllable of evidence that Judge 
Speer attempted to influence a receiver, trustee, or other party to 
employ the firm of which his son-in-law was a member, and it is not 
suggested that Talley & Heyward were employed when the services 
of attorneys were unnecessary or that they failed to render honest 
and competent work. 

Why, if this firm was unduly favored, was it dissolved? 

Talley says that the reason why he dissolved the partnership was 
because the judge placed so many restrictions upon their firm because 
of Heyward’s relationship to the judge that it interfered with his earn¬ 
ings. (See also Judge Speer’s testimony, p. 911.) If Mr. Talley was 
profiting unduly by his partnership with Mr. Heyward, why did 
he dissolve it ? Did he not dissolve it because he knew that with 
his acquaintance in every section of the district and his thorough 
knowledge of Federal practice, he would do better if not hampered 
by the restrictions placed upon his firm as long as Mr. Heyward was 
a member of it? It is stated in the majority report that it is rea¬ 
sonable to assume that the firm of Talley & Heyward received from 
their practice in the Federal court not less than $50,000 during the 
six and one-half years of the partnership. It is not reasonable 
to assume anything unsupported by evidence and especially is 
that true when the assumption is indulged in for the purpose of 
blaming somebody. I thought every lawyer knew that the law 
presumed every man to be innocent until proof is produced to show the 
contrary, but the ordinary rules of evidence appear to be reversed in 
this case. However, let us assume that this firm received from such 
practice not only $50,000 but $150,000, how would that be material? 
These fees were nearly all earned as attorneys. Can jt concern the 
public service that receivers, trustees, and creditors in bankruptcy 
matters, or other litigants employ this firm ? No one questions their 
honesty or ability in doing the work and the majority report does 
not point to a case where Judge Speer procured for this firm any 
such employment or ever fixed their fees for such services. 


178 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

VIOLATION OF SECTION 67. 

In view of the fact that there is no proof that Judge Speer ever 
appointed Mr. Heyward, his son-in-law, to any position in his court, 
it does not appear to be necessary to enter into any extended discus¬ 
sion of section 67 of the Judicial Code. This section reads: 

No person shall be appointed to or employed in any office or duty in any court 
who is related by affinity or consanguinity within the degree of first cousin to the 
judge of such court. 

If this statute applies to receivers and trustees in bankruptcy so 
as to prohibit the appointment of one related to the judge of a dis¬ 
trict court, it might prohibit the referees and the creditors in bank¬ 
ruptcy proceedings pending in Judge Speer's district from making 
these appointments, but as the judge did not appoint Mr. Heyward 
it could not apply to him until proceedings should be taken to have 
Mr. Heyward removed. The proper proceeding for a removal in 
such a case is by an application to the court for that purpose. Sea¬ 
man v. N. W. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 86 Fed., 493. No such application 
was ever made to Judge Speer. The question has been raised whether 
a referee is an officer of the district court or a judge of a separate 
court. If a judge of a separate court, the appointment of Mr. Hey¬ 
ward by a referee would not violate this section. Keferees are 
appointed to have their places of business so located as to accommo¬ 
date the public. In the absence of the judge, they have nearly all 
the powers of the district court in bankruptcy matters and actually 
carry on a bankruptcy court. The statute says that the word “ court" 
may include the “ referee," thus recognizing that the referee is author¬ 
ized to conduct a bankruptcy court. (Sec. 1, bankruptcy act.) 

Unless the referee is held to conduct a bankruptcy court (which 
everybody acquainted with the bankruptcy practice knows that he 
actually does), the referee would not be forbidden by this section 67 
or any other statute to appoint all his own relatives receivers. This 
would permit the very condition the majority report condemns. 
Aside from these considerations, is it quite certain that section 67 
prohibits the appointment of receivers or trustees related to the 
judge of a court? Would not its language suggest that it was aimed 
at what is usually known as the officers of a court, such as marshals, 
clerks, and their deputies, the bailiffs, criers, and other like employees 
who perform their duties in court. The section reads that no person 
shall be appointed to any office or duty in any court. Is a receiver 
that runs a railroad performing his duty in court? Such receiver 
may be a corporation. If everyone that for some purpose is called 
an officer of a court is covered by the prohibition in this section 67, 
then attorneys related to the judge could not practice before him, 
still no one has ever imagined that this section applies to attorneys. 
But it would appear to be entirely unimportant whether the referee 
is a court or whether the receiver and trustee are officers covered by 
the language in this section 67. Let us assume, contrary to the 
evidence, that the judge had violated this statute, then what should 
be the punishment? Congress did not consider the violation so 
serious as to deem it necessary to prescribe a penalty for its violation. 
Does its violation merit one of the mos't drastic punishments knowm 
to the law, that of impeachment? Congress no doubt had in mind 
that this statute like many other statutes would be enforced by the 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 179 

parties for whose protection it was enacted just as is the law in regard 
to the relationship between jurors, attorneys, and parties to a suit. 
If the parties for whose benefit the law was enacted do not insist upon 
but waive its protection, no one else can complain. 

If parties to a bankruptcy proceeding should consent that some 
person related to the judge should act as receiver or trustee, and 
there may be the best of reason why such a person should be ap¬ 
pointed, would it not be a cruel injustice to complain and try to 
impeach a judge because he made the appointment, and would there 
be any more merit to such a complaint if they consented by their 
silence? This statute, if it applies at all to receivers or trustees, was 
enacted for the protection of the parties interested in the bankruptcy 
proceedings. If they waived that protection, they can not complain. 
In not a single bankruptcy case has anyone established that the 
appointment of Mr. Heyward or his firm prejudiced him or caused 
any loss by reason of Mr. Heyward's relationship to the judge. 
The parties that do object are rank outsiders, who complain not 
because of any injury done to them, but because of their malice. 

BEACH MANUFACTURING CO. CASE. 

The gravamen of the charge against Judge Speer in the Beach 
Manufacturing Co. case is that he was guilty of indorsing upon a 
certain order not consented to the words “By consent.” A casual 
examination of the testimony will show that the words complained of 
speak the actual truth, and that they are entirely immaterial under 
the facts on any theory. 

This was a bankruptcy case in which the judge appointed a receiver 
without notice. It is quite evident that upon the facts presented 
in the petition this was a proper appointment. (810 to 812 and 
1056.) After this appointment had been made, an application was 
presented to the court on behalf of the Beach Manufacturing Co. to 
have the receiver discharged. Pending the hearing upon this appli 
cation, the moving parties, through one of their attorneys, a Mr. 
Wilson, made this statement to the court: 

I asked, your honor, a few minutes ago, to “suspend and give us an opportunity to 
confer with our clients with reference to giving a certain direction to this case,” which 
I now want to be given. We have decided, your honor, to withdraw the application 
for the discharge of the receiver and feel satisfied with your honor’s supervision over 
the receiver that the rights of the parties in this matter will be protected. Now, if it 
is necessary for us to consent more fully to the granting of the receiver’s certificates 
to obtain means with which to pay the insurance and take care of the mills, that are 
absolutely necessary at this time, it is our purpose now to tender, your honor, an 
order withdrawing the application. 

In reply, the court said: 

Prepare the order, gentlemen, and incorporate in the order a provision about the 
consent of the bankrupt to the issuance of receiver’s certificates. 

Wilson then added: 

I would like to look into that. 

To which the court responded: 

You may confer about that; the present motion is dismissed. 

This statement of Mr. Wilson was a distinct notice to the court 
that the parties to this proceeding would agree on the form of an 
order to be entered in the matter and in accordance with the notice 


180 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


an order was prepared and submitted to the court for signature. 
Was this order consented to by the parties? Isaacs, one of the 
attorneys for the creditors, drew the order. Mr. Edwards says 
that objection was made to the first order drawn by Mr. Isaacs 
because it conveyed the idea that the attorneys for the Beach Manu¬ 
facturing Co. had consented to the issuance of receiver’s certificates; 
the carrying on of business as a going concern by the receiver, and 
that it consented to the receivership. To avoid these objections 
Isaacs redrew the order. Of the order as redrawn Mr. Edwards 
said that it met their approval as far as it well could, and that the 
only difference between the order that he consented to and the order 
signed by the judge is that the latter contains the indorsement “By 
consent” just ahead of the signature. Mr. Edwards must be in 
error when he says that objection was made because the order as 
first drawn had the attorneys for the Beach Manufacturing Co. con¬ 
sent to the issue of receiver’s certificates. Such an order could not 
have been made without consent as no application had been made 
for it, and the order to which Mr. Edwards did consent expressly 
recites such consent without reference to the words in dispute. (See 
945-947.) Mr. Lamden disagrees with Mr. Edwards. He says that 
the only objection to the order as first drawn by Mr. Isaacs was 
that in its second paragraph it said that the appointment of the 
receiver and the confirmation of his prior appointment were by con¬ 
sent of parties. Mr. Lamden agrees with Mr. Edwards that the 
attorneys for the parties, including himself, consented to the order 
just as it appears on the record except that it did not have indorsed 
thereon the words “By consent” above the judge’s signature. 

On page 814 he says, “We consented to the order just as it reads, 
but not where the order says ‘By consent.’ ” Mr. Padget corrobor¬ 
ates this statement (p. 822). Speaking of this order, he says: “Yes, 
sir; that is the one. I walked out of the courtroom into the hall 
and met Isaacs, who was coming down the hallway, and I asked him 
if he would let me read the order. He handed it to me, and it was 
done in his hand, and I stood there with Charles Edwards and read 
the order. There was a certain part of the order in there with ref¬ 
erence to having to operate the business by consent, and I said, 
‘Well, I did not understand that he had consented to that.’ The 
only thing I understood that we had consented to was the issuance 
of a thousand dollars’ worth of receivership certificates, but I said, 
‘Well, I reckon it don’t make much difference anyway.’ ” 

He says further that at this time the order had been signed by 
Judge Speer, but that it did not contain the words “By consent.” 
All the witnesses agree that this was, in fact, a consent order, but 
two of them, Mr. Edwards and Mr. Padget, insist that they saw the 
order after it had been signed by the judge and that it did not then 
contain the words “By consent” at the end of the order. It is 
quite evident that these parties are mistaken. It must have been 
the original draft that they saw and not the final order. They exam¬ 
ined the order together at the same time. Mr. Padget says that when 
Mr. Isaacs handed him the order for examination it was done in his 
hand. The order complained of is in typewriting, hence the one 
examined could not have been the order complained of. This is also 
confirmed by Padget’s statement that the order he examined pro¬ 
vided that the business was to be operated by consent. The order 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 181 


finally signed makes no such provision unless the words complained 
of were then on the order. 

Strange that these parties should disagree, but this testimony is 
entirely immaterial on any theory. Without considering the words 
in dispute, the order which all parties say they agreed to expressly 
confirms the appointment of the receiver. Here is the language used 
in the order: u It is ordered and adjudged that the order of appoint¬ 
ment appointing Rufus L. Moss as receiver be, and is hereby, confirmed 
and said Rufus L. Moss is hereby appointed permanent receiver/ 7 
See page 946 of the record, where is found a copy of the order. IIow 
anyone can urge that the words complained of affect in the slightest 
degree the rights of the parties seems strange. Judge Speer testified 
that he placed the words “ By.consent" at the bottom of the order at 
the time he signed it because it was a consent order. That this was in 
fact such an order is not disputed by anyone. It was made without 
a formal application or showing on an agreement of parties in court. 
Let us assume that the judge had not written these words upon the 
order, but that the clerk of court had, in accordance with his plain 
duty, made a record of the actual facts, would not those facts have 
shown just as conclusively that this was a consent order as do the 
words complained of? But let us assume they did not consent. This 
order recites that it was made in open court. Of that recital all 
parties had notice. The Beach Manufacturing Co. were there by 
their attorneys and made no objection to an order that in express 
terms confirmed the previous appointment of a receiver. Not only 
did they not object, but they did, in fact, lead the court to believe 
that they did consent. How can they be heard to object? In Huff 
v. Bidwell (151 Fed., 563) the circuit court of appeals held the ap¬ 
pointment of a receiver a consent appointment, because defendant's 
attorney was present in court and did not object. In that case the 
court found that there was otherwise no sufficient reason for the ap¬ 
pointment. This doctrine appears to be conclusive of the question. 

The statement in the majority report that the Beach Manufacturing 
Co. was a large and prosperous concern is rather amusing. The Beach 
Manufacturing Co. owned a large body of land in Florida which it 
had been trying to sell to an insolvent concern on five years' time; 
this land had been sold for taxes and the time for redemption was 
near at hand. It owned a plantation and some timberland in 
Camden County, Ga., and a large sawmill in New Lacey, Appleton 
County, Ga. At the time the application for a receiver in bank¬ 
ruptcy was filed it had ceased regular operations of its sawmill. Its 
laborers had refused to work unless paid each night for the day's 
work. The company owed then several thousand dollars for wages. 
Fifty mules were without feed, although feedstuff was in the depot 
on which the company was not able to pay the freight. The property 
was without insurance. There were 40 or 50 judgments against them 
and a large number of suits nending in the State courts. They had 
default on the issue of $176,J00 in bonds, but the 30 days of grace 
allowed by the mortgage had not expired. Outside of this mortgage 
debt they owed a hundred thousand dollars. If this is a prosperous 
concern/1 am sure the mules, the laborers, and creditors did not 
think so. (811, 812, and 1057.) 

It is true that when the question was submitted to a jury it was 
found by their verdict that the concern had enough property to pay 


182 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

their debts, but the judge who tried the case (and it was not Judge 
Speer) at once placed them back in the hands of a receiver. If 
Judge Speer had made the last order, how gleefully would it not have 
been pointed to as a demonstration of arbitrary and corrupt conduct. 
The majority report claims that there was an offer of settlement in 
this case. If there is anything in the record to show any such offer, I 
would like to have some one point it out. The statement that Mr. 
Lamden testified that the jury found that this company had assets of 
$350,000 or $400,000 and that the indebtedness amounted to only 
$270,000 is not in the record and is an error. And there is no 
such evidence in the record despite the finding of the majority to the 
contrary. There is also a strange omission in the majority report 
of Mr. Lamden’s testimony. Attention is called to the fact that he 
said a prior application was made to have this company put into 
bankruptcy, but the reasons he gave why this application was neces¬ 
sarily dismissed was not considered worthy of notice; (799) still the fact 
that Talley and Heyward were then the attorneys for the company is 
mentioned. Why was not the fact mentioned that Isaacs & Heyward 
were associated in this case with another attorney, which Mr. Lamden 
said was a man of the highest character ? (811.) And why was not the 
evidence of Mr. Lamden and others which shows clearly that there was 
a necessity for the appointment of a receiver placed in the finding 
instead of the opinion to the contrary expressed by disappointed 
attorneys? And why does the majority report omit any mention of 
the fact that though the j ury did find that this company was solvent 
Judge Neuman at once placed it back in the hands of a receiver? 

McREYNOLDS VS. THE CITY & SUBURBAN RY. CO. 

Very little need be said in regard to the action of McReynolds v. The 
City & Suburban Railway Co., which was started about 20 years ago. 
The same policy has been pursued in this as in nearly all other suits. 
Instead of presenting to the committee the records upon which the 
judge acted, Osborne, Lawrence, Padgett, Felder, Akerman, or some 
other disappointed attorney swears that there was no justification 
for the judge’s action. These attorneys had ample notice of the 
hearing; they are the moving force behind these complaints. Why 
do they not present the actual evidence; evidence that would be 
competent in a court ? Oh, no; that would be too tame and it would 
not serve their purpose. From the statement of Mr. Osborne, it 
would appear that this railway company was being wrecked in two 
ways. It was charging as low as half a cent a fare for rides, and a Mr. 
Parsons, who owned most of the capital stock, was trying to take the 
road away from the creditors in rebuilding it as an electric fine. The 
suit was brought by a bondholder on behalf of himself and all other 
creditors to protect their interests. Osborne complains that a 
receiver was appointed without notice and the company was required 
to put up a bond of $250,000 to secure the discharge of the receiver. 
He admits, however, that outside of paying the expense of the suit no 
harm was done to the property. He might as well have admitted 
that it did establish that Mr. Parsons could not steal this road away 
from the creditors and could not run it so as to ruin the property; 
that was what the suit prevented. When a person is actually en¬ 
gaged in robbing a property, as it is admitted Mr. Parsons and this 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 183 

company were doing, they can not complain if the court acts promptly 
in preventing it. 

This case illustrates the utter recklessness of Mr. Osborne as a 
witness. He tried to leave the impression that Judge Speer demanded 
a bond of $250,000 to secure an indebtedness of $2,000, but when 
questioned admitted that the action was brought on behalf of all 
creditors. There were $250,000 of these bonds and possibly other 
debts. But perhaps the most ridiculous part of Mr. Osborne’s 
performance m connection with this case is his attempt to show 
that the judge knew that this suit was not brought in good faith. 
For that purpose he goes on and details a lot of facts in regard to 
plaintiff’s impecunious condition and his relationship to a party 
interested in a competing railway that Mr. Parsons and his client 
were fast putting out of business. How the judge could know those 
facts when he made this order does not appear. Mr. Osborne had 
to make a trip into Tennessee after the order had been made to 
find out these facts. There is no claim that the papers upon which 
the judge acted contained any such information. That the plain¬ 
tiff owned the bonds is not disputed. As such he had a right to 
bring the suit. The fact that it.might assist one of his relatives 
would not be to his discredit and would not justify the court in 
refusing relief. No allegation of insolvency is necessary where an 
action is brought, as in this case, to protect the property upon 
which the bonds were secured. The statement of Osborne that the 
$250,000 bond was taken to secure a debt of $2,000 is bad enough, 
but it is not quite as bad as the statement in the majority report 
that it was demanded to secure costs amounting to $1,300. It 
should be noted with what industrious care nearly every fact that 
would tend to explain away the charge appear to have been omitted, 
not only from the summary of the evidence, but also from the find¬ 
ings in the majority report. 

CENTRAL RY. CO. CASE. 

The Central Railroad Co. case is fully explained in the brief of 
Judge Speer (p. 1029). That case was disposed of some 20 years ago. 
The president of the company was appointed temporary receiver 
under an order which directed him to carry on the business as usual 
without even changing books of account. This order is complained 
of as unauthorized. On an order to show cause why the receivership 
should not be made permanent Judges Speer and Pardee sat together. 
This was only a few days after the temporary receiver had been 
appointed. The two judges concurred in the appointment of per¬ 
manent receivers. Between the appointment of the temporary and 
permanent receivers there had been no change in the situation. If 
Judge Speer was wrong, Judge Pardee was also wrong. It is true that 
some years afterwards Judge Jackson disagreed with Judges Speer 
and Pardee, but his views have since been reversed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States and the views of Judges Speer and Pardee 
sustained. He practically held the State antitrust act and the 
Sherman law void, and for that reason decided that there were no 
equities in the bill. There is no contention that the Central was rot 
being robbed under a void lease to the Richmond & Danville Railway 


184 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


Co., that its rolling stock and even its rails and all its earnings were 
being stolen from it by the defendants. 

This suit forced an abandonment of this lease which was in viola¬ 
tion of the State’s antitrust statute and in violation of the Sherman 
law, and suits were thereupon brought under which the Central recov¬ 
ered much of this plunder. The claim that the action of Judge Speer 
ruined the company is met by the statement of Judge Jackson in 
holding that the company was insolvent and a mere shell a year before 
this action was started. The company that operated the Central was 
insolvent and the Central itself was insolvent, and still Mr. Lawton 
now thinks that the Central could have avoided a receivership through 
the panic of 1893 if Judge Speer would only have allowed the defend¬ 
ants to continue to rob it. This testimony looks a good deal like the 
ordinary expert testimony. By turning to the record it will be found 
that the attorneys who gave this testimony have strangely changed 
their views on this subject. They have commended the judge’s 
action strongly, now they condemn him (1038). The charge m con¬ 
nection with this litigation rests upon the testimony of Mr. Lawton, 
vice president and general counsel of the Central of Georgia Railway 
Co. and his associate, Mr. Cunningham. In 1892 this same Lawton 
and Cunningham issued a printed pamphlet containing a number of 
the decisions of Judge Speer at the conclusion of which they com¬ 
mended the judge and his conduct on the bench in the most emphatic 
language. The thing was then fresh in their minds, and it is evident 
that if any wrong was done their hindsight is better than their fore¬ 
sight. (1038.) This was one of the first cases under the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. Judge Speer’s action broke up a consolidation of 
practically all competing railways in the State. Mr. Lawton’s com¬ 
plaint will not change the verdict of approval that the people of 
Georgia has placed on this act of the judge. 

HUFF CASE. 

The so-called Huff case is an illustration of how a dissatisfied and 
defeated litigant and his attorney sometimes swear at the judge or 
jury. Nearly every feature of this long and varied litigation has 
been in the circuit court of appeals, and there the judge’s orders and 
decrees have been affirmed except in one or two minor matters. 
The appointment of a temporary receiver was disapproved of by 
the circuit court of appeals, but Mr. Huff can not seriously complain, 
as he never made any motion to have this receiver discharged. He 
served for three years and a half and when at the end of that time 
application w T as made for a permanent receiver, he sat quietly by, 
though in court with his attorneys, and allowed a permanent receiver 
to be appointed, and thus, as the circuit court of appeals found, 
consented to the appointment. This receivership, no doubt, saved 
to Huff whatever is left of his property. The record show r s that at 
the time the temporary receiver was appointed all of Mr. Huff’s 
property was so badly incumbered by all sorts of conflicting claims 
that nothing but a receivership could have saved it from being sac¬ 
rificed at execution or judicial sales. The receivership gave time to 
adjust these claims and but for Mr. Huff’s persistent appeals the 
case could have been disposed of long ago. The other matters in 
which Judge Speer was reversed was the attorney’s fee in Huff v. 


CHANGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 185 


Bidwell. In that case the Judge’s order was set aside but by a 
divided court; two of the circuit judges of appeal differed with 
Judge Speer while Judge Pardee in a dissenting opinion sustained 
him. 

In this case the amazing statement is made that a debt aggregating 
$3,900 was the means of destroying the accumulations of a life¬ 
time, some $100,000. This is an illustration of how telling a part of 
the truth can be made to convey an idea entirely different from the 
actual truth. _ The owners of this claim of $3,900 brought a suit, but 
they brought it not only for themselves but also for all other creditors, 
and instead of $3,900 there was found due in 1912, when the facts 
were finally ascertained (exclusive of costs and expenses), $54,511.71 
to creditors and $20,512.27 for taxes, besides $10,880 paid to a 
creditor during the pendency of the suit, making a total of $85,964.98. 
No one has attempted to show that any of these items were not justly 
due. When this suit was brought Mr. Huff was insolvent, as found by 
Judge Speer and by the circuit court of appeals. His property was 
so encumbered by conflicting claims, among which were a great 
many tax titles, that this sum of $3,900 could not be collected. It 
was charged that he had abandoned most of his property and was 
placing what remained beyond the reach of his creditors. No one 
has or can point to any delay in this protracted litigation caused by 
Judge Speer. Mr. Huff’s property, instead of being sacrificed, brought 
$31,278 in excess of the highest estimate made by Mr. Huff of its 
value. No doubt Huff’s estimate, made on oath some time before 
the sale, was as large as he considered it honest to make it. 

The criticism against the judge because some of the money re¬ 
mained in the registry of the court without drawing interest, coming 
as it does from the parties whose duty it was to see that this money 
drew interest, shows how utterly reckless are the charges. Under 
the statute the judge could not place this money on interest without 
an agreement of parties and security for its return (667, 668, and 669). 
This should have come from Mr. Felder, Huff’s attorney, but he never 
made a move to have any of this money placed at interest. Still he 
is the one who chiefly complains. He can not thus shift his respon- 
sibilty for his own negligence. He admits that he never made any 
application to have any of this money placed at interest, but he 
claims that Mr. Huff did. But when Mr. Huff was on the stand he 
denied that he ever made any (p. 232). 

Upon what theory the judge is expected to keep track of what 
money may be in the registry does not appear, nor is any reason sug¬ 
gested why he should consider it necessary to act as the guardian of 
Mr. Felder, Huff’s attorney. If Mr. Felder does not know enough 
or does not care enough to protect the interests of his client, Mr. 
Huff ought to have had another attorney, some one that would have 
looked after his interests instead of swearing at the court to cover up 
his own delinquency. 

There is no evidence to show that any of the fees were excessive. 
They were allowed upon evidence introduced and considered by a mas¬ 
ter at the time. The record does not show what the evidence was. 


186 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


SELECTION OF JURORS. 

The complaint made against the manner in which juries have been 
selected in Judge Speer’s court is fully explained in the judge’s brief 
(pp. 1038-1046). The complaint that grand and petit jurors to 
attend any term of court were not drawn as required by law is simply 
a contention on the part of attorneys that they know the law better 
than the judge. The statute requires that jurors shall be publicly 
drawn. The judge points out that this does not require that the 
drawing shall take place in court or that anybody shall be notified of 
the drawing; but that it must be done in the presence of not less than 
three persons, as prescribed by court rules. The question of select¬ 
ing a petit jury for the trial of a case is always a subject that is under 
the closest scrutiny of the parties to the suit. If anything irregular 
is done either party can take advantage of it; and it does not appear 
that in any instance the court has imposed an illegal panel on anyone 
without his consent, if at all. When Mr. Lawrence made the state¬ 
ment that the judge selected the jury in the Green and Gay nor case 
from the southwestern part of the district to get men who did not 
know the judge, he was making a statement that was ridiculously 
false. Mr. Lawrence was one of the attorneys in that case and knew 
that the judge made the order excluding jurors from the eastern part 
of the district where Savannah and Brunswick are located for the 
reason that people there had become prejudiced in regard to the 
case. This selection was made upon the application of the district 
attorney and in accordance with express provisions of law. He was 
also aware that the circuit court of appeals had held in this very 
case that the selection of this jury was strictly legal. It is rather 
amusing to have Mr. Lawrence, who was defeated in that suit, appeal 
from the circuit court of appeals to Congress on behalf of clients who 
stole $2,000,000 from the Government and who have been convicted 
of that theft, not only in Judge Speer’s court, but in a number of other 
courts where the various phases of that controversy were tried. It 
illustrates his utter recklessness, even to the extent of disregarding 
consistency. Take, for instance, on page 511, speaking of the judge, 
he says: 

He don’t want them (jurors) from Savannah, because they know him. He likes to 
get these jurors from away back who don’t know him; and that is the reason he drew 
his jury from away down in southwestern Georgia in the Green and Gaynor case. 

How does that square with the charge that he had just made, that 
in the Crawley case every juror was from Savannah and had been 
selected from men of such high character that he (the judge) thought 
that he (Mr. Lawrence) and his partner Osborne, who, he says, were 
in politics, would not be able to influence them. This expert opinion 
of Mr. Lawrence is only interesting as proof of his mental condition. 
The opinion of Akerman, to the effect that a jury could not be legally 
drawn at Mount Airy, may be interesting but it would appear that 
the Attorney General of the United States and the judge entertain a 
different view. The brief on behalf of Judge Speer calls attention to 
the law on this subject (p. 1046). 

The testimony of Mr. Barnes that he (Barnes) tried to manipulate 
a jury so as to have a colored person drawn does not connect the judge 
with the matter. If it shows anything it shows that Mr. Akerman 
rewrote Barnes’s return on the venire in the order in which talesmen 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 187 

had been selected, or, in other words, rewrote the return in accordance 
with the facts. Mr. Barnes’s complaint of what took place in selecting 
the grand jury in the Green and Gaynor Gase need hardly be commented 
on. When that great legal battle was going on Mr. Barnes testified 
fully to the facts and he now undertakes to change them to feed fat 
his grudge against the judge. All the questions involved in the selec¬ 
tion of that jury were hotly contested in the suit and reviewed by the 
circuit court of appeals. As has been remarked that court found the 
jury legal. Malice ought to have enough modesty to accept that as 
final. Mr. Felder complains that in the case of the United States v. 
Branen, the jury was illegally selected because no jury had been 
drawn for the term and all the jurors were selected and summoned as 
talesmen by the marshal. Section 280 of the Judicial Code provides 
that: 

When from challenge or otherwise there is not a petit jury to determine any civil or 
criminal case, the marshal or his deputy shall by order of the court in which such, de¬ 
fect of jurors happens return jurymen from the bystanders sufficient to complete the 
panel. 

It is argued that this does not apply except in those cases where 
for some reason a panel that has been drawn does not afford the 
necessary jurors to make up a full jury, and it is said in support 
of this view that this code provides that special juries must be 
returned in accordance with the law of the State. I do not believe 
that this last contention has any force, as I do not believe that this 
was a special jury in the sense in which the word “special” is used 
in the code. The statutes of different States have provisions for the 
selection of special juries of persons possessing special qualifications 
or charged with special duties. The code very properly requires that 
these shall be selected in accordance with the statutes of the States. 

As the Federal statutes provide in detail for the selection of both 
grand and petit juries for ordinary cases, it is quite probable that 
this section, 280, of the Judicial Code will be held to authorize the 
act complained of. This statute does not in express terms limit the 
drawing to talesmen, as statutes of this class usually do. The word 
“ talesman’’means a person drawn to make up the deficiency in an 
existing panel. The language in this statute is broad enough so as 
to authorize the drawing of a full jury from the bystanders in the 
absence of any jurors. 

It is insinuated in the Branen case that something wrong was done 
because an order to the marshal was entered nunc pro tunc to make 
this selection of jurors, but no explanation is offered why this was 
wrong. The marshal no doubt made the selection, as ordered by 
the court; he would not make it without such order. If that order 
had not been entered when it should have been, it was the duty of 
the court to have it entered when his attention was called to the 
omission. No one could be prejudiced by the act. But this whole 
contention is an idle dispute as to what the law is or is not, and has 
no tendency to show any willful wrongdoing. 

JAMISON CASE. 

The Jamison habeas corpus case grew out of a statute under which 
the city recorder of Macon was authorized to summarily try offenders 
against the ordinances of the city without any written charge and 


188 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

without a jury, and impose upon the offenders a six months’ State 
prison sentence at hard labor on the public roads. 

The county of Bibb, in which the city of Macon is located, had 
entered into a contract with the city under which it was agreed 
that if those convicted by the city recorder were sentenced to the 
county chain gang (a part of the State prison system), the county 
would pay to the city $8,000 annually for the labor of these prison¬ 
ers. A young man, as inhuman a wretch as every disgraced a judicial 
position, was appointed city recorder of Macon a short time before 
this case arose. He promptly proceeded to fill the Bibb County 
chain gang. In the month of March, 1904, the month during which 
Mr. Jamison was sentenced, he sent 149 unfortunate victims to this 
chain gang. 

Jamison, an inoffensive colored person between 55 and 60 years 
of age, who had been engaged about town in odd jobs like cleaning 
houses and laying carpets, was arrested charged with being drunk. 
He was brought before the city recorder and promptly sentenced to 
the Bibb County chain gang for three months for drunkenness, and 
because while in this drunken condition he did not while in the bar¬ 
racks speak as politely to the officers in charge of him as they thought 
he ought to, he was sentenced to an additional four months for using 
abusive language, making in all seven months at hard labor in the 
State penitentiary. 

Among those not blinded by any selfish interest in the $8,000 a year, 
there was naturally a good deal of hostility to the system and a good 
deal of sympathy for the unfortunate victims. While nearly all those 
sent to the chain gang were colored, occasionally a white person 
would be drafted in this fashion to do work. About this time a 
young white boy came to Macon to do some business. When this 
was finished, and on the same day, he repaired to one of the depots, 
and bought his ticket to return home. The train was late; he sat 
down in the depot to wait and fell asleep. The train came and left 
without waking him. An industrious officer looking for a victim 
gathered him in, and the next morning, regardless of explanations 
and protests, the city recorder promptly railroaded him into the 
county chain gang, there to stay for several months. The charge 
against him was vagrancy. Public indignation, however, soon re¬ 
leased him. 

When Mr. Jamison was convicted, Mrs. Speer’s sympathies were 
aroused. She knew him; he had done some odd jobs at her home, 
and she called her husband’s attention to the matter. Judge Speer 
then asked the assistant district attorney, Mr. Akerman, to take some 
action to release Jamison, upon the ground that he believed the con¬ 
viction to be void in that the statute under which it was pronounced 
was in violation of the United States Constitution. Mr. Akerman says 
the judge suggested to him to bring the proceedings before some State 
court, but he concluded to bring it before Judge Speer, and presented 
to him for that purpose a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The 
writ was issued. Upon a hearing, Judge Speer released Jamison. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed this order of Judge Speer 
upon the sole ground that Jamison had not exhausted his remedy in 
the State courts. The constitutional question involved was not 
passed on. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 189 

On November 24, 1905, the city attorney presented tlio mandate 
of the Supreme Court to Judge Speer, who was then hearing some 
bankruptcy matters at a hotel in Macon, and orally asked the judge 
to make the judgment of the Supreme Court the judgment of the 
district court. The judge then stated that the court was not in session, 
and that lie would not entertain any other matter than the bankruptcy 
cases then being heard, but advised the city attorney to file the papers 
with the clerk of the court. 

The refusal of the judge to at once enter this judgment is charged 
as an oppressive act. This is a far-fetched conclusion. While the 
city attorney testified that he believed lie made a formal application 
for the order in question and that he placed the application on file 
with the clerk of court, the testimony of the clerk showed that there 
was no record of any such application and that no application could 
bo found in his office. The majority report says this application was 
found, but I would like to have some one point out in the record 
where it can be found. What was found was an unsigned order of 
about half a dozen lines contained in a dirty envelope together with 
some scraps of papers. This order had never been filed and was 
no part of the case. The answer of the city attorney in subsequent 
proceedings against him for contempt shows quite clearly in detailing 
what took place that he made no written application. (See Record, 
pp. 153, 154.) 

This whole contention is trivial. There is nothing to show that 
the judge would not have directed the entry of this judgment on the 
day when the mandate was presented if it had not been for the fact 
that within five minutes after the mandate had been filed in the 
clerk’s office the city attorney, in contempt of Judge Speer, put the 
mandate in force by ordering Jamison arrested. On this order he 
was arrested that very day. 

On the morning of the day following Jamison secured another 
writ of habeas corpus from Hon. W. H. Felton, a State judge. He 
was held on this writ two days, when he was remanded to the Bibb 
County chain gang. An appeal was taken from this action of Judge 
Felton. This exhausted every remedy that Jamison had under the 
State law, but he still remained in custody. No stay of sentence 
could be legally had and he was doomed to serve out his sentence 
pending the hearing on the appeal, unless he could secure relief from 
the Federal court. Mr. Akerman then on a petition showing the 
illegality of the sentence and that he had exhausted every remedy 
under the State law, on the 30th of November, 1905, applied to Judge 
Speer for another writ of habeas corpus; this was granted, and on the 
day following, Jamison was again released on bail. These facts are 
undisputed. How is it fair to call special attention as a cause for 
complaint to the fact that this mandate was filed on November 24, 
1905, and not made the judgment of the court until June 8, 1906? 
How can an act be oppressive when it was well known that its entry 
could not possibly affect anything under the sun? The mandate 
could only set aside the first writ of habeas corpus. Other writs 
had been issued under which Jamison had a right to be at large, 
whether this mandate was entered or not, and no one cared what 
became of it. So far as the city was concerned, the mandate was 
acted on as in force from the moment it was filed. 


190 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


Much is made of the charge that the judge exceeded his authority in 
issuing an order requiring the city attorney to show cause why he 
should not be punished for contempt because he ordered Jamison 
arrested before the mandate of the supreme court had been made a 
judgment of the district court. When the attorney gave that order 
ho was acting on the theory that the judgment of the district court was 
still in force. He had just asked the judge to set it aside. Whether 
the judge was justified in refusing is beside the question; the city 
attorney was clearly in contempt, and on a proper petition from the 
persons affected might properly issue the order. Akerman as attorney 
for Jamison made the application for this order. No action was ever 
taken upon it except to have a hearing. I was afterwards dismissed. 

The majority report suggests that this order was issued to oppress 
the city authorities because ill will existed between the judge and 
these officers. It is true that those who were interested in collecting 
$8,000 per annum from the county of Bibb for the labor of these con¬ 
victs were hostile to the action of the judge, and they did complain not 
only that he liberated Jamison but four or five others who made like 
application, but there is not in the record any evidence that the judge 
had the slightest ill will toward any of the men engaged in enforcing 
this illegal law. 

Let us assume that Judge Speer delayed the entry of this judgment, 
for the purpose of aiding Jamison. The delay could be of no assist¬ 
ance to anyone else and the only way in which it could aid him would 
be in giving him more time in which to prepare an application to some 
State court for relief. Who is this man Jamison? Why, a poor, 
inoffensive colored person depending upon his own labor for support; 
a person so destitute of means and credit that he could not raise $60 
to relieve himself from a seven months’ sentence in the Bibb County 
chain gang. What powerful, sinister influences were back of this man 
to induce a Federal judge to act corruptly? Upon this unfortunate 
victim a sentence had been imposed that was void because of its cruel 
and barbarous character. Judge Speer was convinced that it was not 
valid. The Supreme Court of Georgia later sustained him in that 
view. Is it not far more reasonable to assume that the judge acted 
from motives of humanity? To give some idea of the character of 
this punishment and the motives that must have actuated him I 
quote from his opinion in that case (130 Fed., 351): 

The most cursory view of the evidence in the record will convince the impartial that 
practically every ignominious mark of infamous punishment is stamped upon the 
miserable throng in Bibb County chain gang. This is clear from the testimony of the 
superintendent, E. A. Wimbish, and from the uncontradicted evidence of witnesses 
who have there expiated their disregard of sundry provisions of the city code. The 
sufferers wear the typical striped clothing of the penitentiary convict. Iron manacles 
are riveted upon their legs. These can be removed only by the use of the cold chisel. 
The irons on each leg are connected by chains. The coarse stripes, thick with the dust 
and grime of long torrid days of a semitropical summer, or incrusted with the icy mud 
of winter, are their sleeping clothes when they throw themselves on their pallets of 
straw in the common stockades at night. They wake, toil, rest, eat, and sleep, to the 
never-ceasing clanking of the manacles and chains of this involuntary slavery. 
They progress to and from their work in public, and from the public roads and before 
the public eye. About them as they sleep, journey, and labor, watch the convict 
guards, armed with rifle and shotgun. This is to at once make escape impossible, and 
to make sure the swift thudding of the picks and the rapid flight of the shovels shall 
never cease. If the guards would hesitate to promptly kill one sentenced for petty 
violations of city law should he attempt to escape the evidence does not disclose the 
fact. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 191 


And the fact more baleful and more ignominious than all, with each gang stands the 
whipping boss, with the badge of his authority. This the evidence discloses to be a 
heavy leather strap about two and a half or three feet long, with solid hand grasp, and 
with broad, heavy, flexible lash. From the evidence, we may judge the agony in¬ 
flicted by this implement of torture is not surpassed by the Russian knout, the synonym 
the wMd around for merciless corporal punishment. If we may also accept the 
uncontradicted evidence of the witnesses, it is true that on the Bibb County chain gang 
for no days is the strap wholly idle, and not infrequently it is fiercely active. One 
witness, who seived many months, testified that if the gang does not work like 
‘•fighting fire” (to use his simile) the whipping boss runs down the line, striking with 
apparent indiscrimination the convicts as they bend to their tasks. Often the whip¬ 
ping is more prolonged and deliberate. At times, according to anothei witness, also 
uncontradicted, the convicts when at the stockade are called into the “dog lot.” All 
present, the whipping boss selects the victim in his judgment worthy of punishment. 
They are called to the stable dooi, made to lie face downward across the sill, a strong 
convict holds down the head and shouldeis and the boss lays on the lash on the naked 
body until he thinks the sufferer has been whipped enough. It is but just to Mr. 
Wimbish to record his statement that he knew nothing of the ceremony. It may be 
judged from the evidence that it is a whipping more formal and drastic than any other 
inflicted. Since this is done at the stockade, we may presume that the spectators and 
guards are the only witnesses, but on the public roads, in the presence of wayfarers and 
bystanders, often the convict, to use an expression of a witness, “is taken down and 
whipped.” The evidence gives us the account of two white persons who were thus 
whipped, one a boy with but one arm. For this reason it was not necessary to hold 
him. He stood and cried as the boss applied the lash. The other white boy was com¬ 
pelled to place his head between the legs of a burley negro convict and was thus im¬ 
movably held. The punishment will mark the lad with infamy in the minds of his 
fellows as long as he may live. The offense of one of these lads was “loitering in the 
depot.” 

At another point in this opinion will be found the following: 

He [Jamison] applies for the great writ of right, the writ of habeas corpus, and he 
humbly seeks the portals of that court whose judges are sworn to know no difference 
between the rich and the poor, where justice ever bends the listening ear to catch the 
plaint of the humble and the lowly, and through all whose generous and benign juris¬ 
prudence is heeded the admonition of the Master: “ Inasmuch as ye have done it to 
one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto Me. ” 

That the judge exhibited some interest in this unfortunate victim 
of a cruel system is now charged up against him, and this offense is 
greatly aggravated by the fact that his good wife asked him to do so. 
I wonder when it became an offense for a person on the bench to be 
actuated by motives and feelings such as those disclosed in this 
opinion? Is the inhumanity of the city recorder the sort of impar¬ 
tiality that appeals to the committee? I hope that our country may 
always have judges whose hearts beat in sympathy with the poor and 
oppressed. 

The action of Judge Speer in this case forced the city of Macon, 
through public opinion and the law, to have its charter so amended 
that the city recorder can not now send a person even to the city 
prison for more than 30 days instead of to the State prison for 6 
months. 

It is passing strange that in commenting on this Jamison case the 
majority report repeatedly says that the city officers of Macon were 
attached for contempt for puttiug into force the mandate of the 
Supreme Court, though the testimony establishes that they were not 
attached, but that a notice was only served upon them to show 
cause why they should not be attached. All that was done was to give 
such a notice. No one was restrained of his liberty for a moment. 
Equally strange is the complaint that this action of Judge Speer in 
giving this notice prevented the city authorities from putting into 
effect the judgment of the Supreme Court. The evidence shows, with- 

H. Kept. 1176, 63-2-13 


192 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

out any contradiction, that the enforcement of this mandate and the 
judgment of the city recorder were not delayed at all by this notice. 
The very reason why this notice was served was because the city 
authorities hastened to put that mandate and judgment into force 
before they could legally do so; put it in force in absolute contempt 
of Judge Speer. But what seems still more strange is that this report 
bemoans the fact that by reason of this notice the judgment of the city 
recorder has been annulled and that Jamison is still at large. Does 
anyone imagine that a judgment resting upon a statute declared void 
by the court of last resort can have any force ? If the city authorities 
of Macon think otherwise, why don't they enforce it? They know 
better. They know that they would be liable to a suit for false 
imprisonment if they tried it. 

REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE MANDATE. 

In the case of Holst v. Savannah Electric Co., the j udge is criticized for 
refusing to put into effect a mandate of the circuit court of appeals 
that enables some one to bring an action to defeat the effect of the 
mandate. Two or three weeks' delay did occur before the mandate 
was put in effect in this case, but there is no evidence of either arbi¬ 
trary or oppressive conduct. 

Mr. JohnRourke, a clerk in the office of Osborn & Lawrence, testified 
(pp. 5 6-5 7) that when he presented the mandate to Judge Speer 
he “became quite indignant, stating ‘that the circuit court of 
appeals had no jurisdiction in the matter,' " but he nowhere gives 
any evidence that the judge expressed any ill will toward any at¬ 
torney or party to the action. 

The only other witness that referred to the matter was Lawrence 
(p. 513), but his statement is mere hearsay and besides throws no 
additional light on the subject. 

The statement of Mr. Rourke does not indicate that the judge 
had any hostile feeling toward any attorney or party to the suit. 
If he had such hostility, why did he not express that feeling instead 
of expressing in vigorous language his opinion that the circuit court 
of appeals had no jurisdiction of this kind of an appeal? 

If it was the duty of the judge to pass upon the effect of this man - 
date (and he was asked to do that in accordance with a practice 
which prevails in the district) and it clearly appeared to him that 
the circuit court of appeals had overlooked some limitations upon 
its powers, would he not be justified in doing just what he did do in 
the case ? This view is consistent with the language of the telegram 
sent by Mr. Rourke, which the judge is said to have dictated. This 
telegram reads: 

The court in Savannah not being in session, Judge Speer does not feel at liberty 
to sign a judgment making the mandate of the circuit court of appeals the judgment 
of the circuit court. Besides he wishes to hear counsel upon the question “Has the 
circuit court of appeals jurisdiction to try an appeal involving the constitutional 
question in this case, and has not the Supreme Court of the United States exclusive 
jurisdiction?” The court will convene at Savannah on the 28th instant. He would 
consider a signed consent to waive the question mentioned. 

In relation to this matter, I quote from the brief filed on behalf of 
Judge Speer the following: 

It will be observed that Judge Speer offered to waive the question presented by this 
telegram on a signed consent of counsel. He doubtless had in mind section 5 of the 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 193 

act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. L., p. 826). This provides for a direct appeal to the 
Supreme Court “in any case that involves the construction or application of the Con¬ 
stitution of the United States.” As this bill charged that the property of the plaintiffs 
was being practically taken from them without aue process of law, and that, too, by 
the city of Savannah and the electric company, both of which were agencies created 
by the State law, it seemed to involve the relating clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
On both grounds, therefore, his hesitation to sign a decree, which would have been 
a finality, seems justifiable. If, however, he was in error, it was error only. It seems 
an ugly distortion of these facts, all of which appear from the record and the recited 
telegram, to charge Judge Speer with defying the mandate of the circuit court of 
appeals. 

Is it not doubtful whether the judge did have the power to make 
the order requested3 He was not holding court; he was not even in 
his own district. No notice had been served upon the opposing 
counsel nor hud they consented that he might act. This was an 
equity suit, and the mandate was directed not to him but to the 
circuit court. I have a letter from the clerk of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in which he 
says that in equity suits: 

The party who succeeds in having the upper court reverse the lower court must file 
a motion asking that the original decree be vacated and reversed. 

This rule would fully justify Judge Speer’s action. No motion 
was filed in this case. Judge Speer had the same right to ask for 
orderly proceedings as the Pennsylvania Federal courts. 

The act in question is perfectly consistent with the kindliest 
feelings toward the' attorneys and parties to the action. If it was 
hostile to any attorneys, Osborne & Lawrence would be the ones, as 
they asked to have the mandate enforced. The refusal complained of 
was in November, 1904. In that same year, only a few months earlier, 
Osborne & Lawrence had each signed an indorsement in the most eulo¬ 
gistic terms of the judge to secure his appointment to a place on the 
circuit court of appeals. Is it not reasonable to infer from this that 
the most friendly relationship existed at this time between the judge 
and those attorneys? So far as the record shows, nothing had occurred 
to cause any ill will. The suggestion that the delay was due to the 
judge’s desire to give other parties a chance to bring an action to 
defeat the effect of the mandate is a mere assumption, unsupported 
by any evidence. It is true; that another action was started, but 
there is not a word anywhere to indicate that the judge had any¬ 
thing to do about starting it or knew that it was about to be started. 
His action in this second suit, in which a second restraining order 
had been issued, demonstrates beyond all question how absolutely 
unfounded is this whole contention. If actuated by the motives 
charged against him, why did he not take this suit under advise¬ 
ment and delay action, as he could easily have done? Instead of 
doing that, he decided it within a day or two after it was submitted 
to him and decided in favor of Messrs. Osborne & Lawrence and 
their clients. The mandate of the circuit court of appeals was put 
in effect by Judge Speer on the first day of the Savannah term of 
court, November 28, and the second suit, commenced November 26, 
was dismissed during the first days of December. 

The majority of the committee finds that Judge Speer refuseG i >q 
recognize the mandate of the circuit court of appeals in the case of 


194 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

Bean v. Ore and rests that finding upon the testimony of Mr. E. P. 
Davis.- Here is the testimony: 

I was informed by Mr. Smith—my recollection is now—that this occurred, and I 
am quite sure it was in connection with one rule in that case, and I think it was the 
mandate of the court, that when he took it before the judge in Augusta to have the 
mandate of the court made the judgment of this court he declined to entertain it, and 
that Mr. Smith had to go back to Atlanta and go before the court in Savannah and 
have the mandate jf the court made the judgment. I will not state that as a fact, but 
that is my recollection. I was not present at the time. 

I would like to know on what theory this committee is proceeding. 
In the first place this finding rests entirely on hearsay; but it is not 
even supported by that kind of testimony. The witness tells the 
committee that he does not know whether it was an order or the man¬ 
date in this case that the judge refused to recognize, and then the 
witness winds up by saying that he won’t state that as a fact, evi¬ 
dently referring to the whole storyn Mr. Davis has very properly 
been fined for contempt of court. (424.) I do not know whether 
that was before or after the mandate he was trying to put in effect 
was issued, but if it was before that time I can see some reason why 
he might not like to see Judge Speer about anything and why he 
played Alphonse and Gaston, as he says, with Mr. Smith, in trying to 
have him present the mandate'to the court. Otherwise I can not 
see why he should confess the unseemly and cravenly cowardice that 
he parades before the committee. 

REVERSALS. 


The majority report gives a list of seven cases tried by Judge Speer 
that have been reversed on appeal. No suggestion is made that any 
of these cases was not decided honestly. It seems strange that 
men who have ever had any experience in the trial of lawsuits can 
refer to the cases as having any bearing on the charges preferred 
against the judge. No doubt all of the cases were very carefully 
tried by able counsel who contended—and contended honestly—for 
the decision rendered by Judge Speer. The law announced in most of 
these cases is quite familiar. The questions involved were questions 
as to whether the facts justified the application of the legal principles 
applied. If law was an exact science there would be no occasion for 
appellate courts. When a judge erred he should be impeached. 

These complaints appear to rest on the theory that if an appellate 
court finds that a lower court has gone beyond its jurisdiction some 
culpable act has been established. This is certainly a novel doc¬ 
trine. Equally novel is the contention that something culpable has 
been established if in any case a court appoints a receiver without 
first giving notice. It is the duty of every court to decide whether 
it has jurisdiction, and it has a right to be mistaken, if it is an honest 
mistake. It has been the duty of Judge Speer to appoint receivers 
without first giving notice, and all the public asks is an honest use 
of that power. 

The first and second cases referred to in this enumeration are dis¬ 
cussed in the Huff case, page 185 of this report. The case against 
the Merchants & Miners Transportation Co. was not reversed. The 
error complained of was held to be immaterial. In this case the 
defendant was convicted of a violation of the antitrust law. Who 
has suggested this case as a grievance ? In The First National Bank 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 195 

v. Hopkins the judge was reversed on a mere technicality. When 
Snodgrass, who made the complaint, undertook to argue it on its 
merits Judge Speer said it was too plain for argument. After the 
appeal Snodgrass came to the same conclusion, and settled it by pay¬ 
ing the whole claim. In Gabaniss v. Reco Mining Co. it was held on 
appeal that a receiver should not have been appointed. It is urged 
that Judge Speer defeated this holding and the mandate of the 
appellate court by appointing a receiver in a bankruptcy proceeding 
in this same case, the Roger & Joiner Co. case. This contention is 
absurd. In every bankruptcy proceeding the debtor’s property is 
taken from him and placed in the hands of a receiver or a trustee. 
The case of Heck v. The Joseph Dry Goods Co. is fully discussed in 
the brief filed on behalf of Judge Speer, pages 1016 and 1017. There 
is absolutely nothing in any of these cases that can not be duplicated 
in the record of any judge that has had any service on the bench. 

Attention is called in the majority report in connection with these 
cases to a comment made by Judge Speer upon a statement of Mr. 
Meldrim, of Savannah. Mr. Meldrim’s attention was called to a 
statement of Colton Lewis to the effect that Judge Speer had been 
reversed 19 times in 41 appeals. The judge did not make any state¬ 
ment that this was all the cases that had been appealed nor all the 
cases in which he had been reversed. Mr. Lewis had submitted 
these figures for the purpose of showing how often the judge had been 
reversed. Mr. Meldrim did not agree with Mr. Lewis and expressed 
the opinion that if he had only been reversed in 19 out of 41 appeals 
it was a good showing. Judge Speer only called attention to this 
opinion. The report goes on to say that instead of being reversed on 
an average less than once a year, the average is more than three a 
year, and that nearly 50 per cent of the cases carried up have been 
reversed. There is nothing in the record to establish any such fact. 
But let us assume that the statement is correct—I have not tried to 
verify it; would not that record be a credible one when you come 
to consider that the judge, in the course of a year’s work, makes 
hundreds of orders subject to appeal? 

NEGLECT OF BUSINESS. 

Complaint is made that the judge has neglected court business. It 
is said there is difficulty in securing the trial of cases and that the 
judge has been absent from his district some three or four months 
each year. In support of this charge the majority refers to the testi¬ 
mony of Lawrence, Meldrim, Felder, Akerman, and an affidavit of 
T. T. Johnson. It is true that Judge Speer has been absent from his 
district some three or four months every year, but why does not the 
majority report, in commenting upon this fact, make mention of the 
reason why ? The judge goes up into the near-by mountains in north¬ 
ern Georgia or North Carolina in August or the last days of July and 
remains there until frost in October or the first days in November 
because during that time he is not able to remain in his own district 
on account of hay fever. No one has denied that it is necessary for 
him to remain away from his district during this period, not even his 
bitterest enemies. ‘ It would be impossible for him to do any work 
should he remain. In the mountains he is able to work and there, by 
consent of parties, try a number of cases every summer, besides doing 
other work. No one could read the evidence which this majority 


196 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

report purports to give without repeatedly reading the reason for this 
absence. A glance at the evidence upon which rests the charge that 
the judge has neglected his duties will further illustrate what reliance 
should be placed upon this report. Lawrence was asked, “Does he 
stay here (Savannah) long enough to discharge his duty as judge and 
clean up the docket ? ” 

To this Lawrence answered: 

I don’t know much about his dockets. I generally get my cases tried, because I 

don’t have very many of them here, but I have heard-. I think that is generally 

the complaint in regard to that; it takes you forever to get a case tried, you see; he don’t 
hold his four terms of court, and only here for trying cases once a year; and he will do 
this way, for instance, with Mr. Meldrim: He will have a block of cases that it would 
take a whole railroad to be brought here to try and the cases can not be tried, and it 
is another year before the cases can be tried, I think, as far as that is concerned. 

Evidently Lawrence had no personal grievance. He admits his 
cases have been tried promptly enough. As we proceed with this 
report we shall find that he has had at least some of his cases tried 
too promptly to suit him. He is complaining on behalf of others. 
He starts out by saying he has “ heard’’ that there has been trouble 
about getting cases tried, but evidently thinks that statement too 
strong, so he modifies it by saying that he “thinks” that is the 
general complaint. 

Is he quite certain that he “thinks” there has been complaint? 
The last part of this testimony would indicate that he only thinks 
that he thinks so. He refers us to Mr. Meldrim, another attorney, 
who has had occasion to regret that some of his clients have been 
brought to trial. He says of Meldrim that he has cases enough so 
that it requires a whole railroad to bring them in for trial; but, strange 
as it may seem, Meldrim, with all his cases, gives us no facts upon 
which to base this complaint. He says that quite often there has 
been complaint, but he only mentions one case in which he has 
suffered, and in that case he does not blame the judge (p. 578). If 
it was true that there was any lack of attention to business on the 
part of the judge, these men would know all about it. They are the 
leading attorneys for the railroads and corporations at Savannah. 
The other witnesses, except Akerman, add nothing. Mr. Felder testi¬ 
fied that he had tried one case at the Highlands, outside of the district, 
and he says he has been at Mount Airy, but for what purpose he 
does not explain. He makes a great deal of complaint, because he 
says the judge invited in the ladies to hear the trial at the Highlands; 
and I notice that the co ^mittee considered that of sufficient impor¬ 
tance to call attention to it. 

Well, if that is a grievance Mr. Felder has my sympathy. I don’t 
see what other relief he can get. When Akerman was asked if the 
business of the district had been neglected by Judge Speer, he an¬ 
swered that he could not state in regard to anything but criminal 
business. He said ‘ ‘ the moonshine, illicit distilling, and retailing cases 
had been woefully neglected.” As to the others, he made no com¬ 
plaint except that the judge has been absent during a part of each 
year, but he admitted that he had seen the judge suffer intensely from 
hay fever, and that in consequence it was necessary for him to be 
absent. This statement from Akerman, who has been assistant dis¬ 
trict attorney for many years, and is very bitter against the judge, is 
pretty good evidence that there has been no neglect of duty, unless 
it is of the class of cases mentioned. If there had been neglect of 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 197 

other civil or criminal business he must have known it. Judge Speer 
explains in his testimony why at one time there was a number of 
these liquor cases by saying that it was due to the fact that he had no 
district attorney to prosecute them and could not get them tried on 
that account. Mr. Akerman does not show any effort on his part to 
have them tried except at one time when an outside judge was brought 
in who tried a few cases after the trial of the Green & Gaynor cause, 
which took three months to try, after which Judge Speer was sick for 
some time. But why should this class of testimony be considered? 
Why not bring in the record of how many days Judge Speer holds 
court each year? That record is public and malice can not distort it. 
Judge Speer testified this record would show that he actually aver¬ 
aged more than 200 days in open court each year. Add to that 8 holi¬ 
days and 52 Sundays. What time has he left for vacation and pre¬ 
paring opinions in cases submitted to *him. If there had been the 
slightest merit in this charge, you would have found a congested cal¬ 
endar. No attempt is made to show anything of the kind. Such 
testimony would not serve the purpose of those pushing these charges. 
The complaint that the judge did not hold four terms of court each year 
at Savannah is not accompanied with any showing that any business 
suffered on that account. Mr. Meldrim was asked: 

You mean that Judge Speer never appeared on the dates fixed by law to have 
court held? 

To this he answered: 

Mr. Chairman, I would not say that, because that would necessitate thinking upon 
the general practice of the court, but I think, notwithstanding, in all fairness, this much 
should be said, that during the fall term our business interests and professional inter¬ 
ests were such that, taking it all in all, there would be no object to having cases tried 
at a later season (p. 1653). 

A little later on in his testimony he calls attention to the fact that 
having four terms fixed by law makes it necessary to file pleadings 
more promptly than would otherwise be the case, thus hastening 
trials, and he makes no complaint that not more than two terms 
have been held at Savannah each year, and there is nothing in the 
record to show that there was any business that required attention 
if the terms were held. The Supreme Court of the United States, 
with a calendar always congested, takes as much and more of a holi¬ 
day each year than Judge Speer, and they provide no substitute 
when they adjourn for the summer, which it would appear the com¬ 
mittee considers necessary in the case of Judge Speer. 

CONTINGENT FEES. 

THE BEACH, GRAY, CARTER, AND HESTER CASES. 

Meldrim testified that Talley & Heyward appeared for plaintiffs in 
a false imprisonment case against Mr. Hester, sheriff of Montgomery 
County, Ga.; that the court adopted plaintiff's view of the case from 
the start, and his conduct was exceedingly injudicious. Plaintiff 
recovered a verdict from a jury of $5,000. No specific complaint is 
made of the charge to the jury or any other specific act. Mr. Meldrim 
testifies that before the trial commenced he said to Mr. Talley: “Look 
here, Talley, you and Heyward have a contingent fee in this case and 


198 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

I have an idea that I won’t allow Judge Speer to try it—that I will 
raise this question.” Questioned by Mr. Webb: 

“Why? Because Mr. Heyward was a son-in-law of the judge?” 
Answer: “ No; I do not mean to insinuate or suggest that this fact that 
Heyward was Judge Speer’s son-in-law would affect his rulings, but I 
did not propose to take the chance. Mr. Heyward is an awfully nice 
young fellow, and Talley and I are good friends; and Talley, with that 
peculiar smile of his, rather threw up his hands and said, ‘Well, you 
wouldn’t do that, would you?’ I said, ‘No; I don’t believe I would 
go on with the case.’ I have perhaps regretted that I did.” The 
charge now made is that the judge’s son-in-law had a contingent fee 
in the case. 

This is no doubt true, but there is no intimation that the judge had 
any notice of that fact; while the defendant’s counsel did have such 
notice and did waive it. It is also quite apparent, not only from 
Mr. Meldrim’s action, but also from his testimony, that he did not be¬ 
lieve that such relationship would affect the judge’s rulings. In con¬ 
nection with this matter it should be borne in mind that Mr. Heyward 
took no part in the case. He was not present. Mr. Talley only took 
a minor part. The man who brought the suit and who was the leading 
counsel in the case was a Mr. Cohen. Mr. Meldrim testified, in answer 
to questions from Mr. Calloway: “You knew before the trial that they 
(Talley and Heyward) had a contingent fee?” Mr. Meldrim: “Only 
from Mr. Talley.” Calloway: “And you did not call that to the 
attention of the court ?” Meldrim: “ No, sir; and I make no complaint 
about that at all.” Calloway: “If you did complain of it, it would 
have been your duty to call it to the attention of the court?” Mel¬ 
drim: “Yes,sir.” (587.) Mr. Meldrim testified further that he had 
no reason to know that the judge knew that Talley & Heyward had a 
contingent fee in this case. 

The charge that the judge presided in cases in which his son-in-law, 
Mr. Heyward, had a contingent fee is very fully discussed in the judges’ 
brief (1062-1065). It is not claimed that the judge ever presided in 
a case in which he knew Mr. Heyward had such a fee unless it can be 
said that the appearance of Mr. Heyward’s firm as attorneys for cred¬ 
itors asking that certain parties be placed in bankruptcy involved a 
contingent fee. Unless there was a contract fixing the fee at a spec¬ 
ified sum, whether the parties were declared bankrupt or not, the 
attorneys for the petitioning creditors would ordinarily secure larger 
fees if bankruptcy should be declared, but they would not fail to 
get a fee as is usual in case of contingent fees. I do not believe 
that such a fee can be said, to be a contingent fee; it is only con¬ 
tingent as to amount. My experience has been, and I believe it 
is the experience of every lawyer, that a successful issue justifies and 
is ordinarily rewarded by a larger fee than is a defeat; still, no one 
would contend that because success gives a larger fee than defeat such 
increase makes the fee contingent. If the rule that the majority of 
the committee appear to approve of is to prevail, then no one related 
to a judge can practice before him. The cases referred to in the 
evidence in support of this charge are the Beach Manufacturing 
Co. case, the Gray Lumber Co. case, and the L. Carter case. The 
Beach Manufacturing Co. case has already been quite fully discussed. 
In that case a receiver was appointed* by Judge Speer, but that 
appointment did not determine teat Mr. Heyward or liis firm would 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 199 

be entitled to any attorneys’ fees. It was an order simply to pre¬ 
serve the estate until the question could be decided whether this 
company was in fact insolvent. Later on the judge made another 
order in accordance with an agreement of parties that the receiver 
should be continued and authorized to carry on the business and 
consent was given to raise money to do so. This is the much-abused 
order upon which Judge Speer in accordance with the facts indorsed 
the words “By consent.” This order with or without those words 
could not effect the question of attorneys’ fees to Mr. Heyward or 
his firm. Section 3 of the bankruptcy act makes this clear. To 
secure such attorneys’ fees it is necessary that the debtor must first 
be declared insolvent. This consent order can only effect the costs 
to the receiver. If they consented to the receivership they may have 
to pay such part of his fees as the court may consider proper, but 
this has nothing to do with attorneys’ fees to creditors. The 
Beach Manufacturing Co. demanded a jury trial on the question of 
whether they were insolvent or not and the jury found they were 
not insolvent but that question was not tried by Judge Speer, but 
the judge who presided at the trial at once put this company back 
into the hands of a receiver. In none of the proceedings in this case 
did Judge Speer try any issue that involved the question of attorneys’ 
fees to Mr. Heyward. In the Gray Lumber Co. case pages have been 
written in the majority report condemning the action of Judge Speer. 
There is nothing to justify complaint. The officers of the com¬ 
pany asked that the company be placed in the hands of a receiver. 
Against this some of the creditors objected, others consented. A 
receiver was appointed, but the question of solvency, which would 
determine the question of attorneys’ fees, was not "tried by Judge 
Speer. 

The only thing he did was to appoint the receiver. (816 and 817.) 

Since the hearing was had in Georgia the question involved in 
that case has been retried before another judge and Judge Speer’s 
action upheld, which must mean that the jurisdictional facts, the 
chief bone of contention, have been found to exist. I wonder how 
the attorneys who vented their spleen on Judge Speer and character¬ 
ized his action as ridiculous are going to square their views 
with this new demonstration of the depravity of courts. Why 
these parties should cite the L. Carter case as a demonstration of 
favoritism on the part of the judge is more than can be figured out. 
In that case the only matter that came before the judge was an appli¬ 
cation by Isaacs & Heyward to appoint a receiver, this application 
the judge denied. In connection with this the majority report very 
uncharitably suggests that this application was denied for the reason 
that Mr. Colton Lewis, the one who investigated these charges for the 
Department of Justice, was present at the time and thereby in a 
fashion intimidated the judge to do the right thing. If the judge does 
a thing which a lot of disappointed attorneys criticize then his action 
is corrupt, and if he does a thing which they approve of they charge 
that his motive for even doing that is corrupt. Pretty hard to satisfy. 
The issue that would determine whether Mr. Heyward’s firm should 
receive any attorneys’ fee from either of these companies was not 
passed on by Judge Speer. 

In neither of these cases was Mr. Heyward’s firm the only counsel; 
they were associated in each case with other reputable attorneys who 


200 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

were present and took part in the proceeding, while Mr. Heyward 
was not present nor did he take any part in any of these cases (1056 
to 1061). The attorneys who opposed Mr. Heyward’s firm knew that 
he was a son-in-law of the judge, but they did not object. Is it not 
rather mean after having consented to the appearance of Isaacs 
& Heyward in these cases to in this fashion blame the judge? They 
know that if they had acted the manly part by objecting to the 
appearance of.Mr. Heyward’s firm, the judge would have refused to 
hear the matter. 


FEES TO FAVORITES. 

FIXING OF FEES. 

The finding that Judge Speer improperly raised the fee of Orville 
Park, one of the attorneys for the creditors in the White Sulpher Co. 
bankruptcy matter rests on conjecture and not proof. There is not 
a word of testimony that indicates that Judge Speer in fixing this fee 
had in mind granting any favor to Mr. Park. The judge had a right 
to consider in fixing this fee the additional $3,400 that had been 
brought into the estate since his fee had been fixed by the referee 
whether Mr. Park or his firm had taken any part in the proceedings 
under which it was realized or not. It is a familiar rule that in bank¬ 
ruptcy matters the attorneys for the creditors are paid fees in pro¬ 
portion to the estate involved. It appears that Park, or rather the 
firm of which he is a member, asked for the increase and submitted in 
that connection a letter from the referee showing the increase in the 
estate over and above the amount realized at the time his fees had 
been fixed by the referee. Upon this showing the judge might very 
properly have increased the fee of Mr. Park if his services warranted 
such increase, and there is nothing to show that the fee was not 
justified. Of the fee that was increased from $350 to $550, the firm 
of Hardeman, Jones, Park & Johnston only received ore-half. 
Assuming that Park got one-fourth oUthis one-half, or one-eighth of 
the $200 increase, $25, it would be pretty small sum for a corrupt 
payment. In connection with this, it might be recalled that one 
member of this firm, Mr. Jones, testified against Judge Speer in this 
hearing. Evidently the firm has not been favored to such an extent 
that its members have any pecuniary interest in having Judge Speer 
retained on the bench. 

In the Roger & Joiner case, complaint is made that Orville Park, 
the trustee, was allowed compensation in excess of the amount 
allowed by law and that the firm of which he was a member was also 
favored by having their fees raised beyond the amount fixed by the 
referee. Park was elected trustee by the creditors and Judge Speer 
had nothing to do with his selection. It is true that he was allowed 
compensation in excess of that provided by law but the order ex¬ 
pressly states that the allowance is made because all the creditors, 
the only persons interested in opposing such an allowance, consented 
that it be paid. It is idle to urge that such an order would be illegal. 
Whatever extra compensation was allowed was deducted out of the 
sums paid creditors. The creditors simply said to the judge what¬ 
ever you consider fair pay to Mr. Park, take it out of our pockets 
and give it to him. The criticism that Mr. Park as trustee employed 
his own firm and that this firm also had their compensation raised 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 201 

by the judge is based on a mistake of facts. Park’s firm was not his 
attorneys. The record shows that T. S. Felder, Hardeman, Turner 
& Jones, Bacon, Miller & Brunson were his attorneys, and it was 
these attorneys whose fees were raised. Park was not a member 
of this firm in 1904 when the order in question was made, and there 
is not a word in the record which supports the unfair insinuation 
that in 1904 Mr. Park was in any way a favorite of Judge Speer. 
How these facts can be distorted into a charge of favoritism is strange. 
Equally strange is the charge in connection with the case of Standard 
& Son. They charge there is another allowance of illegal and excessive 
fees. Cook Clayton was not clerk of court at the time these fees were 
allowed to him and Judge Speer did not allow him a penny; besides, 
the record shows that the fees were not excessive and were such as 
allowed by law. These fees were fixed by the referee, J. Ganahl, 
and afterwards approved by Judge Grubb. Judge Speer had noth¬ 
ing to do with these fees whatever. I am not able to see any relevancy 
in the comment made upon Exhibit 18 said to b& attached to the 
majority report. If the judge struck out the names of Irwin & 
Sutton, he only did what he said in his evidence was his custom, not to 
interfere with receivers in the selection of their own attorneys. Irwin 
& Sutton were nevertheless the attorneys for the receiver in this case. 

The testimony of Mr. Akerman in regard to a certain fee allowed 
Calloway & Irvine is not only denied by the judge in his testimony, but 
also disapproved by a letter from Mr. Calloway. Akerman claimed 
that Judge Speer had taken offense at this firm of attorneys because 
they had misled him into allowing them a large fee, because he under¬ 
stood they had rendered gratuitous service to his son-in-law, Mr. Hey¬ 
ward, when, in fact, they had received compensation from the estate 
that was involved. The judge, in this connection, calls attention to 
the fact that in tead of favoring this firm he had, at this time, reduced 
the fee of $4,500 or $4,000, fixed by a master, and to which no objec¬ 
tions had been filed, to about $3,200. This must have been the case 
to which Mr. Akerman refers. On its face, this story is ridiculous, 
unless the attorneys were twice paid in the same case and for the same 
services. If that was true, and such payment was procured through 
decept.on, the judge ought to be indignant. If it was not for the 
same services, can anyone explain how Mr. Heyward was involved or 
why the judge should be indignant ? It is not claimed that the serv¬ 
ices were rendered for Mr. Heyward as an individual, but in a case 
where he had no personal interest, but was simply acting as receiver 
or trustee. As such Mr. Heyward could not possibly profit by hav¬ 
ing the services rendered gratuitou ly; but perhaps it is not mate¬ 
rial that the story is ridiculous, if it blames the judge for something 

For information in regard to the complaint of Mr. Burwell see 
pages 927 and 993. Mr. Burwell was asked if he knew of anything 
that would show favoritism, and he said he did not. The criticism 
of Judge Speer because he suggested the employment of Judge Cobb 
in the Huff case needs no apology. In the difficult litigation, such as 
was involved in that case, Judge Speer might very properly select a 
man of the character and ability of Judge Cobb. Judge Speer did not 
fix the fees of Judge Cobb in this case. The fees were fixed by special 
master, and no exceptions were taken to the amount. The fact that 
Judge Cobb did perform services for Judge Speer without demanding 
pay is no reason why Judge Speer might not very properly appoint 


202 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

him to perform the duties mentioned. To contend that such an ap¬ 
pointment is the slightest evidence of corruption has no merit. No 
one contends that the appointment of Judge Cobb was not a wise 
and proper one. That he did his duty honestly and capably stands 
unchallenged. There is nothing that looks like testimony that would 
even tend to show that the fees allowed him were excessive. Must a 
judge hate a man before he can appoint him? Must Judge Speer 
appoint men such as Snodgrass, Akerman, Lawrence, Osborne, Meldrim, 
Felder, Padget, or any other enemy for fear that a committee of Con¬ 
gress might find him corrupt. If my friends on this committee know 
of judges that appoint their bitterest enemies for fear of such charges, 
they ought to be investigated. 

The criticism that Mr. White, the marshal of the district, received 
fees as receiver in bankruptcy cases is met by the statute that ex¬ 
pressly authorizes the appointment of marshals to that office and 
prescribes their fees. It is said in the report that marshals in other 
districts turn these fees over to the Government. If the majority 
members have any evidence upon which any marshal can be con¬ 
victed of anything as ridiculous as that he certainly ought to be inves¬ 
tigated. An attempt has been made to show favoritism on the part 
of the judge toward Mr. White. To establish this charge every 
appointment as trustee or receiver that he ever received is charged 
directly to Judge Speer and every fee paid him is likewise charged as 
having b'een allowed by the judge. This is utterly unfair. White 
explains that several of his appointments were made by referees and 
that in some instances the parties concerned petitioned for his appoint¬ 
ment. Fees were always fixed upon sworn evidence, and the amount 
allowed was subject to exceptions by the party interested. An apt 
illustration of this unfair method is the criticism of Mr. L. M. Baker. 
The concern of which he was a member was put in bankruptcy by 
Mr. Isaacs as referee. Isaacs appointed Mr. Heyward receiver, the 
creditors appointed Heyward trustee, and the matter was all settled 
up and the fees agreed on by the parties and paid, and there is not 
a word of testimony to show that Judge Speer ever knew of it. It was 
claimed by the attorney for Judge Speer that he was in Alaska when 
this happened (pp. 702-707); still Mr. Baker charged Judge Speer 
with what happened in that case. Mr. Snodgress testified that Talley 
& Hayward and Haws & Pattle did not earn $2,000 in the Oliver bank¬ 
ruptcy case, but he says he would have taken that fee if he could 
have got it. Akerman, on the other hand, testified that this fee was 
not too large (p. 415). When two such friends of Judge Speer disagree, 
I am inclined to accept the judgment of the master who fixed it and 
not retry the question, especially as those interested in the bank¬ 
ruptcy estate did not object. 

The complaint that Judge Speer raised the fees of others that 
his son-in-law might profit by it rests upon the testimony of Mr. 
Akerman alone, and he does not testify to anything of the kind. 
In the famous Oliver bankruptcy case, the instance relied on, fees 
were allowed to a large number of attorneys, including the firm of 
Mr. Heyward, the judge’s son-in-law; Akerman testified repeatedly, 
however, that he did not think the fee allowed Mr. Heyward’s firm 
was excessive. (See p. 415.) Akerman objected to the amount 
allowed his firm and when he came to present the objections to the 
court he expressed the opinion that their fees were less in proportion 
than those allowed other attorneys. All the fees that had been fixed 


CHAEGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMOEY SPEEE, 203 

by a master and the five days allowed, under a standing rule of court 
within which exceptions could be taken to the amount of the fee, 
had expired (p. 415). Mr. Akerman could therefore not object to the 
fee of Mr. Heyward or anyone else except those to his own firm. 
Proper exceptions had been filed in tipie in his case. Nor did he 
express any desire to have the fee of Mr. Heyward or anyone else re¬ 
duced. It is perfectly clear that he only compared his fee with those 
allowed other attorneys as an argument for increasing his own and not 
for reducing the fee of anyone else. The judge did increase Aker- 
man’s fee, but Akerman appears to be dissatisfied with the amount 
allowed. His fee was raised from $200 to $375. Akerman says that 
he had testified that his fee should be $500 (p. 374). It appears, 
that notwithstanding that Akerman testified that the fees allowed 
Mr. Pleyward, the judge’s son-in-law, were reasonable, and not¬ 
withstanding that no objection had or could at that time be made 
to the allowance fixed by the master as fees to Mr. Heyward and his 
associates the judge reduced their allowance quite materially. If 
I remember correctly, the amount deducted for expenses was about 
equal to the increase allowed Mr. Akerman. The order making 
these changes was offered in evidence, but I am not able to find it in 
the record. (See p. 415, where this order is referred to.) 

The statement of Mr. Akerman that Judge Speer wanted his 
son-in-law appointed assistant district attorney is rather amusing. 
Akerman tells us that the only reason he has for the opinion is that 
Talley told him that he, Talley, wanted Mr. Heyward appointed, 
but at the same time said that the judge was opposed to the appoint¬ 
ment. After this Mr. Akerman heard that Heyward denounced him. 
Mr. Akerman then went to Judge Speer and charged him with desiring 
the appointment. In response to this charge the judge told him 
that he had nothing whatever to do with the matter and had never 
asked for the appointment. Upon this testimony Mr. Akerman 
furnished an expert opinion that Mr. Talley and the judge lied to 
him. He based his opinion on the claim that this occurrence caused 
the judge to treat him coolly. Well, Mr. Akerman’s own statement 
would justify some resentment. It is not everybody that likes to 
have another tell him that he is lying to him. More than likely Mr. 
Akerman was trying to even up with the judge for having refused liis 
request to consent to have a clerk in Mr. Akerman’s office appointed 
assistant district attorney; a clerk which Mr. Akerman said was in¬ 
competent and which the judge said was dishonest (pp. 377-394). 

COURT OFFICERS AS PERSONAL SERVANTS. 

The claim that Judge Speer has used his court officers as per¬ 
sonal servants is only an illustration of the malice so apparent in 
this case. It appears clearly that the judge had an abundance of 
servants without using the court officers. They no doubt rendered 
some slight service at times, but no claim is made that the court 
business suffered in any way and the judge says that he paid them 
for all services rendered. Mr. Barnes took occasion in connection 
with this charge to retail a little of his gossip. While he was going 
on at a great rate telling the committee about what Mr. Tucker had 
told him, one of the attorneys for Mr. Speer produced some letters 
from Mr. Lucius M. Lamar, the United States marshal, appointed 


204 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


by President Cleveland, under whom this much aggrieved Mr. Tucker 
did service. These letters which may be found on pages 333-334, 
show how false was the story of Mr. Tucker and his friend Barnes. 
The testimony of the judge on this subject is practically undisputed. 
(See evidence, pp. 893-894.) 

THE HARRIS CASE. 

The case of Mr. Harris against the judge is simply that of a bank¬ 
rupt who was defeated by the activities of the judge in his scheme of 
paying his creditors 21 cents on the dollar instead of 47 cents. 
The additional 26 cents were secured through the action of the 
judge in apprising the creditors of their rights to certain property, 
which Mr. Harris was seeking to save for himself. It is amusing to 
have this man complain about the fees allowed. The fees were all 
fixed by consent of parties and approved by a master without objec¬ 
tion on the part of anyone. The judge did not fix any of the fees. 
(368.) Regardless of the fact that these fees were all fixed by agree¬ 
ment of parties, and there is no evidence that any of them were 
excessive, the majority report insinuates that there was something 
wrong in the fact that Judge Cobb was paid a fee in this case. The 
reason assigned is that Judge Cobb at one time appeared for Judge 
Speer in a probate proceeding in which he was involved, and in that 
proceeding Judge Cobh did not charge Judge Speer any attorney’s fee. 
Suppose that Judge Speer suggested the employment of Mr. Cobb 
and had fixed his fee, would it not be as reasonable and sort as well 
with a spirit of fairness to insinuate that Judge Speer may have 
made the suggestion of Judge Cobb’s employment because he knew 
that he was a very fine lawyer and a man of the very highest 
character ? 

Judge Cobb has occupied a distinguished place on the Supreme 
Court of Georgia. The insinuation contained in the majority report 
does not only reflect on Judge Speer, but is as serious a reflection 
upon the character of Judge Cobb. It is a reflection utterly unjust 
and indefensible from any viewpoint. This case is more fully dis¬ 
cussed in the judge’s brief (pp. 1012 to 1016). The criticism of Mr. 
Akerman, based on the judge’s refusal to withdraw from the case 
when Mr. McNiel filed an affidavit of prejudice, is not important. 
Mr. Akerman advised the judge that he was not disqualified and the 
circuit court of appeals held that he was right. In this case Mr. Har¬ 
ris’s attorney complained because he did not like the judge’s opinion 
of the law applicable to his case, and hence charged prejudice. 
Most States provide that a judge must know some law before he 
becomes a judge. The judge had acquired his views of the law and 
facts in this case in considering an application properly presented to 
him for his decision. To prevent him from making a formal order 
after he had decided the matter, the application was withdrawn to 
enable Mr. Harris to beat his creditors. Had the judge acquiesced 
in what his maligners sought to accomplish, he might have been sub¬ 
ject to criticism. 

SCARBORO CASE. 

The Scarboro case illustrates the general methods pursued in this 
investigation. Instead of trying to get at the actual facts, the judge’s 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 205 

bitterest enemies were allowed to swear to all sorts of hearsay and 
encouraged to embellish that hearsay with every possible opinion 
that malice and mendacity could invent. Where witnesses were on 
hand to disprove this fabric of falsehood, they were kept off the stand 
on the plea that this was a preliminary hearing and not a trial. 
Scarboro was indicted for a violation of the national-bank act. He 
was defended by a number of prominent attorneys. After the case 
had been on trial for a short time Judge Speer suggested to Mr. 
Akerman that he thought the defendant guilty and he ought to get; 
an attorney to assist him in the prosecution. The firm of Pope & 
Bennett were engaged for that purpose. There certainly was nothing 
improper in this. Mr. Akerman admits that he was overmatched 
by defendant's counsel. The case dragged on for several days. 
The defense introduced no evidence. After the ca; e was argued, 
Mr. Akerman "ays the judge turned loose in the most teriffic charge 
against the Government, which was little short of a peremptory 
instruction for the defense, and added that a copy of this charge 
is on file in the Department of Justice. When this criticism of the 
charge was made, Judge Speer arose with a copy of it in his hand and 
asked leave to rekd it to show how unjust was this criticism, but he 
was denied permission, and for some reason the charge has not been 
printed in the record, though it was introduced in evidence. Still the 
majority report approves the substance of this criticism. Is there 
anvthing fair in ^ uch methods ? 

There is absolutely nothing in the charge to justify this finding. 
I appeal to the charge itself. Let it be produced. On cross-exami¬ 
nation of Mr. Akerman the charge in question was handed to him, 
and he was asked to point out (see p. 396) in it what was not law, 
or, if law, not applicable to the evidence, or any unfair statements 
or undue emphasis, but he was unable to point out a single thing, 
though he read it over carefully. It would seem that was as com¬ 
plete a refutation of that slander as it well could be. Air. Akerman 
made a further complaint. He says that after a mistrial had been 
declared by the judge, because the jury failed to agree, Air. White 
told him that the judge, after being informed that the jury stood 
10 to 2 for conviction, directed Mr. White not to let the jury go 
back to deliberate, but to keep them walking until he could declare 
a mistrial. This statement is entirely hearsay. Mr. White, who 
is charged with having made it, flatly contradicts it (p. 483). He 
explains further that the jury were taken our for a walk and were 
thereafter taken to a hotel for supper, and that after supper they 
went back to their jury room for deliberation and remained there 
for that purpose another half hour before they were taken into the 
courtroom, when a mistrial was declared. Riley and Burns, the two 
officers in charge of this jury, were present before the committee, 
but neither of them was called to testify. 

Instead of the testimony of Mr. Burns, what purports to be an 
affidavit of his was offered in evidence. I am told that Mr. Burns 
was subpoenaed as a witness from his home in Florida. That on his 
arrival at Savannah he was shown the affidavit now in evidence and 
asked if he could testify to the facts set out in it, and that he refused 
to do so, saying that it was not true that he had been instructed to 
keep the jury walking and not take them back to their room for 
further deliberation. That as soon as it was discovered that he 


206 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


would not swear to the facts contained in the affidavit, Burns was 
discharged from further attendance upon the committee and sent 
home. I was not told whether any member of the committee knew 
of this occurrence or whether others interested in pushing these 
charges were responsible for it, but I am sure that Mr. Burns was 
there in attendance on the committee and that he was sent home 
without being sworn and his affidavit used in place of his testimony. 
I am equally sure that Mr. Riley was there and that he was not 
called nor was Mr. Bitijman. Judge Speer in his testimony emphati¬ 
cally denied giving any such directions, but regardless of this denial 
by both Mr. White and Judge Speer, the hearsay statement of Mr. 
Akerman is sufficient to sway the judgment of the majority members 
of this committee. Is it believed that the Senate will accept such 
evidence on a charge of impeachment or are these findings only for 
the purpose of satisfying the malignity of Mr. Speer’s enemies ? 
This case was retried before another judge and another mistrial 
resulted after the jury had been out 96 hours, when the case was 
dismissed. (See further judge’s brief, pp. 1007-1009.) 

CHARGES EXCEEDING JURISDICTION IN CASES OF J. T. HILL, GORDON SAUSSY, KAER- 
NEY WRIGHT, AND EMMA POWERS. 

The complaint of J. T. Hill does not appeal to my sympathy. His 
grievance is that the judge issued an order requiring him to show 
cause why he should not pay over to his client certain money. The 

E apers upon which the judge acted charged that part of this money 
ad been collected by Mr. Hill for his client and that part had been 
paid him as an attorney’s fee, but that Hill had neglected and refused 
to perform any service for him as such attorney and had refused to 
pay over the money collected for him or return any part of the attor¬ 
ney’s fee, though this money had been demanded. Upon this com¬ 
plaint, which was produced before the committee, but which does not 
appear in the record, it is clear that the judge had the power to issue 
the order notwithstanding any finding of the majority members to 
the contrary. In the case of Jeffries v. Lawrier (23 Fed., 786), Judge 
Brewer issued a like order and on final hearing directed the payment 
of $4,635.50 from an attorney to his client. The law books are full 
of like cases, and almost every State has a statute that author¬ 
izes this sort of a proceeding. Upon the testimony it is quite clear 
that Mr. Hill need not play the injured innocent. From his own 
statement it is apparent that he entirely neglected his client’s interests 
and still retained his money and deprived him of a chance to use 
that money to secure another lawyer. 

The only thing that he did do, according to his own statement, was 
to spend a few minutes in dictating a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, a petition that he knew, within a few minutes after he had 
dictated it, was useless. His own evidence is a lame attempt to 
excuse himself for not having rendered his client the services that 
he had agreed to render. He shows how he was engaged in court in 
other matters so as to be prevented, and that on account of his 
physical condition he was going away to Florida. To add to his 
unfaithful conduct to his client he even makes a personal attack upon 
him. For a witness that is willing even to expose his own repre¬ 
hensible conduct for the purpose of attacking the judge, I can have 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 207 


nothing but contempt. If there is one thing that lawyers owe to 
their clients it is absolute loyalty. This matter is more fuily discussed 
in the judge’s brief (pp. 1018-1022). 

The Kaerney Wright andEmmaPowers matters are discussed in the 
judge's brief (p. 1009), and so is the R. C. Mulhalland matter (p. 1010). 
That the court had ample power to punish Mulhalland for contempt 
is evident. The fine of $1 each imposed on Wright and Powers was 
paid by the judge. Whether he had the power to impose this fine 
would depend on the circumstances, but conceding that he did not; 
no harm was intended and none resulted. Mr. E. P. Davis eery 
tainly does not make a case against the judge. He was fined for 
contempt upon his own statement that he had told his client, who 
was bound over to appear at court, to leave the court in direct viola¬ 
tion of his duty to remain there. Why should he not be fined (p. 424) ? 

Gordon Saussy only attempts to review the action of the judge in 
ordering him to pay over to a court stenographer the sum of $55 that 
he had collected from his client for the purpose of making this pay¬ 
ment. In this the judge was clearly within his right. (See Wright v, 
Nordland, 58 How., par. 184.) At any rate there is nothing in the 
contention beyond a dispute as to what the law is or is not (p. 548). 
The question of jurisdiction was not raised in any of these cases. 

REFUSAL TO DISMISS CASES OF ANTON P. WRIGHT AND DAVID C. 

BARROW. 

The matter of which Mr. Wright makes complaint is quite simple. 
A petition had been presented giving the court jurisdiction of a 
bankruptcy proceeding. An application was then made for the ap¬ 
pointment of a receiver and the judge found that it was a proper 
case for such an appointment. After this determination had been 
made, but before the receiver had actually been appointed, Mr. 
Wright went to the judge and tried to have him dismiss the proceed¬ 
ings so that his client could get a preference over other creditors in 
violation of the bankruptcy act. It may be that the judge was. 
provoked that an attorney should present such a proposition to him. 
Had he granted the request, there would have been some real cause 
for complaint against the judge. Such composition can only be 
allowed by the creditors in a creditors’ meeting called upon proper 
notice. Clearly, Mr. Wright knew he could not get the other credi¬ 
tors to agree to anything of the kind, but hoped to find a new route 
around the law by having the court dismiss the proceedings. He 
appears to find fault now because Mr. White was made receiver, but 
he admits in his evidence without explanation that he himself wrote 
the order for the appointment of a receiver and inserted the name of 
Mr. White as such receiver. Speer did not select Mr. White’s attor¬ 
neys. The complaint of Mr. Davis that the judge would not allow 
him any fees in his illegal attempt to deprive the Federal court of 
its jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases has my sympathy, but I doubt 
that any legal grounds can be suggested why he would be entitled to 
any such compensation (p. 694). 

The majority report refers to the evidence of Mr. David C. Barrow as 
an illustration of arbitrary conduct. In an equity suit a restraining 
order was issued against the payment of a sum of money upon which 
the plaintiff claimed a hen. If this order had not been issued without 

H. Kept. 1176, 63-2-14 


208 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

notice, it is perfectly evident that the plaintiff would have lost his 
claim (p. 753). Mr. Barrow, attorney for the defendants, then saw 
Judge Speer and tried to have him set aside the order without any 
notice to the plaintiff’s attorney. The judge refused' this, but 
granted an order against the plaintiff’s attorney requiring him to 
show cause why the restraining order should not be set aside. How 
anyone could complain because the judge refused this request is 
strange. There is no claim that the showing upon which the order 
was issued was insufficient. Before this order to show cause was 
heard, plaintiff’s and defendants’ attorneys entered into a stipula¬ 
tion embodied in a consent order which provided that $3,500 should 
be paid into court to be held to satisfy plantiff’s claim of $3,362 
ana cost of suit. Upon hearing on the order to show cause, the 
court released all the money except the $3,500 and refused to 
issue a temporary injunction. Complaint now is made because the 
judge did not also release this $3,500, but Barrow admits (p. 754) 
that he had stipulated that this money should remain in court. Or, 
to be more accurate, he says it is fair to say that construction could 
be placed upon the order to which he had consented. I wonder why 
this bit of testimony, so important in this case, escaped the attention 
of the majority members in writing their report. 

The complaint that Judge Speer allowed certain money to remain 
on deposit without drawing any interest has already been adverted to 
and needs no further consideration. (See judge’s brief, pp. 1010- 
1012 .) 

USE OF DRUGS. 

The summary of Mr. Ballou’s testimony in regard to the sale of 
cocaine to Judge Speer has in it some surprising omissions. It ap¬ 
pears that during the last 10 years Mr. Ballou has sold to the judge 
1 or at most 2 ounces each year of a 3 per cent solution of cocaine; 
that some years he is not sure that he sold him any; that the judge 
called it a hay fever solution; and Ballou says he does not know if 
the judge ever knew that it contained cocaine; that the judge would 
get it with a lot of other medicine as he was going away to the moun¬ 
tains in the summer on account of his hay fever, or just as he was 
coming back in the fall. He further testifies that the amount he sold 
him each year would, not last a man addicted to the use of cocaine 
one day. In summing up the testimony of Dr. Little another strange 
omission appears in the majority report. He testifies that while 
Judge Speer was sick he gave him a minimum dose of morphine and 
a trephine, and that this “absolutely and completely quieted him.” 

The doctor said in this connection: 

It has come to me in this investigation—I have heard that the judge was 
addicted to the drug habit from what I consider very irresponsible people. The 
administration of that hypodermic would have; led me to believe that he had taken 
very little morphine, if any at all, for it was what is known as a minimum dose and 
its effect was prompt and complete. 

Strange how this testimony could have escaped the majority 
members; testimony, that if true, and there is no doubt of its truth, 
demonstrates that this charge is unfounded. To bolster up this 
utterly unsupported charge which Dr. Little says comes from very 
irresponsible people, the opinions of such enemies of the judge as 
Akerman, J. R. L. Smith, and H. S. Edwards are submitted. This 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 209 

is another illustration of the utterly unfair methods employed. The 
hearing was pu] lie. It was held in a court room crowded to the doors. 
Every enemy of the judge was invited to appear against him. They 
made no co?\cealment of their hostility; they were with very few 
exceptions disappointed litigants or attorneys.* They emulated each 
other in maki: g the most extravagant statements and were eagerly 
urged and coaxed on by the committee to do their worst. A very 
large part of the testimony is hearsay or oral testimony of the con¬ 
tents of court records. Much of it is a mass of abuse resting on no 
tangi le facts. 

In several instances where mere hearsay testimony had been sub¬ 
mitted the judge’s attorneys would call attention to witnesses present 
before the c ommittee who knew the actual facts and asked that they 
be sworn so that the truth might be known, but these were not wanted 
and were brushed aside upon the theory that this was only a hearing 
and not a trial. This was illustrated in the King loan matter, in the 
Scarbora case, and this drug matter is another illustration. Mr. 
Howard, one of the judge’s attorneys (p. 208), called to the commit¬ 
tee’s attention the fact that Judge Speer’s physician, who had treated 
him for hay fever, was present in court and could testify on this sub¬ 
ject, but no attention was paid to his statement. At Macon, while 
the judge was being severely criticized for his conduct in the Jamison 
habeas-corpus matter, Judge Felton, the judge of the superior court 
before whom a writ of habeas corpus had been sued out in that case, 
after listening apparently with a good deal of disgust to the testi¬ 
mony, approached the committee and asked-to be permitted to ex¬ 
plain the matter, but he was promptly turned down. As he turned 
to leave the committee he said!, with evident feeling, that if he could 
not be heard here he knew he could be heard before the Senate. The 
letter of Mr. Edwards introduced in connection with this cocaine 
charge does not have the remotest bearing upon it. It could only be 
put in evidence to allow an old enemy to vent his spleen upon the 
judge. Edwards’s philosophical nonsense about constructive and de¬ 
structive spirituality and of lapsing of mood and lapsing of memory 
may be worth reading as a study of his mental condition. 

KING LOAN. 

The charge that the judge took money out of the court funds for 
his own use is the unkindest cut of all. The bare hearsay statement 
of a man dead more than 20 years that he loaned such funds to 
the judge is apparently credited as evidence against the judge, and 
this in face of the fact that competent evidence does exist which no 
doubt absolutely disproves the charge. The judge and his attor¬ 
neys challenged this committee to examine the records of the court 
and its registry and explained that these records had been so kept 
that if a dollar had ever been taken out illegally it would appear. 
They insisted that the record did show that there was not a word 
of truth in the accusation. The judge in commenting upon the mat¬ 
ter said in substance, as he pointed to persons there in the presence 
of the committee: “There sits Marion Erwin, who kept the accounts 
of the clerk and with the registry of the court, and there sits George 
W. Owens, the standing master in chancery, whose duty it was to 



210 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


pass upon the accounts of the clerk with the registry of the court, 
and the officers of the Merchants' National Bank, the registry, a 
bank whose doors it happens I have never entered, are here." But 
none of these were asked to testify. Erwin and King were both 
clerks at the time—one of the circuit and the other of the district 
court. This loan was made 28 years ago and repaid about 24 years 
ago and there is not even a suggestion that Judge Speer had any 
knowledge that any of this money came from court funds and there 
is not a word of competent evidence that a dollar of it ever came 
from such funds. The evidence upon which this whole story rests 
is so contradictory and so clearly false in every particular that it is 
a demonstration of the corrupt motive of some of those who testi¬ 
fied to it. For further details see page 984 and comment upon the 
testimony of Mr. W. E. Simmons. 

OFFER TO ACCEPT BRIBES. 

The charge that the judge offered to accept a bribe from Mr. 
Barnes was emphatically denied by the judge in his testimony (p. 
892). This man Barnes while marshal of the district armed himself 
with a large revolver which he conspicuously di c played as he threat¬ 
ened to kill Judge Speer should he appear in the court room. On 
account of this threat the judge secured his removal. Anyone who 
reads his testimony can not fail to note his intense bitterness toward 
the judge. In the Green & Gaynor case he testified fully as to what 
took place at the time the jury in that case was drawn. A printed 
copy of that testimony was presented to the committee. On this 
hearing he varied and contradicted that testimony, evidently for the 
purpose of impeaching the conduct of the judge. A person that will 
perform in that fashion is not entitled to much credit. The story is 
it c elf improbable and would not be persuasive if told by a person 
who could be relied on. What he claims is that when Barnes thanked 
the judge for what Barnes said was a “little fee," (p. 319) the judge said 
to him: “What is there in it for me?" Strange the judge should ask 
for a division of a small fee. If the judge was corruptly inclined, he 
would not be likely to beg for pennies. 

Even if the judge had asked this question, no one with any faith 
in his honesty would have construed it as Mr. Barnes does. It 
might be spoken as a friendly banter, as the two were on good terms 
at that time. If it had been intended as a request for a part of this 
fee and the judge failed in getting a share, would it not have caused 
estrangement that would have induced the judge to give his favors 
to others? Barnes, however, says he continued to appoint him as 
receiver in various matters as though nothing had happened. Since 
the hearing in Georgia, I am informed that an affidavit has been 
filed by one Hester, charging that the judge asked him this very 
question. Strange that in both of these instances the language 
should be identical. This affidavit, though it only contains a dozen 
lines, reveals the fact that Hester is sore at the judge, because he 
says it clearly appeared that the judge was against him in a suit and 
he lost it. Here is the setting which he presents: In going to the 
court room and while he and Judge Speer were going up the steps 
together the judge said to him: “Mr. Sheriff when a fellow gets into 
trouble he will carry law books," and he then said, “What is there 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 211 


in this case for me?” To which Hester says he answered that it did 
not look as though there was anything in it for anybody. 

The insinuation, of course, is that this language was used with 
the idea of inviting Mr. Hester to pay the judge something for help 
in the lawsuit. Whatever may have been said, I do not believe 
that there is a man in Georgia acquainted with Judge Speer, no 
matter how vindictive he may be, that has any doubt of the judge’s 
personal honesty. Mr. Akerman, who has known Judge Speer 
intimately for years, and who is perhaps as bitter against the judge 
as anyone, said in a statement to the Department of Justice, in 
regard to these charges, “I have never believed and do not believe 
now that he (Judge Speer) is dishonest or corrupt, in so far as money 
is involved.” From what has developed in this hearing, I am sure 
that if any proposition had been made to Judge Speer, such as the 
one he is charged with having invited, the one that made the offer 
would have promptly gone to jail. 


RAILROAD PASSES, 


The charge that Judge Speer used railroad passes and occasionally 
transported, free of charge, some horses and furniture is frankly 
admitted by the judge. He explains that this was before the passage 
of the Hepburn Act and before there was any law forbidding the 
practice. He calls attention to the fact that while lie rode free 
the preachers, the judges of the circuit court of appeals, the judges 
of the State courts, and members of the State legislature rode free. 
Col. Lawton, who testified on this subject, corroborated the judgo 
in this statement. He says that passes were furnished to the judges 
of the circuit court of appeals, the State judges, the governors of 
States, members of the legislature, and Congressmen (p. 619), but 
Col. Lawton claimed that the privilege of shipping freight free 
was not allowed to anyone else. Perhaps that may be true, though 
the judge expresses some doubt on the subject, and suggests that 
special cars were furnished free to others. It is, however, well 
known that it was the custom in those days to give free express 
franks that would carry practically all sorts of freight. Public 
sentiment of to-day strongly condemns the practice of accepting 
free transportation, but that was not true when this transportation 
was accepted. In view of the bitter hostility of these railroads 
to the judge as shown in the evidence, it is apparent that free passes 
did not unduly influence him to favor the donors. One of the charges 
brought against Judge Swayne, of Florida, was that while a rail¬ 
road was in the hands of a receiver in his court he accepted a special 
car and other accommodations from this road. Upon this charge 
13 Senators voted for conviction and 69 voted against it. 


CRAWLEY & M CLELLAN CASE. 


That there is no merit in the contention in the Crawley & McClel¬ 
lan case is apparent. It is claimed that the judge coerced a plea of 
guilty from the defendants when they were not, in fact, guilty. This 
is denied by Mr. Toomer and also by the judge. It is rather sur¬ 
prising that the majority report should place more reliance upon 
malicious hearsay statements of disappointed attorneys and relatives 




212 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


of the defendants than upon the testimony of Mr. Toomer, the only 
witness who testified from personal knowledge of the facts bearing 
on the real charge. Especially is this true, as Mr. Toomer was the 
leading attorney for the defendants and would have as strong a 
reason for resentment against the judge’s conduct as any of the 
other attorneys. This was one of the first peonage cases tried in 
the South. It had been carefully selected by the Attorney General 
of the United States after a report by a special examiner. Its trial 
caused intense bitterness on the part of those interested in main¬ 
taining peonage. Hence the fierce denunciation of the judge. The 
following, from the judge’s brief, gives an idea of the evidence: 

The facts as developed on the trial of the case were that McClellan was the sheriff 
of Ware County and also jailer. Crawley was a lawyer. Henry Brunage and Dave 
Smith, two colored boys, were arrested and tried for stealing a watermelon and were 
convicted before the judge of the county court of Ware County and sentenced to 
imprisonment in Ware County with no alternative of fine. Mr. E. J. Mcltee was 
asked to come for the boys by Crawley. McRee testified: “I received a letter from 
Mr. Crawley, which I can not find after a search, in which he asked me to come to 
Way cross; that there were some boys there who wanted to come to my place.” 
McRee went to Waycross and, accompanied by Crawley and McClellan, went to 
the jail where the two boys were confined and also found, outside of the jail, Jeff 
Brunage, a brother of one of the boys in jail. Jeff was not charged with any offense, 
but “was just out there interceding for them.” McRee gave a check for these boys, 
the check being dated August 6, 1903, for $65, payable to the order of T. J. McClel¬ 
lan, payable at the Citizens Bank of Valdosta, and indorsed by T. J. McClellan. 
This was to cover the fee of Mr. Crawley, the lawyer, and the jail fees of Mr. McClel¬ 
lan. Although in jail under commitment, and no provision made for release upon the 
payment of a fine, and no order of ?ny court authorizing their release, the two boys 
were turned over to Mr. McRee, and not only were they carried to the plantation 
of the McRee’s, at Kinder Lou, but the little brother, who was “interceding for 
them,” was also carried to the plantation,, and E. J. McRee afterwards pleaded 
guilty to holding the three in peonage. 

Another of the indictments charged a similar sale of Lula Frazier, who had been 
arrested for adultery, but on the hearing before the county judge he decided that if 
she was guilty at all it was of bigamy, of which offense his court did not have juris¬ 
diction. While she was in jail with no charge against her, Mr. Crawley, her lawyer, 
telephoned to the McKees as follows: “E. J. McRee, Valdosta, Ga.: Come to "Way- 
cross for woman. W. F. Crawley.” Mr. Frank McRee went to Waycross for her and 
was accompanied to the jail by Crawley and McClellan, the latter being the jailer. 
McRee gave a draft for $50 to Crawley, and the woman was released and carried to the 
Kinder Lou plantation in Lowndes County. This draft was dated August 27, 1902, 
payable to W. F. Crawley, for $50, drawn on the Citizens’ Bank of Valdosta, and 
signed by Kinder Lou Mills, by F. I. McRee. 

Other checks were tendered in evidence, in payment for other negroes, one for $88, 
payable to T. J. McClellan, for George Davis and Ed. Hardy, dated July 8, 1902. 
George Davis carried his wife with him to the Kinder Lou plantation. Another check 
for $40, dated August 11, 1902, payable to T. J. McClellan, in payment for John 
Westley Brown. A third check was dated December 15, 1902, payable to T. J. McClel¬ 
lan, for $240, for “four men and one woman.” 

The two boys charged with stealing a watermelon were kept at McRee for 6 months 
and 10 days each, and Lula Frazier, the woman who had not been convicted of any 
offence,was kept there for 7 months. 

The McRees at that time operated a large plantation in Lowndes County, about 70 
miles from Waycross, where these parties were confined in jail. They also operated a 
large crate factory. About 200 hands were employed by them, many of them obtained 
in the manner above described. ,The negroes were worked under guard, locked up at 
night, whipped by overseers, and made to work out the money advanced to them. 
They were not permitted to leave the plantation. Some escaped and were captured; 
some made good their escape. The prison commission of Georgia made an investiga¬ 
tion of the conditions at the McRee plantation a short time before these indictments 
were returned, and, as Mr. E. J. McRee stated, “did not exonerate us entirely.” 

It is claimed that this evidence did not connect the defendants with 
the charge of peonage. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 213 

Complaint is made that in denying a motion to dismiss when the 
Government rested its case the judge in the presence of the jury 
expressed an emphatic opinion that there was sufficient evidence to 
go to the jury, but in that connection, he told the jury that they must 
not be influenced by anything that he said and that he did not express 
any opinion as to the truth of the evidence, but simply assumed it was 
true for the purpose of the motion (p. 534). The only other complaint 
is that the judge suggested to one of the counsel for the defense, Mr. 
Toomer, that if his client pleaded guilty he would make the pun¬ 
ishment light, a fine of $500 without imprisonment, though the 
statute provided for not to exceed a fine of $5,000 or five years in 
prison. The complaint is that in making this offer the judge refused 
to say what he would do should the defendants be convicted by a jury. 
This refusal is magnified into a threat. Mr. Toomer, who asked the 
question, and who was the only one present, says that he did not 
get the impression that any threat was intended (p.596). The defend¬ 
ants accepted this offer, and now come in and pose as the “injured 
victims” of coercion. This is certainly a strange grievance. I have 
known of a number of cases where the court would intimate the pun¬ 
ishment that would be inflicted u])on a plea of guilty, but I have 
never known a court to make a contract before trial what the pun¬ 
ishment would be in the event of conviction by a jury. Such a con¬ 
tract would be clearly improper, as it would deprive the court of an 
opportunity to fix the punishment in accordance with the testimony 
adduced on the trial. The complaint that a witness for the Govern¬ 
ment, McRay, was mistreated is not important. He had pleaded 
guilty to these charges and the judge had been very lenient with him. 
As a witness he attempted to shield his associates. The judge 
warned him of the possible effect of perjury and the complaint is that 
it had the proper effect (p. 739). The bitterness of Osborn Lawrence 
and others interested in this case is amusing, and, it might be added> 
amazing. 

ATLANTIC COAST LINE CASE. 

In the United States against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad the 
majority report finds that the judge falsified the record of the pro¬ 
ceedings. This finding is based upon the oral testimony of two of the 
disappointed attorneys in that suit. Even this testimony shows 
clearly that there was no falsification of any record. The court simply 
ascertained from one of the attorneys for the defense that he had in 
his possession in court certain written evidence wanted by the Govern¬ 
ment, and thereupon made an order requiring that the evidence be 
produced. No one disputes his right to do just what he did do, but 
the attorneys attempted to show that the court said the evidence was 
produced voluntarily. 

The stenographer’s record does not bear out this claim. The 
judge in his statement denies that he made any such statement, and 
the whole record 'clearly shows that no such construction can be 
placed upon whatever he may have said. The objections and excep¬ 
tions of the defendant’s counsel are fully set out in the record. Tne 
finding that the judge’s action deprived the attorneys of an op¬ 
portunity to appeal is too ridiculous for serious consideration. They 
do not deny that the judge had a right to make the order that he did 
make with or without their consent; they could not possibly be 


214 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER 

injured whether he used the word “ voluntarily” or not. For further 
discussion of this charge see pages 1065 to 1068. 

The George L. Murphy case is discussed in pages 1026 and 1027. 
There is nothing in it beyond the fact that the judge was overruled 
by the circuit court of appeals in holding that Mr. Murphy had pleaded 
himself out of court. While the judge was no doubt wrong in his 
view of the law, there is nothing to suggest that he did anything in¬ 
tentionally wrong. 

BRANEN AND CHAUNCY PEONAGE CASE. 

In the Branen case the defendant was indicted for peonage. This 
was another of those cases where public feeling ran very high. The 
case had been selected for prosecution by the Attorney General of the 
United States. Parties interested in peonage contributed to the 
payment of Mr. Felder’s fee; he was the attorney for the defense. 
After the defendant had been acquitted, those interested in the de¬ 
fense arranged to have a barbecue to celebrate their victory. To 
this the jurors were invited. Complaint is made that the judge per¬ 
suaded the jurors not to attend by publishing in one of the Macon 
papers a protest against the propriety of such action. 

Judge Speer testified (p. 899) that Branen on being acquitted 
went straight home and found a negro that had induced a woman 
whom he held in peonage to run away while he was in Macon where 
the case was tried. He went to a gathering of innocent negroes 
where the young negro was, arrested him, stating: “I will show you 
how to fool with my hands.’’ Took him over to Dodge County in a 
graveyard, strapped him down to a log and beat him to death, then 
took his body back into the big road as a warning to others. This 
was Mr. Felder’s client, the one for whom he makes his complaints. 
This was race war, and Felder is thoroughly imbued with its spirit, and 
is not only bitterly hostile against any judge that will attempt to en¬ 
force the Federal peonage law, but against the peonage law as well. 
A number of complaints are made, such as limiting the number of 
witnesses as to character, keeping the witnesses separate, pre¬ 
venting the defendants from being at large during the trial and stop¬ 
ping the defendant’s attorney from appealing to race prejudice. 
None of these can appeal to anyone with any experience in court. 
They are all matters within the discretion of the judge. As 
nothing appears in the case to indicate that the judge was in¬ 
fluenced by any improper motive it is a far-fetched conclusion to find 
an abuse of discretion upon such testimony as that of Mr. Felder, and he 
does not attempt to state any facts that would warrant such finding; 
he only gives an expert opinion. 

The Chauncy peonage case presents pretty much the same com¬ 
plaint as that of Branen’s. This is discussed in the judge’s brief (pp. 
1047 and 1048) and needs no further comment. 

THE ROBERTS, KELLY, HARRIS, AND TIFT CASES. 

The Roberts case is briefly discussed in the judge’s brief, page 
1076. In this case two attornej^s, who appeared for the defense, 
Col. J. W. Preston and Judge W. D. Nottingham, testified. One 
criticizes the judge’s course, the other says he could not say that 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 215 

th. e judge did anything improper in the case. Col. Preston also 
criticized judge's conduct in the case of Deputy Marshal Kelly, 
but this criticism only indicates a difference of opinion as to what 
the facts in the case tended to prove. (See pp. 1019-1022.) In 
neither case is there any suggestion that the judge was actuated by 
any improper motive. 

The complaint of Mr. Walter A. Harris that the judge refused to 
consider a demurrer because it did not have a certificate of counsel 
is like much of this oral testimony in regard to court proceedings. 
There was no demurrer in the case. The case of Johnson v. The 
Southern Railway Co. was dismissed because one of the jurors became 
sick during the trial. It is claimed that this juror afterwards stated 
to Mr. Harris that he was not sick. Mr. Harris testified that the 
juror said he had been sick, but it would appear that the stenographer 
who reported the testimony did not get this evidence correctly. This 
error is, however, immaterial. The statement is hearsay. There is 
nothing in the record to indicate that the judge had any reason to 
believe that the juror was not in fact sick. Under the circumstances 
it was within the discretion of the court to dismiss the action, and as 
the railway company settled the case later the discretion was probably 
not abused. (See as to these complaints pp. 995-997.) 

In the case of Tift v. The Railway Co. it would appear that the 
judge was trying to protect shippers who had been charged by that 
company excessive freight rates. Whether he was justified in mak¬ 
ing the order complained of does not appear. The fact that the case 
was settled after it had been appealed to the circuit court of appeals 
throws no light on the subject, as the terms of the settlement were 
not put in evidence. 

RULE AGAINST ATTORNEYS OF TIFTON. 

In giving a summary of the testimony of Mr. R. C. Ellis and J. S. 
Ridgley it is surprising that so many of the essential facts have been 
omitted. This was a bankruptcy proceeding in which it was charged 
by the referee that certain attorneys at Tifton had intentionally 
deceived him into declaring a dividend that they knew he ought not 
declare. The referee certified to the district court (Judge Speer pre¬ 
siding) that the dividend had been erroneously computed by George 
E. Simpson, Rodley D. Smith, and J. B. Morrow, all attorneys of 
record in this case, while the referee was engaged in the trial of a case 
in the superior court of Dougherty County, and that it was due to 
their representations and express assurances that they had cor¬ 
rectly figured the dividends that the referee declared an excessive 
divid nd and countersigned the vouchers made payable to the above 
attorneys. That the referee had allowed them to make this calcu¬ 
lation in order to extend to them a personal courtesy and enable 
them to catch trains for their homes. That it was not until the ref¬ 
eree returned to his office and verified the figures that he discovered 
that claims which aggregated $11,743.43 and which had been duly 
allowed in open court at Tifton, Ga., at the first meeting of creditors 
in the presence of these very attorneys and over their objections 
and arguments had for some inexcusable reason been thrown aside 
and were not permitted to share in the equal distribution of the assets 
(pp. 301). 


216 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

The referee further certified to the court that these attorneys had 
refused to repay the money and were in contempt of court and should 
be punished for such contempt and committed to prison until they 
repaid the amount that they had deceived the receiver into paying in 
excess of the amount to which they were entitled. Either this request 
of the referee or some remark made by the judge in commenting upon 
it was seized upon by some of the newspapers and published as 
an order from the court that all the attorneys at Tifton should be 
arrested, and the complaint is that this injured the attorneys. No 
order for arrest was issued and none of the attorneys were arrested. 
An order was simply issued requiring these and other attorneys to 
whom these excessive payments had been made to show cause why 
the excess part of these payments should not be returned or the parties 
punished for contempt. The court in issuing this order acted upon 
the findings of the refereee. He was not required to go into the 
pleadings, evidence, or proceedings had before the referee, as he did 
not undertake to adopt the findings of the referee as his own, but sim¬ 
ply used the findings as a complaint upon which the order to show 
cause was issued. This instead of being drastic was liberal treatment 
of these attorneys as it gave them an opportunity to present fully 
their defense. When the defense was submitted, the judge at once 
and in open court announced that they could not be held. The find¬ 
ing in the majority report that the referee was not properly bonded 
is in line with the general policy upon which this report proceeds. 
There is not a word of testimony to that effect from anyone who claimed 
to have any knowledge on the subject. There is only a statement by 
one of the witnesses that he had heard a rumor to that effect, but 
perhaps that is sufficient if it tends to discredit the judge. This case 
presents another illustration that is instructive. It is found in the 
report that Ellis testified that the judge was willing to let a Mr. 
Timmons pay back more than his share, so that he would not be 
treated the same as the other creditors, and that in that connection 
Ellis said that the judge had just announced “that every man should 
receive justice in his court and all should be treated alike.” Why, 
if this testimony was considered worthy of a finding, did not the 
majority report show, as the evidence clearly shows, that no such 
discrimination was permitted? The order made in this matter was 
read into the record as a part of Mr. Ellis’s testimony (p. 302). Why 
was it omitted from the findings ? Was it because it would spoil the 
effect of Mr. Ellis’s testimony on that point ? See, for a further dis¬ 
cussion of this case, pages 998 to 1001. 

COMPLAINT OF W. E. SIMMONS. 

The complaints of W. E. Simmons relate to matters that occurred 
more than 20 years ago. In both the Gay and the Tarver cases it is 
evident the judge was seeking to protect the defendants against the 
oppressive and unconscionable conduct of Mr. Simmons s clients. 
These were both usury cases. The facts in the Gc.y case, as detailed 
in the judge’s brief, the only evidence in the record as to the facts, 
shows clearly that there is no merit in this complaint (p. 989). In 
the Tarver case, notwithstanding Simmons’s bitter criticism of the 
judge because he hesitated to sign the consent decree and afterwards 
sought to require Mr. Simmons’s client to give Mrs. Tarver a hearing 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 217 

before the decree was put into effect, it is apparent that Judge Speer, 
though perhaps technically in error, was only striving to secure jus¬ 
tice for Mrs. Tarver. Judge Nottingham testified (p. 351) that this 
decree was finally set aside because Simmons’s client nad overreached 
her in securing it and that she eventually recovered 640 acres given 
to Simmons’s client by this decree. In the light of this testimony 
there is perhaps some reason why Mr. Simmons should be bitter; 
some reason why he should be reckless in his statement, as he evi¬ 
dently was, in omitting this important explanation as well as in 
testifying in regard to Mr. King's loan to Judge Speer. 

In his effort to show that the judge had borrowed from the clerk, 
Mr. King, money belonging to the court, he multiplied by more than 
four the actual amount of cost that he recovered back from Mr. 
King, apparently so as to make it appear that Judge Speer’s note of 
$1,200 was made up of this cost, though the court records showed 
that all court costs ever returned to Mr. Simmons aggregated less 
than $400, and these were returned long before this note was paid, 
as appeared by the original bank draft and letters in evidence show¬ 
ing the payment. There is nothing to indicate any connection be¬ 
tween this note and these costs. To aggravate the matter and add 
a touch of pathos he manufactures a widow for a man still living 
and who afterwards died a confirmed bachelor. Strange that his 
memory should play such fantastic tricks. Was it lack of memory 
or an excess of malice. Perhaps in justice to Mr. Simmons, it should 
be added that nearly all of this story is hearsay, according to his 
own testimony. Still, it is hearsay of a class that he knew that no 
honest man could consider in passing judgment upon another. 

CHARLES CRAIGE AND OHLSEN CASES. 

Mr. Colding complains that in U. S. v. Charles Craige the judge 
criticized the evidence of the Government and practically directed a 
verdict for the defendant, who was acquitted. This criticism is 
approved in the majority report. Evidently Golding’s admission that 
the verdict was co rect must have been overlooked in drawing this 
report, as it is omitted from the summary of the evidence. There is 
not a single fact in this case upon which to base a reflection upon the 
judge. (P. 687.) The Ohlsen case needs no discussion. (P. 1076.) 

PARTNERSHIP OF ISAACS & HEYWARD. 

The majority report finds that Judge Speer was a party to the 
formation of the partnership between Isaacs and Heyward, although 
the judge denied it in his evidence and there is not a word of testi¬ 
mony to support the finding. Considerable tiim was spent in 
trying to establish that this was a fact and there is in the record 
some "Window in Thrums” evidence upon which the conclusion 
must rest. They did prove that some days before the partnership 
was formed the judge did actually talk to Mr. Heyward and to Mr. 
Isaacs, but no one testified as to whether it was the last presidential 
election they were discussing or not. Still, of course that is not 
material, and having thus established by such conclusive evidence 
that the judge was a party to this conspiracy on the part of Mr. 
Isaacs and Mr. Heyward, it follows naturally and logically that he 


218 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

became particeps criminis in all the high crimes and misdemeanors 
that this firm might become guilty of. No doubt it was on that 
theory that evidence was introduced to show that Mr. Isaacs had, 
since this partnership was formed, been indicted for barratry. If 
this was material it might be mentioned that this firm has been 
dissolved. 

In the foregoing I have attempted to cover every complaint made 
against the judge that rests on anything outside of mere abuse, oi 
general assertions such as that he is eager for power, arbitrary, un¬ 
just, unjudicial, or the like. This is nothing more nor less than evi¬ 
dence as to character and can only be met by evidence of a like 
character. As the majority report rests largely on this class of evi¬ 
dence, it would seem but justice to the judge that the indorsements 
attached to his brief should have been printed. In printing the 
brief in the record these indorsements were omitted. In view of the 
character of the findings I shall take the liberty of printing a few 
of these. Before submitting these indorsements some general 
observations may be pertinent. 

In the majority report an attempt is made to account for the bit¬ 
terness shown by a number of witnesses who testified against Judge 
Speer by calling attention to the fact that he was appointed as 
judge by a Republican President and because it is said that he has 
participated in Republican politics. This latter statement rests 
upon the evidence of that incomparable witness, Mr. Barnes. This 
statement is, however, flatly contradicted in a letter from Mr. Lyons, 
former register of the United States Treasury, for whom Mr. Barnes 
says the judge devoted his political activities. While it is true that 
polities plays an important part in this persecution, party politics 
is only one element. This record bristles with facts that unmis¬ 
takably point to matters less creditable than politics. The one 
thing that above all others has stirred sentiment against Judge 
Speer is his conduct in trying peonage cases, and in this class of 
cases may be included the Jamison habeas corpus case. That he 
should dare to hold the State statute, under which peonage is prac¬ 
ticed, void as in contravention of the Federal Constitution is an 
unpardonable offense. That peonage does exist in Georgia and 
that it is eagerly cherished by many people no one can doubt who 
reads the record in this case. 

A few days ago I received a newspaper from Georgia containing 
what purports to be an account of a speech delivered by Attorney 
General Felder, one of the witnesses against the judge. In that 
speech Mr. Felder appeals to the voters in behalf of his candidacy for 
the United States Senate on the ground that he is in favor of the 
repeal of the Federal peonage law. This issue could not be popular 
unless there is strong sympathy for this barbarous institution, which 
is nothing more nor less than slavery. After you have eliminated 
the peonage cases, including the Jamison habeas corpus case, the 
Green and Gaynor case looms large as a favorite text for abusing the 
judge. These cases are pushed to the front, and those who partici¬ 
pated in them are the fiercest of the judge’s truculent foes. These 
form the cefiter of the Macedonian phalanx directed against the 

i ‘udge. Back of these is a surprising array of corporation counsel, 
jook at the list: 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 219 

A. R. Lawton, vice president and general counsel, Central of 
Georgia Railway Co. 

P. W. Meldrim, division counsel, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. 

Stanley S. Bennett, division counsel, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad 
Co.; general counsel, South Georgia Railroad. 

L. W. Lambdin, division counsel, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. 

John W. Bennett, division counsel, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. 

Alexander Akerman, special counsel, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad 
Co., and assistant general counsel, Macon, Dublin & Savannah Rail¬ 
road (controlled by Seaboard Air Line Railroad). 

Min ter Wimberly, general counsel, Macon, Dublin & Savannah 
Railroad. 

W. A. Harris, division counsel, Southern Railway Co.; division 
counsel, South Central Railroad. 

George S. Jones, counsel, Georgia Railroad and Louisville & Nash¬ 
ville Railroad. 

A. A. Lawrence, counsel, Southern Railway Co. and Street Railways 
of Savannah. 

W. W. Osborne, counsel, Southern Railway Co. and Street Railways 
of Savannah. 

W. C. Snodgrass, president Blakely Southern Railroad, connecting 
with Central of Georgia and Atlantic Coast Line Railroads. 

# Boling Whitfield, division counsel, Atlanta, Birmingham & Atlan¬ 
tic Railroad Co. 

S. B. Adams, counsel, Merchants & Miners’ Transportation Co., 
Naval Stores Trust, and other corporations. 

J. R. L. Smith, president Flovilla & Indian Springs Railroad, short 
line connecting with Southern Railroad. 

W. E. Simmons, attorney for the Corbin Banking Co. and other 
corporations. 

Why are these witnesses opposed to the judge? The reason is 
not far to find. The record discloses that in several instances the 
judge has offended attorneys for these corporations: In the Rankin 
v. Louisville & Nashville Railway Co. case, the United States v. The 
Atlantic Coast Line case, the Central Railway Co. case, the McRey- 
nolds v. City & Suburban Railway Co. case, the Holst v. Savannah 
Electric Co. case, the Tifft v. Southern Railway Co. case, the Johnson 
v. Southern Railway Co. case, and others, complaints are made on 
behalf of these corporations by their attorneys. In every one of these 
cases it is apparent the judge strove to do justice. The complaint of 
W. E. Simmons is another illustration. As attorney for the Corbin 
Banking Co., a firm famous for its usurious exactions even as far west 
as my home, he was not looking for justice, that was the last thing his 
client wanted. Judge Speer tried to give him what he was honestly 
entitled to and he fled from his court and has not quit cussing the judge 
even unto this day, though that was more than a score of years ago. 
It may be easily guessed that the judge’s record on labor and trust 
questions is not very enthusiastically approved by these men. In 
Waterhouse v. Comer (55 Fed., 148) Judge Speer, for the first time in 
the history of our jurisprudence, recognized the right of labor organi¬ 
zations. His opinion in that case was printed as a Senate document. 
In the case of Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Central of Georgia (166 
Fed., 333) the receiver of that railway had without just cause dis¬ 
charged a conductor from employment on the road. The conductor 


220 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

appealed to Judge Speer’s court for relief. Over the vigorous protest 
of Mr. Lawton, one of these railway attorneys, now a witness against 
the judge, he reinstated the conductor and condemned the unfair prac¬ 
tice of the receiver. In the Erie Lumber Co. case (150 Fed., p. 807) 
will be found another opinion of Judge Speer of inestimable value 
to labor in protecting wages. Mr. George L. Jones, another railway 
attorney who testified against Judge Speer, opposed this view of the 
law. Shortly after the Federal employees’ liability act was passed 
it came before Judge Speer. It was attacked as unconstitutional by 
this same Mr. Lawton. Judge Speer, however, not only sustained its 
constitutionality but commended it in very vigorous language. With 
such a, record it is not surprising that some years ago Grand Chief En¬ 
gineer P. M. Arthur and Assistant Chief A. B. Youngson, acting for 
the brotherhood, strongly commended the judge for promotion to the 
circuit court of appeals. But these are not all the grievances corpora¬ 
tion counsel have against Judge Speer. In the Naval Stores case 
(reported in 151 Fed., 834) this trust was indicted and convicted. It 
was claimed upon the trial that under the operation of this trust the 
people of southern Georgia had been robbed of more than $40,000,000. 
Mr. Adams, a railway attorney and witness against the judge, strove 
to avert this conviction. In the case of United States v. Merchants 
& Miners’ Transportation Co. (187 Fed., 355) rebates were given in 
violation of the interstate-commerce law. The company was con¬ 
victed and fined $30,000. This same Mr. Adams was again of counsel 
for the accused. In United States v. Miller (187 Fed., 355) Mr. Miller, 
who . was the beneficiary of the rebates, was fined $5,000. Messrs. 
Osborne & Lawrence, who testified with exceeding bitterness, were 
of counsel for the accused. 

In the case of Tifft et al. (123 Fed., 789, and 138 Fed., 753) Judge 
Speer enjoined the exactions of excessive rates on lumber and by final 
decree compelled the repayment of more than $2,000,000 to shippers. 
The same Mr. Lawton was of counsel in opposition to this decree, 
which was affirmed in 206 United States, 428. This case affected 
every railroad represented by the attorneys who testified against the 
judge. Osborne, Lawrence, and Meldrim were all of counsel in the 
famous Green and Gaynor case. These parties were convicted for 
embezzlement of Government funds amounting to about $2,000,000. 
Their animosity toward the judge for his conduct in that case is ex¬ 
treme. It was, however, approved on appeal both in the circuit 
court of appeals and the United States Supreme Court. Is it not 
strange that none but disappointed attorneys and their clients 
should have been called in this inquiry? Why, outside of Barnes, 
who was discharged from the office of marshal of the district 
because he threatened to kill the judge, that is what they are with 
hardly a single exception. If the attorneys or parties who appeared 
on the other side in these suits or proceedings had been called, is 
there any doubt that the testimony would have been favorable to the 
judge ? The fact that this testimony was not produced is almost as 
conclusive on that point as anything can be. Every piece of gossip 
from almost before the war down to the last edition of some news¬ 
paper that did not get the last bankruptcy notice to publish was 
dragged into this hearing. 

It is perfectly evident that there is a motive behind this proceeding 
that does not rest on the highest order of disinterested patriotism. 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 221 


After these charges had been made against the judge, the Valdosta 
Times, on December 21, 1912, edited by Mr. C. C. Brantley, now 
editor of the Macon Telegraph, published the following editorial: 

A FIGHT ON JUDGE SPEER. 

The grand jury of the United States court concluded its work in Valdosta yesterday 
by passing some resolutions putting itself on record as being opposed to the proposi¬ 
tion to emasculate the southern district of Georgia and the creation of another division. 
It is geneiallv understood that this movement was started for the purpose of trying 
to get rid of Judge Emory Speer and that it is backed up by some men who are antag¬ 
onistic to Judge Speer because of the fact that he does not look with any degree of 
allowance upon the misdeeds of the high any more than he does on the wrongdoings 
of the humble. 

Judge Speer, though affiliated with the Republican Party, is a judge of the strongest 
democratic tendencies and spirit. He nearly always takes sides with the weak 
against the strong. The men who have been in his court have been impressed with 
the fact that humble offenders are shown the greatest consideration by him. He has 
adopted a system of handling cases against moonshiners that has had a splendid effect, 
though he has not had to impose any severe penalties upon them. 

Several years ago, when Judge Speer wanted to try the Green & Gaynor case, he 
went away from the scene of their operation and influence to get a jury to try them. 
It is said that they had strong friends who wanted them tried by a jury nearer home, 
believing that they would gain much in that way. 

Later on Judge Speer had a round with the Naval Stores Trust, which was com¬ 
posed of large influences in and around Savannah, and it is said that these influences 
have been busy ever since trying to get rid of him. They are supported, of course, by 
the friends of the other culprits who have had to suffer because of Judge Speer’s 
strong stand against “crime in high places.” 

The Times believes that the grand jury on yesterday expressed the sentiments of a 
large majority of the people of south Georgia in protesting against the proposition to 
tear up the southern district and to remove Judge Speer from the place which he 
now occupies with so much firmness, yet tenderness, in dealing with criminals of all 
types. 

The resolutions which were adopted yesterday are printed in this issue of the Times, 
and we commend them and the spirit behind them to our readers. 

Are these charges against those who make these complaints true? 
Has the hostility shown upon this hearing been nursed into being ? 

As late as May, 1913, Mr. Akerman, the dist ict attorney and one 
of the judge’s bitterest enemies, expressed the highest regard for the 
judge (401). In 1910 the Bar Association of Macon tendered to J dge 
Speer a banquet on the twenty-fifth anniversary of his appointment as 
judge. At this, which was lai gely attended by the bar of the district, 
the kindliest feeling toward the judge appears to have existed, as is 
evidenced by the newspaper accounts of the occurrence. He was 
eulogized in the most flattering manner. This would clearly demon¬ 
strate that less than four yeais ago public sentiment was friendly to 
him. Five years earlier the bar association met at Macon and passed 
resolutions commending the judge. In these resolutions they em¬ 
phasize by inserting as the first resolve: 

That in the decision of cases in his court he has known neither the rich nor the 
poor, and that in the enforcement of the criminal laws he has tempered justice with 
that mercy which blesses him that gives and him that receives. 

The Chamber of Commerce of Macon at this time, by resolutions 
presented to him, offered this tribute: 

We recall with a great deal of pleasure: 

First. That it was he who reorganized the jury system in these courts and elimi¬ 
nated the professional and unworthy jurors. 

Second. Through his administration the criminal laws of the United States have 
come to be respected by all classes in this jurisdiction and justice is done to the 
mightiest as well as to the lowliest lawbreaker. The reform wrought by Judge Speer 


222 CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 


by crushing the great system of land piracy which once cursed this State has done a 
great deal to encourage immigration into Georgia and facilitates the work of the 
chambers of commerce and other commercial organizations in bringing investments 
into this section. 

Third. We appreciate the fact that his great power, used as it has been used, has 
proven a protection for the State against men of enormous wealth and influence who 
nave at times sought to increase their riches through crimes of the greatest magnitude. 

Fourth. We are especially appreciative of the fact that the court has from time to 
time, on proper pleadings, taken charge of insolvent corporations involving great 
values, and through the skillful selection of receivers and by constant guidance 
brought about a reorganization of the properties and a restoration of their values, 
thus preventing untold losses in the community. 

Fifth. We note with considerable pleasure the fact that in the administration of 
the bankruptcy law the records of the Attorney General’s office show that in Judge 
Speer’s district there is a maximum of net assets, homestead exemptions, priorities 
paid, and dividends distributed, while the same records show a minimum of cost of 
administration comparing most favorably with any district in the Southern States 
and with any district in the United States. 

Sixth. It is also with pride that the people of Macon recall that within his 20 years 
on the bench Judge Speer has been reversed for his rulings in only one jury trial, and 
that in a large majority of the appeals in cases of all classes his decisions have received 
the approval of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the circuit court of 
appeals; and we find among his most ardent admirers the highest representatives of 
labor on one side and of capital on the other. 

In 1906, at a banquet tendered Judge Speer at Savannah, Judge 
Carlton (now and for a long time judge of the superior court in that 
city) .paid to Judge Speer an eloquent tribute. I copy from this the 
following: 

And throughout the vicissitudes of his career—as soldier, as politician, as lawyer, 
as judge—he has loved his State and her people with a tenderness which is as pro¬ 
nounced to-day as it was when as a boy he took his chances, for their sakes and their 
honor, in the fighting line. His broad culture, his signal ability, the delightful 
humor which oozes from him as did Greek from Gladstone, his grace of oratory, are all 
known to you. But greater than these—perhaps the greatest dignity which can come 
to a man—is the humanity which has marked his judicial career. 

There is no court in the land where the administration of justice is characterized 
by more dignity, and there is no court wherein the humble and the helpless are safer. 
The far-reaching effect of the Jamison case has not only struck a decisive blow at the 
unmerciful dispensation of unregulated justice-—it has brought its administration by 
subordinate tribunals to a sense of proportion and laid upon them the humanizing 
touch which brings consideration for the casual errors of the weak and the poor and 
the friendless, and this is the straight path to the highest civilization it is given us 
to reach. 

It is a signal tribute to his administration of his high office that whilst in this dis¬ 
trict population has increased and human frailties are the same; there is less crime 
than when he came upon the bench and fewer Georgians in Federal prisons. 

Because of all these things—because of any of them—may time so lightly touch 
his heart that as the richly laden years shall pass along content shall follow in their 
wake, and friends be near, and hope and fame and peace. 

In 1903 Judge Speer was a candidate for promotion to the circuit 
court of appeals. At that time he received the indorsement of 
nearly all of those who testified against him at this hearing. Some 
of these indorsements are significant. The one from the Savannah 
bar, which bears the signature of Meldrim, Osborne, Lawrence, Law- 
ton, Cunningham, Saussy, Gazan, and many others, contains this 
language: 

The long and faithful service of Judge Speer on the bench of the district court, 
during which time questions of the utmost moment have been settled by him with 
unusual ability, indicates him as preeminently fitted for the new honor with which 
his name is now associated. 

During his administration this community has not only benefited by the singular 
ability and clear thought which he has brought to bear upon the issues which have 
been submitted to him, but our observation justifies us in declaring him one of the 


CHARGES OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 223 

most humane of judges. During his term not only has crime diminished but his elo¬ 
quent charges to the juries impaneled in his court have done more than any other 
influence to make the people of Georgia feel that the Federal court is one of their own 
institutions. 

The variety of novel points which have arisen in the cases tried by him, many until 
then undetermined, have demanded an acuteness of intellect and patience of research 
rarely exacted in the judicial career of any judge. His success in this direction, 
illustrating his preeminent fitness for the bench of the circuit court, is of record in the 
published reports; the daily evidences of usefulness to the public and consideration 
for the misguided and helpless are matters to which it is just that we should invite your 
attention since they appear only inferentially in the plain statement of judgments. 

The business men of Savannah furnished this tribute: 

During his long service as the judge of this district the proceedings of his court have 
been marked with a dignity which has commanded respect, and his firm and humane 
dispensation of the law has at once diminished crime and tempered its consequences 
to the ignorant and the lowly. His quick and clear apprehension of the intricate 
constitutional and commercial questions which have been constantly submitted for 
his adjudication, has invited the confidence of the business public, and the patriotic 
utterances, expressed with a singular and forceful eloquence, with which, from time 
to time, he has recalled to the people of this State the great priciples which underlie 
the Republic have had an influence for good, far-reaching and permanent. 

The Augusta bar expressed this opinion: 

_ We desire to bear testimony to Judge Speer’s great learning, scholarship, and dis¬ 
tinguished ability. As a judge, his greatest characteristic is perhaps his love for 
substantial justice and equity. It is a common saying among the profession in the 
southern district of Georgia that no innocent man is ever convicted m his court, and 
the guilty rarely escape. The lawyer with a meritorious cause does not hesitate 
to enter his court, while those with bad causes are usually wise to avoid them. 

The business men of Augusta testified: 

We have known Judge Speer personally for many years. He is a man of unques¬ 
tioned ability, absolute fairness and impartiality, and has always undertaken to 
conserve the interests and rights of persons and property when they have been com¬ 
mitted to his care. 

Like indorsements came from his own town, Macon, and from 
other places in his district. In addition to this, he was indorsed 
by the city of Atlanta, not in his district, and by a great many 
public men in different sections of the country. It is significant 
that many of the complaints now presented were then known to 
the men who now so bitterly condemn him. That the judge has at 
all times been very humane and has striven earnestly to preserve 
the rights of the poor and oppressed as against the rich and power¬ 
ful stands out prominently throughout this record. It is one of 
the things that appealed to those who signed these indorsements. 
It is the one thing for which he has been most severely criticised in 
this inquiry. Still there is no showing that any injustice has been 
done to anyone. The complaint against the judge for being unfair 
is due almost entirely to the viewpoint of the lawyers making the 
complaint. In Georgia a judge of the State court can not comment 
upon the testimony in charging a jury, while under the Federal prac¬ 
tice it is the duty of the judge to aid the jury by summing up the 
evidence, just as is done in the State courts of my State and in a 
great many other States. Against this practice, which has aided in 
sending rich clients of those who complain to jail, they protest vigor¬ 
ously. Lawrence, speaking of the judge, gives vent to this com¬ 
plaint (52304): 

He should never have been a judge; he has not got the judicial temperament; he 
has not got the judicial mind; he has not got the judicial character. I believe if he 
had remained at the bar he would have made one of the greatest advocates that ever 

H. Rept. 1176 , 63-2 - 15 



224 CHARGES OE ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OE JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 

lived, because he is talented in that line, and talented as I have never seen anybody 
else. He is the best cross-examiner of a witness I have ever known; he knows the jury, 
knows how to play on their passions, on their prejudices, as no living man that I have 
seen could do it; he has a faculty for marshalling evidence that I have never seen 
another living man able to marshal; and in that Green and Gaynor case he charged 
that jury for eight hours, and I will challenge any six prosecuting attorneys in the 
United States, from the Attorney General down, all of them together, to take that mass 
of testimony taking three months’ time that Judge Speer heard, and then put it down in 
as ingenious an argument against the defense as Judge Speer put it in that thing. It 
was a masterpiece of oratory, but a very poor thing when you come down to look at 
it from a judicial standpoint. 

Despite this condemnation the circuit court of appeals and the 
Supreme Court approved the charge. I have had some experience 
in practicing law under both systems, and have no hesitation in in¬ 
dorsing the Federal practice in preference to that which prevails in 
the State courts of Georgia. I have never heard anyone but a lawyer 
complain because the judge in charging the jury in a Federal court is 
required to point out the questions to be decided by the jury and call 
attention to the evidence that has a bearing on these questions. 
That this practice greatly assists the jury in arriving at a just verdict 
no one can doubt. Under its restraining influence lawyers find it to 
their advantage to try cases fairly. They know that any appeal to 
passion or prejudice or appeals to misleading or irrelevant matters 
will be promptly rebuked in the court’s charge in a fashion that may 
tend to prejudice their client’s case. They find it necessary to appeal 
not only to the jury but also to the judge. 

It takes 13 men to steal a man’s home in the Federal courts, while 
it may take only 12 under such a practice as that which prevails in 
the State courts of Georgia. The Federal practice is the old English 
practice, and it can not be said that it invades the province of the 
jury, as that institution was handed down to us. The Georgia prac¬ 
tice gives a lawyer of superior ability a great advantage over his less 
fortunate competitor, but that advantage is at the expense of justice. 
In these days when reformers are proposing to abolish the jury system 
because of its alleged inefficiency it would hardly be safe to weaken it. 

When it is remembered that none but men with a grievance were 
sought in this investigation, it is surprising that the record does con¬ 
tain some very striking indorsements. 

Mr. Preston, one of the oldest attorneys at the Macon bar, testified 
that in sonw respects Judge Speer was the finest presiding officer he 
had ever seen. He added that the judge’s exalted intellect and his 
splendid manner on the bench always impressed him. Judge Not¬ 
tingham, speaking of the judge, said; 

I have shot off my mouth about the judge, as all lawyers do. That is one of the usual 
things in the profession. It soothes our clients. When I came to Macon in 1888 to 
practice law, Judge Speer had been on the bench for two or three years perhaps. I 
found nearly every member of the bar criticizing him. The burden of the cry was, 
“Damn Republican. We want a Democratic judge sent in to help the party in north 
Georgia.” I found the feeling pretty bitter even when I undertook to be his master 
in chancery. But the judge gained in popularity, and in less than two years, when 
Mr. Lamar died on the bench, I took a petition around for him and got all but 15 of 
the 45 members of the bar to sign it. 

In regard to the charges of favoritism and antipathy to certain lawyers, I have never 
encountered any trouble of that sort. In the 40 years I have practiced at the bar, 
I have heard just as grave charges against the judges of the Superior bench of this 
county. I have heard them charged with favoritism. Even dear old Barnard Hill, 
it was charged, had a school of favoritism in Anderson, Hill & Harris, and he was even 
insulted in open court as being a member of that firm. You could meet one man and 


CHARGES OE ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OE JUDGE EMORY SPEER. 225 


he would tell you Judge Speer was unjust, unfair, and tyrannical. Of course he has 
made strong friends and bitter enemies as every man with a strong personality must. 

Minter Wimberley, speaking of Judge Speer, said: 

When Judge Speer was appointed judge of this court, he cleared out the Augean 
stables. If there ever was a court that was a den of infamy, it was the Federal court 
of this district at that time, in my opinion. When Judge Speer did clean out this 
court, I felt the deepest gratitude to the judge as a citizen and as a patriot, if I may 
be permitted to class myself as such. Judge Speer did me once a personal favor and 
I never forget a personal favor. I took the first petition around Macon. I wrote it 
myself in the effort to nut him on the Supreme bench of the United States. The 
feeling against him in some quarters was very intense; that -was 15 or 20 years ago. I 
have known Judge Speer to do a great many beautiful acts of mercy to the oppressed. 

Speaking of the judge’s conduct in the Jamison case, Mr. Wimberley 
said: 

I do not want to use the witness stand as a way to punish him for a fancied wrong. 
He thought he did me right; I thought he did me wrong. 

At another point in the evidence he said: 

The judge has been exceedingly kind to me and maybe in other cases he has not, 
and I did not expect him to be any kinder to me than to anybody else but at no time 
did I think he did the other side an injustice when he decided in my favor. 

Then again: 

Except in the Jamison case—I am speaking for myself—I got fair and just treat¬ 
ment and I do not know of my own personal knowledge of any other case in which 
I can say he did anybody any injustice. 

Mr. J. R. L. Smith, after giving an unfavorable opinion of the 
judge’s conduct, was asked on cross-examination, “Can you recall 
and cite a single judicial opinion of Judge Speer in which any human 
right or any Federal statute was violated or any right either of per¬ 
son or property denied to anyone?” To this he answered, “Not at 
this time.” Mr. Toomer, 605, gave this opinion of the judge: 

I have, while I have heard some slight testimony to the contrary, always had the 
impression that Judge Speer was a very hard worker. He certainly worked out very 
promptly and thoroughly every case that I ever had any personal knowledge rf when 
I was representing the Government, as I have done in a number of cases, or the de¬ 
fendants. or in civil cases; I think that the judge is a judge of commanding capacity. 
I think that his capacity as a lawyer and as a literary man as well is simply superb. 

I have never been able to convince myself, after 20'years of my knowledge—and he 
has never done me a financial favor in his life—I have never been the recipient of an 
appointment that meant one dollar to me, from him; I have tried cases that I lost in 
his court, but I have never been able to think that Judge Speer was not personally 
honest and judicially honest. I will go further and say this, that while there are some 
men—we all have our peculiarities—I know some very distinguished members of this 
bar who have grievances of manners, and this and that and the other kind, against 
Judge Speer, my own opinion is that the rank and file of the plain people and business 
men of this district find in Judge Speer and in his court a perfect terror to evildoers, not 
because of the severity of the sentence he is going to impose, but because of the cer¬ 
tainty of their conviction in his court. 

Since the hearing was held in Georgia, I have received a large num¬ 
ber of letters and affidavits from lawyers, bankers, and business men 
residing in different sections of Judge Speer’s district commending 
the judge in the strongest terms, and he has since been reelected dean 
of the law school of Mercer University. The jurors attending the 
various divisions of Judge Speer’s district in 1913 protested against 
the project of dividing his district, and in that connection strongly 
indorsed Judge Speer, showing clearly not only friendly feeling 
toward him, but confidence in his ability and fairness as a judge. 


226 CHARGES OE ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE EMORY SPEER. > 

r 

While I concur in the recommendations made in the majority 
report, that no further proceedings be had upon the charges against 
Judge Speer, I desire to express in as emphatic language as possible 
my protest against the methods that have been pursued; but 
I desire to have it distinctly understood that I do not criticize the 
motives of my associates; for them I have the highest personal 
regards. In this investigation no effort was made to protect the 
judge against mere slander and abuse that could serve no other pur¬ 
pose than to disgrace and humiliate him. Every enemy that 29 
years on the bench had produced was invited and eagerly encouraged 
to detail his grievance and to supplement that with all sorts of innu¬ 
endoes, insinuations, and insulting opinions, utterly illegal as evidence 
and incompetent for any proper purpose. To add to this, the meth¬ 
ods pursued in framing the majority report is equally reprehensible. 

It is apparent throughout that nothing has been considered pertinent 
that did not support some charge against the judge. As matters of 
explanation or denial do not meet this requirement, they are quite gen¬ 
erally omitted, not only from the findings, but also from the summary 
of the evidence. Still this is not all. Although the majority report 
announces that there is not sufficient evidence to support any of the 
charges, that announcement is in the nature of a “ Scotch verdict,” 
or worse, because it is accompanied in almost every instance with an 
insinuation that the judge may be guilty, notwithstanding such 
finding. If anything could be more unfair or unjust, it is difficult to 
imagine what it could be. 

It is humiliating to read this record and have to admit that a com¬ 
mittee of Congress could consider such methods justifiable. No 
court in any civilized country would tolerate any such proceedings. 
The framers of our Constitution sought to give to the judges of our 
courts a position of security beyond the reach of passion and preju¬ 
dice so that they might have the courage of their honest convictions. 

If judges are to be subjected to the treatment accorded to Judge 
Speer, how can they be expected to maintain that spirit of inde¬ 
pendence so essential to the just administration of the law? 

It is not necessary to say anything in commendation of Judge 
Speer. The last line in the majority report, recommending no 
further action upon the charges, is, despite all criticism to the con¬ 
trary, a complete vindication. It would not have been written if 
the evidence had pointed to anything worthy of real criticism. In 
conclusion let me add, the day will come when Judge Speer will be 
remembered with pride by the people of Georgia, not only for his 
ability and integrity, but especially for what Mr. Wimberly called 
his many beautiful acts of mercy to" the oppressed. 

Respectfully submitted. 

Andrew J. Volstead. 


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